CryptoPkg/OpensslLib: Switch to upstream fix for OpenSSL RT#4175

A different fix for the PKCS7_verify() regression on Authenticode
signatures has landed in the OpenSSL 1.0.2 branch as commit c436c990f
and will be present in the 1.0.2g release.

Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Qin Long <qin.long@intel.com>
Tested-by: Qin Long <qin.long@intel.com>

1 files changed, 28 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/EDKII_openssl-1.0.2f.patch b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/EDKII_openssl-1.0.2f.patch
index edd2425b11..b93bc2c3f2 100644
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/EDKII_openssl-1.0.2f.patch
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/EDKII_openssl-1.0.2f.patch
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ index d3b23fc..d61605b 100644
  # else

  

 diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c

-index c4d3724..0996c39 100644

+index c4d3724..fd531c9 100644

 --- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c

 +++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c

 @@ -254,7 +254,8 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,

@@ -176,20 +176,37 @@ index c4d3724..0996c39 100644
      int i, j = 0, k, ret = 0;

      BIO *p7bio = NULL;

      BIO *tmpin = NULL, *tmpout = NULL;

-@@ -275,12 +276,6 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,

+@@ -274,12 +275,29 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,

+         PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);

          return 0;

      }

++#if 0

++    /*

++     * NB: this test commented out because some versions of Netscape

++     * illegally include zero length content when signing data. Also

++     * Microsoft Authenticode includes a SpcIndirectDataContent data

++     * structure which describes the content to be protected by the

++     * signature, rather than directly embedding that content. So

++     * Authenticode implementations are also expected to use

++     * PKCS7_verify() with explicit external data, on non-detached

++     * PKCS#7 signatures.

++     *

++     * In OpenSSL 1.1 a new flag PKCS7_NO_DUAL_CONTENT has been

++     * introduced to disable this sanity check. For the 1.0.2 branch

++     * this change is not acceptable, so the check remains completely

++     * commented out (as it has been for a long time).

++     */

+ 

+     /* Check for data and content: two sets of data */

+     if (!PKCS7_get_detached(p7) && indata) {

+         PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_CONTENT_AND_DATA_PRESENT);

+         return 0;

+     }

++#endif

  

--    /* Check for data and content: two sets of data */

--    if (!PKCS7_get_detached(p7) && indata) {

--        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_CONTENT_AND_DATA_PRESENT);

--        return 0;

--    }

--

      sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7);

  

-     if (!sinfos || !sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sinfos)) {

-@@ -355,9 +350,14 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,

+@@ -355,9 +373,14 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,

      } else

          tmpout = out;

  

@@ -205,7 +222,7 @@ index c4d3724..0996c39 100644
          if (i <= 0)

              break;

          if (tmpout)

-@@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,

+@@ -394,6 +417,9 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,

      }

      BIO_free_all(p7bio);

      sk_X509_free(signers);