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* OvmfPkg/UefiCpuPkg: Add CcExit prefix to the APIs of CcExitLibMin M Xu2022-11-141-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4123 APIs which are defined in CcExitLib.h are added with the CcExit prefix. This is to make the APIs' name more meaningful. This change impacts OvmfPkg/UefiCpuPkg. Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
* OvmfPkg/UefiCpuPkg/UefiPayloadPkg: Rename VmgExitLib to CcExitLibMin M Xu2022-11-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4123 VmgExitLib once was designed to provide interfaces to support #VC handler and issue VMGEXIT instruction. After TDVF (enable TDX feature in OVMF) is introduced, this library is updated to support #VE as well. Now the name of VmgExitLib cannot reflect what the lib does. This patch renames VmgExitLib to CcExitLib (Cc means Confidential Computing). This is a simple renaming and there is no logic changes. After renaming all the VmgExitLib related codes are updated with CcExitLib. These changes are in OvmfPkg/UefiCpuPkg/UefiPayloadPkg. Cc: Guo Dong <guo.dong@intel.com> Cc: Sean Rhodes <sean@starlabs.systems> Cc: James Lu <james.lu@intel.com> Cc: Gua Guo <gua.guo@intel.com> Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: James Lu <james.lu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Gua Guo <gua.guo@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
* OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio addressBrijesh Singh2021-12-091-7/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The SetMemoryEncDec() is used by the higher level routines to set or clear the page encryption mask for system RAM and Mmio address. When SEV-SNP is active, in addition to set/clear page mask it also updates the RMP table. The RMP table updates are required for the system RAM address and not the Mmio address. Add a new parameter in SetMemoryEncDec() to tell whether the specified address is Mmio. If its Mmio then skip the page state change in the RMP table. Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP tableBrijesh Singh via groups.io2021-12-091-0/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275 The MemEncryptSev{Set,Clear}PageEncMask() functions are used to set or clear the memory encryption attribute in the page table. When SEV-SNP is active, we also need to change the page state in the RMP table so that it is in sync with the memory encryption attribute change. Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com> Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing FvBrijesh Singh2021-12-091-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275 The VMM launch sequence should have pre-validated all the data pages used in the Reset vector. The range does not cover the data pages used during the SEC phase (mainly PEI and DXE firmware volume decompression memory). When SEV-SNP is active, the memory must be pre-validated before the access. Add support to pre-validate the memory range from SnpSecPreValidatedStart to SnpSecPreValidatedEnd. This should be sufficent to enter into the PEI phase. Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com> Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phaseBrijesh Singh via groups.io2021-12-093-0/+160
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275 The initial page built during the SEC phase is used by the MemEncryptSevSnpValidateSystemRam() for the system RAM validation. The page validation process requires using the PVALIDATE instruction; the instruction accepts a virtual address of the memory region that needs to be validated. If hardware encounters a page table walk failure (due to page-not-present) then it raises #GP. The initial page table built in SEC phase address up to 4GB. Add an internal function to extend the page table to cover > 4GB. The function builds 1GB entries in the page table for access > 4GB. This will provide the support to call PVALIDATE instruction for the virtual address > 4GB in PEI phase. Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com> Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAMBrijesh Singh2021-12-091-1/+66
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275 The MemEncryptSevSnpPreValidateSystemRam() is used for pre-validating the system RAM. As the boot progress, each phase validates a fixed region of the RAM. In the PEI phase, the PlatformPei detects all the available RAM and calls to pre-validate the detected system RAM. While validating the system RAM in PEI phase, we must skip previously validated system RAM to avoid the double validation. Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com> Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0Brijesh Singh via groups.io2021-12-093-1/+51
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275 Virtual Machine Privilege Level (VMPL) feature in the SEV-SNP architecture allows a guest VM to divide its address space into four levels. The level can be used to provide the hardware isolated abstraction layers with a VM. The VMPL0 is the highest privilege, and VMPL3 is the least privilege. Certain operations must be done by the VMPL0 software, such as: * Validate or invalidate memory range (PVALIDATE instruction) * Allocate VMSA page (RMPADJUST instruction when VMSA=1) The initial SEV-SNP support assumes that the guest is running on VMPL0. Let's add function in the MemEncryptSevLib that can be used for checking whether guest is booted under the VMPL0. Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAMBrijesh Singh via groups.io2021-12-095-0/+443
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275 Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Each RMP entry contains the GPA at which a particular page of DRAM should be mapped. The guest can request the hypervisor to add pages in the RMP table via the Page State Change VMGEXIT defined in the GHCB specification section 2.5.1 and 4.1.6. Inside each RMP entry is a Validated flag; this flag is automatically cleared to 0 by the CPU hardware when a new RMP entry is created for a guest. Each VM page can be either validated or invalidated, as indicated by the Validated flag in the RMP entry. Memory access to a private page that is not validated generates a #VC. A VM can use the PVALIDATE instruction to validate the private page before using it. During the guest creation, the boot ROM memory is pre-validated by the AMD-SEV firmware. The MemEncryptSevSnpValidateSystemRam() can be called during the SEC and PEI phase to validate the detected system RAM. One of the fields in the Page State Change NAE is the RMP page size. The page size input parameter indicates that either a 4KB or 2MB page should be used while adding the RMP entry. During the validation, when possible, the MemEncryptSevSnpValidateSystemRam() will use the 2MB entry. A hypervisor backing the memory may choose to use the different page size in the RMP entry. In those cases, the PVALIDATE instruction should return SIZEMISMATCH. If a SIZEMISMATCH is detected, then validate all 512-pages constituting a 2MB region. Upon completion, the PVALIDATE instruction sets the rFLAGS.CF to 0 if instruction changed the RMP entry and to 1 if the instruction did not change the RMP entry. The rFlags.CF will be 1 only when a memory region is already validated. We should not double validate a memory as it could lead to a security compromise. If double validation is detected, terminate the boot. Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com> Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg: Apply uncrustify changesMichael Kubacki2021-12-075-194/+193
| | | | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3737 Apply uncrustify changes to .c/.h files in the OvmfPkg package Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki <michael.kubacki@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com>
* OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: remove Flush parameterBrijesh Singh2021-05-294-36/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275 The Flush parameter is used to provide a hint whether the specified range is Mmio address. Now that we have a dedicated helper to clear the memory encryption mask for the Mmio address range, its safe to remove the Flush parameter from MemEncryptSev{Set,Clear}PageEncMask(). Since the address specified in the MemEncryptSev{Set,Clear}PageEncMask() points to a system RAM, thus a cache flush is required during the encryption mask update. Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Message-Id: <20210519181949.6574-14-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask()Brijesh Singh2021-05-294-0/+119
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275 The MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() helper can be used for clearing the memory encryption mask for the Mmio region. The MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() is a simplified version of MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask() -- it does not flush the caches after clearing the page encryption mask. Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Message-Id: <20210519181949.6574-10-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/IndustryStandard: Introduce PageTable.hAnthony PERARD2021-04-131-142/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | We are going to use the page table structure in yet another place, collect the types and macro that can be used from another module rather than making yet another copy. Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2490 Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <20210412133003.146438-5-anthony.perard@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Address range encryption state interfaceTom Lendacky2021-01-075-11/+302
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108 Update the MemEncryptSevLib library to include an interface that can report the encryption state on a range of memory. The values will represent the range as being unencrypted, encrypted, a mix of unencrypted and encrypted, and error (e.g. ranges that aren't mapped). Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <0d98f4d42a2b67310c29bac7bcdcf1eda6835847.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Make the MemEncryptSevLib available for SECTom Lendacky2021-01-072-0/+80
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108 In preparation for a new interface to be added to the MemEncryptSevLib library that will be used in SEC, create an SEC version of the library. This requires the creation of SEC specific files. Some of the current MemEncryptSevLib functions perform memory allocations which cannot be performed in SEC, so these interfaces will return an error during SEC. Also, the current MemEncryptSevLib library uses some static variables to optimize access to variables, which cannot be used in SEC. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <bc7fa76cc23784ab3f37356b6c10dfec61942c38.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Coding style fixes in prep for SEC libraryTom Lendacky2021-01-071-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108 Creating an SEC version of the library requires renaming an existing file which will result in the existing code failing ECC. Prior to renaming the existing file, fix the coding style to avoid the ECC failure. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <f765d867da4a703e0a0db35e26515a911482fd40.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg: Obtain SEV encryption mask with the new MemEncryptSevLib APITom Lendacky2021-01-071-10/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108 The early assembler code performs validation for some of the SEV-related information, specifically the encryption bit position. The new MemEncryptSevGetEncryptionMask() interface provides access to this validated value. To ensure that we always use a validated encryption mask for an SEV-ES guest, update all locations that use CPUID to calculate the encryption mask to use the new interface. Also, clean up some call areas where extra masking was being performed and where a function call was being used instead of the local variable that was just set using the function. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Cc: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com> Cc: Peter Grehan <grehan@freebsd.org> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com> Cc: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <9de678c0d66443c6cc33e004a4cac0a0223c2ebc.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg: Replace BSD License with BSD+Patent LicenseMichael D Kinney2019-04-093-21/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1373 Replace BSD 2-Clause License with BSD+Patent License. This change is based on the following emails: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-February/036260.html https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2018-October/030385.html RFCs with detailed process for the license change: V3: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-March/038116.html V2: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-March/037669.html V1: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-March/037500.html Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg:Fix VS2012 build failureDandan Bi2018-03-281-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Initialize local variable to suppress warning C4701/C4703: potentially uninitialized local variable/pointer variable. 1.In VirtualMemory.c: Read of "PageMapLevel4Entry" in SetMemoryEncDe() is only reached when "PageMapLevel4Entry" is got correctly. 2.In VirtioBlk.c: Reads (dereferences) of "BufferMapping" and "BufferDeviceAddress" in SynchronousRequest() are only reached if "BufferSize > 0" *and* we map the data buffer successfully. 3.In VirtioScsi.c: Reads (dereferences) of "InDataMapping" and "InDataDeviceAddress", in VirtioScsiPassThru() are only reached if "Packet->InTransferLength > 0" on input, *and* we map the input buffer successfully. The similar reason for "OutDataMapping" and "OutDataDeviceAddress". Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: sort #includes, and entries in INF file sectionsLaszlo Ersek2018-03-063-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: clean up InternalMemEncryptSevSetMemoryEncrypted() ↵Laszlo Ersek2018-03-062-10/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | decl The declaration and the definition(s) of the function should have identical leading comments and/or identical parameter lists. Document the "Cr3BaseAddress" parameter, and correct several parameter references. Replace a "clear" reference to the C-bit with a "set" reference. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: clean up InternalMemEncryptSevSetMemoryDecrypted() ↵Laszlo Ersek2018-03-062-8/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | decl The declaration and the definition(s) of the function should have identical leading comments and/or identical parameter lists. Document the "Cr3BaseAddress" parameter, and correct several parameter references. Replace a "set" reference to the C-bit with a "clear" reference. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: clean up SetMemoryEncDec() comment blockLaszlo Ersek2018-03-061-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Document the "Cr3BaseAddress" parameter, and correct several parameter references. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: clean up MemEncryptSevSetPageEncMask() declLaszlo Ersek2018-03-061-9/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The declaration and the definition(s) of the function should have identical leading comments and/or identical parameter lists. Replace any leftover "clear" references to the C-bit with "set" references. Also remove any excess space in the comment block, and unindent the trailing "**/" if necessary. Correct several parameter references. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: clean up MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask() declLaszlo Ersek2018-03-061-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The declaration and the definition(s) of the function should have identical leading comments and/or identical parameter lists. Also remove any excess space in the comment block, and unindent the trailing "**/" if necessary. Correct several parameter references. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: rewrap to 79 characters widthLaszlo Ersek2018-03-063-115/+212
| | | | | | | | | | | | | There are many overlong lines; it's hard to work with the library like this. Rewrap all files to 79 columns. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: Enable protection for newly added page tableBrijesh Singh2018-01-152-7/+399
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 2ac1730bf2a5 (MdeModulePkg/DxeIpl: Mark page table as read-only) sets the memory pages used for page table as read-only after paging is setup and sets CR0.WP to protect CPU modifying the read-only pages. The commit causes #PF when MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask() or MemEncryptSevSetPageEncMask() tries to change the page-table attributes. This patch takes the similar approach as Commit 147fd35c3e38 (UefiCpuPkg/CpuDxe: Enable protection for newly added page table). When page table protection is enabled, we disable it temporarily before changing the page table attributes. This patch makes use of the same approach as Commit 2ac1730bf2a5 (MdeModulePkg/DxeIpl: Mark page table as read-only)) for allocating page table memory from reserved memory pool, which helps to reduce a potential "split" operation. The patch duplicates code from commit 147fd35c3e38. The code duplication will be removed after we implement page table manipulation library. See bugzilla https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=847. Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: fix typos in DEBUG messagesLaszlo Ersek2017-09-011-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | Replace "spliting" with "splitting". Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: clean up upper-case / lower-case in DEBUGsLaszlo Ersek2017-09-011-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Debug messages that start as natural (English) language phrases (after the debug prefix) should uniformly begin with lower-case or upper-case. In SetMemoryEncDec() we have a mixture now. Stick with lower-case. (Upper-case is better for full sentences that also end with punctuation.) Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: promote DEBUG_WARN levels to DEBUG_ERRORLaszlo Ersek2017-09-011-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In SetMemoryEncDec(), we have four locations where we (a) log a message on the DEBUG_WARN level that says "ERROR", (b) return the status code RETURN_NO_MAPPING right after. These messages clearly describe actual errors (bad PML4, PDPE, PDE, PTE). Promote their debug levels to DEBUG_ERROR, and remove the word "ERROR" from the messages. Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: clean up debug logging of PhysicalAddressLaszlo Ersek2017-09-011-8/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In the SetMemoryEncDec() function, the way we currently report PhysicalAddress is not uniform: - mostly we say "for %lx", - in one spot we say "at %lx" (even though the 2MB page being split does not live *at* PhysicalAddress, instead it maps PhysicalAddress), - in another spot we don't log PhysicalAddress at all (when splitting a 1GB page). Unify this, using the format string "for Physical=0x%Lx". Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: clean up DEBUG prefixesLaszlo Ersek2017-09-011-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The prefix for the SetMemoryEncDec() DEBUG messages should be "ModuleName:FunctionName: " not "ModuleName:FunctionName " Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: break DEBUG calls to multiple linesLaszlo Ersek2017-09-011-20/+48
| | | | | | | | | | | | | None of the DEBUG macro invocations in SetMemoryEncDec() fit on a single line. Break them to multiple lines, for (a) conforming to the coding style spec, (b) easier modification in later patches. Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: unify encrypt/decrypt DEBUG messagesLaszlo Ersek2017-09-011-8/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | Unify the debug messages between InternalMemEncryptSevSetMemoryEncrypted() and InternalMemEncryptSevSetMemoryDecrypted(). Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
* OvmfPkg/BaseMemcryptSevLib: Add SEV helper libraryBrijesh Singh2017-07-103-0/+707
Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) helper library. The library provides the routines to: - set or clear memory encryption bit for a given memory region. - query whether SEV is enabled. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
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