1 files changed, 8 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/AuthData.c b/OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/AuthData.c
index 3b4856a01f..53ee7f7003 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/AuthData.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/AuthData.c
@@ -8,14 +8,13 @@
 
 #include "EnrollDefaultKeys.h"
 
-
 //
 // Second KEK: "Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011".
 // SHA1: 31:59:0b:fd:89:c9:d7:4e:d0:87:df:ac:66:33:4b:39:31:25:4b:30
 //
 // "dbx" updates in "dbxtool" are signed with a key derived from this KEK.
 //
-CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftKek[] = {
+CONST UINT8  mMicrosoftKek[] = {
   0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xe8, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xd0, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,
   0x02, 0x0a, 0x61, 0x0a, 0xd1, 0x88, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x30,
   0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05,
@@ -135,8 +134,7 @@ CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftKek[] = {
   0x57, 0x4e, 0x36, 0xd2, 0x32, 0x84, 0xbf, 0x9e
 };
 
-CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftKek = sizeof mMicrosoftKek;
-
+CONST UINTN  mSizeOfMicrosoftKek = sizeof mMicrosoftKek;
 
 //
 // First DB entry: "Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011"
@@ -145,7 +143,7 @@ CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftKek = sizeof mMicrosoftKek;
 // Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 R2 boot loaders are signed with a chain
 // rooted in this certificate.
 //
-CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftPca[] = {
+CONST UINT8  mMicrosoftPca[] = {
   0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xd7, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xbf, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,
   0x02, 0x0a, 0x61, 0x07, 0x76, 0x56, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x30,
   0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05,
@@ -264,8 +262,7 @@ CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftPca[] = {
   0x62, 0x1c, 0x59, 0x7e
 };
 
-CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftPca = sizeof mMicrosoftPca;
-
+CONST UINTN  mSizeOfMicrosoftPca = sizeof mMicrosoftPca;
 
 //
 // Second DB entry: "Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011"
@@ -273,7 +270,7 @@ CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftPca = sizeof mMicrosoftPca;
 //
 // To verify the "shim" binary and PCI expansion ROMs with.
 //
-CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftUefiCa[] = {
+CONST UINT8  mMicrosoftUefiCa[] = {
   0x30, 0x82, 0x06, 0x10, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xf8, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,
   0x02, 0x0a, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd3, 0xc4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30,
   0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05,
@@ -396,8 +393,7 @@ CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftUefiCa[] = {
   0x07, 0x92, 0x9b, 0xf5, 0xa6, 0xbc, 0x59, 0x83, 0x58
 };
 
-CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftUefiCa = sizeof mMicrosoftUefiCa;
-
+CONST UINTN  mSizeOfMicrosoftUefiCa = sizeof mMicrosoftUefiCa;
 
 //
 // The Microsoft.UefiSecureBootLogo.Tests.OutOfBoxConfirmDBXisPresent test case
@@ -431,10 +427,10 @@ CONST UINTN mSizeOfMicrosoftUefiCa = sizeof mMicrosoftUefiCa;
 // practice recommended -- in natural English langauge -- in the
 // above-referenced TechNet article.
 //
-CONST UINT8 mSha256OfDevNull[] = {
+CONST UINT8  mSha256OfDevNull[] = {
   0xe3, 0xb0, 0xc4, 0x42, 0x98, 0xfc, 0x1c, 0x14, 0x9a, 0xfb, 0xf4, 0xc8, 0x99,
   0x6f, 0xb9, 0x24, 0x27, 0xae, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x64, 0x9b, 0x93, 0x4c, 0xa4, 0x95,
   0x99, 0x1b, 0x78, 0x52, 0xb8, 0x55
 };
 
-CONST UINTN mSizeOfSha256OfDevNull = sizeof mSha256OfDevNull;
+CONST UINTN  mSizeOfSha256OfDevNull = sizeof mSha256OfDevNull;