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authorDun Tan <dun.tan@intel.com>2023-04-20 16:09:15 +0800
committerRay Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>2023-06-30 11:07:40 +0530
commitef64ae06f8065eba5981cfcf0817a006933a306a (patch)
treed1cd4eddf32883f94ad4288be53eed668509a9eb
parent7b6e7d009872af68319e9a91725911829cc59fb7 (diff)
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UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Clear CR0.WP before modify page table
Clear CR0.WP before modify smm page table. Currently, there is an assumption that smm pagetable is always RW before ReadyToLock. However, when AMD SEV is enabled, FvbServicesSmm driver calls MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask to clear AddressEncMask bit in smm page table for this range: [PcdOvmfFdBaseAddress,PcdOvmfFdBaseAddress+PcdOvmfFirmwareFdSize] If page slpit happens in this process, new memory for smm page table is allocated. Then the newly allocated page table memory is marked as RO in smm page table in this FvbServicesSmm driver, which may lead to PF if smm code doesn't clear CR0.WP before modify smm page table when ReadyToLock. Signed-off-by: Dun Tan <dun.tan@intel.com> Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
-rw-r--r--UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmCpuMemoryManagement.c11
-rw-r--r--UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c5
2 files changed, 16 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmCpuMemoryManagement.c b/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmCpuMemoryManagement.c
index 8888c26ffd..8ed4940076 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmCpuMemoryManagement.c
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmCpuMemoryManagement.c
@@ -1033,6 +1033,8 @@ SetMemMapAttributes (
IA32_MAP_ENTRY *Map;
UINTN Count;
UINT64 MemoryAttribute;
+ BOOLEAN WpEnabled;
+ BOOLEAN CetEnabled;
SmmGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEdkiiPiSmmMemoryAttributesTableGuid, (VOID **)&MemoryAttributesTable);
if (MemoryAttributesTable == NULL) {
@@ -1077,6 +1079,8 @@ SetMemMapAttributes (
ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (Status);
+ DisableReadOnlyPageWriteProtect (&WpEnabled, &CetEnabled);
+
MemoryMap = MemoryMapStart;
for (Index = 0; Index < MemoryMapEntryCount; Index++) {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_VERBOSE, "SetAttribute: Memory Entry - 0x%lx, 0x%x\n", MemoryMap->PhysicalStart, MemoryMap->NumberOfPages));
@@ -1105,6 +1109,7 @@ SetMemMapAttributes (
MemoryMap = NEXT_MEMORY_DESCRIPTOR (MemoryMap, DescriptorSize);
}
+ EnableReadOnlyPageWriteProtect (WpEnabled, CetEnabled);
FreePool (Map);
PatchSmmSaveStateMap ();
@@ -1411,11 +1416,15 @@ SetUefiMemMapAttributes (
UINTN MemoryMapEntryCount;
UINTN Index;
EFI_MEMORY_DESCRIPTOR *Entry;
+ BOOLEAN WpEnabled;
+ BOOLEAN CetEnabled;
PERF_FUNCTION_BEGIN ();
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "SetUefiMemMapAttributes\n"));
+ DisableReadOnlyPageWriteProtect (&WpEnabled, &CetEnabled);
+
if (mUefiMemoryMap != NULL) {
MemoryMapEntryCount = mUefiMemoryMapSize/mUefiDescriptorSize;
MemoryMap = mUefiMemoryMap;
@@ -1494,6 +1503,8 @@ SetUefiMemMapAttributes (
}
}
+ EnableReadOnlyPageWriteProtect (WpEnabled, CetEnabled);
+
//
// Do not free mUefiMemoryAttributesTable, it will be checked in IsSmmCommBufferForbiddenAddress().
//
diff --git a/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c b/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c
index ed6e58065f..8736b5251c 100644
--- a/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c
+++ b/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SmmProfile.c
@@ -574,6 +574,8 @@ InitPaging (
BOOLEAN Nx;
IA32_CR4 Cr4;
BOOLEAN Enable5LevelPaging;
+ BOOLEAN WpEnabled;
+ BOOLEAN CetEnabled;
PERF_FUNCTION_BEGIN ();
@@ -622,6 +624,7 @@ InitPaging (
NumberOfPdptEntries = 4;
}
+ DisableReadOnlyPageWriteProtect (&WpEnabled, &CetEnabled);
//
// Go through page table and change 2MB-page into 4KB-page.
//
@@ -802,6 +805,8 @@ InitPaging (
} // end for PML4
} // end for PML5
+ EnableReadOnlyPageWriteProtect (WpEnabled, CetEnabled);
+
//
// Flush TLB
//