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-rw-r--r--CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/Pk/CryptPkcs7Verify.c577
1 files changed, 577 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/Pk/CryptPkcs7Verify.c b/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/Pk/CryptPkcs7Verify.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..24f4c031d5
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+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/Pk/CryptPkcs7Verify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,577 @@
+/** @file
+ PKCS#7 SignedData Verification Wrapper Implementation over OpenSSL.
+
+ Caution: This module requires additional review when modified.
+ This library will have external input - signature (e.g. UEFI Authenticated
+ Variable). It may by input in SMM mode.
+ This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like
+ buffer overflow, integer overflow.
+
+ WrapPkcs7Data(), Pkcs7GetSigners(), Pkcs7Verify() will get UEFI Authenticated
+ Variable and will do basic check for data structure.
+
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+
+#include "InternalCryptLib.h"
+
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+
+UINT8 mOidValue[9] = { 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02 };
+
+/**
+ Verification callback function to override any existing callbacks in OpenSSL
+ for intermediate certificate supports.
+
+ @param[in] Status Original status before calling this callback.
+ @param[in] Context X509 store context.
+
+ @retval 1 Current X509 certificate is verified successfully.
+ @retval 0 Verification failed.
+
+**/
+int
+X509VerifyCb (
+ IN int Status,
+ IN X509_STORE_CTX *Context
+ )
+{
+ X509_OBJECT *Obj;
+ INTN Error;
+ INTN Index;
+ INTN Count;
+
+ Obj = NULL;
+ Error = (INTN) X509_STORE_CTX_get_error (Context);
+
+ //
+ // X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT and X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_
+ // CERT_LOCALLY mean a X509 certificate is not self signed and its issuer
+ // can not be found in X509_verify_cert of X509_vfy.c.
+ // In order to support intermediate certificate node, we override the
+ // errors if the certification is obtained from X509 store, i.e. it is
+ // a trusted ceritifcate node that is enrolled by user.
+ // Besides,X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED and X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
+ // are also ignored to enable such feature.
+ //
+ if ((Error == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT) ||
+ (Error == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY)) {
+ Obj = (X509_OBJECT *) malloc (sizeof (X509_OBJECT));
+ if (Obj == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ Obj->type = X509_LU_X509;
+ Obj->data.x509 = Context->current_cert;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock (CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+
+ if (X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match (Context->ctx->objs, Obj)) {
+ Status = 1;
+ } else {
+ //
+ // If any certificate in the chain is enrolled as trusted certificate,
+ // pass the certificate verification.
+ //
+ if (Error == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY) {
+ Count = (INTN) sk_X509_num (Context->chain);
+ for (Index = 0; Index < Count; Index++) {
+ Obj->data.x509 = sk_X509_value (Context->chain, (int) Index);
+ if (X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match (Context->ctx->objs, Obj)) {
+ Status = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock (CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ }
+
+ if ((Error == X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED) ||
+ (Error == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE)) {
+ Status = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (Obj != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free (Obj);
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Check input P7Data is a wrapped ContentInfo structure or not. If not construct
+ a new structure to wrap P7Data.
+
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
+ UEFI Authenticated Variable is external input, so this function will do basic
+ check for PKCS#7 data structure.
+
+ @param[in] P7Data Pointer to the PKCS#7 message to verify.
+ @param[in] P7Length Length of the PKCS#7 message in bytes.
+ @param[out] WrapFlag If TRUE P7Data is a ContentInfo structure, otherwise
+ return FALSE.
+ @param[out] WrapData If return status of this function is TRUE:
+ 1) when WrapFlag is TRUE, pointer to P7Data.
+ 2) when WrapFlag is FALSE, pointer to a new ContentInfo
+ structure. It's caller's responsibility to free this
+ buffer.
+ @param[out] WrapDataSize Length of ContentInfo structure in bytes.
+
+ @retval TRUE The operation is finished successfully.
+ @retval FALSE The operation is failed due to lack of resources.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+WrapPkcs7Data (
+ IN CONST UINT8 *P7Data,
+ IN UINTN P7Length,
+ OUT BOOLEAN *WrapFlag,
+ OUT UINT8 **WrapData,
+ OUT UINTN *WrapDataSize
+ )
+{
+ BOOLEAN Wrapped;
+ UINT8 *SignedData;
+
+ //
+ // Check whether input P7Data is a wrapped ContentInfo structure or not.
+ //
+ Wrapped = FALSE;
+ if ((P7Data[4] == 0x06) && (P7Data[5] == 0x09)) {
+ if (CompareMem (P7Data + 6, mOidValue, sizeof (mOidValue)) == 0) {
+ if ((P7Data[15] == 0xA0) && (P7Data[16] == 0x82)) {
+ Wrapped = TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (Wrapped) {
+ *WrapData = (UINT8 *) P7Data;
+ *WrapDataSize = P7Length;
+ } else {
+ //
+ // Wrap PKCS#7 signeddata to a ContentInfo structure - add a header in 19 bytes.
+ //
+ *WrapDataSize = P7Length + 19;
+ *WrapData = malloc (*WrapDataSize);
+ if (*WrapData == NULL) {
+ *WrapFlag = Wrapped;
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ SignedData = *WrapData;
+
+ //
+ // Part1: 0x30, 0x82.
+ //
+ SignedData[0] = 0x30;
+ SignedData[1] = 0x82;
+
+ //
+ // Part2: Length1 = P7Length + 19 - 4, in big endian.
+ //
+ SignedData[2] = (UINT8) (((UINT16) (*WrapDataSize - 4)) >> 8);
+ SignedData[3] = (UINT8) (((UINT16) (*WrapDataSize - 4)) & 0xff);
+
+ //
+ // Part3: 0x06, 0x09.
+ //
+ SignedData[4] = 0x06;
+ SignedData[5] = 0x09;
+
+ //
+ // Part4: OID value -- 0x2A 0x86 0x48 0x86 0xF7 0x0D 0x01 0x07 0x02.
+ //
+ CopyMem (SignedData + 6, mOidValue, sizeof (mOidValue));
+
+ //
+ // Part5: 0xA0, 0x82.
+ //
+ SignedData[15] = 0xA0;
+ SignedData[16] = 0x82;
+
+ //
+ // Part6: Length2 = P7Length, in big endian.
+ //
+ SignedData[17] = (UINT8) (((UINT16) P7Length) >> 8);
+ SignedData[18] = (UINT8) (((UINT16) P7Length) & 0xff);
+
+ //
+ // Part7: P7Data.
+ //
+ CopyMem (SignedData + 19, P7Data, P7Length);
+ }
+
+ *WrapFlag = Wrapped;
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+/**
+ Get the signer's certificates from PKCS#7 signed data as described in "PKCS #7:
+ Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard". The input signed data could be wrapped
+ in a ContentInfo structure.
+
+ If P7Data, CertStack, StackLength, TrustedCert or CertLength is NULL, then
+ return FALSE. If P7Length overflow, then return FAlSE.
+
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
+ UEFI Authenticated Variable is external input, so this function will do basic
+ check for PKCS#7 data structure.
+
+ @param[in] P7Data Pointer to the PKCS#7 message to verify.
+ @param[in] P7Length Length of the PKCS#7 message in bytes.
+ @param[out] CertStack Pointer to Signer's certificates retrieved from P7Data.
+ It's caller's responsiblity to free the buffer.
+ @param[out] StackLength Length of signer's certificates in bytes.
+ @param[out] TrustedCert Pointer to a trusted certificate from Signer's certificates.
+ It's caller's responsiblity to free the buffer.
+ @param[out] CertLength Length of the trusted certificate in bytes.
+
+ @retval TRUE The operation is finished successfully.
+ @retval FALSE Error occurs during the operation.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+EFIAPI
+Pkcs7GetSigners (
+ IN CONST UINT8 *P7Data,
+ IN UINTN P7Length,
+ OUT UINT8 **CertStack,
+ OUT UINTN *StackLength,
+ OUT UINT8 **TrustedCert,
+ OUT UINTN *CertLength
+ )
+{
+ PKCS7 *Pkcs7;
+ BOOLEAN Status;
+ UINT8 *SignedData;
+ UINT8 *Temp;
+ UINTN SignedDataSize;
+ BOOLEAN Wrapped;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *Stack;
+ UINT8 Index;
+ UINT8 *CertBuf;
+ UINT8 *OldBuf;
+ UINTN BufferSize;
+ UINTN OldSize;
+ UINT8 *SingleCert;
+ UINTN SingleCertSize;
+
+ if ((P7Data == NULL) || (CertStack == NULL) || (StackLength == NULL) ||
+ (TrustedCert == NULL) || (CertLength == NULL) || (P7Length > INT_MAX)) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ Status = WrapPkcs7Data (P7Data, P7Length, &Wrapped, &SignedData, &SignedDataSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ Status = FALSE;
+ Pkcs7 = NULL;
+ Stack = NULL;
+ CertBuf = NULL;
+ OldBuf = NULL;
+ SingleCert = NULL;
+
+ //
+ // Retrieve PKCS#7 Data (DER encoding)
+ //
+ if (SignedDataSize > INT_MAX) {
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ Temp = SignedData;
+ Pkcs7 = d2i_PKCS7 (NULL, (const unsigned char **) &Temp, (int) SignedDataSize);
+ if (Pkcs7 == NULL) {
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Check if it's PKCS#7 Signed Data (for Authenticode Scenario)
+ //
+ if (!PKCS7_type_is_signed (Pkcs7)) {
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ Stack = PKCS7_get0_signers(Pkcs7, NULL, PKCS7_BINARY);
+ if (Stack == NULL) {
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Convert CertStack to buffer in following format:
+ // UINT8 CertNumber;
+ // UINT32 Cert1Length;
+ // UINT8 Cert1[];
+ // UINT32 Cert2Length;
+ // UINT8 Cert2[];
+ // ...
+ // UINT32 CertnLength;
+ // UINT8 Certn[];
+ //
+ BufferSize = sizeof (UINT8);
+ OldSize = BufferSize;
+
+ for (Index = 0; ; Index++) {
+ Status = X509PopCertificate (Stack, &SingleCert, &SingleCertSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ OldSize = BufferSize;
+ OldBuf = CertBuf;
+ BufferSize = OldSize + SingleCertSize + sizeof (UINT32);
+ CertBuf = malloc (BufferSize);
+
+ if (CertBuf == NULL) {
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ if (OldBuf != NULL) {
+ CopyMem (CertBuf, OldBuf, OldSize);
+ free (OldBuf);
+ OldBuf = NULL;
+ }
+
+ WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *) (CertBuf + OldSize), (UINT32) SingleCertSize);
+ CopyMem (CertBuf + OldSize + sizeof (UINT32), SingleCert, SingleCertSize);
+
+ free (SingleCert);
+ SingleCert = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (CertBuf != NULL) {
+ //
+ // Update CertNumber.
+ //
+ CertBuf[0] = Index;
+
+ *CertLength = BufferSize - OldSize - sizeof (UINT32);
+ *TrustedCert = malloc (*CertLength);
+ if (*TrustedCert == NULL) {
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ CopyMem (*TrustedCert, CertBuf + OldSize + sizeof (UINT32), *CertLength);
+ *CertStack = CertBuf;
+ *StackLength = BufferSize;
+ Status = TRUE;
+ }
+
+_Exit:
+ //
+ // Release Resources
+ //
+ if (!Wrapped) {
+ free (SignedData);
+ }
+
+ if (Pkcs7 != NULL) {
+ PKCS7_free (Pkcs7);
+ }
+
+ if (Stack != NULL) {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(Stack, X509_free);
+ }
+
+ if (SingleCert != NULL) {
+ free (SingleCert);
+ }
+
+ if (!Status && (CertBuf != NULL)) {
+ free (CertBuf);
+ *CertStack = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (OldBuf != NULL) {
+ free (OldBuf);
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ Wrap function to use free() to free allocated memory for certificates.
+
+ @param[in] Certs Pointer to the certificates to be freed.
+
+**/
+VOID
+EFIAPI
+Pkcs7FreeSigners (
+ IN UINT8 *Certs
+ )
+{
+ if (Certs == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ free (Certs);
+}
+
+/**
+ Verifies the validility of a PKCS#7 signed data as described in "PKCS #7:
+ Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard". The input signed data could be wrapped
+ in a ContentInfo structure.
+
+ If P7Data, TrustedCert or InData is NULL, then return FALSE.
+ If P7Length, CertLength or DataLength overflow, then return FAlSE.
+
+ Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.
+ UEFI Authenticated Variable is external input, so this function will do basic
+ check for PKCS#7 data structure.
+
+ @param[in] P7Data Pointer to the PKCS#7 message to verify.
+ @param[in] P7Length Length of the PKCS#7 message in bytes.
+ @param[in] TrustedCert Pointer to a trusted/root certificate encoded in DER, which
+ is used for certificate chain verification.
+ @param[in] CertLength Length of the trusted certificate in bytes.
+ @param[in] InData Pointer to the content to be verified.
+ @param[in] DataLength Length of InData in bytes.
+
+ @retval TRUE The specified PKCS#7 signed data is valid.
+ @retval FALSE Invalid PKCS#7 signed data.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+EFIAPI
+Pkcs7Verify (
+ IN CONST UINT8 *P7Data,
+ IN UINTN P7Length,
+ IN CONST UINT8 *TrustedCert,
+ IN UINTN CertLength,
+ IN CONST UINT8 *InData,
+ IN UINTN DataLength
+ )
+{
+ PKCS7 *Pkcs7;
+ BIO *CertBio;
+ BIO *DataBio;
+ BOOLEAN Status;
+ X509 *Cert;
+ X509_STORE *CertStore;
+ UINT8 *SignedData;
+ UINT8 *Temp;
+ UINTN SignedDataSize;
+ BOOLEAN Wrapped;
+
+ //
+ // Check input parameters.
+ //
+ if (P7Data == NULL || TrustedCert == NULL || InData == NULL ||
+ P7Length > INT_MAX || CertLength > INT_MAX || DataLength > INT_MAX) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ Pkcs7 = NULL;
+ CertBio = NULL;
+ DataBio = NULL;
+ Cert = NULL;
+ CertStore = NULL;
+
+ //
+ // Register & Initialize necessary digest algorithms for PKCS#7 Handling
+ //
+ EVP_add_digest (EVP_md5());
+ EVP_add_digest (EVP_sha1());
+ EVP_add_digest_alias (SN_sha1WithRSAEncryption, SN_sha1WithRSA);
+ EVP_add_digest (EVP_sha256());
+
+ Status = WrapPkcs7Data (P7Data, P7Length, &Wrapped, &SignedData, &SignedDataSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+
+ Status = FALSE;
+
+ //
+ // Retrieve PKCS#7 Data (DER encoding)
+ //
+ if (SignedDataSize > INT_MAX) {
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ Temp = SignedData;
+ Pkcs7 = d2i_PKCS7 (NULL, (const unsigned char **) &Temp, (int) SignedDataSize);
+ if (Pkcs7 == NULL) {
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Check if it's PKCS#7 Signed Data (for Authenticode Scenario)
+ //
+ if (!PKCS7_type_is_signed (Pkcs7)) {
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Read DER-encoded root certificate and Construct X509 Certificate
+ //
+ CertBio = BIO_new (BIO_s_mem ());
+ BIO_write (CertBio, TrustedCert, (int)CertLength);
+ if (CertBio == NULL) {
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+ Cert = d2i_X509_bio (CertBio, NULL);
+ if (Cert == NULL) {
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Setup X509 Store for trusted certificate
+ //
+ CertStore = X509_STORE_new ();
+ if (CertStore == NULL) {
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+ if (!(X509_STORE_add_cert (CertStore, Cert))) {
+ goto _Exit;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Register customized X509 verification callback function to support
+ // trusted intermediate certificate anchor.
+ //
+ CertStore->verify_cb = X509VerifyCb;
+
+ //
+ // For generic PKCS#7 handling, InData may be NULL if the content is present
+ // in PKCS#7 structure. So ignore NULL checking here.
+ //
+ DataBio = BIO_new (BIO_s_mem ());
+ BIO_write (DataBio, InData, (int)DataLength);
+
+ //
+ // Verifies the PKCS#7 signedData structure
+ //
+ Status = (BOOLEAN) PKCS7_verify (Pkcs7, NULL, CertStore, DataBio, NULL, PKCS7_BINARY);
+
+_Exit:
+ //
+ // Release Resources
+ //
+ BIO_free (DataBio);
+ BIO_free (CertBio);
+ X509_free (Cert);
+ X509_STORE_free (CertStore);
+ PKCS7_free (Pkcs7);
+
+ if (!Wrapped) {
+ OPENSSL_free (SignedData);
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}