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* MdePkg: Fix spelling mistake for occurredMichael D Kinney2020-08-192-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2361 Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Cc: Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
* MdeModulePkg: Fix spelling mistake for occurredMichael D Kinney2020-08-1913-19/+19
| | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2361 Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
* EmulatorPkg: Fix spelling mistake for occurredMichael D Kinney2020-08-192-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2361 Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/OpalPassword: Fix spelling mistakeMichael D Kinney2020-08-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2346 Cc: Qi Zhang <qi1.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
* Add a stub CONTRIBUTING.md pointing to the wikiCole Robinson2020-08-181-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Googling for 'edk2 pull request' did not find this wiki page: https://github.com/tianocore/tianocore.github.io/wiki/EDK-II-Development-Process Add it to CONTRIBUTING.md for more discoverability. (When someone opens a pull request, they will see a link to CONTRIBUTING.md; see <https://docs.github.com/en/github/building-a-strong-community/setting-guidelines-for-repository-contributors>.) Signed-off-by: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com> Message-Id: <df6219e77613e93c494996437cf53e302c473392.1597168987.git.crobinso@redhat.com> [lersek@redhat.com: add paragraph with docs.github.com reference] Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* UnitTestFrameworkPkg: Add configuration for Ecc check in yaml fileShenglei Zhang2020-08-171-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Add configuration ExceptionList and IgnoreFiles for package config files. So users can rely on this to ignore some Ecc issues. Besides, add submodule path in IgnoreFiles section. Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.brogan@microsoft.com> Cc: Bret Barkelew <Bret.Barkelew@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Shenglei Zhang <shenglei.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
* UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.ci.yaml: Add configuration for Ecc checkShenglei Zhang2020-08-171-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add configuration ExceptionList and IgnoreFiles for package config files. So users can rely on this to ignore some Ecc issues. Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shenglei Zhang <shenglei.zhang@intel.com> Acked-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
* ShellPkg/ShellPkg.ci.yaml: Add configuration for Ecc checkShenglei Zhang2020-08-171-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | Add configuration ExceptionList and IgnoreFiles for package config files. So users can rely on this to ignore some Ecc issues. Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shenglei Zhang <shenglei.zhang@intel.com> Acked-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml: Add configuration for Ecc checkShenglei Zhang2020-08-171-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | Add configuration ExceptionList and IgnoreFiles for package config files. So users can rely on this to ignore some Ecc issues. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shenglei Zhang <shenglei.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
* PcAtChipsetPkg/PcAtChipsetPkg.ci.yaml: Add configuration for Ecc checkShenglei Zhang2020-08-171-0/+13
| | | | | | | | | | Add configuration ExceptionList and IgnoreFiles for package config files. So users can rely on this to ignore some Ecc issues. Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shenglei Zhang <shenglei.zhang@intel.com> Acked-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
* OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.ci.yaml: Add configuration for Ecc checkShenglei Zhang2020-08-171-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | Add configuration ExceptionList and IgnoreFiles for package config files. So users can rely on this to ignore some Ecc issues. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Shenglei Zhang <shenglei.zhang@intel.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
* NetworkPkg/NetworkPkg.ci.yaml: Add configuration for Ecc checkShenglei Zhang2020-08-171-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | Add configuration ExceptionList and IgnoreFiles for package config files. So users can rely on this to ignore some Ecc issues. Cc: Maciej Rabeda <maciej.rabeda@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jiaxin Wu <jiaxin.wu@intel.com> Cc: Siyuan Fu <siyuan.fu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shenglei Zhang <shenglei.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Maciej Rabeda <maciej.rabeda@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
* MdePkg/MdePkg.ci.yaml: Add configuration for Ecc checkShenglei Zhang2020-08-171-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | Add configuration ExceptionList and IgnoreFiles for package config files. So users can rely on this to ignore some Ecc issues. Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shenglei Zhang <shenglei.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
* FmpDevicePkg/FmpDevicePkg.ci.yaml: Add configuration for Ecc checkShenglei Zhang2020-08-171-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | Add configuration ExceptionList and IgnoreFiles for package config files. So users can rely on this to ignore some Ecc issues. Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shenglei Zhang <shenglei.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
* FatPkg/FatPkg.ci.yaml: Add configuration for Ecc checkShenglei Zhang2020-08-171-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | Add configuration ExceptionList and IgnoreFiles for package config files. So users can rely on this to ignore some Ecc issues. Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shenglei Zhang <shenglei.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
* EmulatorPkg/EmulatorPkg.ci.yaml: Add configuration for Ecc checkShenglei Zhang2020-08-171-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | Add configuration ExceptionList and IgnoreFiles for package config files. So users can rely on this to ignore some Ecc issues. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shenglei Zhang <shenglei.zhang@intel.com> Acked-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
* CryptoPkg/CryptoPkg.ci.yaml: Add configuration for Ecc checkShenglei Zhang2020-08-171-0/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | Add configuration ExceptionList and IgnoreFiles for package config files. So users can rely on this to ignore some Ecc issues. Besides, add submodule path in IgnoreFiles section. Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Xiaoyu Lu <xiaoyux.lu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shenglei Zhang <shenglei.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com>
* ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtPkg.ci.yaml: Add configuration for Ecc checkShenglei Zhang2020-08-171-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Add configuration ExceptionList and IgnoreFiles for package config files. So users can rely on this to ignore some Ecc issues. Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com> Signed-off-by: Shenglei Zhang <shenglei.zhang@intel.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
* MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.ci.yaml: Add configuration for Ecc checkShenglei Zhang2020-08-171-0/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | Add configuration ExceptionList and IgnoreFiles for package config files. So users can rely on this to ignore some Ecc issues. Besides, add submodule path in IgnoreFiles section. Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shenglei Zhang <shenglei.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
* .pytool/Plugin: Add a plugin EccCheckShenglei Zhang2020-08-173-0/+335
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2606 EccCheck is a plugin to report Ecc issues for code in pull request , which will be run on open ci. But note not each kind of issue could be reported out. It can only handle the issues, whose line number in CSV report accurately map with their code in source code files. And Ecc issues about comments can also be handled. Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.brogan@microsoft.com> Cc: Bret Barkelew <Bret.Barkelew@microsoft.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shenglei Zhang <shenglei.zhang@intel.com>
* pip-requirements.txt: Add Ecc required libShenglei Zhang2020-08-171-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | antlr4-python3-runtime is a lib to support Ecc run with Py3.x. Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.brogan@microsoft.com> Cc: Bret Barkelew <Bret.Barkelew@microsoft.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shenglei Zhang <shenglei.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
* Maintainers.txt: Add reviewers for the OvmfPkg SEV-related filesTom Lendacky2020-08-171-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Register reviewers for the SEV-related files in OvmfPkg. Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
* UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Prepare SEV-ES guest APs for OS useTom Lendacky2020-08-174-18/+179
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 Before UEFI transfers control to the OS, it must park the AP. This is done using the AsmRelocateApLoop function to transition into 32-bit non-paging mode. For an SEV-ES guest, a few additional things must be done: - AsmRelocateApLoop must be updated to support SEV-ES. This means performing a VMGEXIT AP Reset Hold instead of an MWAIT or HLT loop. - Since the AP must transition to real mode, a small routine is copied to the WakeupBuffer area. Since the WakeupBuffer will be used by the AP during OS booting, it must be placed in reserved memory. Additionally, the AP stack must be located where it can be accessed in real mode. - Once the AP is in real mode it will transfer control to the destination specified by the OS in the SEV-ES AP Jump Table. The SEV-ES AP Jump Table address is saved by the hypervisor for the OS using the GHCB VMGEXIT AP Jump Table exit code. Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg: Move the GHCB allocations into reserved memoryTom Lendacky2020-08-171-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 After having transitioned from UEFI to the OS, the OS will need to boot the APs. For an SEV-ES guest, the APs will have been parked by UEFI using GHCB pages allocated by UEFI. The hypervisor will write to the GHCB SW_EXITINFO2 field of the GHCB when the AP is booted. As a result, the GHCB pages must be marked reserved so that the OS does not attempt to use them and experience memory corruption because of the hypervisor write. Change the GHCB allocation from the default boot services memory to reserved memory. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg: Use the SEV-ES work area for the SEV-ES AP reset vectorTom Lendacky2020-08-172-0/+101
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 A hypervisor is not allowed to update an SEV-ES guest's register state, so when booting an SEV-ES guest AP, the hypervisor is not allowed to set the RIP to the guest requested value. Instead an SEV-ES AP must be re-directed from within the guest to the actual requested staring location as specified in the INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence. Use the SEV-ES work area for the reset vector code that contains support to jump to the desired RIP location after having been started. This is required for only the very first AP reset. This new OVMF source file, ResetVectorVtf0.asm, is used in place of the original file through the use of the include path order set in OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf under "[BuildOptions]". Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* UefiCpuPkg: Allow AP booting under SEV-ESTom Lendacky2020-08-1711-15/+738
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 Typically, an AP is booted using the INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence. This sequence is intercepted by the hypervisor, which sets the AP's registers to the values requested by the sequence. At that point, the hypervisor can start the AP, which will then begin execution at the appropriate location. Under SEV-ES, AP booting presents some challenges since the hypervisor is not allowed to alter the AP's register state. In this situation, we have to distinguish between the AP's first boot and AP's subsequent boots. First boot: Once the AP's register state has been defined (which is before the guest is first booted) it cannot be altered. Should the hypervisor attempt to alter the register state, the change would be detected by the hardware and the VMRUN instruction would fail. Given this, the first boot for the AP is required to begin execution with this initial register state, which is typically the reset vector. This prevents the BSP from directing the AP startup location through the INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence. To work around this, the firmware will provide a build time reserved area that can be used as the initial IP value. The hypervisor can extract this location value by checking for the SEV-ES reset block GUID that must be located 48-bytes from the end of the firmware. The format of the SEV-ES reset block area is: 0x00 - 0x01 - SEV-ES Reset IP 0x02 - 0x03 - SEV-ES Reset CS Segment Base[31:16] 0x04 - 0x05 - Size of the SEV-ES reset block 0x06 - 0x15 - SEV-ES Reset Block GUID (00f771de-1a7e-4fcb-890e-68c77e2fb44e) The total size is 22 bytes. Any expansion to this block must be done by adding new values before existing values. The hypervisor will use the IP and CS values obtained from the SEV-ES reset block to set as the AP's initial values. The CS Segment Base represents the upper 16 bits of the CS segment base and must be left shifted by 16 bits to form the complete CS segment base value. Before booting the AP for the first time, the BSP must initialize the SEV-ES reset area. This consists of programming a FAR JMP instruction to the contents of a memory location that is also located in the SEV-ES reset area. The BSP must program the IP and CS values for the FAR JMP based on values drived from the INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence. Subsequent boots: Again, the hypervisor cannot alter the AP register state, so a method is required to take the AP out of halt state and redirect it to the desired IP location. If it is determined that the AP is running in an SEV-ES guest, then instead of calling CpuSleep(), a VMGEXIT is issued with the AP Reset Hold exit code (0x80000004). The hypervisor will put the AP in a halt state, waiting for an INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence. Once the sequence is recognized, the hypervisor will resume the AP. At this point the AP must transition from the current 64-bit long mode down to 16-bit real mode and begin executing at the derived location from the INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence. Another change is around the area of obtaining the (x2)APIC ID during AP startup. During AP startup, the AP can't take a #VC exception before the AP has established a stack. However, the AP stack is set by using the (x2)APIC ID, which is obtained through CPUID instructions. A CPUID instruction will cause a #VC, so a different method must be used. The GHCB protocol supports a method to obtain CPUID information from the hypervisor through the GHCB MSR. This method does not require a stack, so it is used to obtain the necessary CPUID information to determine the (x2)APIC ID. The new 16-bit protected mode GDT entry is used in order to transition from 64-bit long mode down to 16-bit real mode. A new assembler routine is created that takes the AP from 64-bit long mode to 16-bit real mode. This is located under 1MB in memory and transitions from 64-bit long mode to 32-bit compatibility mode to 16-bit protected mode and finally 16-bit real mode. Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Add CPU MP data flag to indicate if SEV-ES is enabledTom Lendacky2020-08-174-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 When starting APs in an SMP configuration, the AP needs to know if it is running as an SEV-ES guest in order to assign a GHCB page. Add a field to the CPU_MP_DATA structure that will indicate if SEV-ES is enabled. This new field is set during MP library initialization with the PCD value PcdSevEsIsEnabled. This flag can then be used to determine if SEV-ES is enabled. Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* UefiCpuPkg: Add a 16-bit protected mode code segment descriptorTom Lendacky2020-08-173-6/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 A hypervisor is not allowed to update an SEV-ES guests register state, so when booting an SEV-ES guest AP, the hypervisor is not allowed to set the RIP to the guest requested value. Instead, an SEV-ES AP must be transition from 64-bit long mode to 16-bit real mode in response to an INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence. This requires a 16-bit code segment descriptor. For PEI, create this descriptor in the reset vector GDT table. For DXE, create this descriptor from the newly reserved entry at location 0x28. Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe: Bypass flash detection with SEV-ESTom Lendacky2020-08-175-3/+91
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 The flash detection routine will attempt to determine how the flash device behaves (e.g. ROM, RAM, Flash). But when SEV-ES is enabled and the flash device behaves as a ROM device (meaning it is marked read-only by the hypervisor), this check may result in an infinite nested page fault because of the attempted write. Since the instruction cannot be emulated when SEV-ES is enabled, the RIP is never advanced, resulting in repeated nested page faults. When SEV-ES is enabled, exit the flash detection early and assume that the FD behaves as Flash. This will result in QemuFlashWrite() being called to store EFI variables, which will also result in an infinite nested page fault when the write is performed. In this case, update QemuFlashWrite() to use the VMGEXIT MMIO write support to have the hypervisor perform the write without having to emulate the instruction. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/Sec: Enable cache early to speed up bootingTom Lendacky2020-08-171-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 Currently, the OVMF code relies on the hypervisor to enable the cache support on the processor in order to improve the boot speed. However, with SEV-ES, the hypervisor is not allowed to change the CR0 register to enable caching. Update the OVMF Sec support to enable caching in order to improve the boot speed when running as an SEV-ES guest. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/Sec: Add #VC exception handling for Sec phaseTom Lendacky2020-08-172-13/+173
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 An SEV-ES guest will generate a #VC exception when it encounters a non-automatic exit (NAE) event. It is expected that the #VC exception handler will communicate with the hypervisor using the GHCB to handle the NAE event. NAE events can occur during the Sec phase, so initialize exception handling early in the OVMF Sec support. Before establishing the exception handling, validate that the supported version of the SEV-ES protocol in OVMF is supported by the hypervisor. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Add support for a 32-bit SEV checkTom Lendacky2020-08-173-3/+277
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 During BSP startup, the reset vector code will issue a CPUID instruction while in 32-bit mode. When running as an SEV-ES guest, this will trigger a #VC exception. Add exception handling support to the early reset vector code to catch these exceptions. Also, since the guest is in 32-bit mode at this point, writes to the GHCB will be encrypted and thus not able to be read by the hypervisor, so use the GHCB CPUID request/response protocol to obtain the requested CPUID function values and provide these to the guest. The exception handling support is active during the SEV check and uses the OVMF temporary RAM space for a stack. After the SEV check is complete, the exception handling support is removed and the stack pointer cleared. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Reserve SEV-ES work area if S3 is supportedTom Lendacky2020-08-172-0/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 Protect the SEV-ES work area memory used by an SEV-ES guest. Regarding the lifecycle of the SEV-ES memory area: PcdSevEsWorkArea (a) when and how it is initialized after first boot of the VM If SEV-ES is enabled, the SEV-ES area is initialized during the SEC phase [OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm]. (b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE If SEV-ES is enabled, then InitializeRamRegions() [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c] protects the ranges with either an AcpiNVS (S3 enabled) or BootServicesData (S3 disabled) memory allocation HOB, in PEI. (c) how it is protected from the OS If S3 is enabled, then (b) reserves it from the OS too. If S3 is disabled, then the range needs no protection. (d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path It is rewritten same as in (a), which is fine because (b) reserved it. (e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path It is rewritten same as in (a). Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com> Cc: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg: Reserve a page in memory for the SEV-ES usageTom Lendacky2020-08-171-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 Reserve a fixed area of memory for SEV-ES use and set a fixed PCD, PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase, to this value. This area will be used by SEV-ES support for two purposes: 1. Communicating the SEV-ES status during BSP boot to SEC: Using a byte of memory from the page, the BSP reset vector code can communicate the SEV-ES status to SEC for use before exception handling can be enabled in SEC. After SEC, this field is no longer valid and the standard way of determine if SEV-ES is active should be used. 2. Establishing an area of memory for AP boot support: A hypervisor is not allowed to update an SEV-ES guest's register state, so when booting an SEV-ES guest AP, the hypervisor is not allowed to set the RIP to the guest requested value. Instead an SEV-ES AP must be re-directed from within the guest to the actual requested staring location as specified in the INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence. Use this memory for reset vector code that can be programmed to have the AP jump to the desired RIP location after starting the AP. This is required for only the very first AP reset. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* UefiCpuPkg: Create an SEV-ES workarea PCDTom Lendacky2020-08-172-0/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 Create an SEV-ES workarea PCD. This PCD will be used for BSP communication during SEC and for AP startup during PEI and DXE phases, the latter is the reason for creating it in the UefiCpuPkg. Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Move early GDT into ram when SEV-ES is enabledTom Lendacky2020-08-171-0/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 The SEV support will clear the C-bit from non-RAM areas. The early GDT lives in a non-RAM area, so when an exception occurs (like a #VC) the GDT will be read as un-encrypted even though it is encrypted. This will result in a failure to be able to handle the exception. Move the GDT into RAM so it can be accessed without error when running as an SEV-ES guest. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg: Create GHCB pages for use during Pei and Dxe phaseTom Lendacky2020-08-175-1/+52
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 Allocate memory for the GHCB pages and the per-CPU variable pages during SEV initialization for use during Pei and Dxe phases. The GHCB page(s) must be shared pages, so clear the encryption mask from the current page table entries. Upon successful allocation, set the GHCB PCDs (PcdGhcbBase and PcdGhcbSize). The per-CPU variable page needs to be unique per AP. Using the page after the GHCB ensures that it is unique per AP. Only the GHCB page is marked as shared, keeping the per-CPU variable page encyrpted. The same logic is used in DXE using CreateIdentityMappingPageTables() before switching to the DXE pagetables. The GHCB pages (one per vCPU) will be used by the PEI and DXE #VC exception handlers. The #VC exception handler will fill in the necessary fields of the GHCB and exit to the hypervisor using the VMGEXIT instruction. The hypervisor then accesses the GHCB associated with the vCPU in order to perform the requested function. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Reserve GHCB-related areas if S3 is supportedTom Lendacky2020-08-172-0/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 Protect the memory used by an SEV-ES guest when S3 is supported. This includes the page table used to break down the 2MB page that contains the GHCB so that it can be marked un-encrypted, as well as the GHCB area. Regarding the lifecycle of the GHCB-related memory areas: PcdOvmfSecGhcbPageTableBase PcdOvmfSecGhcbBase (a) when and how it is initialized after first boot of the VM If SEV-ES is enabled, the GHCB-related areas are initialized during the SEC phase [OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm]. (b) how it is protected from memory allocations during DXE If S3 and SEV-ES are enabled, then InitializeRamRegions() [OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c] protects the ranges with an AcpiNVS memory allocation HOB, in PEI. If S3 is disabled, then these ranges are not protected. DXE's own page tables are first built while still in PEI (see HandOffToDxeCore() [MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/X64/DxeLoadFunc.c]). Those tables are located in permanent PEI memory. After CR3 is switched over to them (which occurs before jumping to the DXE core entry point), we don't have to preserve PcdOvmfSecGhcbPageTableBase. PEI switches to GHCB pages in permanent PEI memory and DXE will use these PEI GHCB pages, so we don't have to preserve PcdOvmfSecGhcbBase. (c) how it is protected from the OS If S3 is enabled, then (b) reserves it from the OS too. If S3 is disabled, then the range needs no protection. (d) how it is accessed on the S3 resume path It is rewritten same as in (a), which is fine because (b) reserved it. (e) how it is accessed on the warm reset path It is rewritten same as in (a). Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com> Cc: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg: Create a GHCB page for use during Sec phaseTom Lendacky2020-08-175-0/+113
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 A GHCB page is needed during the Sec phase, so this new page must be created. Since the #VC exception handler routines assume that a per-CPU variable area is immediately after the GHCB, this per-CPU variable area must also be created. Since the GHCB must be marked as an un-encrypted, or shared, page, an additional pagetable page is required to break down the 2MB region where the GHCB page lives into 4K pagetable entries. Create a new entry in the OVMF memory layout for the new page table page and for the SEC GHCB and per-CPU variable pages. After breaking down the 2MB page, update the GHCB page table entry to remove the encryption mask. The GHCB page will be used by the SEC #VC exception handler. The #VC exception handler will fill in the necessary fields of the GHCB and exit to the hypervisor using the VMGEXIT instruction. The hypervisor then accesses the GHCB in order to perform the requested function. Four new fixed PCDs are needed to support the SEC GHCB page: - PcdOvmfSecGhcbBase UINT32 value that is the base address of the GHCB used during the SEC phase. - PcdOvmfSecGhcbSize UINT32 value that is the size, in bytes, of the GHCB area used during the SEC phase. - PcdOvmfSecGhcbPageTableBase UINT32 value that is address of a page table page used to break down the 2MB page into 512 4K pages. - PcdOvmfSecGhcbPageTableSize UINT32 value that is the size, in bytes, of the page table page. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg: Add support to perform SEV-ES initializationTom Lendacky2020-08-175-0/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 When SEV-ES is enabled, then SEV is also enabled. Add support to the SEV initialization function to also check for SEV-ES being enabled, and if enabled, set the SEV-ES enabled PCD (PcdSevEsIsEnabled). Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add an SEV-ES guest indicator functionTom Lendacky2020-08-172-14/+47
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 Create a function that can be used to determine if the VM is running as an SEV-ES guest. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Add support for DR7 Read/Write NAE eventsTom Lendacky2020-08-171-0/+114
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 Under SEV-ES, a DR7 read or write intercept generates a #VC exception. The #VC handler must provide special support to the guest for this. On a DR7 write, the #VC handler must cache the value and issue a VMGEXIT to notify the hypervisor of the write. However, the #VC handler must not actually set the value of the DR7 register. On a DR7 read, the #VC handler must return the cached value of the DR7 register to the guest. VMGEXIT is not invoked for a DR7 register read. The caching of the DR7 values will make use of the per-CPU data pages that are allocated along with the GHCB pages. The per-CPU page for a vCPU is the page that immediately follows the vCPU's GHCB page. Since each GHCB page is unique for a vCPU, the page that follows becomes unique for that vCPU. The SEC phase will reserves an area of memory for a single GHCB and per-CPU page for use by the BSP. After transitioning to the PEI phase, new GHCB and per-CPU pages are allocated for the BSP and all APs. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Add support for MWAIT/MWAITX NAE eventsTom Lendacky2020-08-171-0/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 Under SEV-ES, a MWAIT/MWAITX intercept generates a #VC exception. VMGEXIT must be used to allow the hypervisor to handle this intercept. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Add support for MONITOR/MONITORX NAE eventsTom Lendacky2020-08-171-0/+38
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 Under SEV-ES, a MONITOR/MONITORX intercept generates a #VC exception. VMGEXIT must be used to allow the hypervisor to handle this intercept. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Add support for RDTSCP NAE eventsTom Lendacky2020-08-171-0/+47
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 Under SEV-ES, a RDTSCP intercept generates a #VC exception. VMGEXIT must be used to allow the hypervisor to handle this intercept. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Add support for VMMCALL NAE eventsTom Lendacky2020-08-171-0/+48
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 Under SEV-ES, a VMMCALL intercept generates a #VC exception. VMGEXIT must be used to allow the hypervisor to handle this intercept. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Add support for INVD NAE eventsTom Lendacky2020-08-171-0/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 Under SEV-ES, a INVD intercept generates a #VC exception. VMGEXIT must be used to allow the hypervisor to handle this intercept. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Add support for RDPMC NAE eventsTom Lendacky2020-08-171-0/+46
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 Under SEV-ES, a RDPMC intercept generates a #VC exception. VMGEXIT must be used to allow the hypervisor to handle this intercept. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Add support for RDTSC NAE eventsTom Lendacky2020-08-171-0/+43
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 Under SEV-ES, a RDTSC intercept generates a #VC exception. VMGEXIT must be used to allow the hypervisor to handle this intercept. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Add support for WBINVD NAE eventsTom Lendacky2020-08-171-0/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 Under SEV-ES, a WBINVD intercept generates a #VC exception. VMGEXIT must be used to allow the hypervisor to handle this intercept. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
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