SecurityPkg: Update DxeImageVerificationLib with following changes:

1. Update to check image digest against dbx before execute it.
2. Update to support revoke certificate.
3. Update to support enroll unsigned PE image's Hash to allowed database (db). (Note: Unsigned Image's Hash is calculated in the same way with authenticode, the algorithm is assumed to be SHA256.)

Signed-off-by: xdu2
Reviewed-by: tye
Reviewed-by: gdong1

git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@12598 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524

1 files changed, 204 insertions, 175 deletions

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
index 7bc3cc0ec0..91977522a9 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
@@ -2,12 +2,12 @@
   Implement image verification services for secure boot service in UEFI2.3.1.

 

 Copyright (c) 2009 - 2011, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>

-This program and the accompanying materials 

-are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License 

-which accompanies this distribution.  The full text of the license may be found at 

+This program and the accompanying materials

+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License

+which accompanies this distribution.  The full text of the license may be found at

 http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php

 

-THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS, 

+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,

 WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.

 

 **/

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
 

 EFI_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER_PTR_UNION mNtHeader;

 UINTN                               mImageSize;

-UINT32                              mPeCoffHeaderOffset; 

+UINT32                              mPeCoffHeaderOffset;

 UINT8                               mImageDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];

 UINTN                               mImageDigestSize;

 EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY            *mSecDataDir      = NULL;

@@ -59,9 +59,9 @@ HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {
   Get the image type.

 

   @param[in]    File       This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is

-                           being dispatched. 

+                           being dispatched.

 

-  @return UINT32           Image Type             

+  @return UINT32           Image Type

 

 **/

 UINT32

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ GetImageType (
   )

 {

   EFI_STATUS                        Status;

-  EFI_HANDLE                        DeviceHandle; 

+  EFI_HANDLE                        DeviceHandle;

   EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL          *TempDevicePath;

   EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL             *BlockIo;

 

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ GetImageType (
   // First check to see if File is from a Firmware Volume

   //

   DeviceHandle      = NULL;

-  TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;

+  TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;

   Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (

                   &gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid,

                   &TempDevicePath,

@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ GetImageType (
   // Next check to see if File is from a Block I/O device

   //

   DeviceHandle   = NULL;

-  TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;

+  TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;

   Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (

                   &gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid,

                   &TempDevicePath,

@@ -136,11 +136,11 @@ GetImageType (
   }

 

   //

-  // File is not in a Firmware Volume or on a Block I/O device, so check to see if 

+  // File is not in a Firmware Volume or on a Block I/O device, so check to see if

   // the device path supports the Simple File System Protocol.

   //

   DeviceHandle   = NULL;

-  TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;

+  TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;

   Status = gBS->LocateDevicePath (

                   &gEfiSimpleFileSystemProtocolGuid,

                   &TempDevicePath,

@@ -155,12 +155,12 @@ GetImageType (
 

   //

   // File is not from an FV, Block I/O or Simple File System, so the only options

-  // left are a PCI Option ROM and a Load File Protocol such as a PXE Boot from a NIC.  

+  // left are a PCI Option ROM and a Load File Protocol such as a PXE Boot from a NIC.

   //

-  TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *)File;

+  TempDevicePath = (EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *) File;

   while (!IsDevicePathEndType (TempDevicePath)) {

     switch (DevicePathType (TempDevicePath)) {

-    

+

     case MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH:

       if (DevicePathSubType (TempDevicePath) == MEDIA_RELATIVE_OFFSET_RANGE_DP) {

         return IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM;

@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ GetImageType (
     case MESSAGING_DEVICE_PATH:

       if (DevicePathSubType(TempDevicePath) == MSG_MAC_ADDR_DP) {

         return IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA;

-      } 

+      }

       break;

 

     default:

@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ GetImageType (
     }

     TempDevicePath = NextDevicePathNode (TempDevicePath);

   }

-  return IMAGE_UNKNOWN; 

+  return IMAGE_UNKNOWN;

 }

 

 /**

@@ -186,12 +186,12 @@ GetImageType (
   PE/COFF Specification 8.0 Appendix A

 

   @param[in]    HashAlg   Hash algorithm type.

- 

+

   @retval TRUE            Successfully hash image.

   @retval FALSE           Fail in hash image.

 

 **/

-BOOLEAN 

+BOOLEAN

 HashPeImage (

   IN  UINT32              HashAlg

   )

@@ -208,8 +208,8 @@ HashPeImage (
   UINTN                     Index;

   UINTN                     Pos;

   UINTN                     SumOfSectionBytes;

-  EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER  *SectionCache;  

-  

+  EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER  *SectionCache;

+

   HashCtx       = NULL;

   SectionHeader = NULL;

   Status        = FALSE;

@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ HashPeImage (
   if ((HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA1) && (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256)) {

     return FALSE;

   }

-  

+

   //

   // Initialize context of hash.

   //

@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ HashPeImage (
   }

 

   CtxSize   = mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize();

-  

+

   HashCtx = AllocatePool (CtxSize);

   if (HashCtx == NULL) {

     return FALSE;

@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ HashPeImage (
 

   // 2.  Initialize a SHA hash context.

   Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit(HashCtx);

-  

+

   if (!Status) {

     goto Done;

   }

@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ HashPeImage (
   } else {

     //

     // Use PE32+ offset.

-    //    

+    //

     HashBase = (UINT8 *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.CheckSum + sizeof (UINT32);

     HashSize = (UINTN) ((UINT8 *) (&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY]) - HashBase);

   }

@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ HashPeImage (
   for (Index = 0, SumOfSectionBytes = 0; Index < mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; Index++, SectionCache++) {

     SumOfSectionBytes += SectionCache->SizeOfRawData;

   }

-  

+

   //

   // Sanity check for file corruption. Sections raw data size should be smaller

   // than Image Size.

@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ HashPeImage (
       HashSize = (UINTN)(

                  mImageSize -

                  mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY].Size -

-                 SumOfBytesHashed);      

+                 SumOfBytesHashed);

     }

 

     Status  = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate(HashCtx, HashBase, HashSize);

@@ -457,15 +457,15 @@ Done:
 }

 

 /**

-  Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and caculate hash of 

-  Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in PE/COFF Specification 

+  Recognize the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode and caculate hash of

+  Pe/Coff image based on the authenticode image hashing in PE/COFF Specification

   8.0 Appendix A

 

   @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED             Hash algorithm is not supported.

   @retval EFI_SUCCESS                 Hash successfully.

 

 **/

-EFI_STATUS 

+EFI_STATUS

 HashPeImageByType (

   VOID

   )

@@ -475,10 +475,10 @@ HashPeImageByType (
 

   PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);

 

-  for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {  

+  for (Index = 0; Index < HASHALG_MAX; Index++) {

     //

     // Check the Hash algorithm in PE/COFF Authenticode.

-    //    According to PKCS#7 Definition: 

+    //    According to PKCS#7 Definition:

     //        SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {

     //            version Version,

     //            digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,

@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ HashPeImageByType (
     //            .... }

     //    The DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers can be used to determine the hash algorithm in PE/COFF hashing

     //    This field has the fixed offset (+32) in final Authenticode ASN.1 data.

-    //    

+    //

     if (CompareMem (PkcsCertData->CertData + 32, mHash[Index].OidValue, mHash[Index].OidLength) == 0) {

       break;

     }

@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ HashPeImageByType (
   ImageExeInfoTable. If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL, then 0 is returned.

 

   @param  ImageExeInfoTable          A pointer to a image execution info table structure.

-  

+

   @retval 0       If ImageExeInfoTable is NULL.

   @retval Others  The size of a image execution info table in bytes.

 

@@ -550,12 +550,12 @@ GetImageExeInfoTableSize (
   @param[in]  DevicePath      Input device path pointer.

   @param[in]  Signature       Input signature info in EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST data structure.

   @param[in]  SignatureSize   Size of signature.

-  

+

 **/

 VOID

 AddImageExeInfo (

-  IN       EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION       Action, 

-  IN       CHAR16                           *Name OPTIONAL, 

+  IN       EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION       Action,

+  IN       CHAR16                           *Name OPTIONAL,

   IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL         *DevicePath,

   IN       EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST               *Signature OPTIONAL,

   IN       UINTN                            SignatureSize

@@ -577,13 +577,13 @@ AddImageExeInfo (
   if (DevicePath == NULL) {

     return ;

   }

-  

+

   if (Name != NULL) {

     NameStringLen = StrSize (Name);

   }

 

   ImageExeInfoTable = NULL;

-  EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID**)&ImageExeInfoTable);

+  EfiGetSystemConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID **) &ImageExeInfoTable);

   if (ImageExeInfoTable != NULL) {

     //

     // The table has been found!

@@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ AddImageExeInfo (
   // Update/replace the image execution table.

   //

   gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *) NewImageExeInfoTable);

-  

+

   //

   // Free Old table data!

   //

@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ AddImageExeInfo (
 /**

   Discover if the UEFI image is authorized by user's policy setting.

 

-  @param[in]    Policy            Specify platform's policy setting. 

+  @param[in]    Policy            Specify platform's policy setting.

 

   @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED       Image is not allowed to run.

   @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION  Image is deferred.

@@ -667,7 +667,7 @@ ImageAuthorization (
   Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

 

   switch (Policy) {

-  

+

   case QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION:

     do {

       CreatePopUp (EFI_LIGHTGRAY | EFI_BACKGROUND_BLUE, &Key, mNotifyString1, mNotifyString2, NULL);

@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ ImageAuthorization (
 BOOLEAN

 IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (

   IN CHAR16             *VariableName,

-  IN UINT8              *Signature, 

+  IN UINT8              *Signature,

   IN EFI_GUID           *CertType,

   IN UINTN              SignatureSize

   )

@@ -786,16 +786,20 @@ Done:
 }

 

 /**

-  Verify certificate in WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA format .

+  Verify PKCS#7 SignedData using certificate found in Variable which formatted

+  as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. The Variable may be PK, KEK, DB or DBX.

 

-  @retval EFI_SUCCESS                 Image pass verification.

-  @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION      Image fail verification.

-  @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCE         Fail to allocate memory.

+  @param VariableName  Name of Variable to search for Certificate.

+  @param VendorGuid    Variable vendor GUID.

+

+  @retval TRUE         Image pass verification.

+  @retval FALSE        Image fail verification.

 

 **/

-EFI_STATUS 

-VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (

-  VOID

+BOOLEAN

+IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (

+  IN CHAR16             *VariableName,

+  IN EFI_GUID           *VendorGuid

   )

 {

   EFI_STATUS                Status;

@@ -804,55 +808,50 @@ VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (
   EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST        *CertList;

   EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA        *Cert;

   UINTN                     DataSize;

-  UINT8                     *KekData;

-  UINT8                     *DbData;

+  UINT8                     *Data;

   UINT8                     *RootCert;

   UINTN                     RootCertSize;

   UINTN                     Index;

   UINTN                     CertCount;

 

-  KekData                = NULL;

-  DbData                 = NULL;

-  CertList               = NULL;

-  Cert                   = NULL;

-  RootCert               = NULL;

-  RootCertSize           = 0;

-  VerifyStatus           = FALSE;

-  PkcsCertData           = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);

+  Data         = NULL;

+  CertList     = NULL;

+  Cert         = NULL;

+  RootCert     = NULL;

+  RootCertSize = 0;

+  VerifyStatus = FALSE;

+  PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);

 

-  //

-  // 1: Find certificate from KEK database and try to verify authenticode struct.

-  //

   DataSize = 0;

-  Status   = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);

+  Status   = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);

   if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {

-    KekData = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);

-    if (KekData == NULL) {

-      return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;

+    Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);

+    if (Data == NULL) {

+      return VerifyStatus;

     }

 

-    Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *)KekData);

+    Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);

     if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

       goto Done;

     }

-    

+

+    //

+    // Find X509 certificate in Signature List to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.

     //

-    // Find Cert Enrolled in KEK database to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.

-    // 

-    CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) KekData;

+    CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;

     while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {

       if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {

         Cert          = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);

         CertCount     = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;

         for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {

           //

-          // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify

-          //        

+          // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.

+          //

           RootCert      = Cert->SignatureData;

           RootCertSize  = CertList->SignatureSize;

-  

+

           //

-          // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct. 

+          // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.

           //

           VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (

                            PkcsCertData->CertData,

@@ -862,84 +861,59 @@ VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (
                            mImageDigest,

                            mImageDigestSize

                            );

-  

           if (VerifyStatus) {

             goto Done;

           }

           Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);

-        }        

+        }

       }

       DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;

       CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);

     }

   }

 

-  

+Done:

+  if (Data != NULL) {

+    FreePool (Data);

+  }

 

-  //

-  // 2: Find certificate from DB database and try to verify authenticode struct.

-  //

-  DataSize = 0;

-  Status   = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);

-  if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {

-    DbData = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);

-    if (DbData == NULL) {

-      goto Done;

-    }

+  return VerifyStatus;

+}

 

-    Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *)DbData);

-    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-      goto Done;

-    }

+/**

+  Verify certificate in WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA format.

 

-    //

-    // Find Cert Enrolled in DB database to verify the signature in pkcs7 signed data.

-    // 

-    CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) DbData;

-    while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {

-      if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {

-        Cert          = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);

-        CertCount     = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;

-        for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {

-          //

-          // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for a verify

-          //        

-          RootCert      = Cert->SignatureData;

-          RootCertSize  = CertList->SignatureSize;

-  

-          //

-          // Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct. 

-          //

-          VerifyStatus = AuthenticodeVerify (

-                           PkcsCertData->CertData,

-                           mSecDataDir->Size - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr),

-                           RootCert,

-                           RootCertSize,

-                           mImageDigest,

-                           mImageDigestSize

-                           );

-  

-          if (VerifyStatus) {

-            goto Done;

-          }

-          Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert + CertList->SignatureSize);

-        }        

-      }

-      DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;

-      CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + CertList->SignatureListSize);

-    }

-  }

+  @retval EFI_SUCCESS                 Image pass verification.

+  @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION      Image fail verification.

 

-Done:

-  if (KekData != NULL) {

-    FreePool (KekData);

+**/

+EFI_STATUS

+VerifyCertPkcsSignedData (

+  VOID

+  )

+{

+  //

+  // 1: Find certificate from DBX forbidden database for revoked certificate.

+  //

+  if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid)) {

+    //

+    // DBX is forbidden database, if Authenticode verification pass with

+    // one of the certificate in DBX, this image should be rejected.

+    //

+    return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;

   }

 

-  if (DbData != NULL) {

-    FreePool (DbData);

+  //

+  // 2: Find certificate from KEK database and try to verify authenticode struct.

+  //

+  if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid)) {

+    return EFI_SUCCESS;

   }

 

-  if (VerifyStatus) {

+  //

+  // 3: Find certificate from DB database and try to verify authenticode struct.

+  //

+  if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid)) {

     return EFI_SUCCESS;

   } else {

     return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;

@@ -947,14 +921,14 @@ Done:
 }

 

 /**

-  Verify certificate in WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID format. 

+  Verify certificate in WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID format.

 

   @retval EFI_SUCCESS                 Image pass verification.

   @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION      Image fail verification.

   @retval other error value

 

 **/

-EFI_STATUS 

+EFI_STATUS

 VerifyCertUefiGuid (

   VOID

   )

@@ -1004,7 +978,7 @@ VerifyCertUefiGuid (
   if (KekList == NULL) {

     return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;

   }

-  

+

   //

   // Enumerate all Kek items in this list to verify the variable certificate data.

   // If anyone is authenticated successfully, it means the variable is correct!

@@ -1024,7 +998,7 @@ VerifyCertUefiGuid (
     KekDataSize -= KekList->SignatureListSize;

     KekList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) KekList + KekList->SignatureListSize);

   }

-  

+

   if (!IsFound) {

     //

     // Signed key is not a trust one.

@@ -1041,8 +1015,8 @@ VerifyCertUefiGuid (
     Status = FALSE;

     goto Done;

   }

-  

-  // 

+

+  //

   // Set RSA Key Components.

   // NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.

   //

@@ -1058,13 +1032,13 @@ VerifyCertUefiGuid (
   // Verify the signature.

   //

   Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (

-             Rsa, 

-             mImageDigest, 

-             mImageDigestSize, 

-             CertBlock->Signature, 

+             Rsa,

+             mImageDigest,

+             mImageDigestSize,

+             CertBlock->Signature,

              EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE

              );

- 

+

 Done:

   if (KekList != NULL) {

     FreePool (KekList);

@@ -1081,13 +1055,31 @@ Done:
 

 /**

   Provide verification service for signed images, which include both signature validation

-  and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and 

+  and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and

   MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.

-  

-  In this implementation, only verify external executables when in USER MODE.

-  Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored. 

 

-  @param[in]    AuthenticationStatus 

+  In this implementation, only verify external executables when in USER MODE.

+  Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored.

+

+  The image verification process is:

+    Is the Image signed?

+      If yes,

+        Does the image verify against a certificate (root or intermediate) in the allowed db?

+          Run it

+        Image verification fail

+          Is the Image's Hash not in forbidden database and the Image's Hash in allowed db?

+            Run it

+      If no,

+        Is the Image's Hash in the forbidden database (DBX)?

+          if yes,

+            Error out

+        Is the Image's Hash in the allowed database (DB)?

+          If yes,

+            Run it

+          If no,

+            Error out

+

+  @param[in]    AuthenticationStatus

                            This is the authentication status returned from the security

                            measurement services for the input file.

   @param[in]    File       This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is

@@ -1144,7 +1136,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
   // Check the image type and get policy setting.

   //

   switch (GetImageType (File)) {

-  

+

   case IMAGE_FROM_FV:

     Policy = ALWAYS_EXECUTE;

     break;

@@ -1162,7 +1154,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
     break;

 

   default:

-    Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION; 

+    Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION;

     break;

   }

   //

@@ -1188,8 +1180,8 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
   if (*SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE) {

     FreePool (SecureBootEnable);

     return EFI_SUCCESS;

-  }    

- 

+  }

+

   SetupMode = GetEfiGlobalVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME);

 

   //

@@ -1216,10 +1208,10 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
   }

   mImageBase  = (UINT8 *) FileBuffer;

   mImageSize  = FileSize;

-  DosHdr      = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) (mImageBase);

+  DosHdr      = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) mImageBase;

   if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {

     //

-    // DOS image header is present, 

+    // DOS image header is present,

     // so read the PE header after the DOS image header.

     //

     mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;

@@ -1242,12 +1234,12 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
     //

     // Use PE32 offset.

     //

-    mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *)&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];

+    mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];

   } else if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) {

     //

     // Use PE32+ offset.

     //

-    mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *)&mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];

+    mSecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];

   } else {

     //

     // Invalid header magic number.

@@ -1268,21 +1260,45 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
     //

     // This image is not signed.

     //

+    if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {

+      goto Done;

+    }

+

+    if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {

+      //

+      // Image Hash is in forbidden database (DBX).

+      //

+      Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;

+      Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

+      goto Done;

+    }

+

+    if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {

+      //

+      // Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).

+      //

+      return EFI_SUCCESS;

+    }

+

+    //

+    // Image Hash is not found in both forbidden and allowed database.

+    //

     Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED;

-    Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;  

-    goto Done; 

+    Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

+    goto Done;

   }

+

   //

   // Verify signature of executables.

   //

   WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + mSecDataDir->VirtualAddress);

 

   switch (WinCertificate->wCertificateType) {

-  

+

   case WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID:

     //

     // Verify UEFI GUID type.

-    //   

+    //

     if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {

       goto Done;

     }

@@ -1295,7 +1311,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
     // Verify Pkcs signed data type.

     //

     Status    = HashPeImageByType();

-    if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

+    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

       goto Done;

     }

 

@@ -1306,11 +1322,15 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
     // no need to check image's hash in the allowed database.

     //

     if (!EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {

-      return EFI_SUCCESS;

+      if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {

+        return EFI_SUCCESS;

+      }

     }

+    break;

 

   default:

-    return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

+    Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

+    goto Done;

   }

   //

   // Get image hash value as executable's signature.

@@ -1334,8 +1354,17 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
     //

     // Verification failure.

     //

-    Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;

-    Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

+    if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize) &&

+        IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {

+      //

+      // Verification fail, Image Hash is not in forbidden database (DBX),

+      // and Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).

+      //

+      Status = EFI_SUCCESS;

+    } else {

+      Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;

+      Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

+    }

   } else if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, Signature->SignatureData, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {

     //

     // Executable signature verification passes, but is found in forbidden signature database.

@@ -1375,10 +1404,10 @@ Done:
 

 /**

   When VariableWriteArchProtocol install, create "SecureBoot" variable.

-  

+

   @param[in] Event    Event whose notification function is being invoked.

   @param[in] Context  Pointer to the notification function's context.

-  

+

 **/

 VOID

 EFIAPI

@@ -1396,7 +1425,7 @@ VariableWriteCallBack (
   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

     return;

   }

-  

+

   //

   // Check whether "SecureBoot" variable exists.

   // If this library is built-in, it means firmware has capability to perform

@@ -1418,7 +1447,7 @@ VariableWriteCallBack (
   } else {

     FreePool (SecureBootModePtr);

   }

-}  

+}

 

 /**

   Register security measurement handler.

@@ -1439,7 +1468,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor (
 

   //

   // Register callback function upon VariableWriteArchProtocol.

-  // 

+  //

   EfiCreateProtocolNotifyEvent (

     &gEfiVariableWriteArchProtocolGuid,

     TPL_CALLBACK,

@@ -1451,5 +1480,5 @@ DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor (
   return RegisterSecurityHandler (

           DxeImageVerificationHandler,

           EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_VERIFY_IMAGE | EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_IMAGE_REQUIRED

-          );      

+          );

 }