diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/AuthService.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/AuthService.c | 166 |
1 files changed, 83 insertions, 83 deletions
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/AuthService.c b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/AuthService.c index 490a8b3417..87994587da 100644 --- a/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/AuthService.c +++ b/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/EsalVariableDxeSal/AuthService.c @@ -2,13 +2,13 @@ Implement authentication services for the authenticated variable
service in UEFI2.2.
-Copyright (c) 2009 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
-This program and the accompanying materials
-are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
-which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
-THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
**/
@@ -61,13 +61,13 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize ( mVariableModuleGlobal->HashContext[Physical] = AllocateRuntimePool (CtxSize);
ASSERT (mVariableModuleGlobal->HashContext[Physical] != NULL);
//
- // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.
- // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
+ // Check "AuthVarKeyDatabase" variable's existence.
+ // If it doesn't exist, create a new one with initial value of 0 and EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
//
Status = FindVariable (
- mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableName[Physical][VAR_AUTH_KEY_DB],
- &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,
- &Variable,
+ mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableName[Physical][VAR_AUTH_KEY_DB],
+ &gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid,
+ &Variable,
&mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal[Physical],
mVariableModuleGlobal->FvbInstance
);
@@ -96,10 +96,10 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize ( // Load database in global variable for cache.
//
Valid = IsValidVariableHeader (
- Variable.CurrPtr,
- Variable.Volatile,
- &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal[Physical],
- mVariableModuleGlobal->FvbInstance,
+ Variable.CurrPtr,
+ Variable.Volatile,
+ &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal[Physical],
+ mVariableModuleGlobal->FvbInstance,
&VariableHeader
);
ASSERT (Valid);
@@ -117,23 +117,23 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize ( mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE);
}
//
- // Check "SetupMode" variable's existence.
+ // Check "SetupMode" variable's existence.
// If it doesn't exist, check PK database's existence to determine the value.
- // Then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
+ // Then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
//
Status = FindVariable (
- mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableName[Physical][VAR_SETUP_MODE],
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &Variable,
+ mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableName[Physical][VAR_SETUP_MODE],
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &Variable,
&mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal[Physical],
mVariableModuleGlobal->FvbInstance
);
if (Variable.CurrPtr == 0x0) {
Status = FindVariable (
- mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableName[Physical][VAR_PLATFORM_KEY],
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &Variable,
+ mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableName[Physical][VAR_PLATFORM_KEY],
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &Variable,
&mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal[Physical],
mVariableModuleGlobal->FvbInstance
);
@@ -169,13 +169,13 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize ( );
}
//
- // Check "SignatureSupport" variable's existence.
- // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
+ // Check "SignatureSupport" variable's existence.
+ // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
//
Status = FindVariable (
- EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,
- &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
- &Variable,
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,
+ &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+ &Variable,
&mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal[Physical],
mVariableModuleGlobal->FvbInstance
);
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ VerifyDataPayload ( //
Rsa = RsaNew ();
ASSERT (Rsa != NULL);
- //
+ //
// Set RSA Key Components.
// NOTE: Only N and E are needed to be set as RSA public key for signature verification.
//
@@ -380,10 +380,10 @@ VerifyDataPayload ( // Verify the signature.
//
Status = RsaPkcs1Verify (
- Rsa,
- Digest,
- SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
- CertBlock->Signature,
+ Rsa,
+ Digest,
+ SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ CertBlock->Signature,
EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SHA256_SIZE
);
@@ -419,9 +419,9 @@ UpdatePlatformMode ( UINT32 VarAttr;
Status = FindVariable (
- Global->VariableName[VirtualMode][VAR_SETUP_MODE],
- Global->GlobalVariableGuid[VirtualMode],
- &Variable,
+ Global->VariableName[VirtualMode][VAR_SETUP_MODE],
+ Global->GlobalVariableGuid[VirtualMode],
+ &Variable,
&Global->VariableGlobal[VirtualMode],
Global->FvbInstance
);
@@ -459,8 +459,8 @@ UpdatePlatformMode ( @param[in] IsPk Indicates whether to process pk.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
- @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation
- check carried out by the firmware.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable does NOT pass the validation
+ check carried out by the firmware.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The variable passed validation successfully.
**/
@@ -507,10 +507,10 @@ ProcessVarWithPk ( if (Variable->CurrPtr != 0x0) {
Valid = IsValidVariableHeader (
- Variable->CurrPtr,
- Variable->Volatile,
- &Global->VariableGlobal[VirtualMode],
- Global->FvbInstance,
+ Variable->CurrPtr,
+ Variable->Volatile,
+ &Global->VariableGlobal[VirtualMode],
+ Global->FvbInstance,
&VariableHeader
);
ASSERT (Valid);
@@ -526,9 +526,9 @@ ProcessVarWithPk ( // Get platform key from variable.
//
Status = FindVariable (
- Global->VariableName[VirtualMode][VAR_PLATFORM_KEY],
- Global->GlobalVariableGuid[VirtualMode],
- &PkVariable,
+ Global->VariableName[VirtualMode][VAR_PLATFORM_KEY],
+ Global->GlobalVariableGuid[VirtualMode],
+ &PkVariable,
&Global->VariableGlobal[VirtualMode],
Global->FvbInstance
);
@@ -548,14 +548,14 @@ ProcessVarWithPk ( Status = VerifyDataPayload (VirtualMode, Global, Data, DataSize, OldPkData->SignatureData);
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
Status = UpdateVariable (
- VariableName,
- VendorGuid,
- (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,
- DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,
- Attributes,
- 0,
- CertData->MonotonicCount,
- VirtualMode,
+ VariableName,
+ VendorGuid,
+ (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,
+ DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,
+ Attributes,
+ 0,
+ CertData->MonotonicCount,
+ VirtualMode,
Global,
Variable
);
@@ -596,8 +596,8 @@ ProcessVarWithPk ( @param[in] Attributes The attribute value of the variable.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid parameter.
- @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable did NOT pass the validation
- check carried out by the firmware.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable did NOT pass the validation
+ check carried out by the firmware.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The variable passed validation successfully.
**/
@@ -640,10 +640,10 @@ ProcessVarWithKek ( CertBlock = (EFI_CERT_BLOCK_RSA_2048_SHA256 *) (CertData->AuthInfo.CertData);
if (Variable->CurrPtr != 0x0) {
Valid = IsValidVariableHeader (
- Variable->CurrPtr,
- Variable->Volatile,
- &Global->VariableGlobal[VirtualMode],
- Global->FvbInstance,
+ Variable->CurrPtr,
+ Variable->Volatile,
+ &Global->VariableGlobal[VirtualMode],
+ Global->FvbInstance,
&VariableHeader
);
ASSERT (Valid);
@@ -659,9 +659,9 @@ ProcessVarWithKek ( // Get KEK database from variable.
//
Status = FindVariable (
- Global->VariableName[VirtualMode][VAR_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY],
- Global->GlobalVariableGuid[VirtualMode],
- &KekVariable,
+ Global->VariableName[VirtualMode][VAR_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY],
+ Global->GlobalVariableGuid[VirtualMode],
+ &KekVariable,
&Global->VariableGlobal[VirtualMode],
Global->FvbInstance
);
@@ -698,13 +698,13 @@ ProcessVarWithKek ( Status = VerifyDataPayload (VirtualMode, Global, Data, DataSize, CertBlock->PublicKey);
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
Status = UpdateVariable (
- VariableName,
- VendorGuid,
- (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,
- DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,
- Attributes,
- 0,
- CertData->MonotonicCount,
+ VariableName,
+ VendorGuid,
+ (UINT8*)Data + AUTHINFO_SIZE,
+ DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE,
+ Attributes,
+ 0,
+ CertData->MonotonicCount,
VirtualMode,
Global,
Variable
@@ -715,13 +715,13 @@ ProcessVarWithKek ( // If in setup mode, no authentication needed.
//
Status = UpdateVariable (
- VariableName,
- VendorGuid,
- Data,
- DataSize,
- Attributes,
- 0,
- 0,
+ VariableName,
+ VendorGuid,
+ Data,
+ DataSize,
+ Attributes,
+ 0,
+ 0,
VirtualMode,
Global,
Variable
@@ -748,8 +748,8 @@ ProcessVarWithKek ( @retval EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED The variable is write-protected and needs authentication with
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
@retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The variable is with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
- set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation
- check carried out by the firmware.
+ set, but the AuthInfo does NOT pass the validation
+ check carried out by the firmware.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The variable is not write-protected, or passed validation successfully.
**/
@@ -789,10 +789,10 @@ VerifyVariable ( ZeroMem (&VariableHeader, sizeof (AUTHENTICATED_VARIABLE_HEADER));
if (Variable->CurrPtr != 0x0) {
Valid = IsValidVariableHeader (
- Variable->CurrPtr,
- Variable->Volatile,
- &Global->VariableGlobal[VirtualMode],
- Global->FvbInstance,
+ Variable->CurrPtr,
+ Variable->Volatile,
+ &Global->VariableGlobal[VirtualMode],
+ Global->FvbInstance,
&VariableHeader
);
ASSERT (Valid);
@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ VerifyVariable ( *KeyIndex = VariableHeader.PubKeyIndex;
IsFirstTime = FALSE;
}
- } else if (Valid && (VariableHeader.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {
+ } else if (Valid && (VariableHeader.Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {
//
// If the variable is already write-protected, it always needs authentication before update.
//
@@ -864,7 +864,7 @@ VerifyVariable ( //
return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
}
- }
+ }
//
// Verify the certificate in Data payload.
//
|