diff options
| author | gdong1 <gdong1@6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524> | 2011-09-02 07:49:32 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | gdong1 <gdong1@6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524> | 2011-09-02 07:49:32 +0000 |
| commit | 0c18794ea4289f03fefc7117b56740414cc0536c (patch) | |
| tree | 4e51c5cc23c69a67cead8c58464da870daa4c029 /SecurityPkg/Library | |
| parent | 986d1dfb0813d6a7623531e85c2e2a7e1f956cf8 (diff) | |
| download | edk2-0c18794ea4289f03fefc7117b56740414cc0536c.tar.gz edk2-0c18794ea4289f03fefc7117b56740414cc0536c.tar.bz2 edk2-0c18794ea4289f03fefc7117b56740414cc0536c.zip | |
Add security package to repository.
git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@12261 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
Diffstat (limited to 'SecurityPkg/Library')
14 files changed, 3929 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeDeferImageLoadLib/DxeDeferImageLoadLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeDeferImageLoadLib/DxeDeferImageLoadLib.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f7fe594060 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeDeferImageLoadLib/DxeDeferImageLoadLib.c @@ -0,0 +1,858 @@ +/** @file
+ Implement defer image load services for user identification in UEFI2.2.
+
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+
+#include "DxeDeferImageLoadLib.h"
+
+//
+// Handle for the Deferred Image Load Protocol instance produced by this driver.
+//
+EFI_HANDLE mDeferredImageHandle = NULL;
+BOOLEAN mIsProtocolInstalled = FALSE;
+EFI_USER_MANAGER_PROTOCOL *mUserManager = NULL;
+DEFERRED_IMAGE_TABLE mDeferredImage = {
+ 0, // Deferred image count
+ NULL // The deferred image info
+};
+
+EFI_DEFERRED_IMAGE_LOAD_PROTOCOL gDeferredImageLoad = {
+ GetDefferedImageInfo
+};
+
+/**
+ Get the image type.
+
+ @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file
+ that is being dispatched.
+
+ @return UINT32 Image Type
+
+**/
+UINT32
+GetFileType (
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_HANDLE DeviceHandle;
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *TempDevicePath;
+ EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo;
+
+ //
+ // First check to see if File is from a Firmware Volume
+ //
+ DeviceHandle = NULL;
+ TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;
+ Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (
+ &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,
+ &TempDevicePath,
+ &DeviceHandle
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
+ DeviceHandle,
+ &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_TEST_PROTOCOL
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return IMAGE_FROM_FV;
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Next check to see if File is from a Block I/O device
+ //
+ DeviceHandle = NULL;
+ TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;
+ Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (
+ &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,
+ &TempDevicePath,
+ &DeviceHandle
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ BlockIo = NULL;
+ Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
+ DeviceHandle,
+ &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,
+ (VOID **) &BlockIo,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && BlockIo != NULL) {
+ if (BlockIo->Media != NULL) {
+ if (BlockIo->Media->RemovableMedia) {
+ //
+ // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is removable
+ //
+ return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is not removable
+ //
+ return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
+ // File is not in a Firmware Volume or on a Block I/O device, so check to see if
+ // the device path supports the Simple File System Protocol.
+ //
+ DeviceHandle = NULL;
+ TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;
+ Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (
+ &gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid,
+ &TempDevicePath,
+ &DeviceHandle
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // Simple File System is present without Block I/O, so assume media is fixed.
+ //
+ return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // File is not from an FV, Block I/O or Simple File System, so the only options
+ // left are a PCI Option ROM and a Load File Protocol such as a PXE Boot from a NIC.
+ //
+ TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;
+ while (!IsDevicePathEndType (TempDevicePath)) {
+ switch (DevicePathType (TempDevicePath)) {
+
+ case MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH:
+ if (DevicePathSubType (TempDevicePath) == MEDIA_RELATIVE_OFFSET_RANGE_DP) {
+ return IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH:
+ if (DevicePathSubType(TempDevicePath) == MSG_MAC_ADDR_DP) {
+ return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ TempDevicePath = NextDevicePathNode (TempDevicePath);
+ }
+ return IMAGE_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ Get current user's access right.
+
+ @param[out] AccessControl Points to the user's access control data, the
+ caller should free data buffer.
+ @param[in] AccessType The type of user access control.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get current user access control successfully
+ @retval others Fail to get current user access control
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+GetAccessControl (
+ OUT EFI_USER_INFO_ACCESS_CONTROL **AccessControl,
+ IN UINT32 AccessType
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_USER_INFO_HANDLE UserInfo;
+ EFI_USER_INFO *Info;
+ UINTN InfoSize;
+ EFI_USER_INFO_ACCESS_CONTROL *Access;
+ EFI_USER_PROFILE_HANDLE CurrentUser;
+ UINTN CheckLen;
+ EFI_USER_MANAGER_PROTOCOL *UserManager;
+
+ CurrentUser = NULL;
+ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (
+ &gEfiUserManagerProtocolGuid,
+ NULL,
+ (VOID **) &UserManager
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Get current user access information.
+ //
+ UserManager->Current (UserManager, &CurrentUser);
+
+ UserInfo = NULL;
+ Info = NULL;
+ InfoSize = 0;
+ while (TRUE) {
+ //
+ // Get next user information.
+ //
+ Status = UserManager->GetNextInfo (UserManager, CurrentUser, &UserInfo);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ Status = UserManager->GetInfo (
+ UserManager,
+ CurrentUser,
+ UserInfo,
+ Info,
+ &InfoSize
+ );
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ if (Info != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Info);
+ }
+ Info = AllocateZeroPool (InfoSize);
+ ASSERT (Info != NULL);
+ Status = UserManager->GetInfo (
+ UserManager,
+ CurrentUser,
+ UserInfo,
+ Info,
+ &InfoSize
+ );
+ }
+
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT (Info != NULL);
+ if (Info->InfoType != EFI_USER_INFO_ACCESS_POLICY_RECORD) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Get specified access information.
+ //
+ CheckLen = 0;
+ while (CheckLen < Info->InfoSize - sizeof (EFI_USER_INFO)) {
+ Access = (EFI_USER_INFO_ACCESS_CONTROL *) ((UINT8 *) (Info + 1) + CheckLen);
+ if ((Access->Type == AccessType)) {
+ *AccessControl = AllocateZeroPool (Access->Size);
+ ASSERT (*AccessControl != NULL);
+ CopyMem (*AccessControl, Access, Access->Size);
+ FreePool (Info);
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ CheckLen += Access->Size;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (Info != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Info);
+ }
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ Convert the '/' to '\' in the specified string.
+
+ @param[in, out] Str Points to the string to convert.
+
+**/
+VOID
+ConvertDPStr (
+ IN OUT EFI_STRING Str
+ )
+{
+ INTN Count;
+ INTN Index;
+
+ Count = StrSize(Str) / 2 - 1;
+
+ if (Count < 4) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Convert device path string.
+ //
+ Index = Count - 1;
+ while (Index > 0) {
+ //
+ // Find the last '/'.
+ //
+ for (Index = Count - 1; Index > 0; Index--) {
+ if (Str[Index] == L'/')
+ break;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Check next char.
+ //
+ if (Str[Index + 1] == L'\\')
+ return;
+
+ Str[Index] = L'\\';
+
+ //
+ // Check previous char.
+ //
+ if ((Index > 0) && (Str[Index - 1] == L'\\')) {
+ CopyMem (&Str[Index - 1], &Str[Index], (UINTN) ((Count - Index + 1) * sizeof (CHAR16)));
+ return;
+ }
+ Index--;
+ }
+}
+
+
+/**
+ Check whether the DevicePath2 is identical with DevicePath1, or identical with
+ DevicePath1's child device path.
+
+ If DevicePath2 is identical with DevicePath1, or with DevicePath1's child device
+ path, then TRUE returned. Otherwise, FALSE is returned.
+
+ If DevicePath1 is NULL, then ASSERT().
+ If DevicePath2 is NULL, then ASSERT().
+
+ @param[in] DevicePath1 A pointer to a device path.
+ @param[in] DevicePath2 A pointer to a device path.
+
+ @retval TRUE Two device paths are identical , or DevicePath2 is
+ DevicePath1's child device path.
+ @retval FALSE Two device paths are not identical, and DevicePath2
+ is not DevicePath1's child device path.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+CheckDevicePath (
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath1,
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath2
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_STRING DevicePathStr1;
+ EFI_STRING DevicePathStr2;
+ UINTN StrLen1;
+ UINTN StrLen2;
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TO_TEXT_PROTOCOL *DevicePathText;
+ BOOLEAN DevicePathEqual;
+
+ ASSERT (DevicePath1 != NULL);
+ ASSERT (DevicePath2 != NULL);
+
+ DevicePathEqual = FALSE;
+ DevicePathText = NULL;
+ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (
+ &gEfiDevicePathToTextProtocolGuid,
+ NULL,
+ (VOID **) &DevicePathText
+ );
+ ASSERT (Status == EFI_SUCCESS);
+
+ //
+ // Get first device path string.
+ //
+ DevicePathStr1 = DevicePathText->ConvertDevicePathToText (DevicePath1, TRUE, TRUE);
+ ConvertDPStr (DevicePathStr1);
+ //
+ // Get second device path string.
+ //
+ DevicePathStr2 = DevicePathText->ConvertDevicePathToText (DevicePath2, TRUE, TRUE);
+ ConvertDPStr (DevicePathStr2);
+
+ //
+ // Compare device path string.
+ //
+ StrLen1 = StrSize (DevicePathStr1);
+ StrLen2 = StrSize (DevicePathStr2);
+ if (StrLen1 > StrLen2) {
+ DevicePathEqual = FALSE;
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ if (CompareMem (DevicePathStr1, DevicePathStr2, StrLen1) == 0) {
+ DevicePathEqual = TRUE;
+ }
+
+Done:
+ FreePool (DevicePathStr1);
+ FreePool (DevicePathStr2);
+ return DevicePathEqual;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ Check whether the image pointed to by DevicePath is in the device path list
+ specified by AccessType.
+
+ @param[in] DevicePath Points to device path.
+ @param[in] AccessType The type of user access control.
+
+ @retval TURE The DevicePath is in the specified List.
+ @retval FALSE The DevicePath is not in the specified List.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsDevicePathInList (
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath,
+ IN UINT32 AccessType
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_USER_INFO_ACCESS_CONTROL *Access;
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *Path;
+ UINTN OffSet;
+
+ Status = GetAccessControl (&Access, AccessType);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ OffSet = 0;
+ while (OffSet < Access->Size - sizeof (EFI_USER_INFO_ACCESS_CONTROL)) {
+ Path = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL*)((UINT8*)(Access + 1) + OffSet);
+ if (CheckDevicePath (Path, DevicePath)) {
+ //
+ // The device path is found in list.
+ //
+ FreePool (Access);
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ OffSet += GetDevicePathSize (Path);
+ }
+
+ FreePool (Access);
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ Check whether the image pointed to by DevicePath is permitted to load.
+
+ @param[in] DevicePath Points to device path
+
+ @retval TURE The image pointed by DevicePath is permitted to load.
+ @retval FALSE The image pointed by DevicePath is forbidden to load.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+VerifyDevicePath (
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath
+ )
+{
+ if (IsDevicePathInList (DevicePath, EFI_USER_INFO_ACCESS_PERMIT_LOAD)) {
+ //
+ // This access control overrides any restrictions put in place by the
+ // EFI_USER_INFO_ACCESS_FORBID_LOAD record.
+ //
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ if (IsDevicePathInList (DevicePath, EFI_USER_INFO_ACCESS_FORBID_LOAD)) {
+ //
+ // The device path is found in the forbidden list.
+ //
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ Check the image pointed by DevicePath is a boot option or not.
+
+ @param[in] DevicePath Points to device path.
+
+ @retval TURE The image pointed by DevicePath is a boot option.
+ @retval FALSE The image pointed by DevicePath is not a boot option.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsBootOption (
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINT16 *BootOrderList;
+ UINTN BootOrderListSize;
+ UINTN Index;
+ CHAR16 StrTemp[20];
+ UINT8 *OptionBuffer;
+ UINT8 *OptionPtr;
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *OptionDevicePath;
+
+ //
+ // Get BootOrder
+ //
+ BootOrderListSize = 0;
+ BootOrderList = NULL;
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (
+ L"BootOrder",
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ NULL,
+ &BootOrderListSize,
+ NULL
+ );
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ BootOrderList = AllocateZeroPool (BootOrderListSize);
+ ASSERT (BootOrderList != NULL);
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (
+ L"BootOrder",
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ NULL,
+ &BootOrderListSize,
+ BootOrderList
+ );
+ }
+
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // No Boot option
+ //
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ OptionBuffer = NULL;
+ for (Index = 0; Index < BootOrderListSize / sizeof (UINT16); Index++) {
+ //
+ // Try to find the DevicePath in BootOption
+ //
+ UnicodeSPrint (StrTemp, sizeof (StrTemp), L"Boot%04x", Index);
+ OptionBuffer = GetEfiGlobalVariable (StrTemp);
+ if (OptionBuffer == NULL) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Check whether the image is forbidden.
+ //
+
+ OptionPtr = OptionBuffer;
+ //
+ // Skip attribute.
+ //
+ OptionPtr += sizeof (UINT32);
+
+ //
+ // Skip device path length.
+ //
+ OptionPtr += sizeof (UINT16);
+
+ //
+ // Skip descript string
+ //
+ OptionPtr += StrSize ((UINT16 *) OptionPtr);
+
+ //
+ // Now OptionPtr points to Device Path.
+ //
+ OptionDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) OptionPtr;
+
+ if (CheckDevicePath (DevicePath, OptionDevicePath)) {
+ FreePool (OptionBuffer);
+ OptionBuffer = NULL;
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ FreePool (OptionBuffer);
+ OptionBuffer = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (BootOrderList != NULL) {
+ FreePool (BootOrderList);
+ }
+
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ Add the image info to a deferred image list.
+
+ @param[in] ImageDevicePath A pointer to the device path of a image.
+ @param[in] Image Points to the first byte of the image, or NULL if the
+ image is not available.
+ @param[in] ImageSize The size of the image, or 0 if the image is not available.
+
+**/
+VOID
+PutDefferedImageInfo (
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *ImageDevicePath,
+ IN VOID *Image,
+ IN UINTN ImageSize
+ )
+{
+ DEFERRED_IMAGE_INFO *CurImageInfo;
+ UINTN PathSize;
+
+ //
+ // Expand memory for the new deferred image.
+ //
+ if (mDeferredImage.Count == 0) {
+ mDeferredImage.ImageInfo = AllocatePool (sizeof (DEFERRED_IMAGE_INFO));
+ ASSERT (mDeferredImage.ImageInfo != NULL);
+ } else {
+ CurImageInfo = AllocatePool ((mDeferredImage.Count + 1) * sizeof (DEFERRED_IMAGE_INFO));
+ ASSERT (CurImageInfo != NULL);
+
+ CopyMem (
+ CurImageInfo,
+ mDeferredImage.ImageInfo,
+ mDeferredImage.Count * sizeof (DEFERRED_IMAGE_INFO)
+ );
+ FreePool (mDeferredImage.ImageInfo);
+ mDeferredImage.ImageInfo = CurImageInfo;
+ }
+ mDeferredImage.Count++;
+
+ //
+ // Save the deferred image information.
+ //
+ CurImageInfo = &mDeferredImage.ImageInfo[mDeferredImage.Count - 1];
+ PathSize = GetDevicePathSize (ImageDevicePath);
+ CurImageInfo->ImageDevicePath = AllocateZeroPool (PathSize);
+ ASSERT (CurImageInfo->ImageDevicePath != NULL);
+ CopyMem (CurImageInfo->ImageDevicePath, ImageDevicePath, PathSize);
+
+ CurImageInfo->Image = Image;
+ CurImageInfo->ImageSize = ImageSize;
+ CurImageInfo->BootOption = IsBootOption (ImageDevicePath);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ Returns information about a deferred image.
+
+ This function returns information about a single deferred image. The deferred images are
+ numbered consecutively, starting with 0. If there is no image which corresponds to
+ ImageIndex, then EFI_NOT_FOUND is returned. All deferred images may be returned by
+ iteratively calling this function until EFI_NOT_FOUND is returned.
+ Image may be NULL and ImageSize set to 0 if the decision to defer execution was made
+ because of the location of the executable image, rather than its actual contents.
+
+ @param[in] This Points to this instance of the EFI_DEFERRED_IMAGE_LOAD_PROTOCOL.
+ @param[in] ImageIndex Zero-based index of the deferred index.
+ @param[out] ImageDevicePath On return, points to a pointer to the device path of the image.
+ The device path should not be freed by the caller.
+ @param[out] Image On return, points to the first byte of the image or NULL if the
+ image is not available. The image should not be freed by the caller
+ unless LoadImage() has been successfully called.
+ @param[out] ImageSize On return, the size of the image, or 0 if the image is not available.
+ @param[out] BootOption On return, points to TRUE if the image was intended as a boot option
+ or FALSE if it was not intended as a boot option.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Image information returned successfully.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND ImageIndex does not refer to a valid image.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ImageDevicePath is NULL or Image is NULL or ImageSize is NULL or
+ BootOption is NULL.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+GetDefferedImageInfo (
+ IN EFI_DEFERRED_IMAGE_LOAD_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN UINTN ImageIndex,
+ OUT EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL **ImageDevicePath,
+ OUT VOID **Image,
+ OUT UINTN *ImageSize,
+ OUT BOOLEAN *BootOption
+ )
+{
+ DEFERRED_IMAGE_INFO *ReqImageInfo;
+
+ //
+ // Check the parameter.
+ //
+
+ if ((This == NULL) || (ImageSize == NULL) || (Image == NULL)) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if ((ImageDevicePath == NULL) || (BootOption == NULL)) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if (ImageIndex >= mDeferredImage.Count) {
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Get the request deferred image.
+ //
+ ReqImageInfo = &mDeferredImage.ImageInfo[ImageIndex];
+
+ *ImageDevicePath = ReqImageInfo->ImageDevicePath;
+ *Image = ReqImageInfo->Image;
+ *ImageSize = ReqImageInfo->ImageSize;
+ *BootOption = ReqImageInfo->BootOption;
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ Provides the service of deferring image load based on platform policy control,
+ and installs Deferred Image Load Protocol.
+
+ @param[in] AuthenticationStatus This is the authentication status returned from the
+ security measurement services for the input file.
+ @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that
+ is being dispatched. This will optionally be used for
+ logging.
+ @param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.
+ @param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by File did authenticate, and the
+ platform policy dictates that the DXE Core may use File.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER File is NULL.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by File did not authenticate, and
+ the platform policy dictates that File should be placed
+ in the untrusted state. A file may be promoted from
+ the untrusted to the trusted state at a future time
+ with a call to the Trust() DXE Service.
+ @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File did not authenticate, and
+ the platform policy dictates that File should not be
+ used for any purpose.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+DxeDeferImageLoadHandler (
+ IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File,
+ IN VOID *FileBuffer,
+ IN UINTN FileSize
+ )
+
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_USER_PROFILE_HANDLE CurrentUser;
+ UINT32 Policy;
+ UINT32 FileType;
+
+ if (File == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Check whether user has a logon.
+ //
+ CurrentUser = NULL;
+ if (mUserManager != NULL) {
+ mUserManager->Current (mUserManager, &CurrentUser);
+ if (CurrentUser != NULL) {
+ //
+ // The user is logon; verify the FilePath by current user access policy.
+ //
+ if (!VerifyDevicePath (File)) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[Security] The image is forbidden to load!\n"));
+ return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ }
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Still no user logon.
+ // Check the file type and get policy setting.
+ //
+ FileType = GetFileType (File);
+ Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdDeferImageLoadPolicy);
+ if ((Policy & FileType) == FileType) {
+ //
+ // This file type is secure to load.
+ //
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "[Security] No user identified, the image is deferred to load!\n"));
+ PutDefferedImageInfo (File, NULL, 0);
+
+ //
+ // Install the Deferred Image Load Protocol onto a new handle.
+ //
+ if (!mIsProtocolInstalled) {
+ Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (
+ &mDeferredImageHandle,
+ &gEfiDeferredImageLoadProtocolGuid,
+ &gDeferredImageLoad,
+ NULL
+ );
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+ mIsProtocolInstalled = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+}
+
+/**
+ Locate user manager protocol when user manager is installed.
+
+ @param[in] Event The Event that is being processed, not used.
+ @param[in] Context Event Context, not used.
+
+**/
+VOID
+EFIAPI
+FindUserManagerProtocol (
+ IN EFI_EVENT Event,
+ IN VOID* Context
+ )
+{
+ gBS->LocateProtocol (
+ &gEfiUserManagerProtocolGuid,
+ NULL,
+ (VOID **) &mUserManager
+ );
+
+}
+
+
+/**
+ Register security handler for deferred image load.
+
+ @param[in] ImageHandle ImageHandle of the loaded driver.
+ @param[in] SystemTable Pointer to the EFI System Table.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The handlers were registered successfully.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+DxeDeferImageLoadLibConstructor (
+ IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,
+ IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable
+ )
+{
+ VOID *Registration;
+
+ //
+ // Register user manager notification function.
+ //
+ EfiCreateProtocolNotifyEvent (
+ &gEfiUserManagerProtocolGuid,
+ TPL_CALLBACK,
+ FindUserManagerProtocol,
+ NULL,
+ &Registration
+ );
+
+ return RegisterSecurityHandler (
+ DxeDeferImageLoadHandler,
+ EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_DEFER_IMAGE_LOAD
+ );
+}
+
+
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeDeferImageLoadLib/DxeDeferImageLoadLib.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeDeferImageLoadLib/DxeDeferImageLoadLib.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..52eb81b796 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeDeferImageLoadLib/DxeDeferImageLoadLib.h @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +/** @file
+ The internal header file includes the common header files, defines
+ internal structure and functions used by DeferImageLoadLib.
+
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2010, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+
+#ifndef __DEFER_IMAGE_LOAD_LIB_H__
+#define __DEFER_IMAGE_LOAD_LIB_H__
+
+#include <PiDxe.h>
+#include <Library/UefiRuntimeServicesTableLib.h>
+#include <Library/UefiBootServicesTableLib.h>
+#include <Library/SecurityManagementLib.h>
+#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>
+#include <Library/DevicePathLib.h>
+#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
+#include <Library/PrintLib.h>
+#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
+#include <Library/UefiLib.h>
+#include <Library/PcdLib.h>
+
+#include <Protocol/FirmwareVolume2.h>
+#include <Protocol/BlockIo.h>
+#include <Protocol/SimpleFileSystem.h>
+#include <Protocol/DeferredImageLoad.h>
+#include <Protocol/UserCredential.h>
+#include <Protocol/UserManager.h>
+#include <Protocol/DevicePathToText.h>
+
+#include <Guid/GlobalVariable.h>
+
+//
+// Image type definitions.
+//
+#define IMAGE_UNKNOWN 0x00000001
+#define IMAGE_FROM_FV 0x00000002
+#define IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM 0x00000004
+#define IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA 0x00000008
+#define IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA 0x00000010
+
+//
+// The struct to save the deferred image information.
+//
+typedef struct {
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *ImageDevicePath;
+ VOID *Image;
+ UINTN ImageSize;
+ BOOLEAN BootOption;
+} DEFERRED_IMAGE_INFO;
+
+//
+// The table to save the deferred image item.
+//
+typedef struct {
+ UINTN Count; ///< deferred image count
+ DEFERRED_IMAGE_INFO *ImageInfo; ///< deferred image item
+} DEFERRED_IMAGE_TABLE;
+
+/**
+ Returns information about a deferred image.
+
+ This function returns information about a single deferred image. The deferred images are
+ numbered consecutively, starting with 0. If there is no image which corresponds to
+ ImageIndex, then EFI_NOT_FOUND is returned. All deferred images may be returned by
+ iteratively calling this function until EFI_NOT_FOUND is returned.
+ Image may be NULL and ImageSize set to 0 if the decision to defer execution was made
+ because of the location of the executable image, rather than its actual contents.
+
+ @param[in] This Points to this instance of the EFI_DEFERRED_IMAGE_LOAD_PROTOCOL.
+ @param[in] ImageIndex Zero-based index of the deferred index.
+ @param[out] ImageDevicePath On return, points to a pointer to the device path of the image.
+ The device path should not be freed by the caller.
+ @param[out] Image On return, points to the first byte of the image or NULL if the
+ image is not available. The image should not be freed by the caller
+ unless LoadImage() has been called successfully.
+ @param[out] ImageSize On return, the size of the image, or 0 if the image is not available.
+ @param[out] BootOption On return, points to TRUE if the image was intended as a boot option
+ or FALSE if it was not intended as a boot option.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Image information returned successfully.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND ImageIndex does not refer to a valid image.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ImageDevicePath is NULL or Image is NULL or ImageSize is NULL or
+ BootOption is NULL.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+GetDefferedImageInfo (
+ IN EFI_DEFERRED_IMAGE_LOAD_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN UINTN ImageIndex,
+ OUT EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL **ImageDevicePath,
+ OUT VOID **Image,
+ OUT UINTN *ImageSize,
+ OUT BOOLEAN *BootOption
+ );
+
+#endif
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeDeferImageLoadLib/DxeDeferImageLoadLib.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeDeferImageLoadLib/DxeDeferImageLoadLib.inf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e16fe8dc04 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeDeferImageLoadLib/DxeDeferImageLoadLib.inf @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +## @file
+# The library instance provides security service of deferring image load.
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2010, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+# This program and the accompanying materials
+# are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+# which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+# http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+# THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+#
+##
+
+[Defines]
+ INF_VERSION = 0x00010005
+ BASE_NAME = DxeDeferImageLoadLib
+ FILE_GUID = 5E2FAE1F-41DA-4fbd-BC81-603CE5CD8497
+ MODULE_TYPE = DXE_DRIVER
+ VERSION_STRING = 1.0
+ LIBRARY_CLASS = NULL|DXE_DRIVER UEFI_DRIVER DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER UEFI_APPLICATION
+ CONSTRUCTOR = DxeDeferImageLoadLibConstructor
+
+#
+# The following information is for reference only and not required by the build tools.
+#
+# VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IA32 X64 EBC
+#
+
+[Sources]
+ DxeDeferImageLoadLib.c
+ DxeDeferImageLoadLib.h
+
+[Packages]
+ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
+ MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
+ SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec
+
+[LibraryClasses]
+ UefiRuntimeServicesTableLib
+ UefiBootServicesTableLib
+ SecurityManagementLib
+ MemoryAllocationLib
+ DevicePathLib
+ BaseMemoryLib
+ PrintLib
+ DebugLib
+ UefiLib
+ PcdLib
+
+[Protocols]
+ gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid
+ gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid
+ gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid
+ gEfiUserManagerProtocolGuid
+ gEfiDeferredImageLoadProtocolGuid
+ gEfiDevicePathToTextProtocolGuid
+
+[Guids]
+ gEfiGlobalVariableGuid
+
+[Pcd]
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDeferImageLoadPolicy
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..148dbd5a89 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c @@ -0,0 +1,1368 @@ +/** @file
+ Implement image verification services for secure boot service in UEFI2.3.1.
+
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+
+#include "DxeImageVerificationLib.h"
+
+EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION mNtHeader;
+UINTN mImageSize;
+UINT32 mPeCoffHeaderOffset;
+UINT8 mImageDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+UINTN mImageDigestSize;
+EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *mSecDataDir = NULL;
+UINT8 *mImageBase = NULL;
+EFI_GUID mCertType;
+
+//
+// Notify string for authorization UI.
+//
+CHAR16 mNotifyString1[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN] = L"Image verification pass but not found in authorized database!";
+CHAR16 mNotifyString2[MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN] = L"Launch this image anyway? (Yes/Defer/No)";
+//
+// Public Exponent of RSA Key.
+//
+CONST UINT8 mRsaE[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };
+
+
+//
+// OID ASN.1 Value for Hash Algorithms
+//
+UINT8 mHashOidValue[] = {
+ 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, // OBJ_md5
+ 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, // OBJ_sha1
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, // OBJ_sha224
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, // OBJ_sha256
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, // OBJ_sha384
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, // OBJ_sha512
+ };
+
+HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {
+ { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[8], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init, Sha1Update, Sha1Final },
+ { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[13], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },
+ { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[22], 9, Sha256GetContextSize,Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final},
+ { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[31], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL },
+ { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[40], 9, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+
+/**
+ Get the image type.
+
+ @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is
+ being dispatched.
+
+ @return UINT32 Image Type
+
+**/
+UINT32
+GetImageType (
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_HANDLE DeviceHandle;
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *TempDevicePath;
+ EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo;
+
+ //
+ // First check to see if File is from a Firmware Volume
+ //
+ DeviceHandle = NULL;
+ TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;
+ Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (
+ &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,
+ &TempDevicePath,
+ &DeviceHandle
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
+ DeviceHandle,
+ &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_TEST_PROTOCOL
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return IMAGE_FROM_FV;
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Next check to see if File is from a Block I/O device
+ //
+ DeviceHandle = NULL;
+ TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;
+ Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (
+ &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,
+ &TempDevicePath,
+ &DeviceHandle
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ BlockIo = NULL;
+ Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
+ DeviceHandle,
+ &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,
+ (VOID **) &BlockIo,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && BlockIo != NULL) {
+ if (BlockIo->Media != NULL) {
+ if (BlockIo->Media->RemovableMedia) {
+ //
+ // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is removable
+ //
+ return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Block I/O is present and specifies the media is not removable
+ //
+ return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
+ // File is not in a Firmware Volume or on a Block I/O device, so check to see if
+ // the device path supports the Simple File System Protocol.
+ //
+ DeviceHandle = NULL;
+ TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;
+ Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (
+ &gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid,
+ &TempDevicePath,
+ &DeviceHandle
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // Simple File System is present without Block I/O, so assume media is fixed.
+ //
+ return IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // File is not from an FV, Block I/O or Simple File System, so the only options
+ // left are a PCI Option ROM and a Load File Protocol such as a PXE Boot from a NIC.
+ //
+ TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;
+ while (!IsDevicePathEndType (TempDevicePath)) {
+ switch (DevicePathType (TempDevicePath)) {
+
+ case MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH:
+ if (DevicePathSubType (TempDevicePath) == MEDIA_RELATIVE_OFFSET_RANGE_DP) {
+ return IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH:
+ if (DevicePathSubType(TempDevicePath) == MSG_MAC_ADDR_DP) {
+ return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ TempDevicePath = NextDevicePathNode (TempDevicePath);
+ }
+ return IMAGE_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+/**
+ Caculate hash of Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in
+ PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A
+
+ @param[in] HashAlg Hash algorithm type.
+
+ @retval TRUE Successfully hash image.
+ @retval FALSE Fail in hash image.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+HashPeImage (
+ IN UINT32 HashAlg
+ )
+{
+ BOOLEAN Status;
+ UINT16 Magic;
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;
+ VOID *HashCtx;
+ UINTN CtxSize;
+ UINT8 *HashBase;
+ UINTN HashSize;
+ UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;
+ UINTN Index;
+ UINTN Pos;
+
+ HashCtx = NULL;
+ SectionHeader = NULL;
+ Status = FALSE;
+
+ if ((HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA1) && (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256)) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Initialize context of hash.
+ //
+ ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+ if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA1) {
+ mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ mCertType = gEfiCertSha1Guid;
+ } else if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA256) {
+ mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;
+ } else {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ CtxSize = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();
+
+ HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);
+ ASSERT (HashCtx != NULL);
+
+ // 1. Load the image header into memory.
+
+ // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);
+
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ //
+ // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;
+ // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded
+ //
+ Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;
+ //
+ // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.
+ // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.
+ //
+ HashBase = mImageBase;
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset.
+ //
+ HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset.
+ //
+ HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);
+ }
+
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ //
+ // 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).
+ // 6. Get the address of the beginning of the Cert Directory.
+ // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.
+ //
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset.
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
+ HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset.
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
+ HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);
+ }
+
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ //
+ // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)
+ // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.
+ //
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];
+ HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset.
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];
+ HashSize = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders - (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - mImageBase);
+ }
+
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ //
+ // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header.
+ //
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset.
+ //
+ SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset
+ //
+ SumOfBytesHashed = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
+ // structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image
+ // header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any
+ // IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.
+ //
+ SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);
+ ASSERT (SectionHeader != NULL);
+ //
+ // 12. Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as
+ // a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other
+ // words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of
+ // the section.
+ //
+ Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) (
+ mImageBase +
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset +
+ sizeof (UINT32) +
+ sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +
+ mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader
+ );
+ for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {
+ Pos = Index;
+ while ((Pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[Pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {
+ CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], &SectionHeader[Pos - 1], sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));
+ Pos--;
+ }
+ CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], Section, sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));
+ Section += 1;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // 13. Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section
+ // into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'
+ // field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).
+ // 14. Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .
+ // 15. Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.
+ //
+ for (Index = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {
+ Section = &SectionHeader[Index];
+ if (Section->SizeOfRawData == 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ HashBase = mImageBase + Section->PointerToRawData;
+ HashSize = (UINTN) Section->SizeOfRawData;
+
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // 16. If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra
+ // data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins
+ // at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:
+ // FileSize - (CertDirectory->Size)
+ //
+ if (mImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {
+ HashBase = mImageBase + SumOfBytesHashed;
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset.
+ //
+ HashSize = (UINTN)(
+ mImageSize -
+ mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -
+ SumOfBytesHashed);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset.
+ //
+ HashSize = (UINTN)(
+ mImageSize -
+ mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -
+ SumOfBytesHashed);
+ }
+
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ }
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal(HashCtx, mImageDigest);
+
+Done:
+ if (HashCtx != NULL) {
+ FreePool (HashCtx);
+ }
+ if (SectionHeader != NULL) {
+ FreePool (SectionHeader);
+ }
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and caculate hash of
+ Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in PE/COFF Specification
+ 8.0 Appendix A
+
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+HashPeImageByType (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ UINT8 Index;
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;
+
+ PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);
+
+ for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {
+ //
+ // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.
+ // According to PKCS#7 Definition:
+ // SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ // version Version,
+ // digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
+ // contentInfo ContentInfo,
+ // .... }
+ // The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing
+ // This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.
+ //
+ if (CompareMem (PkcsCertData->CertData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (Index == HASHALG_MAX) {
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // HASH PE Image based on Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.
+ //
+ if (!HashPeImage(Index)) {
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ Returns the size of a given image execution info table in bytes.
+
+ This function returns the size, in bytes, of the image execution info table specified by
+ ImageExeInfoTable. If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL, then 0 is returned.
+
+ @param ImageExeInfoTable A pointer to a image execution info table structure.
+
+ @retval 0 If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL.
+ @retval Others The size of a image execution info table in bytes.
+
+**/
+UINTN
+GetImageExeInfoTableSize (
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable
+ )
+{
+ UINTN Index;
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *ImageExeInfoItem;
+ UINTN TotalSize;
+
+ if (ImageExeInfoTable == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ImageExeInfoItem = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoTable + sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE));
+ TotalSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);
+ for (Index = 0; Index < ImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages; Index++) {
+ TotalSize += ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoItem->InfoSize);
+ ImageExeInfoItem = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) ImageExeInfoItem + ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoItem->InfoSize));
+ }
+
+ return TotalSize;
+}
+
+/**
+ Create an Image Execution Information Table entry and add it to system configuration table.
+
+ @param[in] Action Describes the action taken by the firmware regarding this image.
+ @param[in] Name Input a null-terminated, user-friendly name.
+ @param[in] DevicePath Input device path pointer.
+ @param[in] Signature Input signature info in EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST data structure.
+ @param[in] SignatureSize Size of signature.
+
+**/
+VOID
+AddImageExeInfo (
+ IN EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action,
+ IN CHAR16 *Name OPTIONAL,
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePath,
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *Signature OPTIONAL,
+ IN UINTN SignatureSize
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *ImageExeInfoTable;
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *NewImageExeInfoTable;
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *ImageExeInfoEntry;
+ UINTN ImageExeInfoTableSize;
+ UINTN NewImageExeInfoEntrySize;
+ UINTN NameStringLen;
+ UINTN DevicePathSize;
+
+ ASSERT (DevicePath != NULL);
+ ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;
+ NewImageExeInfoTable = NULL;
+ ImageExeInfoEntry = NULL;
+ NameStringLen = 0;
+
+ if (Name != NULL) {
+ NameStringLen = StrSize (Name);
+ }
+
+ ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;
+ EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID**)&ImageExeInfoTable);
+ if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {
+ //
+ // The table has been found!
+ // We must enlarge the table to accmodate the new exe info entry.
+ //
+ ImageExeInfoTableSize = GetImageExeInfoTableSize (ImageExeInfoTable);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Not Found!
+ // We should create a new table to append to the configuration table.
+ //
+ ImageExeInfoTableSize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE);
+ }
+
+ DevicePathSize = GetDevicePathSize (DevicePath);
+ NewImageExeInfoEntrySize = sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize + SignatureSize;
+ NewImageExeInfoTable = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE *) AllocateRuntimePool (ImageExeInfoTableSize + NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);
+ ASSERT (NewImageExeInfoTable != NULL);
+
+ if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {
+ CopyMem (NewImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTable, ImageExeInfoTableSize);
+ } else {
+ NewImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages = 0;
+ }
+ NewImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages++;
+ ImageExeInfoEntry = (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO *) ((UINT8 *) NewImageExeInfoTable + ImageExeInfoTableSize);
+ //
+ // Update new item's infomation.
+ //
+ WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->Action, Action);
+ WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize, (UINT32) NewImageExeInfoEntrySize);
+
+ if (Name != NULL) {
+ CopyMem ((UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32), Name, NameStringLen);
+ }
+ CopyMem (
+ (UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32) + NameStringLen,
+ DevicePath,
+ DevicePathSize
+ );
+ if (Signature != NULL) {
+ CopyMem (
+ (UINT8 *) &ImageExeInfoEntry->InfoSize + sizeof (UINT32) + NameStringLen + DevicePathSize,
+ Signature,
+ SignatureSize
+ );
+ }
+ //
+ // Update/replace the image execution table.
+ //
+ Status = gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *) NewImageExeInfoTable);
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+ //
+ // Free Old table data!
+ //
+ if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {
+ FreePool (ImageExeInfoTable);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ Discover if the UEFI image is authorized by user's policy setting.
+
+ @param[in] Policy Specify platform's policy setting.
+
+ @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED Image is not allowed to run.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image is deferred.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Image is authorized to run.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+ImageAuthorization (
+ IN UINT32 Policy
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_INPUT_KEY Key;
+
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+
+ switch (Policy) {
+
+ case QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
+ do {
+ CreatePopUp (EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE, &Key, mNotifyString1, mNotifyString2, NULL);
+ if (Key.UnicodeChar == L'Y' || Key.UnicodeChar == L'y') {
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ } else if (Key.UnicodeChar == L'N' || Key.UnicodeChar == L'n') {
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ break;
+ } else if (Key.UnicodeChar == L'D' || Key.UnicodeChar == L'd') {
+ Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ break;
+ }
+ } while (TRUE);
+ break;
+
+ case ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+
+ case DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
+ Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ break;
+
+ case DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Check whether signature is in specified database.
+
+ @param[in] VariableName Name of database variable that is searched in.
+ @param[in] Signature Pointer to signature that is searched for.
+ @param[in] CertType Pointer to hash algrithom.
+ @param[in] SignatureSize Size of Signature.
+
+ @return TRUE Found the signature in the variable database.
+ @return FALSE Not found the signature in the variable database.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (
+ IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
+ IN UINT8 *Signature,
+ IN EFI_GUID *CertType,
+ IN UINTN SignatureSize
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+ UINT8 *Data;
+ UINTN Index;
+ UINTN CertCount;
+ BOOLEAN IsFound;
+ //
+ // Read signature database variable.
+ //
+ IsFound = FALSE;
+ Data = NULL;
+ DataSize = 0;
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
+ if (Status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
+ ASSERT (Data != NULL);
+
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, Data);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ //
+ // Enumerate all signature data in SigDB to check if executable's signature exists.
+ //
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
+ while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+ if ((CertList->SignatureSize == sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + SignatureSize) && (CompareGuid(&CertList->SignatureType, CertType))) {
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
+ if (CompareMem (Cert->SignatureData, Signature, SignatureSize) == 0) {
+ //
+ // Find the signature in database.
+ //
+ IsFound = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);
+ }
+
+ if (IsFound) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
+ }
+
+Done:
+ if (Data != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Data);
+ }
+
+ return IsFound;
+}
+
+/**
+ Verify certificate in WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA format .
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Image pass verification.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image fail verification.
+ @retval other error value
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *PkcsCertData;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+ UINT8 *Data;
+ UINT8 *RootCert;
+ UINTN RootCertSize;
+ UINTN Index;
+ UINTN CertCount;
+
+ Data = NULL;
+ CertList = NULL;
+ Cert = NULL;
+ RootCert = NULL;
+ RootCertSize = 0;
+ VerifyStatus = FALSE;
+ PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);
+
+ //
+ // 1: Find certificate from KEK database and try to verify authenticode struct.
+ //
+ DataSize = 0;
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ Data = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
+ ASSERT (Data != NULL);
+
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *)Data);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Find Cert Enrolled in KEK database to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.
+ //
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
+ while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
+ if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
+ //
+ // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify
+ //
+ RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
+ RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;
+
+ //
+ // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.
+ //
+ VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (
+ PkcsCertData->CertData,
+ mSecDataDir->Size - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr),
+ RootCert,
+ RootCertSize,
+ mImageDigest,
+ mImageDigestSize
+ );
+
+ if (VerifyStatus) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);
+ }
+ }
+ DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
+ }
+ }
+
+
+
+ //
+ // 2: Find certificate from DB database and try to verify authenticode struct.
+ //
+ DataSize = 0;
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ Data = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
+ ASSERT (Data != NULL);
+
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *)Data);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Find Cert Enrolled in DB database to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.
+ //
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
+ while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
+ if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
+ //
+ // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify
+ //
+ RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
+ RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize;
+
+ //
+ // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.
+ //
+ VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (
+ PkcsCertData->CertData,
+ mSecDataDir->Size - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr),
+ RootCert,
+ RootCertSize,
+ mImageDigest,
+ mImageDigestSize
+ );
+
+ if (VerifyStatus) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);
+ }
+ }
+ DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);
+ }
+ }
+
+Done:
+ if (Data != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Data);
+ }
+
+ if (VerifyStatus) {
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ Verify certificate in WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID format.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Image pass verification.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION Image fail verification.
+ @retval other error value
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+VerifyCertUefiGuid (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ BOOLEAN Status;
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *EfiCert;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *KekList;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *KekItem;
+ EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *CertBlock;
+ VOID *Rsa;
+ UINTN KekCount;
+ UINTN Index;
+ UINTN KekDataSize;
+ BOOLEAN IsFound;
+ EFI_STATUS Result;
+
+ EfiCert = NULL;
+ KekList = NULL;
+ KekItem = NULL;
+ CertBlock = NULL;
+ Rsa = NULL;
+ Status = FALSE;
+ IsFound = FALSE;
+ KekDataSize = 0;
+
+ EfiCert = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);
+ CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) EfiCert->CertData;
+ if (!CompareGuid (&EfiCert->CertType, &gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid)) {
+ //
+ // Invalid Certificate Data Type.
+ //
+ return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Get KEK database variable data size
+ //
+ Result = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &KekDataSize, NULL);
+ if (Result != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Get KEK database variable.
+ //
+ KekList = GetEfiGlobalVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME);
+ if (KekList == NULL) {
+ return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Enumerate all Kek items in this list to verify the variable certificate data.
+ // If anyone is authenticated successfully, it means the variable is correct!
+ //
+ while ((KekDataSize > 0) && (KekDataSize >= KekList->SignatureListSize)) {
+ if (CompareGuid (&KekList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertRsa2048Guid)) {
+ KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + KekList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+ KekCount = (KekList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - KekList->SignatureHeaderSize) / KekList->SignatureSize;
+ for (Index = 0; Index < KekCount; Index++) {
+ if (CompareMem (KekItem->SignatureData, CertBlock->PublicKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) == 0) {
+ IsFound = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+ KekItem = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) KekItem + KekList->SignatureSize);
+ }
+ }
+ KekDataSize -= KekList->SignatureListSize;
+ KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + KekList->SignatureListSize);
+ }
+
+ if (!IsFound) {
+ //
+ // Signed key is not a trust one.
+ //
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Now, we found the corresponding security policy.
+ // Verify the data payload.
+ //
+ Rsa = RsaNew ();
+ ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);
+ //
+ // Set RSA Key Components.
+ // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.
+ //
+ Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyN, CertBlock->PublicKey, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ Status = RsaSetKey (Rsa, RsaKeyE, mRsaE, sizeof (mRsaE));
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ //
+ // Verify the signature.
+ //
+ Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (
+ Rsa,
+ mImageDigest,
+ mImageDigestSize,
+ CertBlock->Signature,
+ EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE
+ );
+
+Done:
+ if (KekList != NULL) {
+ FreePool (KekList);
+ }
+ if (Rsa != NULL ) {
+ RsaFree (Rsa);
+ }
+ if (Status) {
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ Provide verification service for signed images, which include both signature validation
+ and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and
+ MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.
+
+ In this implementation, only verify external executables when in USER MODE.
+ Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored.
+
+ @param[in] AuthenticationStatus
+ This is the authentication status returned from the security
+ measurement services for the input file.
+ @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is
+ being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.
+ @param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.
+ @param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by File did authenticate, and the
+ platform policy dictates that the DXE Core may use File.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER File is NULL.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by File did not authenticate, and
+ the platform policy dictates that File should be placed
+ in the untrusted state. A file may be promoted from
+ the untrusted to the trusted state at a future time
+ with a call to the Trust() DXE Service.
+ @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File did not authenticate, and
+ the platform policy dictates that File should not be
+ used for any purpose.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+DxeImageVerificationHandler (
+ IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File,
+ IN VOID *FileBuffer,
+ IN UINTN FileSize
+ )
+
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ UINT16 Magic;
+ EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;
+ EFI_STATUS VerifyStatus;
+ UINT8 *SetupMode;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList;
+ UINTN SignatureListSize;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Signature;
+ EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION Action;
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE *WinCertificate;
+ UINT32 Policy;
+
+ if (File == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ SignatureList = NULL;
+ SignatureListSize = 0;
+ WinCertificate = NULL;
+ Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ //
+ // Check the image type and get policy setting.
+ //
+ switch (GetImageType (File)) {
+
+ case IMAGE_FROM_FV:
+ Policy = ALWAYS_EXECUTE;
+ break;
+
+ case IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM:
+ Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy);
+ break;
+
+ case IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA:
+ Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy);
+ break;
+
+ case IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA:
+ Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ break;
+ }
+ //
+ // If policy is always/never execute, return directly.
+ //
+ if (Policy == ALWAYS_EXECUTE) {
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ } else if (Policy == NEVER_EXECUTE) {
+ return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ }
+ SetupMode = GetEfiGlobalVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME);
+
+ //
+ // SetupMode doesn't exist means no AuthVar driver is dispatched,
+ // skip verification.
+ //
+ if (SetupMode == NULL) {
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // If platform is in SETUP MODE, skip verification.
+ //
+ if (*SetupMode == SETUP_MODE) {
+ FreePool (SetupMode);
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ //
+ // Read the Dos header.
+ //
+ ASSERT (FileBuffer != NULL);
+ mImageBase = (UINT8 *) FileBuffer;
+ mImageSize = FileSize;
+ DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) (mImageBase);
+ if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {
+ //
+ // DOS image header is present,
+ // so read the PE header after the DOS image header.
+ //
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;
+ } else {
+ mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;
+ }
+ //
+ // Check PE/COFF image.
+ //
+ mNtHeader.Pe32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);
+ if (mNtHeader.Pe32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {
+ //
+ // It is not a valid Pe/Coff file.
+ //
+ return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ }
+
+ Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset.
+ //
+ mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *)&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset.
+ //
+ mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *)&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
+ }
+
+ if (mSecDataDir->Size == 0) {
+ //
+ // This image is not signed.
+ //
+ Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ //
+ // Verify signature of executables.
+ //
+ WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);
+
+ switch (WinCertificate->wCertificateType) {
+
+ case WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID:
+ //
+ // Verify UEFI GUID type.
+ //
+ if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ VerifyStatus = VerifyCertUefiGuid ();
+ break;
+
+ case WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA:
+ //
+ // Verify Pkcs signed data type.
+ //
+ Status = HashPeImageByType();
+ if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ VerifyStatus = VerifyCertPkcsSignedData ();
+
+ //
+ // For image verification against enrolled certificate(root or intermediate),
+ // no need to check image's hash in the allowed database.
+ //
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ default:
+ return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ }
+ //
+ // Get image hash value as executable's signature.
+ //
+ SignatureListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + mImageDigestSize;
+ SignatureList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignatureListSize);
+ ASSERT (SignatureList != NULL);
+ SignatureList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;
+ SignatureList->SignatureListSize = (UINT32) SignatureListSize;
+ SignatureList->SignatureSize = (UINT32) mImageDigestSize;
+ CopyMem (&SignatureList->SignatureType, &mCertType, sizeof (EFI_GUID));
+ Signature = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SignatureList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));
+ CopyMem (Signature->SignatureData, mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize);
+ //
+ // Signature database check after verification.
+ //
+ if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {
+ //
+ // Verification failure.
+ //
+ Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ } else if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, Signature->SignatureData, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
+ //
+ // Executable signature verification passes, but is found in forbidden signature database.
+ //
+ Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND;
+ Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
+ } else if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, Signature->SignatureData, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {
+ //
+ // Executable signature is found in authorized signature database.
+ //
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Executable signature verification passes, but cannot be found in authorized signature database.
+ // Get platform policy to determine the action.
+ //
+ Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED;
+ Status = ImageAuthorization (Policy);
+ }
+
+Done:
+ if (Status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ //
+ // Policy decides to defer or reject the image; add its information in image executable information table.
+ //
+ AddImageExeInfo (Action, NULL, File, SignatureList, SignatureListSize);
+ }
+
+ if (SignatureList != NULL) {
+ FreePool (SignatureList);
+ }
+
+ FreePool (SetupMode);
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ When VariableWriteArchProtocol install, create "SecureBoot" variable.
+
+ @param[in] Event Event whose notification function is being invoked.
+ @param[in] Context Pointer to the notification function's context.
+
+**/
+VOID
+EFIAPI
+VariableWriteCallBack (
+ IN EFI_EVENT Event,
+ IN VOID *Context
+ )
+{
+ UINT8 SecureBootMode;
+ UINT8 *SecureBootModePtr;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ VOID *ProtocolPointer;
+
+ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid, NULL, &ProtocolPointer);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Check whether "SecureBoot" variable exists.
+ // If this library is built-in, it means firmware has capability to perform
+ // driver signing verification.
+ //
+ SecureBootModePtr = GetEfiGlobalVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME);
+ if (SecureBootModePtr == NULL) {
+ SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;
+ //
+ // Authenticated variable driver will update "SecureBoot" depending on SetupMode variable.
+ //
+ gRT->SetVariable (
+ EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE,
+ sizeof (UINT8),
+ &SecureBootMode
+ );
+ } else {
+ FreePool (SecureBootModePtr);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ Register security measurement handler.
+
+ @param ImageHandle ImageHandle of the loaded driver.
+ @param SystemTable Pointer to the EFI System Table.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The handlers were registered successfully.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor (
+ IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,
+ IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable
+ )
+{
+ VOID *Registration;
+
+ //
+ // Register callback function upon VariableWriteArchProtocol.
+ //
+ EfiCreateProtocolNotifyEvent (
+ &gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid,
+ TPL_CALLBACK,
+ VariableWriteCallBack,
+ NULL,
+ &Registration
+ );
+
+ return RegisterSecurityHandler (
+ DxeImageVerificationHandler,
+ EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_VERIFY_IMAGE | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_IMAGE_REQUIRED
+ );
+}
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..34ed0c89a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.h @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +/** @file
+ The internal header file includes the common header files, defines
+ internal structure and functions used by ImageVerificationLib.
+
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+
+#ifndef __IMAGEVERIFICATIONLIB_H__
+#define __IMAGEVERIFICATIONLIB_H__
+
+#include <Library/UefiDriverEntryPoint.h>
+#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
+#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
+#include <Library/UefiBootServicesTableLib.h>
+#include <Library/UefiRuntimeServicesTableLib.h>
+#include <Library/UefiLib.h>
+#include <Library/BaseLib.h>
+#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>
+#include <Library/BaseCryptLib.h>
+#include <Library/PcdLib.h>
+#include <Library/DevicePathLib.h>
+#include <Library/SecurityManagementLib.h>
+#include <Protocol/FirmwareVolume2.h>
+#include <Protocol/DevicePath.h>
+#include <Protocol/BlockIo.h>
+#include <Protocol/SimpleFileSystem.h>
+#include <Protocol/VariableWrite.h>
+#include <Guid/ImageAuthentication.h>
+#include <IndustryStandard/PeImage.h>
+
+#define EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE 256
+#define EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE 256
+#define MAX_NOTIFY_STRING_LEN 64
+
+//
+// Image type definitions
+//
+#define IMAGE_UNKNOWN 0x00000000
+#define IMAGE_FROM_FV 0x00000001
+#define IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM 0x00000002
+#define IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA 0x00000003
+#define IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA 0x00000004
+
+//
+// Authorization policy bit definition
+//
+#define ALWAYS_EXECUTE 0x00000000
+#define NEVER_EXECUTE 0x00000001
+#define ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000002
+#define DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000003
+#define DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000004
+#define QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION 0x00000005
+
+//
+// Support hash types
+//
+#define HASHALG_SHA1 0x00000000
+#define HASHALG_SHA224 0x00000001
+#define HASHALG_SHA256 0x00000002
+#define HASHALG_SHA384 0x00000003
+#define HASHALG_SHA512 0x00000004
+#define HASHALG_MAX 0x00000005
+
+//
+// Set max digest size as SHA256 Output (32 bytes) by far
+//
+#define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
+//
+//
+// PKCS7 Certificate definition
+//
+typedef struct {
+ WIN_CERTIFICATE Hdr;
+ UINT8 CertData[1];
+} WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS;
+
+
+/**
+ Retrieves the size, in bytes, of the context buffer required for hash operations.
+
+ @return The size, in bytes, of the context buffer required for hash operations.
+
+**/
+typedef
+UINTN
+(EFIAPI *HASH_GET_CONTEXT_SIZE)(
+ VOID
+ );
+
+/**
+ Initializes user-supplied memory pointed by HashContext as hash context for
+ subsequent use.
+
+ If HashContext is NULL, then ASSERT().
+
+ @param[in, out] HashContext Pointer to Context being initialized.
+
+ @retval TRUE HASH context initialization succeeded.
+ @retval FALSE HASH context initialization failed.
+
+**/
+typedef
+BOOLEAN
+(EFIAPI *HASH_INIT)(
+ IN OUT VOID *HashContext
+ );
+
+
+/**
+ Performs digest on a data buffer of the specified length. This function can
+ be called multiple times to compute the digest of long or discontinuous data streams.
+
+ If HashContext is NULL, then ASSERT().
+
+ @param[in, out] HashContext Pointer to the MD5 context.
+ @param[in] Data Pointer to the buffer containing the data to be hashed.
+ @param[in] DataLength Length of Data buffer in bytes.
+
+ @retval TRUE HASH data digest succeeded.
+ @retval FALSE Invalid HASH context. After HashFinal function has been called, the
+ HASH context cannot be reused.
+
+**/
+typedef
+BOOLEAN
+(EFIAPI *HASH_UPDATE)(
+ IN OUT VOID *HashContext,
+ IN CONST VOID *Data,
+ IN UINTN DataLength
+ );
+
+/**
+ Completes hash computation and retrieves the digest value into the specified
+ memory. After this function has been called, the context cannot be used again.
+
+ If HashContext is NULL, then ASSERT().
+ If HashValue is NULL, then ASSERT().
+
+ @param[in, out] HashContext Pointer to the MD5 context
+ @param[out] HashValue Pointer to a buffer that receives the HASH digest
+ value.
+
+ @retval TRUE HASH digest computation succeeded.
+ @retval FALSE HASH digest computation failed.
+
+**/
+typedef
+BOOLEAN
+(EFIAPI *HASH_FINAL)(
+ IN OUT VOID *HashContext,
+ OUT UINT8 *HashValue
+ );
+
+
+//
+// Hash Algorithm Table
+//
+typedef struct {
+ //
+ // Name for Hash Algorithm
+ //
+ CHAR16 *Name;
+ //
+ // Digest Length
+ //
+ UINTN DigestLength;
+ //
+ // Hash Algorithm OID ASN.1 Value
+ //
+ UINT8 *OidValue;
+ //
+ // Length of Hash OID Value
+ //
+ UINTN OidLength;
+ //
+ // Pointer to Hash GetContentSize function
+ //
+ HASH_GET_CONTEXT_SIZE GetContextSize;
+ //
+ // Pointer to Hash Init function
+ //
+ HASH_INIT HashInit;
+ //
+ // Pointer to Hash Update function
+ //
+ HASH_UPDATE HashUpdate;
+ //
+ // Pointer to Hash Final function
+ //
+ HASH_FINAL HashFinal;
+} HASH_TABLE;
+
+#endif
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.inf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5874d6b66b --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.inf @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +## @file
+# The library instance provides security service of image verification.
+# Image verification Library module supports UEFI2.3.1
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+# This program and the accompanying materials
+# are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+# which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+# http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+# THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+#
+##
+
+[Defines]
+ INF_VERSION = 0x00010005
+ BASE_NAME = DxeImageVerificationLib
+ FILE_GUID = 0CA970E1-43FA-4402-BC0A-81AF336BFFD6
+ MODULE_TYPE = DXE_DRIVER
+ VERSION_STRING = 1.0
+ LIBRARY_CLASS = NULL|DXE_DRIVER DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER DXE_SAL_DRIVER DXE_SMM_DRIVER UEFI_APPLICATION UEFI_DRIVER
+ CONSTRUCTOR = DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor
+
+#
+# The following information is for reference only and not required by the build tools.
+#
+# VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IA32 X64 IPF EBC
+#
+
+[Sources]
+ DxeImageVerificationLib.c
+ DxeImageVerificationLib.h
+
+[Packages]
+ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
+ MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
+ CryptoPkg/CryptoPkg.dec
+ SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec
+
+[LibraryClasses]
+ MemoryAllocationLib
+ BaseLib
+ UefiLib
+ UefiBootServicesTableLib
+ UefiRuntimeServicesTableLib
+ BaseMemoryLib
+ DebugLib
+ DevicePathLib
+ BaseCryptLib
+ SecurityManagementLib
+
+[Protocols]
+ gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid
+ gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid
+ gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid
+ gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid
+
+[Guids]
+ gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid
+ gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
+ gEfiCertSha1Guid
+ gEfiCertSha256Guid
+ gEfiCertX509Guid
+ gEfiCertRsa2048Guid
+
+[Pcd]
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c012f130d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c @@ -0,0 +1,830 @@ +/** @file
+ The library instance provides security service of TPM measure boot.
+
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+
+#include <PiDxe.h>
+
+#include <Protocol/TcgService.h>
+#include <Protocol/FirmwareVolume2.h>
+#include <Protocol/BlockIo.h>
+#include <Protocol/DiskIo.h>
+#include <Protocol/DevicePathToText.h>
+
+#include <Library/BaseLib.h>
+#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
+#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
+#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>
+#include <Library/DevicePathLib.h>
+#include <Library/UefiBootServicesTableLib.h>
+#include <Library/BaseCryptLib.h>
+#include <Library/PeCoffLib.h>
+#include <Library/SecurityManagementLib.h>
+
+//
+// Flag to check GPT partition. It only need be measured once.
+//
+BOOLEAN mMeasureGptTableFlag = FALSE;
+EFI_GUID mZeroGuid = {0, 0, 0, {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}};
+UINTN mMeasureGptCount = 0;
+
+/**
+ Reads contents of a PE/COFF image in memory buffer.
+
+ @param FileHandle Pointer to the file handle to read the PE/COFF image.
+ @param FileOffset Offset into the PE/COFF image to begin the read operation.
+ @param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read operation.
+ On output, the number of bytes actually read.
+ @param Buffer Output buffer that contains the data read from the PE/COFF image.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read and the size
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+ImageRead (
+ IN VOID *FileHandle,
+ IN UINTN FileOffset,
+ IN OUT UINTN *ReadSize,
+ OUT VOID *Buffer
+ )
+{
+ CopyMem (Buffer, (UINT8 *)((UINTN) FileHandle + FileOffset), *ReadSize);
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ Measure GPT table data into TPM log.
+
+ @param TcgProtocol Pointer to the located TCG protocol instance.
+ @param GptHandle Handle that GPT partition was installed.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successfully measure GPT table.
+ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Not support GPT table on the given handle.
+ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR Can't get GPT table because device error.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES No enough resource to measure GPT table.
+ @retval other error value
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+TcgMeasureGptTable (
+ IN EFI_TCG_PROTOCOL *TcgProtocol,
+ IN EFI_HANDLE GptHandle
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo;
+ EFI_DISK_IO_PROTOCOL *DiskIo;
+ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader;
+ EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY *PartitionEntry;
+ UINT8 *EntryPtr;
+ UINTN NumberOfPartition;
+ UINT32 Index;
+ TCG_PCR_EVENT *TcgEvent;
+ EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData;
+ UINT32 EventSize;
+ UINT32 EventNumber;
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLastEntry;
+
+ if (mMeasureGptCount > 0) {
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (GptHandle, &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid, (VOID**)&BlockIo);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+ Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (GptHandle, &gEfiDiskIoProtocolGuid, (VOID**)&DiskIo);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+ //
+ // Read the EFI Partition Table Header
+ //
+ PrimaryHeader = (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *) AllocatePool (BlockIo->Media->BlockSize);
+ if (PrimaryHeader == NULL) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+ Status = DiskIo->ReadDisk (
+ DiskIo,
+ BlockIo->Media->MediaId,
+ 1 * BlockIo->Media->BlockSize,
+ BlockIo->Media->BlockSize,
+ (UINT8 *)PrimaryHeader
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ DEBUG ((EFI_D_ERROR, "Failed to Read Partition Table Header!\n"));
+ FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+ //
+ // Read the partition entry.
+ //
+ EntryPtr = (UINT8 *)AllocatePool (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry);
+ if (EntryPtr == NULL) {
+ FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+ Status = DiskIo->ReadDisk (
+ DiskIo,
+ BlockIo->Media->MediaId,
+ MultU64x32(PrimaryHeader->PartitionEntryLBA, BlockIo->Media->BlockSize),
+ PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry,
+ EntryPtr
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
+ FreePool (EntryPtr);
+ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Count the valid partition
+ //
+ PartitionEntry = (EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY *)EntryPtr;
+ NumberOfPartition = 0;
+ for (Index = 0; Index < PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries; Index++) {
+ if (!CompareGuid (&PartitionEntry->PartitionTypeGUID, &mZeroGuid)) {
+ NumberOfPartition++;
+ }
+ PartitionEntry++;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Parepare Data for Measurement
+ //
+ EventSize = (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_GPT_DATA) - sizeof (GptData->Partitions)
+ + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry);
+ TcgEvent = (TCG_PCR_EVENT *) AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT));
+ if (TcgEvent == NULL) {
+ FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
+ FreePool (EntryPtr);
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ TcgEvent->PCRIndex = 5;
+ TcgEvent->EventType = EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT;
+ TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize;
+ GptData = (EFI_GPT_DATA *) TcgEvent->Event;
+
+ //
+ // Copy the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER and NumberOfPartition
+ //
+ CopyMem ((UINT8 *)GptData, (UINT8*)PrimaryHeader, sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER));
+ GptData->NumberOfPartitions = NumberOfPartition;
+ //
+ // Copy the valid partition entry
+ //
+ PartitionEntry = (EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY*)EntryPtr;
+ NumberOfPartition = 0;
+ for (Index = 0; Index < PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries; Index++) {
+ if (!CompareGuid (&PartitionEntry->PartitionTypeGUID, &mZeroGuid)) {
+ CopyMem (
+ (UINT8 *)&GptData->Partitions + NumberOfPartition * sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY),
+ (UINT8 *)PartitionEntry,
+ sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_ENTRY)
+ );
+ NumberOfPartition++;
+ }
+ PartitionEntry++;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Measure the GPT data
+ //
+ EventNumber = 1;
+ Status = TcgProtocol->HashLogExtendEvent (
+ TcgProtocol,
+ (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) (UINTN) (VOID *) GptData,
+ (UINT64) TcgEvent->EventSize,
+ TPM_ALG_SHA,
+ TcgEvent,
+ &EventNumber,
+ &EventLogLastEntry
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ mMeasureGptCount++;
+ }
+
+ FreePool (PrimaryHeader);
+ FreePool (EntryPtr);
+ FreePool (TcgEvent);
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Measure PE image into TPM log based on the authenticode image hashing in
+ PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A.
+
+ @param[in] TcgProtocol Pointer to the located TCG protocol instance.
+ @param[in] ImageAddress Start address of image buffer.
+ @param[in] ImageSize Image size
+ @param[in] LinkTimeBase Address that the image is loaded into memory.
+ @param[in] ImageType Image subsystem type.
+ @param[in] FilePath File path is corresponding to the input image.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successfully measure image.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES No enough resource to measure image.
+ @retval other error value
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+TcgMeasurePeImage (
+ IN EFI_TCG_PROTOCOL *TcgProtocol,
+ IN EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS ImageAddress,
+ IN UINTN ImageSize,
+ IN UINTN LinkTimeBase,
+ IN UINT16 ImageType,
+ IN EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *FilePath
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ TCG_PCR_EVENT *TcgEvent;
+ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *ImageLoad;
+ UINT32 FilePathSize;
+ VOID *Sha1Ctx;
+ UINTN CtxSize;
+ EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *DosHdr;
+ UINT32 PeCoffHeaderOffset;
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;
+ UINT8 *HashBase;
+ UINTN HashSize;
+ UINTN SumOfBytesHashed;
+ EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *SectionHeader;
+ UINTN Index, Pos;
+ UINT16 Magic;
+ UINT32 EventSize;
+ UINT32 EventNumber;
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLastEntry;
+ EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION Hdr;
+
+ Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+ ImageLoad = NULL;
+ SectionHeader = NULL;
+ Sha1Ctx = NULL;
+ FilePathSize = (UINT32) GetDevicePathSize (FilePath);
+
+ //
+ // Determine destination PCR by BootPolicy
+ //
+ EventSize = sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize;
+ TcgEvent = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (TCG_PCR_EVENT));
+ if (TcgEvent == NULL) {
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+
+ TcgEvent->EventSize = EventSize;
+ ImageLoad = (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *) TcgEvent->Event;
+
+ switch (ImageType) {
+ case EFI_IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION:
+ TcgEvent->EventType = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION;
+ TcgEvent->PCRIndex = 4;
+ break;
+ case EFI_IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_DRIVER:
+ TcgEvent->EventType = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER;
+ TcgEvent->PCRIndex = 2;
+ break;
+ case EFI_IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_RUNTIME_DRIVER:
+ TcgEvent->EventType = EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER;
+ TcgEvent->PCRIndex = 2;
+ break;
+ default:
+ DEBUG ((
+ EFI_D_ERROR,
+ "TcgMeasurePeImage: Unknown subsystem type %d",
+ ImageType
+ ));
+ ASSERT (FALSE);
+ TcgEvent->EventType = ImageType;
+ Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ goto Finish;
+ }
+
+ ImageLoad->ImageLocationInMemory = ImageAddress;
+ ImageLoad->ImageLengthInMemory = ImageSize;
+ ImageLoad->ImageLinkTimeAddress = LinkTimeBase;
+ ImageLoad->LengthOfDevicePath = FilePathSize;
+ CopyMem (ImageLoad->DevicePath, FilePath, FilePathSize);
+
+ //
+ // Check PE/COFF image
+ //
+ DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) (UINTN) ImageAddress;
+ PeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;
+ if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {
+ PeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;
+ }
+ if (((EFI_TE_IMAGE_HEADER *)((UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress + PeCoffHeaderOffset))->Signature
+ == EFI_TE_IMAGE_HEADER_SIGNATURE) {
+ goto Finish;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // PE/COFF Image Measurement
+ //
+ // NOTE: The following codes/steps are based upon the authenticode image hashing in
+ // PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A.
+ //
+ //
+
+ // 1. Load the image header into memory.
+
+ // 2. Initialize a SHA hash context.
+ CtxSize = Sha1GetContextSize ();
+ Sha1Ctx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);
+ if (Sha1Ctx == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto Finish;
+ }
+
+ Sha1Init (Sha1Ctx);
+
+ //
+ // Measuring PE/COFF Image Header;
+ // But CheckSum field and SECURITY data directory (certificate) are excluded
+ //
+ Hdr.Pe32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *)((UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress + PeCoffHeaderOffset);
+ Magic = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;
+
+ //
+ // 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image checksum address.
+ // 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image checksum.
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress;
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset
+ //
+ HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset
+ //
+ HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum) - HashBase);
+ }
+
+ Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);
+
+ //
+ // 5. Skip over the image checksum (it occupies a single ULONG).
+ // 6. Get the address of the beginning of the Cert Directory.
+ // 7. Hash everything from the end of the checksum to the start of the Cert Directory.
+ //
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
+ HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);
+ HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);
+ }
+
+ Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);
+
+ //
+ // 8. Skip over the Cert Directory. (It is sizeof(IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) bytes.)
+ // 9. Hash everything from the end of the Cert Directory to the end of image header.
+ //
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];
+ HashSize = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders -
+ (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - (UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset
+ //
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) &Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1];
+ HashSize = Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders -
+ (UINTN) ((UINT8 *)(&Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY + 1]) - (UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress);
+ }
+
+ Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);
+
+ //
+ // 10. Set the SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED to the size of the header
+ //
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset
+ //
+ SumOfBytesHashed = Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset
+ //
+ SumOfBytesHashed = Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // 11. Build a temporary table of pointers to all the IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
+ // structures in the image. The 'NumberOfSections' field of the image
+ // header indicates how big the table should be. Do not include any
+ // IMAGE_SECTION_HEADERs in the table whose 'SizeOfRawData' field is zero.
+ //
+ SectionHeader = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *)AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER) * Hdr.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections);
+ if (SectionHeader == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ goto Finish;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // 12. Using the 'PointerToRawData' in the referenced section headers as
+ // a key, arrange the elements in the table in ascending order. In other
+ // words, sort the section headers according to the disk-file offset of
+ // the section.
+ //
+ Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) (
+ (UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress +
+ PeCoffHeaderOffset +
+ sizeof(UINT32) +
+ sizeof(EFI_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +
+ Hdr.Pe32->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader
+ );
+ for (Index = 0; Index < Hdr.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {
+ Pos = Index;
+ while ((Pos > 0) && (Section->PointerToRawData < SectionHeader[Pos - 1].PointerToRawData)) {
+ CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], &SectionHeader[Pos - 1], sizeof(EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));
+ Pos--;
+ }
+ CopyMem (&SectionHeader[Pos], Section, sizeof(EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER));
+ Section += 1;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // 13. Walk through the sorted table, bring the corresponding section
+ // into memory, and hash the entire section (using the 'SizeOfRawData'
+ // field in the section header to determine the amount of data to hash).
+ // 14. Add the section's 'SizeOfRawData' to SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED .
+ // 15. Repeat steps 13 and 14 for all the sections in the sorted table.
+ //
+ for (Index = 0; Index < Hdr.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++) {
+ Section = (EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *) &SectionHeader[Index];
+ if (Section->SizeOfRawData == 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress + Section->PointerToRawData;
+ HashSize = (UINTN) Section->SizeOfRawData;
+
+ Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);
+
+ SumOfBytesHashed += HashSize;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // 16. If the file size is greater than SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED, there is extra
+ // data in the file that needs to be added to the hash. This data begins
+ // at file offset SUM_OF_BYTES_HASHED and its length is:
+ // FileSize - (CertDirectory->Size)
+ //
+ if (ImageSize > SumOfBytesHashed) {
+ HashBase = (UINT8 *) (UINTN) ImageAddress + SumOfBytesHashed;
+ if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
+ //
+ // Use PE32 offset
+ //
+ HashSize = (UINTN)(ImageSize -
+ Hdr.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -
+ SumOfBytesHashed);
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Use PE32+ offset
+ //
+ HashSize = (UINTN)(ImageSize -
+ Hdr.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -
+ SumOfBytesHashed);
+ }
+
+ Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, HashBase, HashSize);
+ }
+
+ //
+ // 17. Finalize the SHA hash.
+ //
+ Sha1Final (Sha1Ctx, (UINT8 *)&TcgEvent->Digest);
+
+ //
+ // Log the PE data
+ //
+ EventNumber = 1;
+ Status = TcgProtocol->HashLogExtendEvent (
+ TcgProtocol,
+ (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) (UINTN) (VOID *) NULL,
+ 0,
+ TPM_ALG_SHA,
+ TcgEvent,
+ &EventNumber,
+ &EventLogLastEntry
+ );
+
+Finish:
+ FreePool (TcgEvent);
+
+ if (SectionHeader != NULL) {
+ FreePool (SectionHeader);
+ }
+
+ if (Sha1Ctx != NULL ) {
+ FreePool (Sha1Ctx);
+ }
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ The security handler is used to abstract platform-specific policy
+ from the DXE core response to an attempt to use a file that returns a
+ given status for the authentication check from the section extraction protocol.
+
+ The possible responses in a given SAP implementation may include locking
+ flash upon failure to authenticate, attestation logging for all signed drivers,
+ and other exception operations. The File parameter allows for possible logging
+ within the SAP of the driver.
+
+ If File is NULL, then EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER is returned.
+
+ If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by
+ AuthenticationStatus is safe for the DXE Core to use, then EFI_SUCCESS is returned.
+
+ If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by
+ AuthenticationStatus is not safe for the DXE Core to use under any circumstances,
+ then EFI_ACCESS_DENIED is returned.
+
+ If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by
+ AuthenticationStatus is not safe for the DXE Core to use right now, but it
+ might be possible to use it at a future time, then EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION is
+ returned.
+
+ @param[in, out] AuthenticationStatus This is the authentication status returned
+ from the securitymeasurement services for the
+ input file.
+ @param[in] File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is
+ being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.
+ @param[in] FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.
+ @param[in] FileSize Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by File did authenticate, and the
+ platform policy dictates that the DXE Core may use File.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER File is NULL.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by File did not authenticate, and
+ the platform policy dictates that File should be placed
+ in the untrusted state. A file may be promoted from
+ the untrusted to the trusted state at a future time
+ with a call to the Trust() DXE Service.
+ @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File did not authenticate, and
+ the platform policy dictates that File should not be
+ used for any purpose.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+DxeTpmMeasureBootHandler (
+ IN OUT UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File,
+ IN VOID *FileBuffer OPTIONAL,
+ IN UINTN FileSize OPTIONAL
+ )
+{
+ EFI_TCG_PROTOCOL *TcgProtocol;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ TCG_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY ProtocolCapability;
+ UINT32 TCGFeatureFlags;
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLocation;
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS EventLogLastEntry;
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *DevicePathNode;
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *OrigDevicePathNode;
+ EFI_HANDLE Handle;
+ BOOLEAN ApplicationRequired;
+ PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT ImageContext;
+
+ if (File == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiTcgProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **) &TcgProtocol);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // TCG protocol is not installed. So, TPM is not present.
+ // Don't do any measurement, and directly return EFI_SUCCESS.
+ //
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ ProtocolCapability.Size = (UINT8) sizeof (ProtocolCapability);
+ Status = TcgProtocol->StatusCheck (
+ TcgProtocol,
+ &ProtocolCapability,
+ &TCGFeatureFlags,
+ &EventLogLocation,
+ &EventLogLastEntry
+ );
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || ProtocolCapability.TPMDeactivatedFlag) {
+ //
+ // TPM device doesn't work or activate.
+ //
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Copy File Device Path
+ //
+ OrigDevicePathNode = DuplicateDevicePath (File);
+ ASSERT (OrigDevicePathNode != NULL);
+
+ //
+ // 1. Check whether this device path support BlockIo protocol.
+ // Is so, this device path may be a GPT device path.
+ //
+ DevicePathNode = OrigDevicePathNode;
+ Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (&gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid, &DevicePathNode, &Handle);
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) && !mMeasureGptTableFlag) {
+ //
+ // Find the gpt partion on the given devicepath
+ //
+ DevicePathNode = OrigDevicePathNode;
+ while (!IsDevicePathEnd (DevicePathNode)) {
+ //
+ // Find the Gpt partition
+ //
+ if (DevicePathType (DevicePathNode) == MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH &&
+ DevicePathSubType (DevicePathNode) == MEDIA_HARDDRIVE_DP) {
+ //
+ // Check whether it is a gpt partition or not
+ //
+ if (((HARDDRIVE_DEVICE_PATH *) DevicePathNode)->MBRType == MBR_TYPE_EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER &&
+ ((HARDDRIVE_DEVICE_PATH *) DevicePathNode)->SignatureType == SIGNATURE_TYPE_GUID) {
+
+ //
+ // Change the partition device path to its parent device path (disk) and get the handle.
+ //
+ DevicePathNode->Type = END_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE;
+ DevicePathNode->SubType = END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE;
+ DevicePathNode = OrigDevicePathNode;
+ Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (
+ &gEfiDiskIoProtocolGuid,
+ &DevicePathNode,
+ &Handle
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // Measure GPT disk.
+ //
+ Status = TcgMeasureGptTable (TcgProtocol, Handle);
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // GPT disk check done.
+ //
+ mMeasureGptTableFlag = TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ FreePool (OrigDevicePathNode);
+ OrigDevicePathNode = DuplicateDevicePath (File);
+ ASSERT (OrigDevicePathNode != NULL);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ DevicePathNode = NextDevicePathNode (DevicePathNode);
+ }
+ }
+
+ //
+ // 2. Measure PE image.
+ //
+ ApplicationRequired = FALSE;
+
+ //
+ // Check whether this device path support FV2 protocol.
+ //
+ DevicePathNode = OrigDevicePathNode;
+ Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (&gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid, &DevicePathNode, &Handle);
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // Don't check FV image, and directly return EFI_SUCCESS.
+ // It can be extended to the specific FV authentication according to the different requirement.
+ //
+ if (IsDevicePathEnd (DevicePathNode)) {
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ //
+ // The image from Firmware image will not be mearsured.
+ // Current policy doesn't measure PeImage from Firmware if it is driver
+ // If the got PeImage is application, it will be still be measured.
+ //
+ ApplicationRequired = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // File is not found.
+ //
+ if (FileBuffer == NULL) {
+ Status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ goto Finish;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Measure PE Image
+ //
+ DevicePathNode = OrigDevicePathNode;
+ ZeroMem (&ImageContext, sizeof (ImageContext));
+ ImageContext.Handle = (VOID *) FileBuffer;
+ ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE) ImageRead;
+
+ //
+ // Get information about the image being loaded
+ //
+ Status = PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage
+ //
+ goto Finish;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Measure only application if Application flag is set
+ // Measure drivers and applications if Application flag is not set
+ //
+ if ((!ApplicationRequired) ||
+ (ApplicationRequired && ImageContext.ImageType == EFI_IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION)) {
+ //
+ // Print the image path to be measured.
+ //
+ DEBUG_CODE_BEGIN ();
+ CHAR16 *ToText;
+ EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TO_TEXT_PROTOCOL *DevPathToText;
+ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (
+ &gEfiDevicePathToTextProtocolGuid,
+ NULL,
+ (VOID **) &DevPathToText
+ );
+ if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ ToText = DevPathToText->ConvertDevicePathToText (
+ DevicePathNode,
+ FALSE,
+ TRUE
+ );
+ if (ToText != NULL) {
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "The measured image path is %s.\n", ToText));
+ }
+ }
+ DEBUG_CODE_END ();
+
+ //
+ // Measure PE image into TPM log.
+ //
+ Status = TcgMeasurePeImage (
+ TcgProtocol,
+ (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) (UINTN) FileBuffer,
+ FileSize,
+ (UINTN) ImageContext.ImageAddress,
+ ImageContext.ImageType,
+ DevicePathNode
+ );
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Done, free the allocated resource.
+ //
+Finish:
+ FreePool (OrigDevicePathNode);
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Register the security handler to provide TPM measure boot service.
+
+ @param ImageHandle ImageHandle of the loaded driver.
+ @param SystemTable Pointer to the EFI System Table.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Register successfully.
+ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES No enough memory to register this handler.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+DxeTpmMeasureBootLibConstructor (
+ IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,
+ IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable
+ )
+{
+ return RegisterSecurityHandler (
+ DxeTpmMeasureBootHandler,
+ EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_MEASURE_IMAGE | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_IMAGE_REQUIRED
+ );
+}
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.inf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bf83bf1022 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib/DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.inf @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +## @file
+# The library instance provides security service of TPM measure boot.
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2009 - 2010, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+# This program and the accompanying materials
+# are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+# which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+# http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+# THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+#
+##
+
+[Defines]
+ INF_VERSION = 0x00010005
+ BASE_NAME = DxeTpmMeasureBootLib
+ FILE_GUID = 6C60C7D0-922A-4b7c-87D7-E503EDD73BBF
+ MODULE_TYPE = DXE_DRIVER
+ VERSION_STRING = 1.0
+ LIBRARY_CLASS = NULL|DXE_DRIVER DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER DXE_SAL_DRIVER DXE_SMM_DRIVER UEFI_APPLICATION UEFI_DRIVER
+ CONSTRUCTOR = DxeTpmMeasureBootLibConstructor
+
+#
+# The following information is for reference only and not required by the build tools.
+#
+# VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IA32 X64 IPF EBC
+#
+
+[Sources]
+ DxeTpmMeasureBootLib.c
+
+[Packages]
+ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
+ MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
+ SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec
+ CryptoPkg/CryptoPkg.dec
+
+[LibraryClasses]
+ BaseMemoryLib
+ DebugLib
+ MemoryAllocationLib
+ DevicePathLib
+ UefiBootServicesTableLib
+ BaseCryptLib
+ PeCoffLib
+ BaseLib
+ SecurityManagementLib
+
+[Protocols]
+ gEfiTcgProtocolGuid ## CONSUMES
+ gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid ## CONSUMES
+ gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid ## CONSUMES
+ gEfiDiskIoProtocolGuid ## CONSUMES
+ gEfiDevicePathToTextProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES (Only used in debug mode)
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/PlatformSecureLibNull/PlatformSecureLibNull.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/PlatformSecureLibNull/PlatformSecureLibNull.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f085d62b77 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/PlatformSecureLibNull/PlatformSecureLibNull.c @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +/** @file
+ Provides a secure platform-specific method to clear PK(Platform Key).
+
+Copyright (c) 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+
+/**
+
+ This function detects whether a secure platform-specific method to clear PK(Platform Key)
+ is configured by platform owner. This method is provided for users force to clear PK
+ in case incorrect enrollment mis-haps.
+
+ UEFI231 spec chapter 27.5.2 stipulates: The platform key may also be cleared using
+ a secure platform-specific method. In this case, the global variable SetupMode
+ must also be updated to 1.
+
+ NOTE THAT: This function cannot depend on any EFI Variable Service since they are
+ not available when this function is called in AuthenticateVariable driver.
+
+ @retval TRUE The Platform owner wants to force clear PK.
+ @retval FALSE The Platform owner doesn't want to force clear PK.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+EFIAPI
+ForceClearPK (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ return FALSE;
+}
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/PlatformSecureLibNull/PlatformSecureLibNull.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/PlatformSecureLibNull/PlatformSecureLibNull.inf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5750198aa7 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/PlatformSecureLibNull/PlatformSecureLibNull.inf @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +## @file
+# Provides a secure platform-specific method to clear PK(Platform Key).
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+# This program and the accompanying materials
+# are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+# which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+# http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+# THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+#
+##
+
+[Defines]
+ INF_VERSION = 0x00010005
+ BASE_NAME = PlatformSecureLibNull
+ FILE_GUID = 7FA68D82-10A4-4e71-9524-D3D9500D3CDF
+ MODULE_TYPE = DXE_DRIVER
+ VERSION_STRING = 1.0
+ LIBRARY_CLASS = PlatformSecureLib|DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER DXE_SMM_DRIVER
+
+
+#
+# The following information is for reference only and not required by the build tools.
+#
+# VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IA32 X64 IPF EBC
+#
+
+[Sources]
+ PlatformSecureLibNull.c
+
+[Packages]
+ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/TpmCommLib/CommonHeader.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/TpmCommLib/CommonHeader.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b8496c7276 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/TpmCommLib/CommonHeader.h @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/** @file
+ The intenal header file for TpmCommLib.
+
+Copyright (c) 2006 - 2010, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+
+#ifndef _TPMCOMMLIB_COMMON_HEADER_H_
+#define _TPMCOMMLIB_COMMON_HEADER_H_
+
+#include <PiPei.h>
+#include <IndustryStandard/Tpm12.h>
+#include <Library/BaseLib.h>
+#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h>
+#include <Library/IoLib.h>
+#include <Library/TimerLib.h>
+#include <Library/TpmCommLib.h>
+#include <Library/BaseCryptLib.h>
+#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h>
+#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
+
+#endif
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/TpmCommLib/TisPc.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/TpmCommLib/TisPc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3d74a012df --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/TpmCommLib/TisPc.c @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +/** @file
+ Basic TIS (TPM Interface Specification) functions.
+
+Copyright (c) 2005 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+
+#include "CommonHeader.h"
+
+/**
+ Check whether TPM chip exist.
+
+ @param[in] TisReg Pointer to TIS register.
+
+ @retval TRUE TPM chip exists.
+ @retval FALSE TPM chip is not found.
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+TisPcPresenceCheck (
+ IN TIS_PC_REGISTERS_PTR TisReg
+ )
+{
+ UINT8 RegRead;
+
+ RegRead = MmioRead8 ((UINTN)&TisReg->Access);
+ return (BOOLEAN)(RegRead != (UINT8)-1);
+}
+
+/**
+ Check whether the value of a TPM chip register satisfies the input BIT setting.
+
+ @param[in] Register Address port of register to be checked.
+ @param[in] BitSet Check these data bits are set.
+ @param[in] BitClear Check these data bits are clear.
+ @param[in] TimeOut The max wait time (unit MicroSecond) when checking register.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The register satisfies the check bit.
+ @retval EFI_TIMEOUT The register can't run into the expected status in time.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+TisPcWaitRegisterBits (
+ IN UINT8 *Register,
+ IN UINT8 BitSet,
+ IN UINT8 BitClear,
+ IN UINT32 TimeOut
+ )
+{
+ UINT8 RegRead;
+ UINT32 WaitTime;
+
+ for (WaitTime = 0; WaitTime < TimeOut; WaitTime += 30){
+ RegRead = MmioRead8 ((UINTN)Register);
+ if ((RegRead & BitSet) == BitSet && (RegRead & BitClear) == 0)
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ MicroSecondDelay (30);
+ }
+ return EFI_TIMEOUT;
+}
+
+/**
+ Get BurstCount by reading the burstCount field of a TIS regiger
+ in the time of default TIS_TIMEOUT_D.
+
+ @param[in] TisReg Pointer to TIS register.
+ @param[out] BurstCount Pointer to a buffer to store the got BurstConut.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get BurstCount.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER TisReg is NULL or BurstCount is NULL.
+ @retval EFI_TIMEOUT BurstCount can't be got in time.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+TisPcReadBurstCount (
+ IN TIS_PC_REGISTERS_PTR TisReg,
+ OUT UINT16 *BurstCount
+ )
+{
+ UINT32 WaitTime;
+ UINT8 DataByte0;
+ UINT8 DataByte1;
+
+ if (BurstCount == NULL || TisReg == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ WaitTime = 0;
+ do {
+ //
+ // TIS_PC_REGISTERS_PTR->burstCount is UINT16, but it is not 2bytes aligned,
+ // so it needs to use MmioRead8 to read two times
+ //
+ DataByte0 = MmioRead8 ((UINTN)&TisReg->BurstCount);
+ DataByte1 = MmioRead8 ((UINTN)&TisReg->BurstCount + 1);
+ *BurstCount = (UINT16)((DataByte1 << 8) + DataByte0);
+ if (*BurstCount != 0) {
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ MicroSecondDelay (30);
+ WaitTime += 30;
+ } while (WaitTime < TIS_TIMEOUT_D);
+
+ return EFI_TIMEOUT;
+}
+
+/**
+ Set TPM chip to ready state by sending ready command TIS_PC_STS_READY
+ to Status Register in time.
+
+ @param[in] TisReg Pointer to TIS register.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS TPM chip enters into ready state.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER TisReg is NULL.
+ @retval EFI_TIMEOUT TPM chip can't be set to ready state in time.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+TisPcPrepareCommand (
+ IN TIS_PC_REGISTERS_PTR TisReg
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ if (TisReg == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ MmioWrite8((UINTN)&TisReg->Status, TIS_PC_STS_READY);
+ Status = TisPcWaitRegisterBits (
+ &TisReg->Status,
+ TIS_PC_STS_READY,
+ 0,
+ TIS_TIMEOUT_B
+ );
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Get the control of TPM chip by sending requestUse command TIS_PC_ACC_RQUUSE
+ to ACCESS Register in the time of default TIS_TIMEOUT_D.
+
+ @param[in] TisReg Pointer to TIS register.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Get the control of TPM chip.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER TisReg is NULL.
+ @retval EFI_NOT_FOUND TPM chip doesn't exit.
+ @retval EFI_TIMEOUT Can't get the TPM control in time.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+TisPcRequestUseTpm (
+ IN TIS_PC_REGISTERS_PTR TisReg
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ if (TisReg == NULL) {
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if (!TisPcPresenceCheck (TisReg)) {
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ }
+
+ MmioWrite8((UINTN)&TisReg->Access, TIS_PC_ACC_RQUUSE);
+ Status = TisPcWaitRegisterBits (
+ &TisReg->Access,
+ (UINT8)(TIS_PC_ACC_ACTIVE |TIS_PC_VALID),
+ 0,
+ TIS_TIMEOUT_D
+ );
+ return Status;
+}
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/TpmCommLib/TpmComm.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/TpmCommLib/TpmComm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3197f96a99 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/TpmCommLib/TpmComm.c @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/** @file
+ Basic TPM command functions.
+
+Copyright (c) 2005 - 2010, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+
+#include "CommonHeader.h"
+
+/**
+ Single function calculates SHA1 digest value for all raw data. It
+ combines Sha1Init(), Sha1Update() and Sha1Final().
+
+ @param[in] Data Raw data to be digested.
+ @param[in] DataLen Size of the raw data.
+ @param[out] Digest Pointer to a buffer that stores the final digest.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Always successfully calculate the final digest.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+TpmCommHashAll (
+ IN CONST UINT8 *Data,
+ IN UINTN DataLen,
+ OUT TPM_DIGEST *Digest
+ )
+{
+ VOID *Sha1Ctx;
+ UINTN CtxSize;
+
+ CtxSize = Sha1GetContextSize ();
+ Sha1Ctx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);
+ ASSERT (Sha1Ctx != NULL);
+
+ Sha1Init (Sha1Ctx);
+ Sha1Update (Sha1Ctx, Data, DataLen);
+ Sha1Final (Sha1Ctx, (UINT8 *)Digest);
+
+ FreePool (Sha1Ctx);
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
+
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/TpmCommLib/TpmCommLib.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/TpmCommLib/TpmCommLib.inf new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7188a3b165 --- /dev/null +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/TpmCommLib/TpmCommLib.inf @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +## @file
+# TpmCommLib instance implements basis TPM Interface Specification (TIS) and TPM command functions.
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2006 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+# This program and the accompanying materials
+# are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+# which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+# http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+# THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+#
+##
+
+[Defines]
+ INF_VERSION = 0x00010005
+ BASE_NAME = TpmCommLib
+ FILE_GUID = 7d9fe32e-a6a9-4cdf-abff-10cc7f22e1c9
+ MODULE_TYPE = PEIM
+ VERSION_STRING = 1.0
+ LIBRARY_CLASS = TpmCommLib|DXE_DRIVER UEFI_DRIVER PEIM DXE_SMM_DRIVER
+
+#
+# The following information is for reference only and not required by the build tools.
+#
+# VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IA32 X64 IPF
+#
+
+[Sources]
+ TisPc.c
+ TpmComm.c
+ CommonHeader.h
+
+[Packages]
+ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
+ SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec
+ CryptoPkg/CryptoPkg.dec
+
+[LibraryClasses]
+ BaseLib
+ BaseMemoryLib
+ IoLib
+ TimerLib
+ BaseCryptLib
+ MemoryAllocationLib
+ DebugLib
+
|