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authorjljusten <jljusten@6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524>2012-08-15 00:03:59 +0000
committerjljusten <jljusten@6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524>2012-08-15 00:03:59 +0000
commit8c71ec8f11dd3e8f5163df48d1175c975aa19973 (patch)
treed1c1a36b47242de06884ba03453fa4e593b3205e /OvmfPkg
parentff8dd312ddaa945a313f091c7157a34a12e7067a (diff)
downloadedk2-8c71ec8f11dd3e8f5163df48d1175c975aa19973.tar.gz
edk2-8c71ec8f11dd3e8f5163df48d1175c975aa19973.tar.bz2
edk2-8c71ec8f11dd3e8f5163df48d1175c975aa19973.zip
OvmfPkg: Add custom SecureBootConfigDxe that doesn't reset
We don't force a platform reset for OVMF when PK is changed in custom mode setup. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Lee Rosenbaum <lee.g.rosenbaum@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Erik Bjorge <erik.c.bjorge@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@13635 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
Diffstat (limited to 'OvmfPkg')
-rw-r--r--OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc2
-rw-r--r--OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf6
-rw-r--r--OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc2
-rw-r--r--OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf6
-rw-r--r--OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc2
-rw-r--r--OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf6
-rw-r--r--OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr495
-rw-r--r--OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDevicePath.c1537
-rw-r--r--OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDriver.c133
-rw-r--r--OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf105
-rw-r--r--OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigFileExplorer.c1227
-rw-r--r--OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c2804
-rw-r--r--OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.h614
-rw-r--r--OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigMisc.c334
-rw-r--r--OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigNvData.h118
-rw-r--r--OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigStrings.unibin0 -> 9518 bytes
16 files changed, 7379 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
index 453a5788cb..232e010e12 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
@@ -527,5 +527,5 @@
BaseCryptLib|CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/RuntimeCryptLib.inf
OpensslLib|CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf
}
- SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
+ OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
!endif
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf
index f31d002192..f819e6b59b 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.fdf
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWriteDxe/FaultTolerantWriteDxe.inf
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf
- INF SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
+ INF OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
!else
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf
!endif
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ FILE FV_IMAGE = 9E21FD93-9C72-4c15-8C4B-E77F1DB2D792 {
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
-
+
[Rule.Common.UEFI_APPLICATION]
FILE APPLICATION = $(NAMED_GUID) {
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ FILE FV_IMAGE = 9E21FD93-9C72-4c15-8C4B-E77F1DB2D792 {
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
-
+
[Rule.Common.USER_DEFINED.ACPITABLE]
FILE FREEFORM = $(NAMED_GUID) {
RAW ACPI |.acpi
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
index 73e8c987b5..c095df935d 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
@@ -529,5 +529,5 @@
BaseCryptLib|CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/RuntimeCryptLib.inf
OpensslLib|CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf
}
- SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
+ OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
!endif
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf
index 71c9b981f0..399f01321c 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWriteDxe/FaultTolerantWriteDxe.inf
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf
- INF SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
+ INF OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
!else
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf
!endif
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ FILE FV_IMAGE = 9E21FD93-9C72-4c15-8C4B-E77F1DB2D792 {
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
-
+
[Rule.Common.UEFI_APPLICATION]
FILE APPLICATION = $(NAMED_GUID) {
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ FILE FV_IMAGE = 9E21FD93-9C72-4c15-8C4B-E77F1DB2D792 {
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
-
+
[Rule.Common.USER_DEFINED.ACPITABLE]
FILE FREEFORM = $(NAMED_GUID) {
RAW ACPI |.acpi
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
index 1c2aec0cdc..d742c1cae1 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
@@ -527,5 +527,5 @@
BaseCryptLib|CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/RuntimeCryptLib.inf
OpensslLib|CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/OpensslLib.inf
}
- SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
+ OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
!endif
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
index e234f4fdae..6a5bcb6fad 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWriteDxe/FaultTolerantWriteDxe.inf
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf
- INF SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
+ INF OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
!else
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf
!endif
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ FILE FV_IMAGE = 9E21FD93-9C72-4c15-8C4B-E77F1DB2D792 {
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
-
+
[Rule.Common.UEFI_APPLICATION]
FILE APPLICATION = $(NAMED_GUID) {
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ FILE FV_IMAGE = 9E21FD93-9C72-4c15-8C4B-E77F1DB2D792 {
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
-
+
[Rule.Common.USER_DEFINED.ACPITABLE]
FILE FREEFORM = $(NAMED_GUID) {
RAW ACPI |.acpi
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..22c03c1288
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr
@@ -0,0 +1,495 @@
+/** @file
+ VFR file used by the SecureBoot configuration component.
+
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+
+#include "SecureBootConfigNvData.h"
+
+formset
+ guid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_FORM_SET_GUID,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECUREBOOT_TITLE),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECUREBOOT_HELP),
+ classguid = EFI_HII_PLATFORM_SETUP_FORMSET_GUID,
+
+ varstore SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION,
+ varid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION_VARSTORE_ID,
+ name = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION,
+ guid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_FORM_SET_GUID;
+
+ //
+ // ##1 Form "Secure Boot Configuration"
+ //
+ form formid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION_FORM_ID,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECUREBOOT_TITLE);
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ //
+ // Define of Check Box: Attempt Secure Boot
+ //
+ suppressif TRUE;
+ checkbox varid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.HideSecureBoot,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL),
+ endcheckbox;
+ endif;
+
+ //
+ // Display of Check Box: Attempt Secure Boot
+ //
+ grayoutif ideqval SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.HideSecureBoot == 1;
+ checkbox varid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.SecureBootState,
+ questionid = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_PROMPT),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_HELP),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ endcheckbox;
+ endif;
+
+ //
+ // Display of Oneof: 'Secure Boot Mode'
+ //
+ oneof varid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.SecureBootMode,
+ questionid = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_MODE,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_PROMPT),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_HELP),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ option text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_STANDARD_MODE), value = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_STANDARD, flags = DEFAULT;
+ option text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_CUSTOM_MODE), value = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_CUSTOM, flags = 0;
+ endoneof;
+
+ //
+ //
+ // Display of 'Current Secure Boot Mode'
+ //
+ suppressif ideqval SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_STANDARD;
+ grayoutif NOT ideqval SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.PhysicalPresent == 1;
+ goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION_FORM,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION_HELP),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION;
+ endif;
+ endif;
+ endform;
+
+ //
+ // ##2 Form: 'Custom Secure Boot Options'
+ //
+ form formid = FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION_FORM,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION_TITLE);
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION_FORM,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION_HELP),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION;
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION_FORM,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION_HELP),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION;
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION_FORM,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION_HELP),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION;
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION_FORM,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION_HELP),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION;
+
+ endform;
+
+ //
+ // ##3 Form: 'PK Options'
+ //
+ form formid = FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION_FORM,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION);
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ //
+ // Define of Check Box: 'Delete PK'
+ //
+ suppressif TRUE;
+ checkbox varid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.DeletePk,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL),
+ endcheckbox;
+ endif;
+
+ grayoutif ideqval SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.HasPk == 1;
+ goto FORMID_ENROLL_PK_FORM,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_ENROLL_PK),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_ENROLL_PK_HELP),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_ENROLL_PK;
+ endif;
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ //
+ // Display of Check Box: 'Delete Pk'
+ //
+ grayoutif ideqval SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.HideSecureBoot == 1;
+ checkbox varid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.DeletePk,
+ questionid = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_DELETE_PK),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_DELETE_PK_HELP),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ endcheckbox;
+ endif;
+ endform;
+
+ //
+ // ##4 Form: 'Enroll PK'
+ //
+ form formid = FORMID_ENROLL_PK_FORM,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_ENROLL_PK);
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_PK,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_ENROLL_PK_FILE),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_ENROLL_PK_FILE),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID;
+ endform;
+
+ //
+ // ##5 Form: 'KEK Options'
+ //
+ form formid = FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION_FORM,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION);
+
+ //
+ // Display of 'Enroll KEK'
+ //
+ goto FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_ENROLL_KEK),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_ENROLL_KEK_HELP),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE;
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ //
+ // Display of 'Delete KEK'
+ //
+ goto FORMID_DELETE_KEK_FORM,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_DELETE_KEK),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_DELETE_KEK_HELP),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_DELETE_KEK;
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+ endform;
+
+ //
+ // ##6 Form: 'Enroll KEK'
+ //
+ form formid = FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_ENROLL_KEK_TITLE);
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_KEK,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_FORM_ENROLL_KEK_FROM_FILE_TITLE),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_FORM_ENROLL_KEK_FROM_FILE_TITLE_HELP),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM;
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+ label FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM;
+ label LABEL_END;
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ string varid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.SignatureGuid,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_HELP),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_GUID,
+ minsize = SECURE_BOOT_GUID_SIZE,
+ maxsize = SECURE_BOOT_GUID_SIZE,
+ endstring;
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION_FORM,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_KEK;
+
+ goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION_FORM,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_KEK;
+
+ endform;
+
+ //
+ // ##7 Form: 'Delete KEK'
+ //
+ form formid = FORMID_DELETE_KEK_FORM,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_DELETE_KEK_TITLE);
+
+ label LABEL_KEK_DELETE;
+ label LABEL_END;
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ endform;
+
+ //
+ // ##8 Form: 'DB Options'
+ //
+ form formid = FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION_FORM,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION);
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE),
+ flags = 0;
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB;
+
+ endform;
+
+ //
+ // ##9 Form: 'DBX Options'
+ //
+ form formid = FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION_FORM,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION);
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE),
+ flags = 0;
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBX,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBX;
+
+ endform;
+
+ //
+ // Form: 'Delete Signature' for DB Options.
+ //
+ form formid = SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE);
+
+ label LABEL_DB_DELETE;
+ label LABEL_END;
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ endform;
+
+ //
+ // Form: 'Delete Signature' for DBX Options.
+ //
+ form formid = SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBX,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE);
+
+ label LABEL_DBX_DELETE;
+ label LABEL_END;
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ endform;
+
+ //
+ // Form: 'Enroll Signature' for DB options.
+ //
+ form formid = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE);
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_DB,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_ADD_SIGNATURE_FILE),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_ADD_SIGNATURE_FILE),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB;
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+ label SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB;
+ label LABEL_END;
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ string varid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.SignatureGuid,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_HELP),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DB,
+ minsize = SECURE_BOOT_GUID_SIZE,
+ maxsize = SECURE_BOOT_GUID_SIZE,
+ endstring;
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION_FORM,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DB;
+
+ goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION_FORM,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DB;
+
+ endform;
+
+ //
+ // Form: 'Enroll Signature' for DBX options.
+ //
+ form formid = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE);
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_DBX,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_ADD_SIGNATURE_FILE),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_ADD_SIGNATURE_FILE),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX;
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+ label SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX;
+ label LABEL_END;
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ string varid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.SignatureGuid,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_HELP),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DBX,
+ minsize = SECURE_BOOT_GUID_SIZE,
+ maxsize = SECURE_BOOT_GUID_SIZE,
+ endstring;
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION_FORM,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBX;
+
+ goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION_FORM,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBX;
+
+ endform;
+
+ //
+ // File Explorer for PK
+ //
+ form formid = FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_PK,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_FILE_EXPLORER_TITLE);
+
+ label FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID;
+ label LABEL_END;
+ endform;
+
+ //
+ // File Explorer for KEK
+ //
+ form formid = FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_KEK,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_FILE_EXPLORER_TITLE);
+
+ label FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID;
+ label LABEL_END;
+ endform;
+
+ //
+ // File Explorer for DB
+ //
+ form formid = FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_DB,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_FILE_EXPLORER_TITLE);
+
+ label FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID;
+ label LABEL_END;
+ endform;
+
+ //
+ // File Explorer for DBX
+ //
+ form formid = FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_DBX,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_FILE_EXPLORER_TITLE);
+
+ label FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID;
+ label LABEL_END;
+ endform;
+
+
+ //
+ // Enroll Pk from File Commit Form
+ //
+ form formid = SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SAVE_PK_FILE);
+
+ label SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID;
+ label LABEL_END;
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ text
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK;
+
+ text
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK;
+
+ endform;
+
+endformset;
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDevicePath.c b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDevicePath.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ae44626594
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDevicePath.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1537 @@
+/** @file
+ Internal function defines the default device path string for SecureBoot configuration module.
+
+Copyright (c) 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+
+#include "SecureBootConfigImpl.h"
+
+/**
+ Concatenates a formatted unicode string to allocated pool.
+ The caller must free the resulting buffer.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str Tracks the allocated pool, size in use, and amount of pool allocated.
+ @param[in] Fmt The format string
+ @param[in] ... The data will be printed.
+
+ @return Allocated buffer with the formatted string printed in it.
+ The caller must free the allocated buffer.
+ The buffer allocation is not packed.
+
+**/
+CHAR16 *
+EFIAPI
+CatPrint (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN CHAR16 *Fmt,
+ ...
+ )
+{
+ UINT16 *AppendStr;
+ VA_LIST Args;
+ UINTN StringSize;
+
+ AppendStr = AllocateZeroPool (0x1000);
+ if (AppendStr == NULL) {
+ return Str->Str;
+ }
+
+ VA_START (Args, Fmt);
+ UnicodeVSPrint (AppendStr, 0x1000, Fmt, Args);
+ VA_END (Args);
+ if (NULL == Str->Str) {
+ StringSize = StrSize (AppendStr);
+ Str->Str = AllocateZeroPool (StringSize);
+ ASSERT (Str->Str != NULL);
+ } else {
+ StringSize = StrSize (AppendStr);
+ StringSize += (StrSize (Str->Str) - sizeof (UINT16));
+
+ Str->Str = ReallocatePool (
+ StrSize (Str->Str),
+ StringSize,
+ Str->Str
+ );
+ ASSERT (Str->Str != NULL);
+ }
+
+ Str->Maxlen = MAX_CHAR * sizeof (UINT16);
+ if (StringSize < Str->Maxlen) {
+ StrCat (Str->Str, AppendStr);
+ Str->Len = StringSize - sizeof (UINT16);
+ }
+
+ FreePool (AppendStr);
+ return Str->Str;
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathPci (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ PCI_DEVICE_PATH *Pci;
+
+ Pci = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (Str, L"Pci(%x|%x)", (UINTN) Pci->Device, (UINTN) Pci->Function);
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathPccard (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ PCCARD_DEVICE_PATH *Pccard;
+
+ Pccard = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (Str, L"Pcmcia(Function%x)", (UINTN) Pccard->FunctionNumber);
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathMemMap (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ MEMMAP_DEVICE_PATH *MemMap;
+
+ MemMap = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (
+ Str,
+ L"MemMap(%d:%lx-%lx)",
+ (UINTN) MemMap->MemoryType,
+ MemMap->StartingAddress,
+ MemMap->EndingAddress
+ );
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathController (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ CONTROLLER_DEVICE_PATH *Controller;
+
+ Controller = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (Str, L"Ctrl(%d)", (UINTN) Controller->ControllerNumber);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ Convert Vendor device path to device name.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer store device name
+ @param[in] DevPath Pointer to vendor device path
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathVendor (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH *Vendor;
+ CHAR16 *Type;
+ UINTN DataLength;
+ UINTN Index;
+ UINT32 FlowControlMap;
+
+ UINT16 Info;
+
+ Vendor = DevPath;
+
+ switch (DevicePathType (&Vendor->Header)) {
+ case HARDWARE_DEVICE_PATH:
+ Type = L"Hw";
+ break;
+
+ case MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH:
+ Type = L"Msg";
+ if (CompareGuid (&Vendor->Guid, &gEfiPcAnsiGuid)) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"VenPcAnsi()");
+ return ;
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&Vendor->Guid, &gEfiVT100Guid)) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"VenVt100()");
+ return ;
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&Vendor->Guid, &gEfiVT100PlusGuid)) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"VenVt100Plus()");
+ return ;
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&Vendor->Guid, &gEfiVTUTF8Guid)) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"VenUft8()");
+ return ;
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&Vendor->Guid, &gEfiUartDevicePathGuid )) {
+ FlowControlMap = (((UART_FLOW_CONTROL_DEVICE_PATH *) Vendor)->FlowControlMap);
+ switch (FlowControlMap & 0x00000003) {
+ case 0:
+ CatPrint (Str, L"UartFlowCtrl(%s)", L"None");
+ break;
+
+ case 1:
+ CatPrint (Str, L"UartFlowCtrl(%s)", L"Hardware");
+ break;
+
+ case 2:
+ CatPrint (Str, L"UartFlowCtrl(%s)", L"XonXoff");
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ;
+
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&Vendor->Guid, &gEfiSasDevicePathGuid)) {
+ CatPrint (
+ Str,
+ L"SAS(%lx,%lx,%x,",
+ ((SAS_DEVICE_PATH *) Vendor)->SasAddress,
+ ((SAS_DEVICE_PATH *) Vendor)->Lun,
+ (UINTN) ((SAS_DEVICE_PATH *) Vendor)->RelativeTargetPort
+ );
+ Info = (((SAS_DEVICE_PATH *) Vendor)->DeviceTopology);
+ if ((Info & 0x0f) == 0) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"NoTopology,0,0,0,");
+ } else if (((Info & 0x0f) == 1) || ((Info & 0x0f) == 2)) {
+ CatPrint (
+ Str,
+ L"%s,%s,%s,",
+ ((Info & (0x1 << 4)) != 0) ? L"SATA" : L"SAS",
+ ((Info & (0x1 << 5)) != 0) ? L"External" : L"Internal",
+ ((Info & (0x1 << 6)) != 0) ? L"Expanded" : L"Direct"
+ );
+ if ((Info & 0x0f) == 1) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"0,");
+ } else {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%x,", (UINTN) ((Info >> 8) & 0xff));
+ }
+ } else {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"0,0,0,0,");
+ }
+
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%x)", (UINTN) ((SAS_DEVICE_PATH *) Vendor)->Reserved);
+ return ;
+
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&Vendor->Guid, &gEfiDebugPortProtocolGuid)) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"DebugPort()");
+ return ;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH:
+ Type = L"Media";
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ Type = L"?";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ CatPrint (Str, L"Ven%s(%g", Type, &Vendor->Guid);
+ DataLength = DevicePathNodeLength (&Vendor->Header) - sizeof (VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH);
+ if (DataLength > 0) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L",");
+ for (Index = 0; Index < DataLength; Index++) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%02x", (UINTN) ((VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH_WITH_DATA *) Vendor)->VendorDefinedData[Index]);
+ }
+ }
+ CatPrint (Str, L")");
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathAcpi (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ ACPI_HID_DEVICE_PATH *Acpi;
+
+ Acpi = DevPath;
+ if ((Acpi->HID & PNP_EISA_ID_MASK) == PNP_EISA_ID_CONST) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"Acpi(PNP%04x,%x)", (UINTN) EISA_ID_TO_NUM (Acpi->HID), (UINTN) Acpi->UID);
+ } else {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"Acpi(%08x,%x)", (UINTN) Acpi->HID, (UINTN) Acpi->UID);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathExtendedAcpi (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ ACPI_EXTENDED_HID_DEVICE_PATH *ExtendedAcpi;
+
+ //
+ // Index for HID, UID and CID strings, 0 for non-exist
+ //
+ UINT16 HIDSTRIdx;
+ UINT16 UIDSTRIdx;
+ UINT16 CIDSTRIdx;
+ UINT16 Index;
+ UINT16 Length;
+ UINT16 Anchor;
+ CHAR8 *AsChar8Array;
+
+ HIDSTRIdx = 0;
+ UIDSTRIdx = 0;
+ CIDSTRIdx = 0;
+ ExtendedAcpi = DevPath;
+ Length = (UINT16) DevicePathNodeLength ((EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) ExtendedAcpi);
+
+ AsChar8Array = (CHAR8 *) ExtendedAcpi;
+
+ //
+ // find HIDSTR
+ //
+ Anchor = 16;
+ for (Index = Anchor; Index < Length && AsChar8Array[Index] != '\0'; Index++) {
+ ;
+ }
+ if (Index > Anchor) {
+ HIDSTRIdx = Anchor;
+ }
+ //
+ // find UIDSTR
+ //
+ Anchor = (UINT16) (Index + 1);
+ for (Index = Anchor; Index < Length && AsChar8Array[Index] != '\0'; Index++) {
+ ;
+ }
+ if (Index > Anchor) {
+ UIDSTRIdx = Anchor;
+ }
+ //
+ // find CIDSTR
+ //
+ Anchor = (UINT16) (Index + 1);
+ for (Index = Anchor; Index < Length && AsChar8Array[Index] != '\0'; Index++) {
+ ;
+ }
+ if (Index > Anchor) {
+ CIDSTRIdx = Anchor;
+ }
+
+ if (HIDSTRIdx == 0 && CIDSTRIdx == 0 && ExtendedAcpi->UID == 0) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"AcpiExp(");
+ if ((ExtendedAcpi->HID & PNP_EISA_ID_MASK) == PNP_EISA_ID_CONST) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"PNP%04x,", (UINTN) EISA_ID_TO_NUM (ExtendedAcpi->HID));
+ } else {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%08x,", (UINTN) ExtendedAcpi->HID);
+ }
+ if ((ExtendedAcpi->CID & PNP_EISA_ID_MASK) == PNP_EISA_ID_CONST) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"PNP%04x,", (UINTN) EISA_ID_TO_NUM (ExtendedAcpi->CID));
+ } else {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%08x,", (UINTN) ExtendedAcpi->CID);
+ }
+ if (UIDSTRIdx != 0) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%a)", AsChar8Array + UIDSTRIdx);
+ } else {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"\"\")");
+ }
+ } else {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"AcpiEx(");
+ if ((ExtendedAcpi->HID & PNP_EISA_ID_MASK) == PNP_EISA_ID_CONST) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"PNP%04x,", (UINTN) EISA_ID_TO_NUM (ExtendedAcpi->HID));
+ } else {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%08x,", (UINTN) ExtendedAcpi->HID);
+ }
+ if ((ExtendedAcpi->CID & PNP_EISA_ID_MASK) == PNP_EISA_ID_CONST) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"PNP%04x,", (UINTN) EISA_ID_TO_NUM (ExtendedAcpi->CID));
+ } else {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%08x,", (UINTN) ExtendedAcpi->CID);
+ }
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%x,", (UINTN) ExtendedAcpi->UID);
+
+ if (HIDSTRIdx != 0) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%a,", AsChar8Array + HIDSTRIdx);
+ } else {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"\"\",");
+ }
+ if (CIDSTRIdx != 0) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%a,", AsChar8Array + CIDSTRIdx);
+ } else {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"\"\",");
+ }
+ if (UIDSTRIdx != 0) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%a)", AsChar8Array + UIDSTRIdx);
+ } else {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"\"\")");
+ }
+ }
+
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathAdrAcpi (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ ACPI_ADR_DEVICE_PATH *AcpiAdr;
+ UINT16 Index;
+ UINT16 Length;
+ UINT16 AdditionalAdrCount;
+
+ AcpiAdr = DevPath;
+ Length = (UINT16) DevicePathNodeLength ((EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) AcpiAdr);
+ AdditionalAdrCount = (UINT16) ((Length - 8) / 4);
+
+ CatPrint (Str, L"AcpiAdr(%x", (UINTN) AcpiAdr->ADR);
+ for (Index = 0; Index < AdditionalAdrCount; Index++) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L",%x", (UINTN) *(UINT32 *) ((UINT8 *) AcpiAdr + 8 + Index * 4));
+ }
+ CatPrint (Str, L")");
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathAtapi (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ ATAPI_DEVICE_PATH *Atapi;
+
+ Atapi = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (
+ Str,
+ L"Ata(%s,%s)",
+ (Atapi->PrimarySecondary != 0)? L"Secondary" : L"Primary",
+ (Atapi->SlaveMaster != 0)? L"Slave" : L"Master"
+ );
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathScsi (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ SCSI_DEVICE_PATH *Scsi;
+
+ Scsi = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (Str, L"Scsi(Pun%x,Lun%x)", (UINTN) Scsi->Pun, (UINTN) Scsi->Lun);
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathFibre (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ FIBRECHANNEL_DEVICE_PATH *Fibre;
+
+ Fibre = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (Str, L"Fibre(Wwn%lx,Lun%x)", Fibre->WWN, Fibre->Lun);
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPath1394 (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ F1394_DEVICE_PATH *F1394Path;
+
+ F1394Path = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (Str, L"1394(%lx)", &F1394Path->Guid);
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathUsb (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ USB_DEVICE_PATH *Usb;
+
+ Usb = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (Str, L"Usb(%x,%x)", (UINTN) Usb->ParentPortNumber, (UINTN) Usb->InterfaceNumber);
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathUsbWWID (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ USB_WWID_DEVICE_PATH *UsbWWId;
+
+ UsbWWId = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (
+ Str,
+ L"UsbWwid(%x,%x,%x,\"WWID\")",
+ (UINTN) UsbWWId->VendorId,
+ (UINTN) UsbWWId->ProductId,
+ (UINTN) UsbWWId->InterfaceNumber
+ );
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathLogicalUnit (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ DEVICE_LOGICAL_UNIT_DEVICE_PATH *LogicalUnit;
+
+ LogicalUnit = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (Str, L"Unit(%x)", (UINTN) LogicalUnit->Lun);
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathUsbClass (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ USB_CLASS_DEVICE_PATH *UsbClass;
+
+ UsbClass = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (
+ Str,
+ L"Usb Class(%x,%x,%x,%x,%x)",
+ (UINTN) UsbClass->VendorId,
+ (UINTN) UsbClass->ProductId,
+ (UINTN) UsbClass->DeviceClass,
+ (UINTN) UsbClass->DeviceSubClass,
+ (UINTN) UsbClass->DeviceProtocol
+ );
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathSata (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ SATA_DEVICE_PATH *Sata;
+
+ Sata = DevPath;
+ if ((Sata->PortMultiplierPortNumber & SATA_HBA_DIRECT_CONNECT_FLAG) != 0) {
+ CatPrint (
+ Str,
+ L"Sata(%x,%x)",
+ (UINTN) Sata->HBAPortNumber,
+ (UINTN) Sata->Lun
+ );
+ } else {
+ CatPrint (
+ Str,
+ L"Sata(%x,%x,%x)",
+ (UINTN) Sata->HBAPortNumber,
+ (UINTN) Sata->PortMultiplierPortNumber,
+ (UINTN) Sata->Lun
+ );
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathI2O (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ I2O_DEVICE_PATH *I2OPath;
+
+ I2OPath = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (Str, L"I2O(%x)", (UINTN) I2OPath->Tid);
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathMacAddr (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ MAC_ADDR_DEVICE_PATH *MACDevPath;
+ UINTN HwAddressSize;
+ UINTN Index;
+
+ MACDevPath = DevPath;
+
+ HwAddressSize = sizeof (EFI_MAC_ADDRESS);
+ if (MACDevPath->IfType == 0x01 || MACDevPath->IfType == 0x00) {
+ HwAddressSize = 6;
+ }
+
+ CatPrint (Str, L"Mac(");
+
+ for (Index = 0; Index < HwAddressSize; Index++) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%02x", (UINTN) MACDevPath->MacAddress.Addr[Index]);
+ }
+
+ CatPrint (Str, L")");
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathIPv4 (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ IPv4_DEVICE_PATH *IPDevPath;
+
+ IPDevPath = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (
+ Str,
+ L"IPv4(%d.%d.%d.%d:%d)",
+ (UINTN) IPDevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[0],
+ (UINTN) IPDevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[1],
+ (UINTN) IPDevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[2],
+ (UINTN) IPDevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[3],
+ (UINTN) IPDevPath->RemotePort
+ );
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathIPv6 (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ IPv6_DEVICE_PATH *IPv6DevPath;
+
+ IPv6DevPath = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (
+ Str,
+ L"IPv6(%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x)",
+ (UINTN) IPv6DevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[0],
+ (UINTN) IPv6DevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[1],
+ (UINTN) IPv6DevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[2],
+ (UINTN) IPv6DevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[3],
+ (UINTN) IPv6DevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[4],
+ (UINTN) IPv6DevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[5],
+ (UINTN) IPv6DevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[6],
+ (UINTN) IPv6DevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[7],
+ (UINTN) IPv6DevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[8],
+ (UINTN) IPv6DevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[9],
+ (UINTN) IPv6DevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[10],
+ (UINTN) IPv6DevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[11],
+ (UINTN) IPv6DevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[12],
+ (UINTN) IPv6DevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[13],
+ (UINTN) IPv6DevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[14],
+ (UINTN) IPv6DevPath->RemoteIpAddress.Addr[15]
+ );
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathInfiniBand (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ INFINIBAND_DEVICE_PATH *InfiniBand;
+
+ InfiniBand = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (
+ Str,
+ L"Infiniband(%x,%g,%lx,%lx,%lx)",
+ (UINTN) InfiniBand->ResourceFlags,
+ InfiniBand->PortGid,
+ InfiniBand->ServiceId,
+ InfiniBand->TargetPortId,
+ InfiniBand->DeviceId
+ );
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathUart (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ UART_DEVICE_PATH *Uart;
+ CHAR8 Parity;
+
+ Uart = DevPath;
+ switch (Uart->Parity) {
+ case 0:
+ Parity = 'D';
+ break;
+
+ case 1:
+ Parity = 'N';
+ break;
+
+ case 2:
+ Parity = 'E';
+ break;
+
+ case 3:
+ Parity = 'O';
+ break;
+
+ case 4:
+ Parity = 'M';
+ break;
+
+ case 5:
+ Parity = 'S';
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ Parity = 'x';
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (Uart->BaudRate == 0) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"Uart(DEFAULT,%c,", Parity);
+ } else {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"Uart(%ld,%c,", Uart->BaudRate, Parity);
+ }
+
+ if (Uart->DataBits == 0) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"D,");
+ } else {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%d,", (UINTN) Uart->DataBits);
+ }
+
+ switch (Uart->StopBits) {
+ case 0:
+ CatPrint (Str, L"D)");
+ break;
+
+ case 1:
+ CatPrint (Str, L"1)");
+ break;
+
+ case 2:
+ CatPrint (Str, L"1.5)");
+ break;
+
+ case 3:
+ CatPrint (Str, L"2)");
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ CatPrint (Str, L"x)");
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathiSCSI (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ ISCSI_DEVICE_PATH_WITH_NAME *IScsi;
+ UINT16 Options;
+
+ IScsi = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (
+ Str,
+ L"iSCSI(%a,%x,%lx,",
+ IScsi->TargetName,
+ (UINTN) IScsi->TargetPortalGroupTag,
+ IScsi->Lun
+ );
+
+ Options = IScsi->LoginOption;
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%s,", (((Options >> 1) & 0x0001) != 0) ? L"CRC32C" : L"None");
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%s,", (((Options >> 3) & 0x0001) != 0) ? L"CRC32C" : L"None");
+ if (((Options >> 11) & 0x0001) != 0) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%s,", L"None");
+ } else if (((Options >> 12) & 0x0001) != 0) {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%s,", L"CHAP_UNI");
+ } else {
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%s,", L"CHAP_BI");
+
+ }
+
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%s)", (IScsi->NetworkProtocol == 0) ? L"TCP" : L"reserved");
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathVlan (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ VLAN_DEVICE_PATH *Vlan;
+
+ Vlan = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (Str, L"Vlan(%d)", (UINTN) Vlan->VlanId);
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathHardDrive (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ HARDDRIVE_DEVICE_PATH *Hd;
+
+ Hd = DevPath;
+ switch (Hd->SignatureType) {
+ case SIGNATURE_TYPE_MBR:
+ CatPrint (
+ Str,
+ L"HD(Part%d,Sig%08x)",
+ (UINTN) Hd->PartitionNumber,
+ (UINTN) *((UINT32 *) (&(Hd->Signature[0])))
+ );
+ break;
+
+ case SIGNATURE_TYPE_GUID:
+ CatPrint (
+ Str,
+ L"HD(Part%d,Sig%g)",
+ (UINTN) Hd->PartitionNumber,
+ (EFI_GUID *) &(Hd->Signature[0])
+ );
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ CatPrint (
+ Str,
+ L"HD(Part%d,MBRType=%02x,SigType=%02x)",
+ (UINTN) Hd->PartitionNumber,
+ (UINTN) Hd->MBRType,
+ (UINTN) Hd->SignatureType
+ );
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathCDROM (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ CDROM_DEVICE_PATH *Cd;
+
+ Cd = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (Str, L"CDROM(Entry%x)", (UINTN) Cd->BootEntry);
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathFilePath (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ FILEPATH_DEVICE_PATH *Fp;
+
+ Fp = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%s", Fp->PathName);
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathMediaProtocol (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ MEDIA_PROTOCOL_DEVICE_PATH *MediaProt;
+
+ MediaProt = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (Str, L"Media(%g)", &MediaProt->Protocol);
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathFvFilePath (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ MEDIA_FW_VOL_FILEPATH_DEVICE_PATH *FvFilePath;
+
+ FvFilePath = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (Str, L"%g", &FvFilePath->FvFileName);
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathRelativeOffsetRange (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ MEDIA_RELATIVE_OFFSET_RANGE_DEVICE_PATH *Offset;
+
+ Offset = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (
+ Str,
+ L"Offset(%lx,%lx)",
+ Offset->StartingOffset,
+ Offset->EndingOffset
+ );
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathBssBss (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ BBS_BBS_DEVICE_PATH *Bbs;
+ CHAR16 *Type;
+
+ Bbs = DevPath;
+ switch (Bbs->DeviceType) {
+ case BBS_TYPE_FLOPPY:
+ Type = L"Floppy";
+ break;
+
+ case BBS_TYPE_HARDDRIVE:
+ Type = L"Harddrive";
+ break;
+
+ case BBS_TYPE_CDROM:
+ Type = L"CDROM";
+ break;
+
+ case BBS_TYPE_PCMCIA:
+ Type = L"PCMCIA";
+ break;
+
+ case BBS_TYPE_USB:
+ Type = L"Usb";
+ break;
+
+ case BBS_TYPE_EMBEDDED_NETWORK:
+ Type = L"Net";
+ break;
+
+ case BBS_TYPE_BEV:
+ Type = L"BEV";
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ Type = L"?";
+ break;
+ }
+ CatPrint (Str, L"Legacy-%s", Type);
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathEndInstance (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ CatPrint (Str, L",");
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathNodeUnknown (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ CatPrint (Str, L"?");
+}
+/**
+ Convert Device Path to a Unicode string for printing.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str The buffer holding the output string.
+ This buffer contains the length of the string and
+ the maixmum length reserved for the string buffer.
+ @param[in] DevPath The device path.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DevPathFvPath (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ MEDIA_FW_VOL_DEVICE_PATH *FvPath;
+
+ FvPath = DevPath;
+ CatPrint (Str, L"Fv(%g)", &FvPath->FvName);
+}
+
+DEVICE_PATH_STRING_TABLE DevPathTable[] = {
+ {
+ HARDWARE_DEVICE_PATH,
+ HW_PCI_DP,
+ DevPathPci
+ },
+ {
+ HARDWARE_DEVICE_PATH,
+ HW_PCCARD_DP,
+ DevPathPccard
+ },
+ {
+ HARDWARE_DEVICE_PATH,
+ HW_MEMMAP_DP,
+ DevPathMemMap
+ },
+ {
+ HARDWARE_DEVICE_PATH,
+ HW_VENDOR_DP,
+ DevPathVendor
+ },
+ {
+ HARDWARE_DEVICE_PATH,
+ HW_CONTROLLER_DP,
+ DevPathController
+ },
+ {
+ ACPI_DEVICE_PATH,
+ ACPI_DP,
+ DevPathAcpi
+ },
+ {
+ ACPI_DEVICE_PATH,
+ ACPI_EXTENDED_DP,
+ DevPathExtendedAcpi
+ },
+ {
+ ACPI_DEVICE_PATH,
+ ACPI_ADR_DP,
+ DevPathAdrAcpi
+ },
+ {
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MSG_ATAPI_DP,
+ DevPathAtapi
+ },
+ {
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MSG_SCSI_DP,
+ DevPathScsi
+ },
+ {
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MSG_FIBRECHANNEL_DP,
+ DevPathFibre
+ },
+ {
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MSG_1394_DP,
+ DevPath1394
+ },
+ {
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MSG_USB_DP,
+ DevPathUsb
+ },
+ {
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MSG_USB_WWID_DP,
+ DevPathUsbWWID
+ },
+ {
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MSG_DEVICE_LOGICAL_UNIT_DP,
+ DevPathLogicalUnit
+ },
+ {
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MSG_USB_CLASS_DP,
+ DevPathUsbClass
+ },
+ {
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MSG_SATA_DP,
+ DevPathSata
+ },
+ {
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MSG_I2O_DP,
+ DevPathI2O
+ },
+ {
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MSG_MAC_ADDR_DP,
+ DevPathMacAddr
+ },
+ {
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MSG_IPv4_DP,
+ DevPathIPv4
+ },
+ {
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MSG_IPv6_DP,
+ DevPathIPv6
+ },
+ {
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MSG_INFINIBAND_DP,
+ DevPathInfiniBand
+ },
+ {
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MSG_UART_DP,
+ DevPathUart
+ },
+ {
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MSG_VENDOR_DP,
+ DevPathVendor
+ },
+ {
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MSG_ISCSI_DP,
+ DevPathiSCSI
+ },
+ {
+ MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MSG_VLAN_DP,
+ DevPathVlan
+ },
+ {
+ MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MEDIA_HARDDRIVE_DP,
+ DevPathHardDrive
+ },
+ {
+ MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MEDIA_CDROM_DP,
+ DevPathCDROM
+ },
+ {
+ MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MEDIA_VENDOR_DP,
+ DevPathVendor
+ },
+ {
+ MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MEDIA_FILEPATH_DP,
+ DevPathFilePath
+ },
+ {
+ MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MEDIA_PROTOCOL_DP,
+ DevPathMediaProtocol
+ },
+ {
+ MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MEDIA_PIWG_FW_VOL_DP,
+ DevPathFvPath,
+ },
+ {
+ MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MEDIA_PIWG_FW_FILE_DP,
+ DevPathFvFilePath
+ },
+ {
+ MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH,
+ MEDIA_RELATIVE_OFFSET_RANGE_DP,
+ DevPathRelativeOffsetRange,
+ },
+ {
+ BBS_DEVICE_PATH,
+ BBS_BBS_DP,
+ DevPathBssBss
+ },
+ {
+ END_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE,
+ END_INSTANCE_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE,
+ DevPathEndInstance
+ },
+ {
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ NULL
+ }
+};
+
+
+/**
+ This function converts an input device structure to a Unicode string.
+
+ @param[in] DevPath A pointer to the device path structure.
+
+ @return A new allocated Unicode string that represents the device path.
+
+**/
+CHAR16 *
+EFIAPI
+DevicePathToStr (
+ IN EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevPath
+ )
+{
+ POOL_PRINT Str;
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevPathNode;
+ VOID (*DumpNode) (POOL_PRINT *, VOID *);
+
+ UINTN Index;
+ UINTN NewSize;
+
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ CHAR16 *ToText;
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TO_TEXT_PROTOCOL *DevPathToText;
+
+ ZeroMem (&Str, sizeof (Str));
+
+ if (DevPath == NULL) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (
+ &gEfiDevicePathToTextProtocolGuid,
+ NULL,
+ (VOID **) &DevPathToText
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ ToText = DevPathToText->ConvertDevicePathToText (
+ DevPath,
+ FALSE,
+ TRUE
+ );
+ ASSERT (ToText != NULL);
+ return ToText;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Process each device path node
+ //
+ DevPathNode = DevPath;
+ while (!IsDevicePathEnd (DevPathNode)) {
+ //
+ // Find the handler to dump this device path node
+ //
+ DumpNode = NULL;
+ for (Index = 0; DevPathTable[Index].Function != NULL; Index += 1) {
+
+ if (DevicePathType (DevPathNode) == DevPathTable[Index].Type &&
+ DevicePathSubType (DevPathNode) == DevPathTable[Index].SubType
+ ) {
+ DumpNode = DevPathTable[Index].Function;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ //
+ // If not found, use a generic function
+ //
+ if (!DumpNode) {
+ DumpNode = DevPathNodeUnknown;
+ }
+ //
+ // Put a path seperator in if needed
+ //
+ if ((Str.Len != 0) && (DumpNode != DevPathEndInstance)) {
+ CatPrint (&Str, L"/");
+ }
+ //
+ // Print this node of the device path
+ //
+ DumpNode (&Str, DevPathNode);
+
+ //
+ // Next device path node
+ //
+ DevPathNode = NextDevicePathNode (DevPathNode);
+ }
+
+Done:
+ NewSize = (Str.Len + 1) * sizeof (CHAR16);
+ Str.Str = ReallocatePool (NewSize, NewSize, Str.Str);
+ ASSERT (Str.Str != NULL);
+ Str.Str[Str.Len] = 0;
+ return Str.Str;
+}
+
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDriver.c b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDriver.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1d6c4ac6e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDriver.c
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+/** @file
+ The module entry point for SecureBoot configuration module.
+
+Copyright (c) 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+
+#include "SecureBootConfigImpl.h"
+
+/**
+ The entry point for SecureBoot configuration driver.
+
+ @param[in] ImageHandle The image handle of the driver.
+ @param[in] SystemTable The system table.
+
+ @retval EFI_ALREADY_STARTED The driver already exists in system.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Fail to execute entry point due to lack of resources.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCES All the related protocols are installed on the driver.
+ @retval Others Fail to get the SecureBootEnable variable.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SecureBootConfigDriverEntryPoint (
+ IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,
+ IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData;
+
+ //
+ // If already started, return.
+ //
+ Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
+ ImageHandle,
+ &gEfiCallerIdGuid,
+ NULL,
+ ImageHandle,
+ ImageHandle,
+ EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_TEST_PROTOCOL
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return EFI_ALREADY_STARTED;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Create a private data structure.
+ //
+ PrivateData = AllocateCopyPool (sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA), &mSecureBootConfigPrivateDateTemplate);
+ if (PrivateData == NULL) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Install SecureBoot configuration form
+ //
+ Status = InstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto ErrorExit;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Install private GUID.
+ //
+ Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (
+ &ImageHandle,
+ &gEfiCallerIdGuid,
+ PrivateData,
+ NULL
+ );
+
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto ErrorExit;
+ }
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+
+ErrorExit:
+ if (PrivateData != NULL) {
+ UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Unload the SecureBoot configuration form.
+
+ @param[in] ImageHandle The driver's image handle.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The SecureBoot configuration form is unloaded.
+ @retval Others Failed to unload the form.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SecureBootConfigDriverUnload (
+ IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData;
+
+ Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (
+ ImageHandle,
+ &gEfiCallerIdGuid,
+ (VOID **) &PrivateData
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT (PrivateData->Signature == SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA_SIGNATURE);
+
+ gBS->UninstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (
+ &ImageHandle,
+ &gEfiCallerIdGuid,
+ PrivateData,
+ NULL
+ );
+
+ UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..44b15b8eb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+## @file
+# Component name for SecureBoot configuration module for OVMF.
+#
+# Need custom SecureBootConfigDxe for OVMF that does not force
+# resets after PK changes since OVMF doesn't have persistent variables
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2011 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+# This program and the accompanying materials
+# are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+# which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+# http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+# THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+#
+##
+
+[Defines]
+ INF_VERSION = 0x00010005
+ BASE_NAME = SecureBootConfigDxe
+ FILE_GUID = F0E6A44F-7195-41c3-AC64-54F202CD0A21
+ MODULE_TYPE = DXE_DRIVER
+ VERSION_STRING = 1.0
+ ENTRY_POINT = SecureBootConfigDriverEntryPoint
+ UNLOAD_IMAGE = SecureBootConfigDriverUnload
+
+#
+# VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IA32 X64 IPF EBC
+#
+
+[Sources]
+ SecureBootConfigDriver.c
+ SecureBootConfigImpl.c
+ SecureBootConfigFileExplorer.c
+ SecureBootConfigDevicePath.c
+ SecureBootConfigMisc.c
+ SecureBootConfigImpl.h
+ SecureBootConfig.vfr
+ SecureBootConfigStrings.uni
+ SecureBootConfigNvData.h
+
+[Packages]
+ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
+ MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
+ SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec
+ CryptoPkg/CryptoPkg.dec
+
+[LibraryClasses]
+ BaseLib
+ BaseMemoryLib
+ BaseCryptLib
+ MemoryAllocationLib
+ UefiLib
+ UefiBootServicesTableLib
+ UefiRuntimeServicesTableLib
+ UefiDriverEntryPoint
+ UefiHiiServicesLib
+ DebugLib
+ HiiLib
+ PlatformSecureLib
+
+[Guids]
+ gEfiIfrTianoGuid
+ gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid
+ gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid
+ gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid
+ gEfiCertPkcs7Guid
+ gEfiCertRsa2048Guid ## CONSUMES
+ gEfiCertX509Guid ## CONSUMES
+ gEfiCertSha1Guid ## CONSUMES
+ gEfiCertSha256Guid ## CONSUMES
+ gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid ## CONSUMES
+ gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid ## CONSUMES
+ gEfiFileSystemVolumeLabelInfoIdGuid ## CONSUMES
+ gEfiGlobalVariableGuid ## PRODUCES ## Variable Guid
+ gEfiVT100PlusGuid ## CONSUMES ## GUID (The type of terminal)
+ gEfiVT100Guid ## CONSUMES ## GUID (The type of terminal)
+ ## CONSUMES ## GUID HOB (The hob holding memory type information)
+ gEfiVTUTF8Guid ## CONSUMES ## GUID (The type of terminal)
+ ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"BootXX" (Boot option variable)
+ ## CONSUMES ## Variable:L"Timeout" (The time out value in second of showing progress bar)
+ ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"BootOrder" (The boot option array)
+ ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"DriverOrder" (The driver order list)
+ ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"ConIn" (The device path of console in device)
+ ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"ConOut" (The device path of console out device)
+ ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"ErrOut" (The device path of error out device)
+ gEfiFileInfoGuid ## CONSUMES ## GUID
+ gEfiPcAnsiGuid ## CONSUMES ## GUID (The type of terminal)
+ gEfiUartDevicePathGuid ## CONSUMES ## GUID (Identify the device path for UARD device)
+ gEfiSasDevicePathGuid ## CONSUMES ## GUID (Identify the device path for SAS device)
+
+[Protocols]
+ gEfiHiiConfigAccessProtocolGuid ## PRODUCES
+ gEfiHiiConfigRoutingProtocolGuid ## CONSUMES
+ gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid ## PROTOCOL CONSUMES
+ gEfiLoadFileProtocolGuid ## PROTOCOL CONSUMES
+ gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid ## PROTOCOL CONSUMES
+ gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid ## PROTOCOL CONSUMES
+ gEfiDevicePathToTextProtocolGuid
+ gEfiDebugPortProtocolGuid
+
+[Depex]
+ gEfiHiiConfigRoutingProtocolGuid AND
+ gEfiHiiDatabaseProtocolGuid AND
+ gEfiVariableArchProtocolGuid AND
+ gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigFileExplorer.c b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigFileExplorer.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..deff87bcbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigFileExplorer.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1227 @@
+/** @file
+ Internal file explorer functions for SecureBoot configuration module.
+
+Copyright (c) 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+
+#include "SecureBootConfigImpl.h"
+
+///
+/// File system selection menu
+///
+SECUREBOOT_MENU_OPTION FsOptionMenu = {
+ SECUREBOOT_MENU_OPTION_SIGNATURE,
+ {NULL},
+ 0
+};
+
+///
+/// Files and sub-directories in current directory menu
+///
+SECUREBOOT_MENU_OPTION DirectoryMenu = {
+ SECUREBOOT_MENU_OPTION_SIGNATURE,
+ {NULL},
+ 0
+};
+
+VOID *mStartOpCodeHandle = NULL;
+VOID *mEndOpCodeHandle = NULL;
+EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *mStartLabel = NULL;
+EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *mEndLabel = NULL;
+
+/**
+ Duplicate a string.
+
+ @param[in] Src The source string.
+
+ @return A new string which is duplicated copy of the source,
+ or NULL if there is not enough memory.
+
+**/
+CHAR16 *
+StrDuplicate (
+ IN CHAR16 *Src
+ )
+{
+ CHAR16 *Dest;
+ UINTN Size;
+
+ Size = StrSize (Src);
+ Dest = AllocateZeroPool (Size);
+ ASSERT (Dest != NULL);
+ if (Dest != NULL) {
+ CopyMem (Dest, Src, Size);
+ }
+
+ return Dest;
+}
+
+/**
+ Helper function called as part of the code needed to allocate
+ the proper sized buffer for various EFI interfaces.
+
+ @param[in, out] Status Current status
+ @param[in, out] Buffer Current allocated buffer, or NULL
+ @param[in] BufferSize Current buffer size needed
+
+ @retval TRUE If the buffer was reallocated and the caller
+ should try the API again.
+ @retval FALSE The caller should not call this function again.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+GrowBuffer (
+ IN OUT EFI_STATUS *Status,
+ IN OUT VOID **Buffer,
+ IN UINTN BufferSize
+ )
+{
+ BOOLEAN TryAgain;
+
+ //
+ // If this is an initial request, buffer will be null with a new buffer size
+ //
+ if ((*Buffer == NULL) && (BufferSize != 0)) {
+ *Status = EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ //
+ // If the status code is "buffer too small", resize the buffer
+ //
+ TryAgain = FALSE;
+ if (*Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+
+ if (*Buffer != NULL) {
+ FreePool (*Buffer);
+ }
+
+ *Buffer = AllocateZeroPool (BufferSize);
+
+ if (*Buffer != NULL) {
+ TryAgain = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ *Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+ }
+ //
+ // If there's an error, free the buffer
+ //
+ if (!TryAgain && EFI_ERROR (*Status) && (*Buffer != NULL)) {
+ FreePool (*Buffer);
+ *Buffer = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return TryAgain;
+}
+
+/**
+ Append file name to existing file name, and allocate a new buffer
+ to hold the appended result.
+
+ @param[in] Str1 The existing file name
+ @param[in] Str2 The file name to be appended
+
+ @return A new string with appended result.
+
+**/
+CHAR16 *
+AppendFileName (
+ IN CHAR16 *Str1,
+ IN CHAR16 *Str2
+ )
+{
+ UINTN Size1;
+ UINTN Size2;
+ CHAR16 *Str;
+ CHAR16 *TmpStr;
+ CHAR16 *Ptr;
+ CHAR16 *LastSlash;
+
+ Size1 = StrSize (Str1);
+ Size2 = StrSize (Str2);
+ Str = AllocateZeroPool (Size1 + Size2 + sizeof (CHAR16));
+ ASSERT (Str != NULL);
+
+ TmpStr = AllocateZeroPool (Size1 + Size2 + sizeof (CHAR16));
+ ASSERT (TmpStr != NULL);
+
+ StrCat (Str, Str1);
+ if (!((*Str == '\\') && (*(Str + 1) == 0))) {
+ StrCat (Str, L"\\");
+ }
+
+ StrCat (Str, Str2);
+
+ Ptr = Str;
+ LastSlash = Str;
+ while (*Ptr != 0) {
+ if (*Ptr == '\\' && *(Ptr + 1) == '.' && *(Ptr + 2) == '.' && *(Ptr + 3) == L'\\') {
+ //
+ // Convert "\Name\..\" to "\"
+ // DO NOT convert the .. if it is at the end of the string. This will
+ // break the .. behavior in changing directories.
+ //
+
+ //
+ // Use TmpStr as a backup, as StrCpy in BaseLib does not handle copy of two strings
+ // that overlap.
+ //
+ StrCpy (TmpStr, Ptr + 3);
+ StrCpy (LastSlash, TmpStr);
+ Ptr = LastSlash;
+ } else if (*Ptr == '\\' && *(Ptr + 1) == '.' && *(Ptr + 2) == '\\') {
+ //
+ // Convert a "\.\" to a "\"
+ //
+
+ //
+ // Use TmpStr as a backup, as StrCpy in BaseLib does not handle copy of two strings
+ // that overlap.
+ //
+ StrCpy (TmpStr, Ptr + 2);
+ StrCpy (Ptr, TmpStr);
+ Ptr = LastSlash;
+ } else if (*Ptr == '\\') {
+ LastSlash = Ptr;
+ }
+
+ Ptr++;
+ }
+
+ FreePool (TmpStr);
+
+ return Str;
+}
+
+/**
+ Create a SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY, and stores it in a buffer allocated from the pool.
+
+ @return The new menu entry or NULL of error happens.
+
+**/
+SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY *
+CreateMenuEntry (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY *MenuEntry;
+ UINTN ContextSize;
+
+ //
+ // Create new menu entry
+ //
+ MenuEntry = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY));
+ if (MenuEntry == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ContextSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT);
+ MenuEntry->FileContext = AllocateZeroPool (ContextSize);
+ if (MenuEntry->FileContext == NULL) {
+ FreePool (MenuEntry);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ MenuEntry->Signature = SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY_SIGNATURE;
+
+ return MenuEntry;
+}
+
+/**
+ Get Menu Entry from the Menu Entry List by MenuNumber.
+
+ If MenuNumber is great or equal to the number of Menu
+ Entry in the list, then ASSERT.
+
+ @param[in] MenuOption The Menu Entry List to read the menu entry.
+ @param[in] MenuNumber The index of Menu Entry.
+
+ @return The Menu Entry.
+
+**/
+SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY *
+GetMenuEntry (
+ IN SECUREBOOT_MENU_OPTION *MenuOption,
+ IN UINTN MenuNumber
+ )
+{
+ SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY *NewMenuEntry;
+ UINTN Index;
+ LIST_ENTRY *List;
+
+ ASSERT (MenuNumber < MenuOption->MenuNumber);
+
+ List = MenuOption->Head.ForwardLink;
+ for (Index = 0; Index < MenuNumber; Index++) {
+ List = List->ForwardLink;
+ }
+
+ NewMenuEntry = CR (List, SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY, Link, SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY_SIGNATURE);
+
+ return NewMenuEntry;
+}
+
+/**
+ Create string tokens for a menu from its help strings and display strings.
+
+ @param[in] HiiHandle Hii Handle of the package to be updated.
+ @param[in] MenuOption The Menu whose string tokens need to be created.
+
+**/
+VOID
+CreateMenuStringToken (
+ IN EFI_HII_HANDLE HiiHandle,
+ IN SECUREBOOT_MENU_OPTION *MenuOption
+ )
+{
+ SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY *NewMenuEntry;
+ UINTN Index;
+
+ for (Index = 0; Index < MenuOption->MenuNumber; Index++) {
+ NewMenuEntry = GetMenuEntry (MenuOption, Index);
+
+ NewMenuEntry->DisplayStringToken = HiiSetString (
+ HiiHandle,
+ 0,
+ NewMenuEntry->DisplayString,
+ NULL
+ );
+
+ if (NewMenuEntry->HelpString == NULL) {
+ NewMenuEntry->HelpStringToken = NewMenuEntry->DisplayStringToken;
+ } else {
+ NewMenuEntry->HelpStringToken = HiiSetString (
+ HiiHandle,
+ 0,
+ NewMenuEntry->HelpString,
+ NULL
+ );
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ Free up all resources allocated for a SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY.
+
+ @param[in, out] MenuEntry A pointer to SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY.
+
+**/
+VOID
+DestroyMenuEntry (
+ IN OUT SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY *MenuEntry
+ )
+{
+ SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT *FileContext;
+
+
+ FileContext = (SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT *) MenuEntry->FileContext;
+
+ if (!FileContext->IsRoot) {
+ FreePool (FileContext->DevicePath);
+ } else {
+ if (FileContext->FHandle != NULL) {
+ FileContext->FHandle->Close (FileContext->FHandle);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (FileContext->FileName != NULL) {
+ FreePool (FileContext->FileName);
+ }
+ if (FileContext->Info != NULL) {
+ FreePool (FileContext->Info);
+ }
+
+ FreePool (FileContext);
+
+ FreePool (MenuEntry->DisplayString);
+ if (MenuEntry->HelpString != NULL) {
+ FreePool (MenuEntry->HelpString);
+ }
+
+ FreePool (MenuEntry);
+}
+
+/**
+ Free resources allocated in Allocate Rountine.
+
+ @param[in, out] MenuOption Menu to be freed
+
+**/
+VOID
+FreeMenu (
+ IN OUT SECUREBOOT_MENU_OPTION *MenuOption
+ )
+{
+ SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY *MenuEntry;
+ while (!IsListEmpty (&MenuOption->Head)) {
+ MenuEntry = CR (
+ MenuOption->Head.ForwardLink,
+ SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY,
+ Link,
+ SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY_SIGNATURE
+ );
+ RemoveEntryList (&MenuEntry->Link);
+ DestroyMenuEntry (MenuEntry);
+ }
+ MenuOption->MenuNumber = 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ This function gets the file information from an open file descriptor, and stores it
+ in a buffer allocated from pool.
+
+ @param[in] FHand File Handle.
+
+ @return A pointer to a buffer with file information or NULL is returned
+
+**/
+EFI_FILE_INFO *
+FileInfo (
+ IN EFI_FILE_HANDLE FHand
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_FILE_INFO *Buffer;
+ UINTN BufferSize;
+
+ //
+ // Initialize for GrowBuffer loop
+ //
+ Buffer = NULL;
+ BufferSize = SIZE_OF_EFI_FILE_INFO + 200;
+
+ //
+ // Call the real function
+ //
+ while (GrowBuffer (&Status, (VOID **) &Buffer, BufferSize)) {
+ Status = FHand->GetInfo (
+ FHand,
+ &gEfiFileInfoGuid,
+ &BufferSize,
+ Buffer
+ );
+ }
+
+ return Buffer;
+}
+
+/**
+ This function gets the file system information from an open file descriptor,
+ and stores it in a buffer allocated from pool.
+
+ @param[in] FHand The file handle.
+
+ @return A pointer to a buffer with file information.
+ @retval NULL is returned if failed to get Vaolume Label Info.
+
+**/
+EFI_FILE_SYSTEM_VOLUME_LABEL *
+FileSystemVolumeLabelInfo (
+ IN EFI_FILE_HANDLE FHand
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_FILE_SYSTEM_VOLUME_LABEL *Buffer;
+ UINTN BufferSize;
+ //
+ // Initialize for GrowBuffer loop
+ //
+ Buffer = NULL;
+ BufferSize = SIZE_OF_EFI_FILE_SYSTEM_VOLUME_LABEL + 200;
+
+ //
+ // Call the real function
+ //
+ while (GrowBuffer (&Status, (VOID **) &Buffer, BufferSize)) {
+ Status = FHand->GetInfo (
+ FHand,
+ &gEfiFileSystemVolumeLabelInfoIdGuid,
+ &BufferSize,
+ Buffer
+ );
+ }
+
+ return Buffer;
+}
+
+/**
+ This function will open a file or directory referenced by DevicePath.
+
+ This function opens a file with the open mode according to the file path. The
+ Attributes is valid only for EFI_FILE_MODE_CREATE.
+
+ @param[in, out] FilePath On input, the device path to the file.
+ On output, the remaining device path.
+ @param[out] FileHandle Pointer to the file handle.
+ @param[in] OpenMode The mode to open the file with.
+ @param[in] Attributes The file's file attributes.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The information was set.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER One of the parameters has an invalid value.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Could not open the file path.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND The specified file could not be found on the
+ device or the file system could not be found on
+ the device.
+ @retval EFI_NO_MEDIA The device has no medium.
+ @retval EFI_MEDIA_CHANGED The device has a different medium in it or the
+ medium is no longer supported.
+ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The device reported an error.
+ @retval EFI_VOLUME_CORRUPTED The file system structures are corrupted.
+ @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED The file or medium is write protected.
+ @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file was opened read only.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough resources were available to open the
+ file.
+ @retval EFI_VOLUME_FULL The volume is full.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+OpenFileByDevicePath(
+ IN OUT EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL **FilePath,
+ OUT EFI_FILE_HANDLE *FileHandle,
+ IN UINT64 OpenMode,
+ IN UINT64 Attributes
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_SIMPLE_FILE_SYSTEM_PROTOCOL *EfiSimpleFileSystemProtocol;
+ EFI_FILE_PROTOCOL *Handle1;
+ EFI_FILE_PROTOCOL *Handle2;
+ EFI_HANDLE DeviceHandle;
+
+ if ((FilePath == NULL || FileHandle == NULL)) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (
+ &gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid,
+ FilePath,
+ &DeviceHandle
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ Status = gBS->OpenProtocol(
+ DeviceHandle,
+ &gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid,
+ (VOID**)&EfiSimpleFileSystemProtocol,
+ gImageHandle,
+ NULL,
+ EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ Status = EfiSimpleFileSystemProtocol->OpenVolume(EfiSimpleFileSystemProtocol, &Handle1);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ FileHandle = NULL;
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // go down directories one node at a time.
+ //
+ while (!IsDevicePathEnd (*FilePath)) {
+ //
+ // For file system access each node should be a file path component
+ //
+ if (DevicePathType (*FilePath) != MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH ||
+ DevicePathSubType (*FilePath) != MEDIA_FILEPATH_DP
+ ) {
+ FileHandle = NULL;
+ return (EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ }
+ //
+ // Open this file path node
+ //
+ Handle2 = Handle1;
+ Handle1 = NULL;
+
+ //
+ // Try to test opening an existing file
+ //
+ Status = Handle2->Open (
+ Handle2,
+ &Handle1,
+ ((FILEPATH_DEVICE_PATH*)*FilePath)->PathName,
+ OpenMode &~EFI_FILE_MODE_CREATE,
+ 0
+ );
+
+ //
+ // see if the error was that it needs to be created
+ //
+ if ((EFI_ERROR (Status)) && (OpenMode != (OpenMode &~EFI_FILE_MODE_CREATE))) {
+ Status = Handle2->Open (
+ Handle2,
+ &Handle1,
+ ((FILEPATH_DEVICE_PATH*)*FilePath)->PathName,
+ OpenMode,
+ Attributes
+ );
+ }
+ //
+ // Close the last node
+ //
+ Handle2->Close (Handle2);
+
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ return (Status);
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Get the next node
+ //
+ *FilePath = NextDevicePathNode (*FilePath);
+ }
+
+ //
+ // This is a weak spot since if the undefined SHELL_FILE_HANDLE format changes this must change also!
+ //
+ *FileHandle = (VOID*)Handle1;
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ Function opens and returns a file handle to the root directory of a volume.
+
+ @param[in] DeviceHandle A handle for a device
+
+ @return A valid file handle or NULL if error happens.
+
+**/
+EFI_FILE_HANDLE
+OpenRoot (
+ IN EFI_HANDLE DeviceHandle
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_SIMPLE_FILE_SYSTEM_PROTOCOL *Volume;
+ EFI_FILE_HANDLE File;
+
+ File = NULL;
+
+ //
+ // File the file system interface to the device
+ //
+ Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (
+ DeviceHandle,
+ &gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid,
+ (VOID *) &Volume
+ );
+
+ //
+ // Open the root directory of the volume
+ //
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ Status = Volume->OpenVolume (
+ Volume,
+ &File
+ );
+ }
+ //
+ // Done
+ //
+ return EFI_ERROR (Status) ? NULL : File;
+}
+
+/**
+ This function builds the FsOptionMenu list which records all
+ available file system in the system. They include all instances
+ of EFI_SIMPLE_FILE_SYSTEM_PROTOCOL, all instances of EFI_LOAD_FILE_SYSTEM
+ and all type of legacy boot device.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Success find the file system
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Can not create menu entry
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+FindFileSystem (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ UINTN NoBlkIoHandles;
+ UINTN NoSimpleFsHandles;
+ UINTN NoLoadFileHandles;
+ EFI_HANDLE *BlkIoHandle;
+ EFI_HANDLE *SimpleFsHandle;
+ UINT16 *VolumeLabel;
+ EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlkIo;
+ UINTN Index;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY *MenuEntry;
+ SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT *FileContext;
+ UINT16 *TempStr;
+ UINTN OptionNumber;
+ VOID *Buffer;
+
+ BOOLEAN RemovableMedia;
+
+
+ NoSimpleFsHandles = 0;
+ NoLoadFileHandles = 0;
+ OptionNumber = 0;
+ InitializeListHead (&FsOptionMenu.Head);
+
+ //
+ // Locate Handles that support BlockIo protocol
+ //
+ Status = gBS->LocateHandleBuffer (
+ ByProtocol,
+ &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,
+ NULL,
+ &NoBlkIoHandles,
+ &BlkIoHandle
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+
+ for (Index = 0; Index < NoBlkIoHandles; Index++) {
+ Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (
+ BlkIoHandle[Index],
+ &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,
+ (VOID **) &BlkIo
+ );
+
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Issue a dummy read to trigger reinstall of BlockIo protocol for removable media
+ //
+ if (BlkIo->Media->RemovableMedia) {
+ Buffer = AllocateZeroPool (BlkIo->Media->BlockSize);
+ if (NULL == Buffer) {
+ FreePool (BlkIoHandle);
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ BlkIo->ReadBlocks (
+ BlkIo,
+ BlkIo->Media->MediaId,
+ 0,
+ BlkIo->Media->BlockSize,
+ Buffer
+ );
+ FreePool (Buffer);
+ }
+ }
+ FreePool (BlkIoHandle);
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Locate Handles that support Simple File System protocol
+ //
+ Status = gBS->LocateHandleBuffer (
+ ByProtocol,
+ &gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid,
+ NULL,
+ &NoSimpleFsHandles,
+ &SimpleFsHandle
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // Find all the instances of the File System prototocol
+ //
+ for (Index = 0; Index < NoSimpleFsHandles; Index++) {
+ Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (
+ SimpleFsHandle[Index],
+ &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,
+ (VOID **) &BlkIo
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // If no block IO exists assume it's NOT a removable media
+ //
+ RemovableMedia = FALSE;
+ } else {
+ //
+ // If block IO exists check to see if it's remobable media
+ //
+ RemovableMedia = BlkIo->Media->RemovableMedia;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Allocate pool for this instance.
+ //
+ MenuEntry = CreateMenuEntry ();
+ if (NULL == MenuEntry) {
+ FreePool (SimpleFsHandle);
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ FileContext = (SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT *) MenuEntry->FileContext;
+
+ FileContext->Handle = SimpleFsHandle[Index];
+ MenuEntry->OptionNumber = Index;
+ FileContext->FHandle = OpenRoot (FileContext->Handle);
+ if (FileContext->FHandle == NULL) {
+ DestroyMenuEntry (MenuEntry);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ MenuEntry->HelpString = DevicePathToStr (DevicePathFromHandle (FileContext->Handle));
+ FileContext->Info = FileSystemVolumeLabelInfo (FileContext->FHandle);
+ FileContext->FileName = StrDuplicate (L"\\");
+ FileContext->DevicePath = FileDevicePath (
+ FileContext->Handle,
+ FileContext->FileName
+ );
+ FileContext->IsDir = TRUE;
+ FileContext->IsRoot = TRUE;
+ FileContext->IsRemovableMedia = RemovableMedia;
+ FileContext->IsLoadFile = FALSE;
+
+ //
+ // Get current file system's Volume Label
+ //
+ if (FileContext->Info == NULL) {
+ VolumeLabel = L"NO FILE SYSTEM INFO";
+ } else {
+ if (FileContext->Info->VolumeLabel == NULL) {
+ VolumeLabel = L"NULL VOLUME LABEL";
+ } else {
+ VolumeLabel = FileContext->Info->VolumeLabel;
+ if (*VolumeLabel == 0x0000) {
+ VolumeLabel = L"NO VOLUME LABEL";
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ TempStr = MenuEntry->HelpString;
+ MenuEntry->DisplayString = AllocateZeroPool (MAX_CHAR);
+ ASSERT (MenuEntry->DisplayString != NULL);
+ UnicodeSPrint (
+ MenuEntry->DisplayString,
+ MAX_CHAR,
+ L"%s, [%s]",
+ VolumeLabel,
+ TempStr
+ );
+ OptionNumber++;
+ InsertTailList (&FsOptionMenu.Head, &MenuEntry->Link);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (NoSimpleFsHandles != 0) {
+ FreePool (SimpleFsHandle);
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Remember how many file system options are here
+ //
+ FsOptionMenu.MenuNumber = OptionNumber;
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ Find files under the current directory. All files and sub-directories
+ in current directory will be stored in DirectoryMenu for future use.
+
+ @param[in] MenuEntry The Menu Entry.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get files from current dir successfully.
+ @return Other Can't get files from current dir.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+FindFiles (
+ IN SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY *MenuEntry
+ )
+{
+ EFI_FILE_HANDLE NewDir;
+ EFI_FILE_HANDLE Dir;
+ EFI_FILE_INFO *DirInfo;
+ UINTN BufferSize;
+ UINTN DirBufferSize;
+ SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY *NewMenuEntry;
+ SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT *FileContext;
+ SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT *NewFileContext;
+ UINTN Pass;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINTN OptionNumber;
+
+ FileContext = (SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT *) MenuEntry->FileContext;
+ Dir = FileContext->FHandle;
+ OptionNumber = 0;
+ //
+ // Open current directory to get files from it
+ //
+ Status = Dir->Open (
+ Dir,
+ &NewDir,
+ FileContext->FileName,
+ EFI_FILE_READ_ONLY,
+ 0
+ );
+ if (!FileContext->IsRoot) {
+ Dir->Close (Dir);
+ }
+
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ DirInfo = FileInfo (NewDir);
+ if (DirInfo == NULL) {
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ if ((DirInfo->Attribute & EFI_FILE_DIRECTORY) == 0) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ FileContext->DevicePath = FileDevicePath (
+ FileContext->Handle,
+ FileContext->FileName
+ );
+
+ DirBufferSize = sizeof (EFI_FILE_INFO) + 1024;
+ DirInfo = AllocateZeroPool (DirBufferSize);
+ if (DirInfo == NULL) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Get all files in current directory
+ // Pass 1 to get Directories
+ // Pass 2 to get files that are EFI images
+ //
+ for (Pass = 1; Pass <= 2; Pass++) {
+ NewDir->SetPosition (NewDir, 0);
+ for (;;) {
+ BufferSize = DirBufferSize;
+ Status = NewDir->Read (NewDir, &BufferSize, DirInfo);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || BufferSize == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (((DirInfo->Attribute & EFI_FILE_DIRECTORY) != 0 && Pass == 2) ||
+ ((DirInfo->Attribute & EFI_FILE_DIRECTORY) == 0 && Pass == 1)
+ ) {
+ //
+ // Pass 1 is for Directories
+ // Pass 2 is for file names
+ //
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ NewMenuEntry = CreateMenuEntry ();
+ if (NULL == NewMenuEntry) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ NewFileContext = (SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT *) NewMenuEntry->FileContext;
+ NewFileContext->Handle = FileContext->Handle;
+ NewFileContext->FileName = AppendFileName (
+ FileContext->FileName,
+ DirInfo->FileName
+ );
+ NewFileContext->FHandle = NewDir;
+ NewFileContext->DevicePath = FileDevicePath (
+ NewFileContext->Handle,
+ NewFileContext->FileName
+ );
+ NewMenuEntry->HelpString = NULL;
+
+ NewFileContext->IsDir = (BOOLEAN) ((DirInfo->Attribute & EFI_FILE_DIRECTORY) == EFI_FILE_DIRECTORY);
+ if (NewFileContext->IsDir) {
+ BufferSize = StrLen (DirInfo->FileName) * 2 + 6;
+ NewMenuEntry->DisplayString = AllocateZeroPool (BufferSize);
+
+ UnicodeSPrint (
+ NewMenuEntry->DisplayString,
+ BufferSize,
+ L"<%s>",
+ DirInfo->FileName
+ );
+
+ } else {
+ NewMenuEntry->DisplayString = StrDuplicate (DirInfo->FileName);
+ }
+
+ NewFileContext->IsRoot = FALSE;
+ NewFileContext->IsLoadFile = FALSE;
+ NewFileContext->IsRemovableMedia = FALSE;
+
+ NewMenuEntry->OptionNumber = OptionNumber;
+ OptionNumber++;
+ InsertTailList (&DirectoryMenu.Head, &NewMenuEntry->Link);
+ }
+ }
+
+ DirectoryMenu.MenuNumber = OptionNumber;
+ FreePool (DirInfo);
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ Refresh the global UpdateData structure.
+
+**/
+VOID
+RefreshUpdateData (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ //
+ // Free current updated date
+ //
+ if (mStartOpCodeHandle != NULL) {
+ HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (mStartOpCodeHandle);
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Create new OpCode Handle
+ //
+ mStartOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();
+
+ //
+ // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode as the start opcode
+ //
+ mStartLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (
+ mStartOpCodeHandle,
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,
+ NULL,
+ sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)
+ );
+ mStartLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;
+}
+
+/**
+ Update the File Explore page.
+
+ @param[in] HiiHandle Hii Handle of the package to be updated.
+ @param[in] MenuOption The Menu whose string tokens need to be updated.
+ @param[in] FeCurrentState Current file explorer state.
+
+**/
+VOID
+UpdateFileExplorePage (
+ IN EFI_HII_HANDLE HiiHandle,
+ IN SECUREBOOT_MENU_OPTION *MenuOption,
+ IN FILE_EXPLORER_STATE FeCurrentState
+ )
+{
+ UINTN Index;
+ SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY *NewMenuEntry;
+ SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT *NewFileContext;
+ EFI_FORM_ID FormId;
+ EFI_FORM_ID FileFormId;
+
+ if (FeCurrentState == FileExplorerStateEnrollPkFile) {
+ FormId = SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID;
+ FileFormId = FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_PK;
+ } else if (FeCurrentState == FileExplorerStateEnrollKekFile) {
+ FormId = FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM;
+ FileFormId = FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_KEK;
+ } else if (FeCurrentState == FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDb) {
+ FormId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB;
+ FileFormId = FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_DB;
+ } else if (FeCurrentState == FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDbx) {
+ FormId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX;
+ FileFormId = FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_DBX;
+ } else {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ NewMenuEntry = NULL;
+ NewFileContext = NULL;
+
+ RefreshUpdateData ();
+ mStartLabel->Number = FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID;
+
+ for (Index = 0; Index < MenuOption->MenuNumber; Index++) {
+ NewMenuEntry = GetMenuEntry (MenuOption, Index);
+ NewFileContext = (SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT *) NewMenuEntry->FileContext;
+
+ if (NewFileContext->IsDir) {
+ //
+ // Create Text opcode for directory.
+ //
+ HiiCreateActionOpCode (
+ mStartOpCodeHandle,
+ (UINT16) (FILE_OPTION_OFFSET + Index),
+ NewMenuEntry->DisplayStringToken,
+ STRING_TOKEN (STR_NULL),
+ EFI_IFR_FLAG_CALLBACK,
+ 0
+ );
+ } else {
+
+ //
+ // Create Goto opcode for file.
+ //
+ HiiCreateGotoOpCode (
+ mStartOpCodeHandle,
+ FormId,
+ NewMenuEntry->DisplayStringToken,
+ STRING_TOKEN (STR_NULL),
+ EFI_IFR_FLAG_CALLBACK,
+ (UINT16) (FILE_OPTION_OFFSET + Index)
+ );
+ }
+ }
+
+ HiiUpdateForm (
+ HiiHandle,
+ &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid,
+ FileFormId,
+ mStartOpCodeHandle, // Label FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID
+ mEndOpCodeHandle // LABEL_END
+ );
+}
+
+/**
+ Update the file explorer page with the refreshed file system.
+
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module private data.
+ @param[in] KeyValue Key value to identify the type of data to expect.
+
+ @retval TRUE Inform the caller to create a callback packet to exit file explorer.
+ @retval FALSE Indicate that there is no need to exit file explorer.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+UpdateFileExplorer (
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,
+ IN UINT16 KeyValue
+ )
+{
+ UINT16 FileOptionMask;
+ SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY *NewMenuEntry;
+ SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT *NewFileContext;
+ EFI_FORM_ID FormId;
+ BOOLEAN ExitFileExplorer;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *TmpDevicePath;
+
+ NewMenuEntry = NULL;
+ NewFileContext = NULL;
+ ExitFileExplorer = FALSE;
+ FileOptionMask = (UINT16) (FILE_OPTION_MASK & KeyValue);
+
+ if (PrivateData->FeDisplayContext == FileExplorerDisplayUnknown) {
+ //
+ // First in, display file system.
+ //
+ FreeMenu (&FsOptionMenu);
+ FindFileSystem ();
+
+ CreateMenuStringToken (PrivateData->HiiHandle, &FsOptionMenu);
+ UpdateFileExplorePage (PrivateData->HiiHandle, &FsOptionMenu, PrivateData->FeCurrentState);
+
+ PrivateData->FeDisplayContext = FileExplorerDisplayFileSystem;
+ } else {
+ if (PrivateData->FeDisplayContext == FileExplorerDisplayFileSystem) {
+ NewMenuEntry = GetMenuEntry (&FsOptionMenu, FileOptionMask);
+ } else if (PrivateData->FeDisplayContext == FileExplorerDisplayDirectory) {
+ NewMenuEntry = GetMenuEntry (&DirectoryMenu, FileOptionMask);
+ }
+
+ NewFileContext = (SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT *) NewMenuEntry->FileContext;
+
+ if (NewFileContext->IsDir ) {
+ PrivateData->FeDisplayContext = FileExplorerDisplayDirectory;
+
+ RemoveEntryList (&NewMenuEntry->Link);
+ FreeMenu (&DirectoryMenu);
+ Status = FindFiles (NewMenuEntry);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ ExitFileExplorer = TRUE;
+ goto OnExit;
+ }
+ CreateMenuStringToken (PrivateData->HiiHandle, &DirectoryMenu);
+ DestroyMenuEntry (NewMenuEntry);
+
+ UpdateFileExplorePage (PrivateData->HiiHandle, &DirectoryMenu, PrivateData->FeCurrentState);
+
+ } else {
+ if (PrivateData->FeCurrentState == FileExplorerStateEnrollPkFile) {
+ FormId = SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID;
+ } else if (PrivateData->FeCurrentState == FileExplorerStateEnrollKekFile) {
+ FormId = FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM;
+ } else if (PrivateData->FeCurrentState == FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDb) {
+ FormId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB;
+ } else if (PrivateData->FeCurrentState == FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDbx) {
+ FormId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX;
+ } else {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ PrivateData->MenuEntry = NewMenuEntry;
+ PrivateData->FileContext->FileName = NewFileContext->FileName;
+
+ TmpDevicePath = NewFileContext->DevicePath;
+ OpenFileByDevicePath (
+ &TmpDevicePath,
+ &PrivateData->FileContext->FHandle,
+ EFI_FILE_MODE_READ,
+ 0
+ );
+
+ //
+ // Create Subtitle op-code for the display string of the option.
+ //
+ RefreshUpdateData ();
+ mStartLabel->Number = FormId;
+
+ HiiCreateSubTitleOpCode (
+ mStartOpCodeHandle,
+ NewMenuEntry->DisplayStringToken,
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ 0
+ );
+
+ HiiUpdateForm (
+ PrivateData->HiiHandle,
+ &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid,
+ FormId,
+ mStartOpCodeHandle, // Label FormId
+ mEndOpCodeHandle // LABEL_END
+ );
+ }
+ }
+
+OnExit:
+ return ExitFileExplorer;
+}
+
+/**
+ Clean up the dynamic opcode at label and form specified by both LabelId.
+
+ @param[in] LabelId It is both the Form ID and Label ID for opcode deletion.
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module private data.
+
+**/
+VOID
+CleanUpPage (
+ IN UINT16 LabelId,
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData
+ )
+{
+ RefreshUpdateData ();
+
+ //
+ // Remove all op-codes from dynamic page
+ //
+ mStartLabel->Number = LabelId;
+ HiiUpdateForm (
+ PrivateData->HiiHandle,
+ &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid,
+ LabelId,
+ mStartOpCodeHandle, // Label LabelId
+ mEndOpCodeHandle // LABEL_END
+ );
+}
+
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c82c0f4f95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2804 @@
+/** @file
+ HII Config Access protocol implementation of SecureBoot configuration module.
+
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+
+#include "SecureBootConfigImpl.h"
+
+CHAR16 mSecureBootStorageName[] = L"SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION";
+
+SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA mSecureBootConfigPrivateDateTemplate = {
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA_SIGNATURE,
+ {
+ SecureBootExtractConfig,
+ SecureBootRouteConfig,
+ SecureBootCallback
+ }
+};
+
+HII_VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath = {
+ {
+ {
+ HARDWARE_DEVICE_PATH,
+ HW_VENDOR_DP,
+ {
+ (UINT8) (sizeof (VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH)),
+ (UINT8) ((sizeof (VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH)) >> 8)
+ }
+ },
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_FORM_SET_GUID
+ },
+ {
+ END_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE,
+ END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE,
+ {
+ (UINT8) (END_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH),
+ (UINT8) ((END_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH) >> 8)
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+
+//
+// OID ASN.1 Value for Hash Algorithms
+//
+UINT8 mHashOidValue[] = {
+ 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, // OBJ_md5
+ 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, // OBJ_sha1
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, // OBJ_sha224
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, // OBJ_sha256
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, // OBJ_sha384
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, // OBJ_sha512
+ };
+
+HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {
+ { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[8], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init, Sha1Update, Sha1Final },
+ { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[13], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },
+ { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[22], 9, Sha256GetContextSize,Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final},
+ { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[31], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },
+ { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[40], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+//
+// Variable Definitions
+//
+UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;
+WIN_CERTIFICATE *mCertificate = NULL;
+IMAGE_TYPE mImageType;
+UINT8 *mImageBase = NULL;
+UINTN mImageSize = 0;
+UINT8 mImageDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+UINTN mImageDigestSize;
+EFI_GUID mCertType;
+EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY *mSecDataDir = NULL;
+EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION mNtHeader;
+
+//
+// Possible DER-encoded certificate file suffixes, end with NULL pointer.
+//
+CHAR16* mDerEncodedSuffix[] = {
+ L".cer",
+ L".der",
+ L".crt",
+ NULL
+};
+CHAR16* mSupportX509Suffix = L"*.cer/der/crt";
+
+/**
+ This code checks if the FileSuffix is one of the possible DER-encoded certificate suffix.
+
+ @param[in] FileSuffix The suffix of the input certificate file
+
+ @retval TRUE It's a DER-encoded certificate.
+ @retval FALSE It's NOT a DER-encoded certificate.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsDerEncodeCertificate (
+ IN CONST CHAR16 *FileSuffix
+)
+{
+ UINTN Index;
+ for (Index = 0; mDerEncodedSuffix[Index] != NULL; Index++) {
+ if (StrCmp (FileSuffix, mDerEncodedSuffix[Index]) == 0) {
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+/**
+ Set Secure Boot option into variable space.
+
+ @param[in] VarValue The option of Secure Boot.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is finished successfully.
+ @retval Others Other errors as indicated.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+SaveSecureBootVariable (
+ IN UINT8 VarValue
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,
+ &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
+ sizeof (UINT8),
+ &VarValue
+ );
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Create a time based data payload by concatenating the EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2
+ descriptor with the input data. NO authentication is required in this function.
+
+ @param[in, out] DataSize On input, the size of Data buffer in bytes.
+ On output, the size of data returned in Data
+ buffer in bytes.
+ @param[in, out] Data On input, Pointer to data buffer to be wrapped or
+ pointer to NULL to wrap an empty payload.
+ On output, Pointer to the new payload date buffer allocated from pool,
+ it's caller's responsibility to free the memory when finish using it.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Create time based payload successfully.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resourses to create time based payload.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.
+ @retval Others Unexpected error happens.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+CreateTimeBasedPayload (
+ IN OUT UINTN *DataSize,
+ IN OUT UINT8 **Data
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINT8 *NewData;
+ UINT8 *Payload;
+ UINTN PayloadSize;
+ EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *DescriptorData;
+ UINTN DescriptorSize;
+ EFI_TIME Time;
+
+ if (Data == NULL || DataSize == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // In Setup mode or Custom mode, the variable does not need to be signed but the
+ // parameters to the SetVariable() call still need to be prepared as authenticated
+ // variable. So we create EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_2 descriptor without certificate
+ // data in it.
+ //
+ Payload = *Data;
+ PayloadSize = *DataSize;
+
+ DescriptorSize = OFFSET_OF (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2, AuthInfo) + OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData);
+ NewData = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DescriptorSize + PayloadSize);
+ if (NewData == NULL) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ if ((Payload != NULL) && (PayloadSize != 0)) {
+ CopyMem (NewData + DescriptorSize, Payload, PayloadSize);
+ }
+
+ DescriptorData = (EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 *) (NewData);
+
+ ZeroMem (&Time, sizeof (EFI_TIME));
+ Status = gRT->GetTime (&Time, NULL);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ FreePool(NewData);
+ return Status;
+ }
+ Time.Pad1 = 0;
+ Time.Nanosecond = 0;
+ Time.TimeZone = 0;
+ Time.Daylight = 0;
+ Time.Pad2 = 0;
+ CopyMem (&DescriptorData->TimeStamp, &Time, sizeof (EFI_TIME));
+
+ DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.dwLength = OFFSET_OF (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData);
+ DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wRevision = 0x0200;
+ DescriptorData->AuthInfo.Hdr.wCertificateType = WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID;
+ CopyGuid (&DescriptorData->AuthInfo.CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid);
+
+ if (Payload != NULL) {
+ FreePool(Payload);
+ }
+
+ *DataSize = DescriptorSize + PayloadSize;
+ *Data = NewData;
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ Internal helper function to delete a Variable given its name and GUID, NO authentication
+ required.
+
+ @param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.
+ @param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Variable deleted successfully.
+ @retval Others The driver failed to start the device.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+DeleteVariable (
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
+ IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ VOID* Variable;
+ UINT8 *Data;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+ UINT32 Attr;
+
+ GetVariable2 (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Variable, NULL);
+ if (Variable == NULL) {
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ Data = NULL;
+ DataSize = 0;
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
+
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &Data);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable (
+ VariableName,
+ VendorGuid,
+ Attr,
+ DataSize,
+ Data
+ );
+ if (Data != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Data);
+ }
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Generate the PK signature list from the X509 Certificate storing file (.cer)
+
+ @param[in] X509File FileHandle of X509 Certificate storing file.
+ @param[out] PkCert Point to the data buffer to store the signature list.
+
+ @return EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported Key Length.
+ @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough memory resourses to form the signature list.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+CreatePkX509SignatureList (
+ IN EFI_FILE_HANDLE X509File,
+ OUT EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST **PkCert
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINT8 *X509Data;
+ UINTN X509DataSize;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *PkCertData;
+
+ X509Data = NULL;
+ PkCertData = NULL;
+ X509DataSize = 0;
+
+ Status = ReadFileContent (X509File, (VOID**) &X509Data, &X509DataSize, 0);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+ ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);
+
+ //
+ // Allocate space for PK certificate list and initialize it.
+ // Create PK database entry with SignatureHeaderSize equals 0.
+ //
+ *PkCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) AllocateZeroPool (
+ sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1
+ + X509DataSize
+ );
+ if (*PkCert == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ (*PkCert)->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)
+ + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1
+ + X509DataSize);
+ (*PkCert)->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);
+ (*PkCert)->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;
+ CopyGuid (&(*PkCert)->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);
+ PkCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINTN)(*PkCert)
+ + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)
+ + (*PkCert)->SignatureHeaderSize);
+ CopyGuid (&PkCertData->SignatureOwner, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid);
+ //
+ // Fill the PK database with PKpub data from X509 certificate file.
+ //
+ CopyMem (&(PkCertData->SignatureData[0]), X509Data, X509DataSize);
+
+ON_EXIT:
+
+ if (X509Data != NULL) {
+ FreePool (X509Data);
+ }
+
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status) && *PkCert != NULL) {
+ FreePool (*PkCert);
+ *PkCert = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Enroll new PK into the System without original PK's authentication.
+
+ The SignatureOwner GUID will be the same with PK's vendorguid.
+
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New PK enrolled successfully.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EnrollPlatformKey (
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA* Private
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINT32 Attr;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *PkCert;
+ UINT16* FilePostFix;
+
+ if (Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ PkCert = NULL;
+
+ //
+ // Parse the file's postfix. Only support DER encoded X.509 certificate files.
+ //
+ FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName) - 4;
+ if (!IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Unsupported file type, only DER encoded certificate (%s) is supported.", mSupportX509Suffix));
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "FileName= %s\n", Private->FileContext->FileName));
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "FilePostFix = %s\n", FilePostFix));
+
+ //
+ // Prase the selected PK file and generature PK certificate list.
+ //
+ Status = CreatePkX509SignatureList (
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,
+ &PkCert
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+ ASSERT (PkCert != NULL);
+
+ //
+ // Set Platform Key variable.
+ //
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
+ DataSize = PkCert->SignatureListSize;
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, (UINT8**) &PkCert);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable(
+ EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ Attr,
+ DataSize,
+ PkCert
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ if (Status == EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Enroll PK failed with out of resource.\n"));
+ }
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ON_EXIT:
+
+ if (PkCert != NULL) {
+ FreePool(PkCert);
+ }
+
+ if (Private->FileContext->FHandle != NULL) {
+ CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Remove the PK variable.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete PK successfully.
+ @retval Others Could not allow to delete PK.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+DeletePlatformKey (
+ VOID
+)
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ Status = DeleteVariable (
+ EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid
+ );
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Enroll a new KEK item from public key storing file (*.pbk).
+
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New KEK enrolled successfully.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EnrollRsa2048ToKek (
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINT32 Attr;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekSigList;
+ UINTN KeyBlobSize;
+ UINT8 *KeyBlob;
+ CPL_KEY_INFO *KeyInfo;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KEKSigData;
+ UINTN KekSigListSize;
+ UINT8 *KeyBuffer;
+ UINTN KeyLenInBytes;
+
+ Attr = 0;
+ DataSize = 0;
+ KeyBuffer = NULL;
+ KeyBlobSize = 0;
+ KeyBlob = NULL;
+ KeyInfo = NULL;
+ KEKSigData = NULL;
+ KekSigList = NULL;
+ KekSigListSize = 0;
+
+ //
+ // Form the KeKpub certificate list into EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST type.
+ // First, We have to parse out public key data from the pbk key file.
+ //
+ Status = ReadFileContent (
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,
+ (VOID**) &KeyBlob,
+ &KeyBlobSize,
+ 0
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+ ASSERT (KeyBlob != NULL);
+ KeyInfo = (CPL_KEY_INFO *) KeyBlob;
+ if (KeyInfo->KeyLengthInBits / 8 != WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Unsupported key length, Only RSA2048 is supported.\n"));
+ Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Convert the Public key to fix octet string format represented in RSA PKCS#1.
+ //
+ KeyLenInBytes = KeyInfo->KeyLengthInBits / 8;
+ KeyBuffer = AllocateZeroPool (KeyLenInBytes);
+ if (KeyBuffer == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+ Int2OctStr (
+ (UINTN*) (KeyBlob + sizeof (CPL_KEY_INFO)),
+ KeyLenInBytes / sizeof (UINTN),
+ KeyBuffer,
+ KeyLenInBytes
+ );
+ CopyMem(KeyBlob + sizeof(CPL_KEY_INFO), KeyBuffer, KeyLenInBytes);
+
+ //
+ // Form an new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.
+ //
+ KekSigListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)
+ + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1
+ + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;
+
+ KekSigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) AllocateZeroPool (KekSigListSize);
+ if (KekSigList == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ KekSigList->SignatureListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)
+ + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1
+ + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;
+ KekSigList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;
+ KekSigList->SignatureSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE;
+ CopyGuid (&KekSigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid);
+
+ KEKSigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*)((UINT8*)KekSigList + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));
+ CopyGuid (&KEKSigData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);
+ CopyMem (
+ KEKSigData->SignatureData,
+ KeyBlob + sizeof(CPL_KEY_INFO),
+ WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE
+ );
+
+ //
+ // Check if KEK entry has been already existed.
+ // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the
+ // new KEK to original variable.
+ //
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8**) &KekSigList);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable(
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ NULL,
+ &DataSize,
+ NULL
+ );
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;
+ } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Done. Now we have formed the correct KEKpub database item, just set it into variable storage,
+ //
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable(
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ Attr,
+ KekSigListSize,
+ KekSigList
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ON_EXIT:
+
+ CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;
+ Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;
+
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);
+ Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (KeyBlob != NULL) {
+ FreePool (KeyBlob);
+ }
+ if (KeyBuffer != NULL) {
+ FreePool (KeyBuffer);
+ }
+ if (KekSigList != NULL) {
+ FreePool (KekSigList);
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Enroll a new KEK item from X509 certificate file.
+
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New X509 is enrolled successfully.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EnrollX509ToKek (
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINTN X509DataSize;
+ VOID *X509Data;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KEKSigData;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekSigList;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+ UINTN KekSigListSize;
+ UINT32 Attr;
+
+ X509Data = NULL;
+ X509DataSize = 0;
+ KekSigList = NULL;
+ KekSigListSize = 0;
+ DataSize = 0;
+ KEKSigData = NULL;
+
+ Status = ReadFileContent (
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,
+ &X509Data,
+ &X509DataSize,
+ 0
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+ ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);
+
+ KekSigListSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize;
+ KekSigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) AllocateZeroPool (KekSigListSize);
+ if (KekSigList == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Fill Certificate Database parameters.
+ //
+ KekSigList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) KekSigListSize;
+ KekSigList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;
+ KekSigList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);
+ CopyGuid (&KekSigList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);
+
+ KEKSigData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINT8*) KekSigList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));
+ CopyGuid (&KEKSigData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);
+ CopyMem (KEKSigData->SignatureData, X509Data, X509DataSize);
+
+ //
+ // Check if KEK been already existed.
+ // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the
+ // new kek to original variable
+ //
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&KekSigListSize, (UINT8**) &KekSigList);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable(
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ NULL,
+ &DataSize,
+ NULL
+ );
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;
+ } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable(
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ Attr,
+ KekSigListSize,
+ KekSigList
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ON_EXIT:
+
+ CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);
+ Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;
+
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);
+ Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (KekSigList != NULL) {
+ FreePool (KekSigList);
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Enroll new KEK into the System without PK's authentication.
+ The SignatureOwner GUID will be Private->SignatureGUID.
+
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New KEK enrolled successful.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.
+ @retval others Fail to enroll KEK data.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EnrollKeyExchangeKey (
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private
+ )
+{
+ UINT16* FilePostFix;
+
+ if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Parse the file's postfix. Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate,
+ // and .pbk as RSA public key file.
+ //
+ FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName) - 4;
+ if (IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {
+ return EnrollX509ToKek (Private);
+ } else if (CompareMem (FilePostFix, L".pbk",4) == 0) {
+ return EnrollRsa2048ToKek (Private);
+ } else {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ Enroll a new X509 certificate into Signature Database (DB or DBX) without
+ KEK's authentication.
+
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.
+ @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New X509 is enrolled successfully.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EnrollX509toSigDB (
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINTN X509DataSize;
+ VOID *X509Data;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigDBCert;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SigDBCertData;
+ VOID *Data;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+ UINTN SigDBSize;
+ UINT32 Attr;
+
+ X509DataSize = 0;
+ SigDBSize = 0;
+ DataSize = 0;
+ X509Data = NULL;
+ SigDBCert = NULL;
+ SigDBCertData = NULL;
+ Data = NULL;
+
+ Status = ReadFileContent (
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,
+ &X509Data,
+ &X509DataSize,
+ 0
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+ ASSERT (X509Data != NULL);
+
+ SigDBSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize;
+
+ Data = AllocateZeroPool (SigDBSize);
+ if (Data == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Fill Certificate Database parameters.
+ //
+ SigDBCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;
+ SigDBCert->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SigDBSize;
+ SigDBCert->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;
+ SigDBCert->SignatureSize = (UINT32) (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + X509DataSize);
+ CopyGuid (&SigDBCert->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid);
+
+ SigDBCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*) ((UINT8* ) SigDBCert + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));
+ CopyGuid (&SigDBCertData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);
+ CopyMem ((UINT8* ) (SigDBCertData->SignatureData), X509Data, X509DataSize);
+
+ //
+ // Check if signature database entry has been already existed.
+ // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the
+ // new signature data to original variable
+ //
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8**) &Data);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable(
+ VariableName,
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
+ NULL,
+ &DataSize,
+ NULL
+ );
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;
+ } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable(
+ VariableName,
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
+ Attr,
+ SigDBSize,
+ Data
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ON_EXIT:
+
+ CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);
+ Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;
+
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);
+ Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (Data != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Data);
+ }
+
+ if (X509Data != NULL) {
+ FreePool (X509Data);
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Load PE/COFF image information into internal buffer and check its validity.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successful
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Invalid PE/COFF file
+ @retval EFI_ABORTED Serious error occurs, like file I/O error etc.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+LoadPeImage (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;
+ EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *NtHeader32;
+ EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *NtHeader64;
+
+ NtHeader32 = NULL;
+ NtHeader64 = NULL;
+ //
+ // Read the Dos header
+ //
+ DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER*)(mImageBase);
+ if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE)
+ {
+ //
+ // DOS image header is present,
+ // So read the PE header after the DOS image header
+ //
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Read PE header and check the signature validity and machine compatibility
+ //
+ NtHeader32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32*) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);
+ if (NtHeader32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE)
+ {
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ mNtHeader.Pe32 = NtHeader32;
+
+ //
+ // Check the architecture field of PE header and get the Certificate Data Directory data
+ // Note the size of FileHeader field is constant for both IA32 and X64 arch
+ //
+ if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA32)
+ || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_EBC)) {
+ //
+ // IA-32 Architecture
+ //
+ mImageType = ImageType_IA32;
+ mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]);
+ }
+ else if ((NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_IA64)
+ || (NtHeader32->FileHeader.Machine == EFI_IMAGE_MACHINE_X64)) {
+ //
+ // 64-bits Architecture
+ //
+ mImageType = ImageType_X64;
+ NtHeader64 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);
+ mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY*) &(NtHeader64->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]);
+ } else {
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ Calculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in
+ PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A
+
+ @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.
+
+ @retval TRUE Successfully hash image.
+ @retval FALSE Fail in hash image.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+HashPeImage (
+ IN UINT32 HashAlg
+ )
+{
+ BOOLEAN Status;
+ UINT16 Magic;
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;
+ VOID *HashCtx;
+ UINTN CtxSize;
+ UINT8 *HashBase;
+ UINTN HashSize;
+ UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;
+ UINTN Index;
+ UINTN Pos;
+
+ HashCtx = NULL;
+ SectionHeader = NULL;
+ Status = FALSE;
+
+ if ((HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA1) && (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256)) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Initialize context of hash.
+ //
+ ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+ if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA1) {
+ mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ mCertType = gEfiCertSha1Guid;
+ } else if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA256) {
+ mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;
+ }
+
+ CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();
+
+ HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);
+ ASSERT (HashCtx != NULL);
+
+ // 1. Load the image header into memory.
+
+ // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ //
+ // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;
+ // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded
+ //
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value
+ // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the
+ // Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
+ // then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
+ //
+ Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header
+ //
+ Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.
+ // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.
+ //
+ HashBase = mImageBase;
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset.
+ //
+ HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset.
+ //
+ HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);
+ }
+
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ //
+ // 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).
+ // 6. Get the address of the beginning of the Cert Directory.
+ // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.
+ //
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset.
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
+ HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset.
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
+ HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);
+ }
+
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ //
+ // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)
+ // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.
+ //
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];
+ HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset.
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];
+ HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);
+ }
+
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ //
+ // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.
+ //
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset.
+ //
+ SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset
+ //
+ SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
+ // structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image
+ // header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any
+ // IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.
+ //
+ SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);
+ ASSERT (SectionHeader != NULL);
+ //
+ // 12. Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as
+ // a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other
+ // words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of
+ // the section.
+ //
+ Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) (
+ mImageBase +
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset +
+ sizeof (UINT32) +
+ sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +
+ mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader
+ );
+ for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {
+ Pos = Index;
+ while ((Pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[Pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {
+ CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], &SectionHeader[Pos - 1], sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));
+ Pos--;
+ }
+ CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], Section, sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));
+ Section += 1;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // 13. Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section
+ // into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'
+ // field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).
+ // 14. Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .
+ // 15. Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.
+ //
+ for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {
+ Section = &SectionHeader[Index];
+ if (Section->SizeOfRawData == 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ HashBase = mImageBase + Section->PointerToRawData;
+ HashSize = (UINTN) Section->SizeOfRawData;
+
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // 16. If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra
+ // data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins
+ // at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:
+ // FileSize - (CertDirectory->Size)
+ //
+ if (mImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {
+ HashBase = mImageBase + SumOfBytesHashed;
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset.
+ //
+ HashSize = (UINTN)(
+ mImageSize -
+ mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -
+ SumOfBytesHashed);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset.
+ //
+ HashSize = (UINTN)(
+ mImageSize -
+ mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -
+ SumOfBytesHashed);
+ }
+
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal(HashCtx, mImageDigest);
+
+Done:
+ if (HashCtx != NULL) {
+ FreePool (HashCtx);
+ }
+ if (SectionHeader != NULL) {
+ FreePool (SectionHeader);
+ }
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and caculate hash of
+ Pe/Coff image based on the authenticated image hashing in PE/COFF Specification
+ 8.0 Appendix A
+
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+HashPeImageByType (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ UINT8 Index;
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;
+
+ PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->Offset);
+
+ for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {
+ //
+ // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.
+ // According to PKCS#7 Definition:
+ // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ // version Version,
+ // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
+ // contentInfo ContentInfo,
+ // .... }
+ // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing
+ // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.
+ // Fixed offset (+32) is calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.
+ //
+ if ((*(PkcsCertData->CertData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) {
+ //
+ // Only support two bytes of Long Form of Length Encoding.
+ //
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ //
+ if (CompareMem (PkcsCertData->CertData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (Index == HASHALG_MAX) {
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // HASH PE Image based on Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.
+ //
+ if (!HashPeImage(Index)) {
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ Enroll a new executable's signature into Signature Database.
+
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.
+ @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New signature is enrolled successfully.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Unsupported command.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB (
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SigDBCert;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *SigDBCertData;
+ VOID *Data;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+ UINTN SigDBSize;
+ UINT32 Attr;
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *GuidCertData;
+
+ Data = NULL;
+ GuidCertData = NULL;
+
+ //
+ // Form the SigDB certificate list.
+ // Format the data item into EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST type.
+ //
+ // We need to parse executable's signature data from specified signed executable file.
+ // In current implementation, we simply trust the pass-in signed executable file.
+ // In reality, it's OS's responsibility to verify the signed executable file.
+ //
+
+ //
+ // Read the whole file content
+ //
+ Status = ReadFileContent(
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle,
+ (VOID **) &mImageBase,
+ &mImageSize,
+ 0
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+ ASSERT (mImageBase != NULL);
+
+ Status = LoadPeImage ();
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ if (mSecDataDir->SizeOfCert == 0) {
+ if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {
+ Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+ } else {
+
+ //
+ // Read the certificate data
+ //
+ mCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *)(mImageBase + mSecDataDir->Offset);
+
+ if (mCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) {
+ GuidCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID*) mCertificate;
+ if (CompareMem (&GuidCertData->CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid, sizeof(EFI_GUID)) != 0) {
+ Status = EFI_ABORTED;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {
+ Status = EFI_ABORTED;
+ goto ON_EXIT;;
+ }
+
+ } else if (mCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {
+
+ Status = HashPeImageByType ();
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;;
+ }
+ } else {
+ Status = EFI_ABORTED;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Create a new SigDB entry.
+ //
+ SigDBSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)
+ + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1
+ + (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;
+
+ Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (SigDBSize);
+ if (Data == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Adjust the Certificate Database parameters.
+ //
+ SigDBCert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;
+ SigDBCert->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SigDBSize;
+ SigDBCert->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;
+ SigDBCert->SignatureSize = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;
+ CopyGuid (&SigDBCert->SignatureType, &mCertType);
+
+ SigDBCertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*)((UINT8*)SigDBCert + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));
+ CopyGuid (&SigDBCertData->SignatureOwner, Private->SignatureGUID);
+ CopyMem (SigDBCertData->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize);
+
+ Attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&SigDBSize, (UINT8**) &Data);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Check if SigDB variable has been already existed.
+ // If true, use EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE attribute to append the
+ // new signature data to original variable
+ //
+ DataSize = 0;
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable(
+ VariableName,
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
+ NULL,
+ &DataSize,
+ NULL
+ );
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ Attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;
+ } else if (Status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Enroll the variable.
+ //
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable(
+ VariableName,
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
+ Attr,
+ SigDBSize,
+ Data
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ON_EXIT:
+
+ CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;
+ Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;
+
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);
+ Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (Data != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Data);
+ }
+
+ if (mImageBase != NULL) {
+ FreePool (mImageBase);
+ mImageBase = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Enroll signature into DB/DBX without KEK's authentication.
+ The SignatureOwner GUID will be Private->SignatureGUID.
+
+ @param[in] PrivateData The module's private data.
+ @param[in] VariableName Variable name of signature database, must be
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE or EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS New signature enrolled successfully.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER The parameter is invalid.
+ @retval others Fail to enroll signature data.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EnrollSignatureDatabase (
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private,
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName
+ )
+{
+ UINT16* FilePostFix;
+
+ if ((Private->FileContext->FileName == NULL) || (Private->FileContext->FHandle == NULL) || (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL)) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Parse the file's postfix.
+ //
+ FilePostFix = Private->FileContext->FileName + StrLen (Private->FileContext->FileName) - 4;
+ if (IsDerEncodeCertificate(FilePostFix)) {
+ //
+ // Supports DER-encoded X509 certificate.
+ //
+ return EnrollX509toSigDB (Private, VariableName);
+ }
+
+ return EnrollImageSignatureToSigDB (Private, VariableName);
+}
+
+/**
+ List all signatures in specified signature database (e.g. KEK/DB/DBX)
+ by GUID in the page for user to select and delete as needed.
+
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.
+ @param[in] VariableName The variable name of the vendor's signature database.
+ @param[in] VendorGuid A unique identifier for the vendor.
+ @param[in] LabelNumber Label number to insert opcodes.
+ @param[in] FormId Form ID of current page.
+ @param[in] QuestionIdBase Base question id of the signature list.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Success to update the signature list page
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Unable to allocate required resources.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+UpdateDeletePage (
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
+ IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
+ IN UINT16 LabelNumber,
+ IN EFI_FORM_ID FormId,
+ IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionIdBase
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINT32 Index;
+ UINTN CertCount;
+ UINTN GuidIndex;
+ VOID *StartOpCodeHandle;
+ VOID *EndOpCodeHandle;
+ EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *StartLabel;
+ EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *EndLabel;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+ UINT8 *Data;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;
+ UINT32 ItemDataSize;
+ CHAR16 *GuidStr;
+ EFI_STRING_ID GuidID;
+ EFI_STRING_ID Help;
+
+ Data = NULL;
+ CertList = NULL;
+ Cert = NULL;
+ GuidStr = NULL;
+ StartOpCodeHandle = NULL;
+ EndOpCodeHandle = NULL;
+
+ //
+ // Initialize the container for dynamic opcodes.
+ //
+ StartOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();
+ if (StartOpCodeHandle == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ EndOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();
+ if (EndOpCodeHandle == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode.
+ //
+ StartLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (
+ StartOpCodeHandle,
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,
+ NULL,
+ sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)
+ );
+ StartLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;
+ StartLabel->Number = LabelNumber;
+
+ EndLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (
+ EndOpCodeHandle,
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,
+ NULL,
+ sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)
+ );
+ EndLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;
+ EndLabel->Number = LABEL_END;
+
+ //
+ // Read Variable.
+ //
+ DataSize = 0;
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
+ if (Data == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ GuidStr = AllocateZeroPool (100);
+ if (GuidStr == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Enumerate all KEK pub data.
+ //
+ ItemDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
+ GuidIndex = 0;
+
+ while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
+
+ if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID);
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_PCKS7_GUID);
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha1Guid)) {
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_SHA1_GUID);
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid)) {
+ Help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_CERT_TYPE_SHA256_GUID);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // The signature type is not supported in current implementation.
+ //
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList
+ + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)
+ + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize
+ + Index * CertList->SignatureSize);
+ //
+ // Display GUID and help
+ //
+ GuidToString (&Cert->SignatureOwner, GuidStr, 100);
+ GuidID = HiiSetString (PrivateData->HiiHandle, 0, GuidStr, NULL);
+ HiiCreateCheckBoxOpCode (
+ StartOpCodeHandle,
+ (EFI_QUESTION_ID) (QuestionIdBase + GuidIndex++),
+ 0,
+ 0,
+ GuidID,
+ Help,
+ EFI_IFR_FLAG_CALLBACK,
+ 0,
+ NULL
+ );
+ }
+
+ ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
+ }
+
+ON_EXIT:
+ HiiUpdateForm (
+ PrivateData->HiiHandle,
+ &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid,
+ FormId,
+ StartOpCodeHandle,
+ EndOpCodeHandle
+ );
+
+ if (StartOpCodeHandle != NULL) {
+ HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (StartOpCodeHandle);
+ }
+
+ if (EndOpCodeHandle != NULL) {
+ HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (EndOpCodeHandle);
+ }
+
+ if (Data != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Data);
+ }
+
+ if (GuidStr != NULL) {
+ FreePool (GuidStr);
+ }
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ Delete a KEK entry from KEK database.
+
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.
+ @param[in] QuestionId Question id of the KEK item to delete.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete kek item successfully.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+DeleteKeyExchangeKey (
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,
+ IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionId
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+ UINT8 *Data;
+ UINT8 *OldData;
+ UINT32 Attr;
+ UINT32 Index;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;
+ UINTN CertCount;
+ UINT32 Offset;
+ BOOLEAN IsKEKItemFound;
+ UINT32 KekDataSize;
+ UINTN DeleteKekIndex;
+ UINTN GuidIndex;
+
+ Data = NULL;
+ OldData = NULL;
+ CertList = NULL;
+ Cert = NULL;
+ Attr = 0;
+ DeleteKekIndex = QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID;
+
+ //
+ // Get original KEK variable.
+ //
+ DataSize = 0;
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ OldData = (UINT8*)AllocateZeroPool(DataSize);
+ if (OldData == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Attr, &DataSize, OldData);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Allocate space for new variable.
+ //
+ Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
+ if (Data == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Enumerate all KEK pub data and erasing the target item.
+ //
+ IsKEKItemFound = FALSE;
+ KekDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) OldData;
+ Offset = 0;
+ GuidIndex = 0;
+ while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
+ if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid) ||
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
+ CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize));
+ NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)(Data + Offset);
+ Offset += (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
+ if (GuidIndex == DeleteKekIndex ) {
+ //
+ // Find it! Skip it!
+ //
+ NewCertList->SignatureListSize -= CertList->SignatureSize;
+ IsKEKItemFound = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ //
+ // This item doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.
+ //
+ CopyMem (Data + Offset, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize);
+ Offset += CertList->SignatureSize;
+ }
+ GuidIndex++;
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8*) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);
+ }
+ } else {
+ //
+ // This List doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.
+ //
+ CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, CertList->SignatureListSize);
+ Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;
+ }
+
+ KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) ((UINT8*) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
+ }
+
+ if (!IsKEKItemFound) {
+ //
+ // Doesn't find the Kek Item!
+ //
+ Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Delete the Signature header if there is no signature in the list.
+ //
+ KekDataSize = Offset;
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) Data;
+ Offset = 0;
+ ZeroMem (OldData, KekDataSize);
+ while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount));
+ if (CertCount != 0) {
+ CopyMem (OldData + Offset, CertList, CertList->SignatureListSize);
+ Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;
+ }
+ KekDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
+ }
+
+ DataSize = Offset;
+ if ((Attr & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &OldData);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+ }
+
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable(
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ Attr,
+ DataSize,
+ OldData
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to set variable, Status = %r\n", Status));
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ON_EXIT:
+ if (Data != NULL) {
+ FreePool(Data);
+ }
+
+ if (OldData != NULL) {
+ FreePool(OldData);
+ }
+
+ return UpdateDeletePage (
+ PrivateData,
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ LABEL_KEK_DELETE,
+ FORMID_DELETE_KEK_FORM,
+ OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID
+ );
+}
+
+/**
+ Delete a signature entry from siganture database.
+
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module's private data.
+ @param[in] VariableName The variable name of the vendor's signature database.
+ @param[in] VendorGuid A unique identifier for the vendor.
+ @param[in] LabelNumber Label number to insert opcodes.
+ @param[in] FormId Form ID of current page.
+ @param[in] QuestionIdBase Base question id of the signature list.
+ @param[in] DeleteIndex Signature index to delete.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Delete siganture successfully.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Can't find the signature item,
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Could not allocate needed resources.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+DeleteSignature (
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
+ IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid,
+ IN UINT16 LabelNumber,
+ IN EFI_FORM_ID FormId,
+ IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionIdBase,
+ IN UINTN DeleteIndex
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+ UINT8 *Data;
+ UINT8 *OldData;
+ UINT32 Attr;
+ UINT32 Index;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *NewCertList;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;
+ UINTN CertCount;
+ UINT32 Offset;
+ BOOLEAN IsItemFound;
+ UINT32 ItemDataSize;
+ UINTN GuidIndex;
+
+ Data = NULL;
+ OldData = NULL;
+ CertList = NULL;
+ Cert = NULL;
+ Attr = 0;
+
+ //
+ // Get original signature list data.
+ //
+ DataSize = 0;
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) && Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ OldData = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
+ if (OldData == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, &Attr, &DataSize, OldData);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Allocate space for new variable.
+ //
+ Data = (UINT8*) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
+ if (Data == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Enumerate all signature data and erasing the target item.
+ //
+ IsItemFound = FALSE;
+ ItemDataSize = (UINT32) DataSize;
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) OldData;
+ Offset = 0;
+ GuidIndex = 0;
+ while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
+ if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid) ||
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid) ||
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha1Guid) ||
+ CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertSha256Guid)
+ ) {
+ //
+ // Copy EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header then calculate the signature count in this list.
+ //
+ CopyMem (Data + Offset, CertList, (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize));
+ NewCertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST*) (Data + Offset);
+ Offset += (sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
+ if (GuidIndex == DeleteIndex) {
+ //
+ // Find it! Skip it!
+ //
+ NewCertList->SignatureListSize -= CertList->SignatureSize;
+ IsItemFound = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ //
+ // This item doesn't match. Copy it to the Data buffer.
+ //
+ CopyMem (Data + Offset, (UINT8*)(Cert), CertList->SignatureSize);
+ Offset += CertList->SignatureSize;
+ }
+ GuidIndex++;
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);
+ }
+ } else {
+ //
+ // This List doesn't match. Just copy it to the Data buffer.
+ //
+ CopyMem (Data + Offset, (UINT8*)(CertList), CertList->SignatureListSize);
+ Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;
+ }
+
+ ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
+ }
+
+ if (!IsItemFound) {
+ //
+ // Doesn't find the signature Item!
+ //
+ Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Delete the EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST header if there is no signature in the list.
+ //
+ ItemDataSize = Offset;
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
+ Offset = 0;
+ ZeroMem (OldData, ItemDataSize);
+ while ((ItemDataSize > 0) && (ItemDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, " CertCount = %x\n", CertCount));
+ if (CertCount != 0) {
+ CopyMem (OldData + Offset, (UINT8*)(CertList), CertList->SignatureListSize);
+ Offset += CertList->SignatureListSize;
+ }
+ ItemDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
+ }
+
+ DataSize = Offset;
+ if ((Attr & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {
+ Status = CreateTimeBasedPayload (&DataSize, &OldData);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Fail to create time-based data payload: %r", Status));
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+ }
+
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable(
+ VariableName,
+ VendorGuid,
+ Attr,
+ DataSize,
+ OldData
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to set variable, Status = %r\n", Status));
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ON_EXIT:
+ if (Data != NULL) {
+ FreePool(Data);
+ }
+
+ if (OldData != NULL) {
+ FreePool(OldData);
+ }
+
+ return UpdateDeletePage (
+ PrivateData,
+ VariableName,
+ VendorGuid,
+ LabelNumber,
+ FormId,
+ QuestionIdBase
+ );
+}
+
+/**
+ This function extracts configuration from variable.
+
+ @param[in, out] ConfigData Point to SecureBoot configuration private data.
+
+**/
+VOID
+SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (
+ IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION *ConfigData
+ )
+{
+ UINT8 *SecureBootEnable;
+ UINT8 *SetupMode;
+ UINT8 *SecureBoot;
+ UINT8 *SecureBootMode;
+
+ SecureBootEnable = NULL;
+ SetupMode = NULL;
+ SecureBoot = NULL;
+ SecureBootMode = NULL;
+
+ //
+ // If the SecureBootEnable Variable doesn't exist, hide the SecureBoot Enable/Disable
+ // Checkbox.
+ //
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);
+ if (SecureBootEnable == NULL) {
+ ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ ConfigData->HideSecureBoot = FALSE;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // If it is Physical Presence User, set the PhysicalPresent to true.
+ //
+ if (UserPhysicalPresent()) {
+ ConfigData->PhysicalPresent = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ ConfigData->PhysicalPresent = FALSE;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // If there is no PK then the Delete Pk button will be gray.
+ //
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SetupMode, NULL);
+ if (SetupMode == NULL || (*SetupMode) == SETUP_MODE) {
+ ConfigData->HasPk = FALSE;
+ } else {
+ ConfigData->HasPk = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // If the value of SecureBoot variable is 1, the platform is operating in secure boot mode.
+ //
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL);
+ if (SecureBoot != NULL && *SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {
+ ConfigData->SecureBootState = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ ConfigData->SecureBootState = FALSE;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Get the SecureBootMode from CustomMode variable.
+ //
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootMode, NULL);
+ if (SecureBootMode == NULL) {
+ ConfigData->SecureBootMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;
+ } else {
+ ConfigData->SecureBootMode = *(SecureBootMode);
+ }
+
+}
+
+/**
+ This function allows a caller to extract the current configuration for one
+ or more named elements from the target driver.
+
+ @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.
+ @param[in] Request A null-terminated Unicode string in
+ <ConfigRequest> format.
+ @param[out] Progress On return, points to a character in the Request
+ string. Points to the string's null terminator if
+ request was successful. Points to the most recent
+ '&' before the first failing name/value pair (or
+ the beginning of the string if the failure is in
+ the first name/value pair) if the request was not
+ successful.
+ @param[out] Results A null-terminated Unicode string in
+ <ConfigAltResp> format which has all values filled
+ in for the names in the Request string. String to
+ be allocated by the called function.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The Results is filled with the requested values.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough memory to store the results.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Request is illegal syntax, or unknown name.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Routing data doesn't match any storage in this
+ driver.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SecureBootExtractConfig (
+ IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN CONST EFI_STRING Request,
+ OUT EFI_STRING *Progress,
+ OUT EFI_STRING *Results
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINTN BufferSize;
+ UINTN Size;
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION Configuration;
+ EFI_STRING ConfigRequest;
+ EFI_STRING ConfigRequestHdr;
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData;
+ BOOLEAN AllocatedRequest;
+
+ if (Progress == NULL || Results == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ AllocatedRequest = FALSE;
+ ConfigRequestHdr = NULL;
+ ConfigRequest = NULL;
+ Size = 0;
+
+ ZeroMem (&Configuration, sizeof (Configuration));
+ PrivateData = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This);
+ *Progress = Request;
+
+ if ((Request != NULL) && !HiiIsConfigHdrMatch (Request, &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName)) {
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Get Configuration from Variable.
+ //
+ SecureBootExtractConfigFromVariable (&Configuration);
+
+ BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);
+ ConfigRequest = Request;
+ if ((Request == NULL) || (StrStr (Request, L"OFFSET") == NULL)) {
+ //
+ // Request is set to NULL or OFFSET is NULL, construct full request string.
+ //
+ // Allocate and fill a buffer large enough to hold the <ConfigHdr> template
+ // followed by "&OFFSET=0&WIDTH=WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW" followed by a Null-terminator
+ //
+ ConfigRequestHdr = HiiConstructConfigHdr (&gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName, PrivateData->DriverHandle);
+ Size = (StrLen (ConfigRequestHdr) + 32 + 1) * sizeof (CHAR16);
+ ConfigRequest = AllocateZeroPool (Size);
+ ASSERT (ConfigRequest != NULL);
+ AllocatedRequest = TRUE;
+ UnicodeSPrint (ConfigRequest, Size, L"%s&OFFSET=0&WIDTH=%016LX", ConfigRequestHdr, (UINT64)BufferSize);
+ FreePool (ConfigRequestHdr);
+ ConfigRequestHdr = NULL;
+ }
+
+ Status = gHiiConfigRouting->BlockToConfig (
+ gHiiConfigRouting,
+ ConfigRequest,
+ (UINT8 *) &Configuration,
+ BufferSize,
+ Results,
+ Progress
+ );
+
+ //
+ // Free the allocated config request string.
+ //
+ if (AllocatedRequest) {
+ FreePool (ConfigRequest);
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Set Progress string to the original request string.
+ //
+ if (Request == NULL) {
+ *Progress = NULL;
+ } else if (StrStr (Request, L"OFFSET") == NULL) {
+ *Progress = Request + StrLen (Request);
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ This function processes the results of changes in configuration.
+
+ @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.
+ @param[in] Configuration A null-terminated Unicode string in <ConfigResp>
+ format.
+ @param[out] Progress A pointer to a string filled in with the offset of
+ the most recent '&' before the first failing
+ name/value pair (or the beginning of the string if
+ the failure is in the first name/value pair) or
+ the terminating NULL if all was successful.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The Results is processed successfully.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Configuration is NULL.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Routing data doesn't match any storage in this
+ driver.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SecureBootRouteConfig (
+ IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN CONST EFI_STRING Configuration,
+ OUT EFI_STRING *Progress
+ )
+{
+ if (Configuration == NULL || Progress == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ *Progress = Configuration;
+ if (!HiiIsConfigHdrMatch (Configuration, &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid, mSecureBootStorageName)) {
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ *Progress = Configuration + StrLen (Configuration);
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ This function is called to provide results data to the driver.
+
+ @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.
+ @param[in] Action Specifies the type of action taken by the browser.
+ @param[in] QuestionId A unique value which is sent to the original
+ exporting driver so that it can identify the type
+ of data to expect.
+ @param[in] Type The type of value for the question.
+ @param[in] Value A pointer to the data being sent to the original
+ exporting driver.
+ @param[out] ActionRequest On return, points to the action requested by the
+ callback function.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The callback successfully handled the action.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough storage is available to hold the
+ variable and its data.
+ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The variable could not be saved.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The specified Action is not supported by the
+ callback.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SecureBootCallback (
+ IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN EFI_BROWSER_ACTION Action,
+ IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionId,
+ IN UINT8 Type,
+ IN EFI_IFR_TYPE_VALUE *Value,
+ OUT EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST *ActionRequest
+ )
+{
+ EFI_INPUT_KEY Key;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *Private;
+ UINTN BufferSize;
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION *IfrNvData;
+ UINT16 LabelId;
+ UINT8 *SecureBootEnable;
+ CHAR16 PromptString[100];
+
+ SecureBootEnable = NULL;
+
+ if ((This == NULL) || (Value == NULL) || (ActionRequest == NULL)) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if ((Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) && (Action != EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGING)) {
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ Private = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS (This);
+
+ //
+ // Retrieve uncommitted data from Browser
+ //
+ BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);
+ IfrNvData = AllocateZeroPool (BufferSize);
+ if (IfrNvData == NULL) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+
+ HiiGetBrowserData (NULL, NULL, BufferSize, (UINT8 *) IfrNvData);
+
+ if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGING) {
+
+ switch (QuestionId) {
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE:
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);
+ if (NULL != SecureBootEnable) {
+ if (EFI_ERROR (SaveSecureBootVariable (Value->u8))) {
+ CreatePopUp (
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,
+ &Key,
+ L"Only Physical Presence User could disable secure boot!",
+ NULL
+ );
+ Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+ *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION:
+ FreeMenu (&DirectoryMenu);
+ FreeMenu (&FsOptionMenu);
+ break;
+
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION:
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION:
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION:
+ //
+ // Clear Signature GUID.
+ //
+ ZeroMem (IfrNvData->SignatureGuid, sizeof (IfrNvData->SignatureGuid));
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL) {
+ Private->SignatureGUID = (EFI_GUID *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_GUID));
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID == NULL) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION) {
+ LabelId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB;
+ } else if (QuestionId == KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION) {
+ LabelId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX;
+ } else {
+ LabelId = FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Refresh selected file.
+ //
+ CleanUpPage (LabelId, Private);
+ break;
+
+ case SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID:
+ case FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM:
+ case SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB:
+ case SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX:
+ if (QuestionId == SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID) {
+ Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollPkFile;
+ } else if (QuestionId == FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM) {
+ Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollKekFile;
+ } else if (QuestionId == SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB) {
+ Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDb;
+ } else {
+ Private->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDbx;
+ }
+
+ Private->FeDisplayContext = FileExplorerDisplayUnknown;
+ CleanUpPage (FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID, Private);
+ UpdateFileExplorer (Private, 0);
+ break;
+
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK:
+ if (Value->u8) {
+ Status = DeletePlatformKey ();
+ *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case KEY_DELETE_KEK:
+ UpdateDeletePage (
+ Private,
+ EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ LABEL_KEK_DELETE,
+ FORMID_DELETE_KEK_FORM,
+ OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID
+ );
+ break;
+
+ case SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB:
+ UpdateDeletePage (
+ Private,
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
+ LABEL_DB_DELETE,
+ SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB,
+ OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID
+ );
+ break;
+
+ case SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBX:
+ UpdateDeletePage (
+ Private,
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
+ LABEL_DBX_DELETE,
+ SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBX,
+ OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID
+ );
+
+ break;
+
+ case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_KEK:
+ Status = EnrollKeyExchangeKey (Private);
+ break;
+
+ case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DB:
+ Status = EnrollSignatureDatabase (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE);
+ break;
+
+ case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBX:
+ Status = EnrollSignatureDatabase (Private, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ if (QuestionId >= FILE_OPTION_OFFSET) {
+ UpdateFileExplorer (Private, QuestionId);
+ } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID) &&
+ (QuestionId < (OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE))) {
+ DeleteKeyExchangeKey (Private, QuestionId);
+ } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID) &&
+ (QuestionId < (OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE))) {
+ DeleteSignature (
+ Private,
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
+ LABEL_DB_DELETE,
+ SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB,
+ OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID,
+ QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID
+ );
+ } else if ((QuestionId >= OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID) &&
+ (QuestionId < (OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID + OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE))) {
+ DeleteSignature (
+ Private,
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,
+ &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
+ LABEL_DBX_DELETE,
+ SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBX,
+ OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID,
+ QuestionId - OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID
+ );
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if (Action == EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_CHANGED) {
+ switch (QuestionId) {
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE:
+ *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_SUBMIT;
+ break;
+ case KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK:
+ Status = EnrollPlatformKey (Private);
+ UnicodeSPrint (
+ PromptString,
+ sizeof (PromptString),
+ L"Only DER encoded certificate file (%s) is supported.",
+ mSupportX509Suffix
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ CreatePopUp (
+ EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE,
+ &Key,
+ L"ERROR: Unsupported file type!",
+ PromptString,
+ NULL
+ );
+ } else {
+ *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_SUBMIT;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK:
+ case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_KEK:
+ case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DB:
+ case KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBX:
+ if (Private->FileContext->FHandle != NULL) {
+ CloseFile (Private->FileContext->FHandle);
+ Private->FileContext->FHandle = NULL;
+ Private->FileContext->FileName = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Private->SignatureGUID);
+ Private->SignatureGUID = NULL;
+ }
+ *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_EXIT;
+ break;
+
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_MODE:
+ GetVariable2 (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid, (VOID**)&SecureBootEnable, NULL);
+ if (NULL != SecureBootEnable) {
+ Status = gRT->SetVariable (
+ EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
+ sizeof (UINT8),
+ &Value->u8
+ );
+ *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;
+ IfrNvData->SecureBootMode = Value->u8;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_GUID:
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DB:
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DBX:
+ ASSERT (Private->SignatureGUID != NULL);
+ Status = StringToGuid (
+ IfrNvData->SignatureGuid,
+ StrLen (IfrNvData->SignatureGuid),
+ Private->SignatureGUID
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_FORM_APPLY;
+ break;
+
+ case KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK:
+ if (Value->u8) {
+ *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_SUBMIT;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ BufferSize = sizeof (SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION);
+ HiiSetBrowserData (NULL, NULL, BufferSize, (UINT8*) IfrNvData, NULL);
+ }
+ FreePool (IfrNvData);
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ This function publish the SecureBoot configuration Form.
+
+ @param[in, out] PrivateData Points to SecureBoot configuration private data.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS HII Form is installed successfully.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough resource for HII Form installation.
+ @retval Others Other errors as indicated.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+InstallSecureBootConfigForm (
+ IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_HII_HANDLE HiiHandle;
+ EFI_HANDLE DriverHandle;
+ EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *ConfigAccess;
+
+ DriverHandle = NULL;
+ ConfigAccess = &PrivateData->ConfigAccess;
+ Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (
+ &DriverHandle,
+ &gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid,
+ &mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath,
+ &gEfiHiiConfigAccessProtocolGuid,
+ ConfigAccess,
+ NULL
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ PrivateData->DriverHandle = DriverHandle;
+
+ //
+ // Publish the HII package list
+ //
+ HiiHandle = HiiAddPackages (
+ &gSecureBootConfigFormSetGuid,
+ DriverHandle,
+ SecureBootConfigDxeStrings,
+ SecureBootConfigBin,
+ NULL
+ );
+ if (HiiHandle == NULL) {
+ gBS->UninstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (
+ DriverHandle,
+ &gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid,
+ &mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath,
+ &gEfiHiiConfigAccessProtocolGuid,
+ ConfigAccess,
+ NULL
+ );
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ PrivateData->HiiHandle = HiiHandle;
+
+ PrivateData->FileContext = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT));
+ PrivateData->MenuEntry = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY));
+
+ if (PrivateData->FileContext == NULL || PrivateData->MenuEntry == NULL) {
+ UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ PrivateData->FeCurrentState = FileExplorerStateInActive;
+ PrivateData->FeDisplayContext = FileExplorerDisplayUnknown;
+
+ InitializeListHead (&FsOptionMenu.Head);
+ InitializeListHead (&DirectoryMenu.Head);
+
+ //
+ // Init OpCode Handle and Allocate space for creation of Buffer
+ //
+ mStartOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();
+ if (mStartOpCodeHandle == NULL) {
+ UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ mEndOpCodeHandle = HiiAllocateOpCodeHandle ();
+ if (mEndOpCodeHandle == NULL) {
+ UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (PrivateData);
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode as the start opcode
+ //
+ mStartLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (
+ mStartOpCodeHandle,
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,
+ NULL,
+ sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)
+ );
+ mStartLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;
+
+ //
+ // Create Hii Extend Label OpCode as the end opcode
+ //
+ mEndLabel = (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *) HiiCreateGuidOpCode (
+ mEndOpCodeHandle,
+ &gEfiIfrTianoGuid,
+ NULL,
+ sizeof (EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL)
+ );
+ mEndLabel->ExtendOpCode = EFI_IFR_EXTEND_OP_LABEL;
+ mEndLabel->Number = LABEL_END;
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ This function removes SecureBoot configuration Form.
+
+ @param[in, out] PrivateData Points to SecureBoot configuration private data.
+
+**/
+VOID
+UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (
+ IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData
+ )
+{
+ //
+ // Uninstall HII package list
+ //
+ if (PrivateData->HiiHandle != NULL) {
+ HiiRemovePackages (PrivateData->HiiHandle);
+ PrivateData->HiiHandle = NULL;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Uninstall HII Config Access Protocol
+ //
+ if (PrivateData->DriverHandle != NULL) {
+ gBS->UninstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (
+ PrivateData->DriverHandle,
+ &gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid,
+ &mSecureBootHiiVendorDevicePath,
+ &gEfiHiiConfigAccessProtocolGuid,
+ &PrivateData->ConfigAccess,
+ NULL
+ );
+ PrivateData->DriverHandle = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (PrivateData->SignatureGUID != NULL) {
+ FreePool (PrivateData->SignatureGUID);
+ }
+
+ if (PrivateData->MenuEntry != NULL) {
+ FreePool (PrivateData->MenuEntry);
+ }
+
+ if (PrivateData->FileContext != NULL) {
+ FreePool (PrivateData->FileContext);
+ }
+
+ FreePool (PrivateData);
+
+ FreeMenu (&DirectoryMenu);
+ FreeMenu (&FsOptionMenu);
+
+ if (mStartOpCodeHandle != NULL) {
+ HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (mStartOpCodeHandle);
+ }
+
+ if (mEndOpCodeHandle != NULL) {
+ HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (mEndOpCodeHandle);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.h b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5a5ac12426
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,614 @@
+/** @file
+ The header file of HII Config Access protocol implementation of SecureBoot
+ configuration module.
+
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+
+#ifndef __SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_IMPL_H__
+#define __SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_IMPL_H__
+
+#include <Uefi.h>
+
+#include <Protocol/HiiConfigAccess.h>
+#include <Protocol/HiiConfigRouting.h>
+#include <Protocol/SimpleFileSystem.h>
+#include <Protocol/BlockIo.h>
+#include <Protocol/DevicePath.h>
+#include <Protocol/DevicePathToText.h>
+#include <Protocol/DebugPort.h>
+#include <Protocol/LoadFile.h>
+
+#include <Library/BaseLib.h>
+#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
+#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
+#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>
+#include <Library/UefiBootServicesTableLib.h>
+#include <Library/UefiRuntimeServicesTableLib.h>
+#include <Library/UefiHiiServicesLib.h>
+#include <Library/UefiLib.h>
+#include <Library/HiiLib.h>
+#include <Library/DevicePathLib.h>
+#include <Library/PrintLib.h>
+#include <Library/PlatformSecureLib.h>
+#include <Library/BaseCryptLib.h>
+#include <Guid/MdeModuleHii.h>
+#include <Guid/AuthenticatedVariableFormat.h>
+#include <Guid/FileSystemVolumeLabelInfo.h>
+#include <Guid/ImageAuthentication.h>
+#include <Guid/FileInfo.h>
+
+#include "SecureBootConfigNvData.h"
+
+//
+// Tool generated IFR binary data and String package data
+//
+extern UINT8 SecureBootConfigBin[];
+extern UINT8 SecureBootConfigDxeStrings[];
+
+//
+// Shared IFR form update data
+//
+extern VOID *mStartOpCodeHandle;
+extern VOID *mEndOpCodeHandle;
+extern EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *mStartLabel;
+extern EFI_IFR_GUID_LABEL *mEndLabel;
+
+#define MAX_CHAR 480
+#define TWO_BYTE_ENCODE 0x82
+
+//
+// SHA-1 digest size in bytes.
+//
+#define SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE 20
+//
+// SHA-256 digest size in bytes
+//
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE 32
+//
+// Set max digest size as SHA256 Output (32 bytes) by far
+//
+#define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
+
+#define WIN_CERT_UEFI_RSA2048_SIZE 256
+
+//
+// Support hash types
+//
+#define HASHALG_SHA1 0x00000000
+#define HASHALG_SHA224 0x00000001
+#define HASHALG_SHA256 0x00000002
+#define HASHALG_SHA384 0x00000003
+#define HASHALG_SHA512 0x00000004
+#define HASHALG_MAX 0x00000005
+
+
+#define SECUREBOOT_MENU_OPTION_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32 ('S', 'b', 'M', 'u')
+#define SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32 ('S', 'b', 'M', 'r')
+
+typedef struct {
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL Header;
+ EFI_GUID Guid;
+ UINT8 VendorDefinedData[1];
+} VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH_WITH_DATA;
+
+typedef struct {
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL Header;
+ UINT16 NetworkProtocol;
+ UINT16 LoginOption;
+ UINT64 Lun;
+ UINT16 TargetPortalGroupTag;
+ CHAR16 TargetName[1];
+} ISCSI_DEVICE_PATH_WITH_NAME;
+
+typedef enum _FILE_EXPLORER_DISPLAY_CONTEXT {
+ FileExplorerDisplayFileSystem,
+ FileExplorerDisplayDirectory,
+ FileExplorerDisplayUnknown
+} FILE_EXPLORER_DISPLAY_CONTEXT;
+
+typedef enum _FILE_EXPLORER_STATE {
+ FileExplorerStateInActive = 0,
+ FileExplorerStateEnrollPkFile,
+ FileExplorerStateEnrollKekFile,
+ FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDb,
+ FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDbx,
+ FileExplorerStateUnknown
+} FILE_EXPLORER_STATE;
+
+typedef struct {
+ CHAR16 *Str;
+ UINTN Len;
+ UINTN Maxlen;
+} POOL_PRINT;
+
+typedef
+VOID
+(*DEV_PATH_FUNCTION) (
+ IN OUT POOL_PRINT *Str,
+ IN VOID *DevPath
+ );
+
+typedef struct {
+ UINT8 Type;
+ UINT8 SubType;
+ DEV_PATH_FUNCTION Function;
+} DEVICE_PATH_STRING_TABLE;
+
+typedef struct {
+ UINTN Signature;
+ LIST_ENTRY Head;
+ UINTN MenuNumber;
+} SECUREBOOT_MENU_OPTION;
+
+extern SECUREBOOT_MENU_OPTION FsOptionMenu;
+extern SECUREBOOT_MENU_OPTION DirectoryMenu;
+
+typedef struct {
+ UINTN Signature;
+ LIST_ENTRY Link;
+ UINTN OptionNumber;
+ UINT16 *DisplayString;
+ UINT16 *HelpString;
+ EFI_STRING_ID DisplayStringToken;
+ EFI_STRING_ID HelpStringToken;
+ VOID *FileContext;
+} SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY;
+
+typedef struct {
+ EFI_HANDLE Handle;
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath;
+ EFI_FILE_HANDLE FHandle;
+ UINT16 *FileName;
+ EFI_FILE_SYSTEM_VOLUME_LABEL *Info;
+
+ BOOLEAN IsRoot;
+ BOOLEAN IsDir;
+ BOOLEAN IsRemovableMedia;
+ BOOLEAN IsLoadFile;
+ BOOLEAN IsBootLegacy;
+} SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT;
+
+
+//
+// We define another format of 5th directory entry: security directory
+//
+typedef struct {
+ UINT32 Offset; // Offset of certificate
+ UINT32 SizeOfCert; // size of certificate appended
+} EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATA_DIRECTORY;
+
+typedef enum{
+ ImageType_IA32,
+ ImageType_X64
+} IMAGE_TYPE;
+
+///
+/// HII specific Vendor Device Path definition.
+///
+typedef struct {
+ VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH VendorDevicePath;
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL End;
+} HII_VENDOR_DEVICE_PATH;
+
+typedef struct {
+ UINTN Signature;
+
+ EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL ConfigAccess;
+ EFI_HII_HANDLE HiiHandle;
+ EFI_HANDLE DriverHandle;
+
+ FILE_EXPLORER_STATE FeCurrentState;
+ FILE_EXPLORER_DISPLAY_CONTEXT FeDisplayContext;
+
+ SECUREBOOT_MENU_ENTRY *MenuEntry;
+ SECUREBOOT_FILE_CONTEXT *FileContext;
+
+ EFI_GUID *SignatureGUID;
+} SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA;
+
+extern SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA mSecureBootConfigPrivateDateTemplate;
+
+#define SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32 ('S', 'E', 'C', 'B')
+#define SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_FROM_THIS(a) CR (a, SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA, ConfigAccess, SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA_SIGNATURE)
+
+//
+// Cryptograhpic Key Information
+//
+#pragma pack(1)
+typedef struct _CPL_KEY_INFO {
+ UINT32 KeyLengthInBits; // Key Length In Bits
+ UINT32 BlockSize; // Operation Block Size in Bytes
+ UINT32 CipherBlockSize; // Output Cipher Block Size in Bytes
+ UINT32 KeyType; // Key Type
+ UINT32 CipherMode; // Cipher Mode for Symmetric Algorithm
+ UINT32 Flags; // Additional Key Property Flags
+} CPL_KEY_INFO;
+#pragma pack()
+
+
+/**
+ Retrieves the size, in bytes, of the context buffer required for hash operations.
+
+ @return The size, in bytes, of the context buffer required for hash operations.
+
+**/
+typedef
+EFI_STATUS
+(EFIAPI *HASH_GET_CONTEXT_SIZE)(
+ VOID
+ );
+
+/**
+ Initializes user-supplied memory pointed by HashContext as hash context for
+ subsequent use.
+
+ If HashContext is NULL, then ASSERT().
+
+ @param[in, out] HashContext Pointer to Context being initialized.
+
+ @retval TRUE HASH context initialization succeeded.
+ @retval FALSE HASH context initialization failed.
+
+**/
+typedef
+BOOLEAN
+(EFIAPI *HASH_INIT)(
+ IN OUT VOID *HashContext
+ );
+
+
+/**
+ Performs digest on a data buffer of the specified length. This function can
+ be called multiple times to compute the digest of long or discontinuous data streams.
+
+ If HashContext is NULL, then ASSERT().
+
+ @param[in, out] HashContext Pointer to the MD5 context.
+ @param[in] Data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be hashed.
+ @param[in] DataLength Length of Data buffer in bytes.
+
+ @retval TRUE HASH data digest succeeded.
+ @retval FALSE Invalid HASH context. After HashFinal function has been called, the
+ HASH context cannot be reused.
+
+**/
+typedef
+BOOLEAN
+(EFIAPI *HASH_UPDATE)(
+ IN OUT VOID *HashContext,
+ IN CONST VOID *Data,
+ IN UINTN DataLength
+ );
+
+/**
+ Completes hash computation and retrieves the digest value into the specified
+ memory. After this function has been called, the context cannot be used again.
+
+ If HashContext is NULL, then ASSERT().
+ If HashValue is NULL, then ASSERT().
+
+ @param[in, out] HashContext Pointer to the MD5 context
+ @param[out] HashValue Pointer to a buffer that receives the HASH digest
+ value (16 bytes).
+
+ @retval TRUE HASH digest computation succeeded.
+ @retval FALSE HASH digest computation failed.
+
+**/
+typedef
+BOOLEAN
+(EFIAPI *HASH_FINAL)(
+ IN OUT VOID *HashContext,
+ OUT UINT8 *HashValue
+ );
+
+//
+// Hash Algorithm Table
+//
+typedef struct {
+ CHAR16 *Name; ///< Name for Hash Algorithm
+ UINTN DigestLength; ///< Digest Length
+ UINT8 *OidValue; ///< Hash Algorithm OID ASN.1 Value
+ UINTN OidLength; ///< Length of Hash OID Value
+ HASH_GET_CONTEXT_SIZE GetContextSize; ///< Pointer to Hash GetContentSize function
+ HASH_INIT HashInit; ///< Pointer to Hash Init function
+ HASH_UPDATE HashUpdate; ///< Pointer to Hash Update function
+ HASH_FINAL HashFinal; ///< Pointer to Hash Final function
+} HASH_TABLE;
+
+typedef struct {
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE Hdr;
+ UINT8 CertData[1];
+} WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS;
+
+
+/**
+ This function publish the SecureBoot configuration Form.
+
+ @param[in, out] PrivateData Points to SecureBoot configuration private data.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS HII Form is installed successfully.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough resource for HII Form installation.
+ @retval Others Other errors as indicated.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+InstallSecureBootConfigForm (
+ IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData
+ );
+
+
+/**
+ This function removes SecureBoot configuration Form.
+
+ @param[in, out] PrivateData Points to SecureBoot configuration private data.
+
+**/
+VOID
+UninstallSecureBootConfigForm (
+ IN OUT SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData
+ );
+
+
+/**
+ This function allows a caller to extract the current configuration for one
+ or more named elements from the target driver.
+
+ @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.
+ @param[in] Request A null-terminated Unicode string in
+ <ConfigRequest> format.
+ @param[out] Progress On return, points to a character in the Request
+ string. Points to the string's null terminator if
+ request was successful. Points to the most recent
+ '&' before the first failing name/value pair (or
+ the beginning of the string if the failure is in
+ the first name/value pair) if the request was not
+ successful.
+ @param[out] Results A null-terminated Unicode string in
+ <ConfigAltResp> format which has all values filled
+ in for the names in the Request string. String to
+ be allocated by the called function.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The Results is filled with the requested values.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough memory to store the results.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Request is illegal syntax, or unknown name.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Routing data doesn't match any storage in this
+ driver.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SecureBootExtractConfig (
+ IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN CONST EFI_STRING Request,
+ OUT EFI_STRING *Progress,
+ OUT EFI_STRING *Results
+ );
+
+
+/**
+ This function processes the results of changes in configuration.
+
+ @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.
+ @param[in] Configuration A null-terminated Unicode string in <ConfigResp>
+ format.
+ @param[out] Progress A pointer to a string filled in with the offset of
+ the most recent '&' before the first failing
+ name/value pair (or the beginning of the string if
+ the failure is in the first name/value pair) or
+ the terminating NULL if all was successful.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The Results is processed successfully.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Configuration is NULL.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Routing data doesn't match any storage in this
+ driver.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SecureBootRouteConfig (
+ IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN CONST EFI_STRING Configuration,
+ OUT EFI_STRING *Progress
+ );
+
+
+/**
+ This function processes the results of changes in configuration.
+
+ @param[in] This Points to the EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL.
+ @param[in] Action Specifies the type of action taken by the browser.
+ @param[in] QuestionId A unique value which is sent to the original
+ exporting driver so that it can identify the type
+ of data to expect.
+ @param[in] Type The type of value for the question.
+ @param[in] Value A pointer to the data being sent to the original
+ exporting driver.
+ @param[out] ActionRequest On return, points to the action requested by the
+ callback function.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The callback successfully handled the action.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Not enough storage is available to hold the
+ variable and its data.
+ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The variable could not be saved.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The specified Action is not supported by the
+ callback.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SecureBootCallback (
+ IN CONST EFI_HII_CONFIG_ACCESS_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN EFI_BROWSER_ACTION Action,
+ IN EFI_QUESTION_ID QuestionId,
+ IN UINT8 Type,
+ IN EFI_IFR_TYPE_VALUE *Value,
+ OUT EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST *ActionRequest
+ );
+
+
+/**
+ This function converts an input device structure to a Unicode string.
+
+ @param[in] DevPath A pointer to the device path structure.
+
+ @return A new allocated Unicode string that represents the device path.
+
+**/
+CHAR16 *
+EFIAPI
+DevicePathToStr (
+ IN EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevPath
+ );
+
+
+/**
+ Clean up the dynamic opcode at label and form specified by both LabelId.
+
+ @param[in] LabelId It is both the Form ID and Label ID for opcode deletion.
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module private data.
+
+**/
+VOID
+CleanUpPage (
+ IN UINT16 LabelId,
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData
+ );
+
+
+/**
+ Update the file explorer page with the refreshed file system.
+
+ @param[in] PrivateData Module private data.
+ @param[in] KeyValue Key value to identify the type of data to expect.
+
+ @retval TRUE Inform the caller to create a callback packet to exit file explorer.
+ @retval FALSE Indicate that there is no need to exit file explorer.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+UpdateFileExplorer (
+ IN SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA *PrivateData,
+ IN UINT16 KeyValue
+ );
+
+
+/**
+ Free resources allocated in Allocate Rountine.
+
+ @param[in, out] MenuOption Menu to be freed
+
+**/
+VOID
+FreeMenu (
+ IN OUT SECUREBOOT_MENU_OPTION *MenuOption
+ );
+
+
+/**
+ Read file content into BufferPtr, the size of the allocate buffer
+ is *FileSize plus AddtionAllocateSize.
+
+ @param[in] FileHandle The file to be read.
+ @param[in, out] BufferPtr Pointers to the pointer of allocated buffer.
+ @param[out] FileSize Size of input file
+ @param[in] AddtionAllocateSize Addtion size the buffer need to be allocated.
+ In case the buffer need to contain others besides the file content.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file was read into the buffer.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER A parameter was invalid.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES A memory allocation failed.
+ @retval others Unexpected error.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+ReadFileContent (
+ IN EFI_FILE_HANDLE FileHandle,
+ IN OUT VOID **BufferPtr,
+ OUT UINTN *FileSize,
+ IN UINTN AddtionAllocateSize
+ );
+
+
+/**
+ Close an open file handle.
+
+ @param[in] FileHandle The file handle to close.
+
+**/
+VOID
+CloseFile (
+ IN EFI_FILE_HANDLE FileHandle
+ );
+
+
+/**
+ Converts a nonnegative integer to an octet string of a specified length.
+
+ @param[in] Integer Pointer to the nonnegative integer to be converted
+ @param[in] IntSizeInWords Length of integer buffer in words
+ @param[out] OctetString Converted octet string of the specified length
+ @param[in] OSSizeInBytes Intended length of resulting octet string in bytes
+
+Returns:
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Data conversion successfully
+ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOOL_SMALL Buffer is too small for output string
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+Int2OctStr (
+ IN CONST UINTN *Integer,
+ IN UINTN IntSizeInWords,
+ OUT UINT8 *OctetString,
+ IN UINTN OSSizeInBytes
+ );
+
+
+/**
+ Convert a String to Guid Value.
+
+ @param[in] Str Specifies the String to be converted.
+ @param[in] StrLen Number of Unicode Characters of String (exclusive \0)
+ @param[out] Guid Return the result Guid value.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is finished successfully.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Invalid string.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+StringToGuid (
+ IN CHAR16 *Str,
+ IN UINTN StrLen,
+ OUT EFI_GUID *Guid
+ );
+
+
+/**
+ Worker function that prints an EFI_GUID into specified Buffer.
+
+ @param[in] Guid Pointer to GUID to print.
+ @param[in] Buffer Buffer to print Guid into.
+ @param[in] BufferSize Size of Buffer.
+
+ @retval Number of characters printed.
+
+**/
+UINTN
+GuidToString (
+ IN EFI_GUID *Guid,
+ IN CHAR16 *Buffer,
+ IN UINTN BufferSize
+ );
+
+#endif
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigMisc.c b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigMisc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..13c7c27387
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigMisc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+/** @file
+ Helper functions for SecureBoot configuration module.
+
+Copyright (c) 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+
+#include "SecureBootConfigImpl.h"
+
+/**
+ Read file content into BufferPtr, the size of the allocate buffer
+ is *FileSize plus AddtionAllocateSize.
+
+ @param[in] FileHandle The file to be read.
+ @param[in, out] BufferPtr Pointers to the pointer of allocated buffer.
+ @param[out] FileSize Size of input file
+ @param[in] AddtionAllocateSize Addtion size the buffer need to be allocated.
+ In case the buffer need to contain others besides the file content.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file was read into the buffer.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER A parameter was invalid.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES A memory allocation failed.
+ @retval others Unexpected error.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+ReadFileContent (
+ IN EFI_FILE_HANDLE FileHandle,
+ IN OUT VOID **BufferPtr,
+ OUT UINTN *FileSize,
+ IN UINTN AddtionAllocateSize
+ )
+
+{
+ UINTN BufferSize;
+ UINT64 SourceFileSize;
+ VOID *Buffer;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ if ((FileHandle == NULL) || (FileSize == NULL)) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ Buffer = NULL;
+
+ //
+ // Get the file size
+ //
+ Status = FileHandle->SetPosition (FileHandle, (UINT64) -1);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ Status = FileHandle->GetPosition (FileHandle, &SourceFileSize);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ Status = FileHandle->SetPosition (FileHandle, 0);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ BufferSize = (UINTN) SourceFileSize + AddtionAllocateSize;
+ Buffer = AllocateZeroPool(BufferSize);
+ if (Buffer == NULL) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ BufferSize = (UINTN) SourceFileSize;
+ *FileSize = BufferSize;
+
+ Status = FileHandle->Read (FileHandle, &BufferSize, Buffer);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || BufferSize != *FileSize) {
+ FreePool (Buffer);
+ Buffer = NULL;
+ Status = EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE;
+ goto ON_EXIT;
+ }
+
+ON_EXIT:
+
+ *BufferPtr = Buffer;
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Close an open file handle.
+
+ @param[in] FileHandle The file handle to close.
+
+**/
+VOID
+CloseFile (
+ IN EFI_FILE_HANDLE FileHandle
+ )
+{
+ if (FileHandle != NULL) {
+ FileHandle->Close (FileHandle);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ Convert a nonnegative integer to an octet string of a specified length.
+
+ @param[in] Integer Pointer to the nonnegative integer to be converted
+ @param[in] IntSizeInWords Length of integer buffer in words
+ @param[out] OctetString Converted octet string of the specified length
+ @param[in] OSSizeInBytes Intended length of resulting octet string in bytes
+
+Returns:
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Data conversion successfully
+ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOOL_SMALL Buffer is too small for output string
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+Int2OctStr (
+ IN CONST UINTN *Integer,
+ IN UINTN IntSizeInWords,
+ OUT UINT8 *OctetString,
+ IN UINTN OSSizeInBytes
+ )
+{
+ CONST UINT8 *Ptr1;
+ UINT8 *Ptr2;
+
+ for (Ptr1 = (CONST UINT8 *)Integer, Ptr2 = OctetString + OSSizeInBytes - 1;
+ Ptr1 < (UINT8 *)(Integer + IntSizeInWords) && Ptr2 >= OctetString;
+ Ptr1++, Ptr2--) {
+ *Ptr2 = *Ptr1;
+ }
+
+ for (; Ptr1 < (CONST UINT8 *)(Integer + IntSizeInWords) && *Ptr1 == 0; Ptr1++);
+
+ if (Ptr1 < (CONST UINT8 *)(Integer + IntSizeInWords)) {
+ return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ if (Ptr2 >= OctetString) {
+ ZeroMem (OctetString, Ptr2 - OctetString + 1);
+ }
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+
+/**
+ Convert a String to Guid Value.
+
+ @param[in] Str Specifies the String to be converted.
+ @param[in] StrLen Number of Unicode Characters of String (exclusive \0)
+ @param[out] Guid Return the result Guid value.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation is finished successfully.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND Invalid string.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+StringToGuid (
+ IN CHAR16 *Str,
+ IN UINTN StrLen,
+ OUT EFI_GUID *Guid
+ )
+{
+ CHAR16 *PtrBuffer;
+ CHAR16 *PtrPosition;
+ UINT16 *Buffer;
+ UINTN Data;
+ UINTN Index;
+ UINT16 Digits[3];
+
+ Buffer = (CHAR16 *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (CHAR16) * (StrLen + 1));
+ if (Buffer == NULL) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ StrCpy (Buffer, Str);
+
+ //
+ // Data1
+ //
+ PtrBuffer = Buffer;
+ PtrPosition = PtrBuffer;
+ while (*PtrBuffer != L'\0') {
+ if (*PtrBuffer == L'-') {
+ break;
+ }
+ PtrBuffer++;
+ }
+ if (*PtrBuffer == L'\0') {
+ FreePool (Buffer);
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ *PtrBuffer = L'\0';
+ Data = StrHexToUintn (PtrPosition);
+ Guid->Data1 = (UINT32)Data;
+
+ //
+ // Data2
+ //
+ PtrBuffer++;
+ PtrPosition = PtrBuffer;
+ while (*PtrBuffer != L'\0') {
+ if (*PtrBuffer == L'-') {
+ break;
+ }
+ PtrBuffer++;
+ }
+ if (*PtrBuffer == L'\0') {
+ FreePool (Buffer);
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+ *PtrBuffer = L'\0';
+ Data = StrHexToUintn (PtrPosition);
+ Guid->Data2 = (UINT16)Data;
+
+ //
+ // Data3
+ //
+ PtrBuffer++;
+ PtrPosition = PtrBuffer;
+ while (*PtrBuffer != L'\0') {
+ if (*PtrBuffer == L'-') {
+ break;
+ }
+ PtrBuffer++;
+ }
+ if (*PtrBuffer == L'\0') {
+ FreePool (Buffer);
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+ *PtrBuffer = L'\0';
+ Data = StrHexToUintn (PtrPosition);
+ Guid->Data3 = (UINT16)Data;
+
+ //
+ // Data4[0..1]
+ //
+ for ( Index = 0 ; Index < 2 ; Index++) {
+ PtrBuffer++;
+ if ((*PtrBuffer == L'\0') || ( *(PtrBuffer + 1) == L'\0')) {
+ FreePool (Buffer);
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+ Digits[0] = *PtrBuffer;
+ PtrBuffer++;
+ Digits[1] = *PtrBuffer;
+ Digits[2] = L'\0';
+ Data = StrHexToUintn (Digits);
+ Guid->Data4[Index] = (UINT8)Data;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // skip the '-'
+ //
+ PtrBuffer++;
+ if ((*PtrBuffer != L'-' ) || ( *PtrBuffer == L'\0')) {
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Data4[2..7]
+ //
+ for ( ; Index < 8; Index++) {
+ PtrBuffer++;
+ if ((*PtrBuffer == L'\0') || ( *(PtrBuffer + 1) == L'\0')) {
+ FreePool (Buffer);
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+ Digits[0] = *PtrBuffer;
+ PtrBuffer++;
+ Digits[1] = *PtrBuffer;
+ Digits[2] = L'\0';
+ Data = StrHexToUintn (Digits);
+ Guid->Data4[Index] = (UINT8)Data;
+ }
+
+ FreePool (Buffer);
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ Worker function that prints an EFI_GUID into specified Buffer.
+
+ @param[in] Guid Pointer to GUID to print.
+ @param[in] Buffer Buffer to print Guid into.
+ @param[in] BufferSize Size of Buffer.
+
+ @retval Number of characters printed.
+
+**/
+UINTN
+GuidToString (
+ IN EFI_GUID *Guid,
+ IN CHAR16 *Buffer,
+ IN UINTN BufferSize
+ )
+{
+ UINTN Size;
+
+ Size = UnicodeSPrint (
+ Buffer,
+ BufferSize,
+ L"%08x-%04x-%04x-%02x%02x-%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
+ (UINTN)Guid->Data1,
+ (UINTN)Guid->Data2,
+ (UINTN)Guid->Data3,
+ (UINTN)Guid->Data4[0],
+ (UINTN)Guid->Data4[1],
+ (UINTN)Guid->Data4[2],
+ (UINTN)Guid->Data4[3],
+ (UINTN)Guid->Data4[4],
+ (UINTN)Guid->Data4[5],
+ (UINTN)Guid->Data4[6],
+ (UINTN)Guid->Data4[7]
+ );
+
+ //
+ // SPrint will null terminate the string. The -1 skips the null
+ //
+ return Size - 1;
+}
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigNvData.h b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigNvData.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6015dd636d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigNvData.h
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/** @file
+ Header file for NV data structure definition.
+
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+
+#ifndef __SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_NV_DATA_H__
+#define __SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_NV_DATA_H__
+
+#include <Guid/HiiPlatformSetupFormset.h>
+#include <Guid/SecureBootConfigHii.h>
+
+//
+// Used by VFR for form or button identification
+//
+#define SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION_VARSTORE_ID 0x0001
+#define SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION_FORM_ID 0x01
+#define FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION_FORM 0x02
+#define FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION_FORM 0x03
+#define FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION_FORM 0x04
+#define FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION_FORM 0x05
+#define FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION_FORM 0x06
+#define FORMID_ENROLL_PK_FORM 0x07
+#define SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID 0x08
+#define FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM 0x09
+#define FORMID_DELETE_KEK_FORM 0x0a
+#define SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB 0x0b
+#define SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB 0x0c
+#define SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX 0x0d
+#define SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBX 0x0e
+#define FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID 0x0f
+#define FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_PK 0x10
+#define FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_KEK 0x11
+#define FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_DB 0x12
+#define FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_DBX 0x13
+
+#define SECURE_BOOT_MODE_CUSTOM 0x01
+#define SECURE_BOOT_MODE_STANDARD 0x00
+
+#define KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE 0x1000
+#define KEY_SECURE_BOOT_MODE 0x1001
+#define KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DB 0x1002
+#define KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DB 0x1003
+#define KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK 0x1004
+#define KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK 0x1005
+#define KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_KEK 0x1008
+#define KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_KEK 0x1009
+#define KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBX 0x100a
+#define KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBX 0x100b
+
+#define KEY_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION 0x1100
+#define KEY_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION 0x1101
+#define KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION 0x1102
+#define KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION 0x1103
+#define KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION 0x1104
+#define KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK 0x1105
+#define KEY_ENROLL_PK 0x1106
+#define KEY_ENROLL_KEK 0x1107
+#define KEY_DELETE_KEK 0x1108
+#define KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_GUID 0x110a
+#define KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DB 0x110b
+#define KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DBX 0x110c
+
+#define LABEL_KEK_DELETE 0x1200
+#define LABEL_DB_DELETE 0x1201
+#define LABEL_DBX_DELETE 0x1202
+#define LABEL_END 0xffff
+
+#define SECURE_BOOT_MAX_ATTEMPTS_NUM 255
+
+#define CONFIG_OPTION_OFFSET 0x2000
+
+#define OPTION_CONFIG_QUESTION_ID 0x2000
+#define OPTION_CONFIG_RANGE 0x1000
+
+//
+// Question ID 0x2000 ~ 0x2FFF is for KEK
+//
+#define OPTION_DEL_KEK_QUESTION_ID 0x2000
+//
+// Question ID 0x3000 ~ 0x3FFF is for DB
+//
+#define OPTION_DEL_DB_QUESTION_ID 0x3000
+//
+// Question ID 0x4000 ~ 0x4FFF is for DBX
+//
+#define OPTION_DEL_DBX_QUESTION_ID 0x4000
+
+
+#define FILE_OPTION_OFFSET 0x8000
+#define FILE_OPTION_MASK 0x7FFF
+
+#define SECURE_BOOT_GUID_SIZE 36
+#define SECURE_BOOT_GUID_STORAGE_SIZE 37
+
+
+//
+// Nv Data structure referenced by IFR
+//
+typedef struct {
+ BOOLEAN SecureBootState; //Secure Boot Disable/Enable;
+ BOOLEAN HideSecureBoot; //Hiden Attempt Secure Boot
+ CHAR16 SignatureGuid[SECURE_BOOT_GUID_STORAGE_SIZE];
+ BOOLEAN PhysicalPresent; //If a Physical Present User;
+ UINT8 SecureBootMode; //Secure Boot Mode: Standard Or Custom
+ BOOLEAN DeletePk;
+ BOOLEAN HasPk; //If Pk is existed it is true;
+} SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION;
+
+#endif
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigStrings.uni b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigStrings.uni
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ed4db131e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigStrings.uni
Binary files differ