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* OvmfPkg: Add RAM disk supportAlcantara, Paulo2016-04-011-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently booting off of a RAM disk is not supported by IntelFrameWorkModulePkg BDS, however on systems without writable disks, the RAM disk can be made useful when loading raw HDD images into it -- specially the ones with a FAT32 partition on which files can be natively accessed by system firmware. This patch adds RamDiskDxe driver by default in OVMF platform. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <paulo.alc.cavalcanti@hp.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
* OvmfPkg: Increase the maximum size for Authenticated variablesJames Bottomley2016-03-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | During real world testing I was getting an error with too many entries in db: On my Secure boot laptop, I currently have seven certificates: two Microsoft ones, Three Kernel ones from various distributions, my own Secure Key and a temporary test key. That gives a total EFI Signature List size of 8317 which is over the 0x2000 maximum. Fix this by setting the PcdMaxAuthVariableSize to 0x2800 (10K) which isn't much of an increase but allows for 9-10 certificates. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
* OvmfPkg: match PCI config access to machine type (if not USE_OLD_PCI_HOST)Laszlo Ersek2016-03-101-0/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If USE_OLD_PCI_HOST is FALSE, then we switch all executable module types supported by DxePciLibI440FxQ35 to the following library instance stack: BasePciSegmentLibPci [class: PciSegmentLib] DxePciLibI440FxQ35 [class: PciLib] BasePciCf8Lib [class: PciCf8Lib] BasePciExpressLib [class: PciExpressLib] Every module will select 0xCF8 vs. ECAM based on the OVMF platform type (i440fx or Q35). Notably, MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciHostBridgeDxe is among the affected drivers. The BasePciExpressLib instance is where the PcdPciExpressBaseAddress PCD fills its original role. Cc: Gabriel Somlo <somlo@cmu.edu> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com> Cc: Michał Zegan <webczat_200@poczta.onet.pl> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Tested-by: Gabriel Somlo <somlo@cmu.edu> Tested-by: Michał Zegan <webczat_200@poczta.onet.pl>
* OvmfPkg: PlatformPei: enable PCIEXBAR (aka MMCONFIG / ECAM) on Q35Laszlo Ersek2016-03-101-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The comments in the code should speak for themselves; here we note only two facts: - The PCI config space writes (to the PCIEXBAR register) are performed using the 0xCF8 / 0xCFC IO ports, by virtue of PciLib being resolved to BasePciLibCf8. (This library resolution will permanently remain in place for the PEI phase.) - Since PCIEXBAR counts as a chipset register, it is the responsibility of the firmware to reprogram it at S3 resume. Therefore PciExBarInitialization() is called regardless of the boot path. (Marcel recently posted patches for SeaBIOS that implement this.) This patch suffices to enable PCIEXBAR (and the dependent ACPI table generation in QEMU), for the sake of "PCIeHotplug" in the Linux guest: ACPI: MCFG 0x000000007E17F000 00003C (v01 BOCHS BXPCMCFG 00000001 BXPC 00000001) PCI: MMCONFIG for domain 0000 [bus 00-ff] at [mem 0x80000000-0x8fffffff] (base 0x80000000) PCI: MMCONFIG at [mem 0x80000000-0x8fffffff] reserved in E820 acpi PNP0A08:00: _OSC: OS supports [ExtendedConfig ASPM ClockPM Segments MSI] acpi PNP0A08:00: _OSC: OS now controls [PCIeHotplug PME AER PCIeCapability] In the following patches, we'll equip the core PCI host bridge / root bridge driver and the rest of DXE as well to utilize ECAM on Q35. Cc: Gabriel Somlo <somlo@cmu.edu> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com> Cc: Michał Zegan <webczat_200@poczta.onet.pl> Ref: https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/issues/32 Ref: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.bios.coreboot.seabios/10548 Suggested-by: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com> Reported-by: Michał Zegan <webczat_200@poczta.onet.pl> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com> Tested-by: Gabriel Somlo <somlo@cmu.edu> Tested-by: Michał Zegan <webczat_200@poczta.onet.pl> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
* OvmfPkg: Enable Network2 Shell Commands for IPv6Gary Lin2016-03-081-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | Enable the network2 commands when NETWORK_IP6_ENABLE is TRUE, so we would have Ping6 and Ifconfig6. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com> [lersek@redhat.com: added the word "Shell" to the subject] Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg: switch to MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciHostBridgeDxeLaszlo Ersek2016-03-031-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The old driver is retained for now; it remains available with "-D USE_OLD_PCI_HOST". This is because I'd like to involve end users and downstreams in testing the new drier, but also allow them to switch back to the old driver at the first sight of trouble, while we debug the new driver in parallel. In a few weeks the ifdeffery and the "OvmfPkg/PciHostBridgeDxe/" driver should be removed. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Cc: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com> Cc: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
* OvmfPkg: resolve PciSegmentLibLaszlo Ersek2016-03-031-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In the next patch we'll build "MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciHostBridgeDxe". That driver depends on the PciSegmentLib class. Edk2 offers four instances: (1) MdePkg/Library/UefiPciSegmentLibPciRootBridgeIo/ Inappropriate here because it consumes EFI_PCI_ROOT_BRIDGE_IO_PROTOCOL, but "MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciHostBridgeDxe" needs the library class for producing that protocol. (2) MdePkg/Library/PeiPciSegmentLibPciCfg2/ Restricted to PEIM, SEC, and PEI_CORE client modules. (3) MdePkg/Library/DxePciSegmentLibEsal/ "uses ESAL services to perform PCI Configuration cycles" (4) MdePkg/Library/BasePciSegmentLibPci/ A simple BASE library instance that sits on top of PciLib. This is our choice. We can resolve PciSegmentLib to this instance for all module types. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Cc: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
* OvmfPkg: factor the MMIO aperture shared by all PCI root bridges into PCDsLaszlo Ersek2016-03-031-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Going forward, two modules will need to know about the aperture: PlatformPei (as before), and OVMF's upcoming PciHostBridgeLib instance (because the core PciHostBridgeDxe driver requires the library to state the exact apertures for all root bridges). On QEMU, all root bridges share the same MMIO aperture, hence one pair of PCDs suffices. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Cc: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
* OvmfPkg: copy log level comments from DebugLib.hLaszlo Ersek2016-03-021-0/+22
| | | | | | | | Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
* OvmfPkg: Add FileExplorerLib.inf to the dsc fileDandan Bi2016-02-261-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Because SecureBootConfigDxe use FileExplorerLib now, but FileExplorerLib is not in the dsc file of the package that use SecureBootConfigDxe. Now add it to pass build. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
* OvmfPkg: add driver for Virtio-RNG deviceArd Biesheuvel2016-02-241-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | This adds the new Virtio-RNG DXE module to all three builds of OvmfPkg. Note that QEMU needs to be invoked with the 'device virtio-rng-pci' option in order for this device to be exposed to the guest. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg: include NvmExpressDxe driverLaszlo Ersek2016-02-021-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | QEMU emulates NVMe. NvmExpressDxe seems to work well with it. The relevant QEMU options are -drive id=drive0,if=none,format=FORMAT,file=PATHNAME \ -device nvme,drive=drive0,serial=SERIAL where the required SERIAL value sets the Serial Number (SN) field of the "Identify Controller Data Structure". It is an ASCII string with up to 20 characters, which QEMU pads with spaces to maximum length. (Refer to "NVME_ADMIN_CONTROLLER_DATA.Sn" in "MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/NvmExpressDxe/NvmExpressHci.h".) Cc: Vladislav Vovchenko <vladislav.vovchenko@sk.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Reference: https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/issues/48 Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Tested-by: Vladislav Vovchenko <vladislav.vovchenko@sk.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19791 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: execute option ROM images regardless of Secure BootLaszlo Ersek2016-01-071-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Change the image verification policy for option ROM images to 0x00 (ALWAYS_EXECUTE). While this may not be a good idea for physical platforms (see e.g. <https://trmm.net/Thunderstrike>), on the QEMU platform the benefits seem to outweigh the drawbacks: - For QEMU's virtual PCI devices, and for some assigned PCI devices, the option ROMs come from host-side files, which can never be rewritten from within the guest. Since the host admin has full control over a guest anyway, executing option ROMs that originate from host-side files presents no additional threat to the guest. - For assigned physical PCI devices with option ROMs, the argument is not so clear-cut. In theory a setup could exist where: - the host-side UEFI firmware (with DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) rejects the option ROM of a malicious physical PCI device, but - when the device is assigned to the guest, OVMF executes the option ROM in the guest, - the option ROM breaks out of the guest (using an assumed QEMU vulnerability) and gains QEMU user privileges on the host. However, in order to escalate as far as it would happen on the bare metal with ALWAYS_EXECUTE (i.e., in order to gain firmware-level access on the host), the malicious option ROM would have to break through (1) QEMU, (2) traditional UID and GID based privilege separation on the host, (3) sVirt (SELinux) on the host, (4) the host OS - host firmware boundary. This is not impossible, but not likely enough to discourage the use cases below. - This patch makes it possible to use unsigned iPXE network drivers that QEMU presents in the option ROMs of virtual NICs and assigned SR-IOV VFs, even if Secure Boot is in User Mode or Deployed Mode. - The change also makes it possible to execute unsigned, outdated (revoked), or downright malicious option ROMs of assigned physical devices in guests, for corporate, entertainment, academia, or security research purposes. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19614 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: inherit Image Verification Policy defaults from SecurityPkgLaszlo Ersek2016-01-071-7/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Secure Boot support was originally addded to OvmfPkg on 2012-Mar-09, in SVN r13093 (git 8cee3de7e9f4), titled OvmfPkg: Enable secure-boot support when SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE==TRUE At that time the image verification policies in SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec were: - option ROM image: 0x00 (ALWAYS_EXECUTE) - removable media image: 0x05 (QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) - fixed media image: 0x05 (QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) The author of SVN r13093 apparently didn't want to depend on the SecurityPkg defaults for the latter two image origins, plus the ALWAYS_EXECUTE policy for option ROM images must have been deemed too lax. For this reason SVN r13093 immediately spelled out 0x05 (QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) within OvmfPkg for all three image origins. Fast forward to 2013-Aug-28: policy 0x05 (QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) had been forbidden in the UEFI spec, and SVN r14607 (git db44ea6c4e09) reflected this in the source code: - The policies for the latter two image origins were switched from 0x05 to 0x04 (DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) in SecurityPkg, - the patch changed the default policy for option ROM images too, from 0x00 (ALWAYS_EXECUTE) to 0x04 (DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION), - any other client DSC files, including OvmfPkg's, underwent a whole-sale 0x05 (QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) -> 0x04 (DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) replacement too. The practical result of that patch for OvmfPkg was that the explicit 0x04 settings would equal the strict SecurityPkg defaults exactly. And that's what we have today: the "override the default values from SecurityPkg" comments in OvmfPkg's DSC files are stale, in practice. It is extremely unlikely that SecurityPkg would change the defaults from 0x04 (DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) any time in the future, so let's just inherit those in OvmfPkg. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19613 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: pull in SMM-based variable driver stackLaszlo Ersek2015-11-301-2/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When -D SMM_REQUIRE is given, replace both - OvmfPkg/QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe/FvbServicesRuntimeDxe.inf and - OvmfPkg/EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe/Fvb.inf with - OvmfPkg/QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe/FvbServicesSmm.inf. The outermost (= runtime DXE driver) VariableSmmRuntimeDxe enters SMM, and the rest: - the privileged half of the variable driver, VariableSmm, - the fault tolerant write driver, FaultTolerantWriteSmm, - and the FVB driver, FvbServicesSmm, work in SMM purely. We also resolve the BaseCryptLib class for DXE_SMM_DRIVER modules, for the authenticated VariableSmm driver's sake. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19065 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: consolidate variable driver stack in DSC and FDF filesLaszlo Ersek2015-11-301-10/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The following modules constitute the variable driver stack: - QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe and EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe, runtime alternatives for providing the Firmware Volume Block(2) Protocol, dependent on qemu pflash presence, - FaultTolerantWriteDxe, providing the Fault Tolerant Write Protocol, - MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe, independently of -D SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE, providing the Variable and Variable Write Architectural Protocols. Let's move these drivers closer to each other in the DSC and FDF files, so that we can switch the variable driver stack to SMM with more local changes. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19064 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: build PiSmmCpuDxeSmm for -D SMM_REQUIRELaszlo Ersek2015-11-301-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | At this point we can enable building PiSmmCpuDxeSmm. CPU specific features, like SMRR detection, and functions that are used to initialize SMM and process SMIs, are abstracted through the SmmCpuFeaturesLib class for the PiSmmCpuDxeSmm module. Resolve it to our own implementation under OvmfPkg -- it allows PiSmmCpuDxeSmm to work with QEMU's and KVM's 64-bit state save map format, which follows the definition from AMD's programmer manual. SmmCpuPlatformHookLib provides platform specific functions that are used to initialize SMM and process SMIs. Resolve it to the one Null instance provided by UefiCpuPkg, which is expected to work for most platforms. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> [pbonzini@redhat.com: resolve the SmmCpuFeaturesLib class to OVMF's own instance] Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19061 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: build CpuS3DataDxe for -D SMM_REQUIRELaszlo Ersek2015-11-301-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The PiSmmCpuDxeSmm driver from UefiCpuPkg depends on the ACPI_CPU_DATA structure -- created by a platform- and CPU-specific driver -- in order to support ACPI S3. The address of this structure is communicated through the dynamic PCD PcdCpuS3DataAddress. The "UefiCpuPkg/Include/AcpiCpuData.h" header file documents the fields of this structure in detail. The simple/generic "UefiCpuPkg/CpuS3DataDxe" driver creates and populates the structure in a conformant way, and it co-operates well with PiSmmCpuDxeSmm, for OVMF's purposes. PlatformBdsLib CpuS3DataDxe PiSmmCpuDxeSmm S3Resume2Pei (DXE_DRIVER) (DXE_DRIVER) (DXE_SMM_DRIVER) (PEIM) -------------- --------------- ---------------- -------------- normal collects data boot except MTRR settings into ACPI_CPU_DATA sets PcdCpuS3Da... signals End-of-Dxe | +----------> collects MTRR settings into ACPI_CPU_DATA installs [Dxe]Smm ReadyToLock | +---------------------------> fetches PcdCpuS3Dat... copies ACPI_CPU_DATA into SMRAM runtime S3 suspend S3 transfers resume control to PiSmmCpuDxe... | uses <----+ ACPI_CPU_DATA from SMRAM Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19060 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: any AP in SMM should not wait for the BSP for more than 100 msLaszlo Ersek2015-11-301-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch complements the previous one, "OvmfPkg: use relaxed AP SMM synchronization mode". While that patch focuses on the case when the SMI is raised synchronously by the BSP, on the BSP: BSPHandler() [UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/MpService.c] SmmWaitForApArrival() [UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/MpService.c] IsSyncTimerTimeout() [UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SyncTimer.c] this patch concerns itself with the case when it is one of the APs that raises (and sees delivered) the synchronous SMI: APHandler() [UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/MpService.c] IsSyncTimerTimeout() [UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/SyncTimer.c] Namely, in APHandler() the AP waits for the BSP to enter SMM regardless of PcdCpuSmmSyncMode, for PcdCpuSmmApSyncTimeout microseconds (the default value is 1 second). If the BSP doesn't show up in SMM within that interval, then the AP brings it in with a directed SMI, and waits for the BSP again for PcdCpuSmmApSyncTimeout microseconds. Although during boot services, SmmControl2DxeTrigger() is only called by the BSP, at runtime the OS can invoke runtime services from an AP (it can even be forced with "taskset -c 1 efibootmgr"). Because on QEMU SmmControl2DxeTrigger() only raises the SMI for the calling processor (BSP and AP alike), the first interval above times out invariably in such cases -- the BSP never shows up before the AP calls it in. In order to mitigate the performance penalty, decrease PcdCpuSmmApSyncTimeout to one tenth of its default value: 100 ms. (For comparison, Vlv2TbltDevicePkg sets 1 ms.) NOTE: once QEMU becomes capable of synchronous broadcast SMIs, this patch and the previous one ("OvmfPkg: use relaxed AP SMM synchronization mode") should be reverted, and SmmControl2DxeTrigger() should be adjusted instead. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19059 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: use relaxed AP SMM synchronization modePaolo Bonzini2015-11-301-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Port 0xb2 on QEMU only sends an SMI to the currently executing processor. The SMI handler, however, and in particular SmmWaitForApArrival, currently expects that SmmControl2DxeTrigger triggers an SMI IPI on all processors rather than just the BSP. Thus all SMM invocations loop for a second (the default value of PcdCpuSmmApSyncTimeout) before SmmWaitForApArrival sends another SMI IPI to the APs. With the default SmmCpuFeaturesLib, 32-bit machines must broadcast SMIs because 32-bit machines must reset the MTRRs on each entry to system management modes (they have no SMRRs). However, our virtual platform does not have problems with cacheability of SMRAM, so we can use "directed" SMIs instead. To do this, just set gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuSmmSyncMode to 1 (aka SmmCpuSyncModeRelaxedAp). This fixes SMM on multiprocessor virtual machines. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19058 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: set gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuSmmEnableBspElection to FALSELaszlo Ersek2015-11-301-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Explanation from Michael Kinney: This PCD allows a platform to provide PlatformSmmBspElection() in a platform specific SmmCpuPlatformHookLib instance to decide which CPU gets elected to be the BSP in each SMI. The SmmCpuPlatformHookLibNull [instance] always returns EFI_NOT_READY for that function, which makes the module behave the same as the PCD being set to FALSE. The default is TRUE, so the platform lib is always called, so a platform developer can implement the hook function and does not have to also change a PCD setting for the hook function to be active. A platform that wants to eliminate the call to the hook function [altogether] can set the PCD to FALSE. So for OVMF, I think it makes sense to set this PCD to FALSE in the DSC file. Suggested-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19053 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: select LocalApicLib instance with x2apic supportLaszlo Ersek2015-11-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Although neither LocalApicLib instance is suitable for runtime DXE drivers (because they access the APIC at the physical address retrieved from either MSR_IA32_APIC_BASE_ADDRESS or PcdCpuLocalApicBaseAddress), they are suitable for SMM drivers -- SMM drivers are not influenced by the runtime OS's virtual address map. PiSmmCpuDxeSmm links against LocalApicLib. 64-bit Linux guests tend to enable x2apic mode even in simple VCPU configurations (e.g., 4 sockets, 1 core/socket, 1 thread/core): [ 0.028173] x2apic enabled If PiSmmCpuDxeSmm was linked with the BaseXApicLib instance (i.e., with no x2apic support), then the next runtime service call that is backed by an SMM driver triggers the following ASSERT in BaseXApicLib (because the latter notices that x2apic has been enabled, which it doesn't support): ASSERT .../UefiCpuPkg/Library/BaseXApicLib/BaseXApicLib.c(263): ApicBaseMsr.Bits.Extd == 0 It is reasonable to give all LocalApicLib client modules in OVMF the same level of x2apic support, hence resolve LocalApicLib globally to BaseXApicX2ApicLib. This will not be conditional on -D SMM_REQUIRE, because BaseXApicX2ApicLib is compatible with BaseXApicLib in any environment where the latter can be used. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19052 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: resolve DebugAgentLib for DXE_SMM_DRIVER modulesMichael Kinney2015-11-301-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add mappings to DebugAgentLib for SMM modules to prevent build breaks when SMM_REQUIRE and SOURCE_DEBUG_ENABLE are both set. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> [lersek@redhat.com: cover the X64 dsc, update commit msg, kudos Jordan] Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19051 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: resolve CpuExceptionHandlerLib for DXE_SMM_DRIVER modulesLaszlo Ersek2015-11-301-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm depends on this library (the RegisterCpuInterruptHandler() function specifically) to set up its specialized page fault handler (SmiPFHandler() -> DumpModuleInfoByIp()). It doesn't hurt to resolve this library class for all DXE_SMM_DRIVER modules. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19050 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: resolve ReportStatusCodeLib for DXE_SMM_DRIVER modulesLaszlo Ersek2015-11-301-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | PiSmmCpuDxeSmm depends on this library class, and it's okay to resolve it generally for all DXE_SMM_DRIVER modules. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19049 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: LockBox: use SMM stack with -D SMM_REQUIRELaszlo Ersek2015-11-301-0/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | During DXE, drivers save data in the LockBox. A save operation is layered as follows: - The unprivileged driver wishing to store data in the LockBox links against the "MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxDxeLib.inf" library instance. The library allows the unprivileged driver to format requests for the privileged SMM LockBox driver (see below), and to parse responses. We apply this resolution for DXE_DRIVER modules. - The privileged SMM LockBox driver is built from "MdeModulePkg/Universal/LockBox/SmmLockBox/SmmLockBox.inf". This driver has module type DXE_SMM_DRIVER and can access SMRAM. The driver delegates command parsing and response formatting to "MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxSmmLib.inf". Therefore we include this DXE_SMM_DRIVER in the build, and apply said resolution specifically to it. (Including the driver requires us to resolve a few of other library classes for DXE_SMM_DRIVER modules.) - In PEI, the S3 Resume PEIM (UefiCpuPkg/Universal/Acpi/S3Resume2Pei) retrieves data from the LockBox. It is capable of searching SMRAM itself. We resolve LockBoxLib to "MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxPeiLib.inf" specifically for this one PEIM. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19048 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: pull in CpuIo2Smm driverLaszlo Ersek2015-11-301-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This driver provides EFI_SMM_CPU_IO2_PROTOCOL, which the SMM core depends on in its gEfiDxeSmmReadyToLockProtocolGuid callback (SmmReadyToLockHandler(), "MdeModulePkg/Core/PiSmmCore/PiSmmCore.c"). Approached on a higher level, this driver provides the SmmIo member of the EFI_SMM_SYSTEM_TABLE2 (SMST). Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19044 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: pull in the SMM IPL and SMM coreLaszlo Ersek2015-11-301-0/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | "MdeModulePkg/Core/PiSmmCore/PiSmmIpl.inf" (a DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER) implements the SMM Initial Program Loader. It produces EFI_SMM_BASE2_PROTOCOL and EFI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL, relying on: - EFI_SMM_ACCESS2_PROTOCOL (provided by OvmfPkg/SmmAccess/SmmAccess2Dxe.inf), - EFI_SMM_CONTROL2_PROTOCOL (provided by OvmfPkg/SmmControl2Dxe/SmmControl2Dxe.inf). (The SMM IPL also depends on EFI_SMM_CONFIGURATION_PROTOCOL_GUID, but this dependency is not enforced in the entry point. A protocol notify callback is registered instead, hence we can delay providing that protocol via the PiSmmCpuDxeSmm driver that is (to be) imported from UefiCpuPkg/.) The SMM IPL loads the SMM core into SMRAM and executes it from there. Therefore we add the SMM core to the build as well. For the SMM core, a number of library classes need to be resolved. Furthermore, each FDF file must provide the GenFds.py BaseTools utility with a build rule for SMM_CORE; we copy the DXE_CORE's rule. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19043 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: implement EFI_SMM_CONTROL2_PROTOCOL with a DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVERLaszlo Ersek2015-11-301-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The EFI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL implementation that is provided by the SMM core depends on EFI_SMM_CONTROL2_PROTOCOL; see the mSmmControl2->Trigger() call in the SmmCommunicationCommunicate() function [MdeModulePkg/Core/PiSmmCore/PiSmmIpl.c]. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19042 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: add DXE_DRIVER for providing TSEG-as-SMRAM during boot-time DXELaszlo Ersek2015-11-301-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The SMM core depends on EFI_SMM_ACCESS2_PROTOCOL. This small driver (which is a thin wrapper around "OvmfPkg/SmmAccess/SmramInternal.c" that was added in the previous patch) provides that protocol. Notably, EFI_SMM_ACCESS2_PROTOCOL is for boot time only, therefore our MODULE_TYPE is not DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19041 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: add PEIM for providing TSEG-as-SMRAM during PEILaszlo Ersek2015-11-301-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | "MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxPeiLib.inf" is the LockBoxLib instance with SMRAM access for the PEI phase. Said library instance must, and can, access the LockBox data in SMRAM directly if it is invoked before SMBASE relocation / SMI handler installation. In that case, it only needs PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI from the platform, and it doesn't depend on EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI. OVMF satisfies the description in SVN r18823 ("MdeModulePkg: SmmLockBoxPeiLib: work without EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI"): in OVMF, only S3Resume2Pei links against SmmLockBoxPeiLib. Therefore, introduce a PEIM that produces the PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI interface, enabling SmmLockBoxPeiLib to work; we can omit including "UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCommunication/PiSmmCommunicationPei.inf". The load / installation order of S3Resume2Pei and SmmAccessPei is indifferent. SmmAccessPei produces the gEfiAcpiVariableGuid HOB during its installation (which happens during PEI), but S3Resume2Pei accesses the HOB only when the DXE IPL calls its S3RestoreConfig2 PPI member, as last act of PEI. MCH_SMRAM_D_LCK and MCH_ESMRAMC_T_EN are masked out the way they are, in SmmAccessPeiEntryPoint() and SmramAccessOpen() respectively, in order to prevent VS20xx from warning about the (otherwise fully intentional) truncation in the UINT8 casts. (Warnings reported by Michael Kinney.) Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19040 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: introduce -D SMM_REQUIRE and PcdSmmSmramRequireLaszlo Ersek2015-11-301-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | This build time flag and corresponding Feature PCD will control whether OVMF supports (and, equivalently, requires) SMM/SMRAM support from QEMU. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19034 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: set 4 KB section alignment for DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER modulesArd Biesheuvel2015-09-301-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Increase the section alignment to 4 KB for DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER modules. This allows the OS to map them with tightened permissions (i.e., R-X for .text and RW- for .data). This is a prerequisite for enabling the EFI_PROPERTIES_RUNTIME_MEMORY_PROTECTION_NON_EXECUTABLE_PE_DATA (sic) feature that was introduced in UEFIv2.5. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@18564 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: build the TFTP command into the UEFI shellLaszlo Ersek2015-09-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The TFTP command is easy to use, it has very nice documentation (accessible with "HELP TFTP" in the shell), and it's a very versatile tool for downloading files from the host to the guest, via virtual network, while the guest is in the UEFI shell. Even better, enabling this command in the shell increases the uncompressed DXEFV size only by 12896 bytes, in my X64 build, and the final size increase (after LZMA compression) that is visible in the FVMAIN_COMPACT volume is merely 2576 bytes. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@18554 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: enable SATA controllerReza Jelveh2015-09-221-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In this patch, we replace the traditional IDE driver stack that comes from PcAtChipsetPkg and IntelFrameworkModulePkg with more featureful drivers from OvmfPkg and MdeModulePkg. The resultant driver stack is compatible with the previous one, but provides more protocols, on more kinds of virtual hardware. Remove: - PcAtChipsetPkg/Bus/Pci/IdeControllerDxe/IdeControllerDxe.inf (removing EFI_IDE_CONTROLLER_INIT_PROTOCOL [1]) Remove the dependent: - IntelFrameworkModulePkg/Bus/Pci/IdeBusDxe/IdeBusDxe.inf (removing EFI_DISK_INFO_PROTOCOL [2], EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL [3]) As replacement, add: - OvmfPkg/SataControllerDxe/SataControllerDxe.inf (supplying EFI_IDE_CONTROLLER_INIT_PROTOCOL [1]) On top of which, add the dependent: - MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaAtapiPassThru/AtaAtapiPassThru.inf (providing EFI_ATA_PASS_THRU_PROTOCOL, EFI_EXT_SCSI_PASS_THRU_PROTOCOL) On top of which, add the dependent: - MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaBusDxe/AtaBusDxe.inf (supplying EFI_DISK_INFO_PROTOCOL [2], EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL [3], providing EFI_BLOCK_IO2PROTOCOL, EFI_STORAGE_SECURITY_COMMAND_PROTOCOL) Cc: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de> Cc: Reza Jelveh <reza.jelveh@tuhh.de> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Cc: Gabriel L. Somlo <somlo@cmu.edu> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Reza Jelveh <reza.jelveh@tuhh.de> [lersek@redhat.com: rewrote commit message] Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Tested-by: Gabriel Somlo <somlo@cmu.edu> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@18532 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: disable no-exec DXE stack by defaultLaszlo Ersek2015-09-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (PcdSetNxForStack == TRUE) breaks a number of GRUB versions that, it turns out, are still widely in use. Disable PcdSetNxForStack by default for now. QEMU users can enable it dynamically using the micro-feature added in the previous patch. Reported-by: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@18472 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: make PcdPropertiesTableEnable dynamicLaszlo Ersek2015-09-151-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since PcdPropertiesTableEnable is used by the DXE Core (in the InstallPropertiesTable() function, which runs at End-of-Dxe), we must also change the PcdLib class resolution for that module, from the default BasePcdLibNull to DxePcdLib. Traditionally we've considered the DXE Core to be incapable of accessing dynamic PCDs -- the PCD PPI is not available any longer to the DXE Core, and the PCD Protocol is not available to it *yet*. There are exceptions however: if the DXE Core can ensure, by whatever means, that the PCD Protocol *is* available, then DxePcdLib will just work (the latter even lists DXE_CORE as an allowed client module type). Namely, DxePcdLib looks up the PCD Protocol dynamically, on the first library call that actually needs it (for accessing a dynamic PCD); the lookup doesn't occur in a library constructor. And because the DXE Core fetches PcdPropertiesTableEnable at End-of-Dxe, the PCD Protocol is definitely available then. In addition, we change the default value of PcdPropertiesTableEnable from the inherited TRUE to FALSE. It makes no difference at this point (our runtime DXE drivers are not built with the required 4KB section alignment anyway), but it's better to be clear about this. The properties table feature requires OS compatibility, and it breaks Windows 7 minimally. Therefore the default should be FALSE. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@18470 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: make PcdSetNxForStack dynamicLaszlo Ersek2015-09-151-2/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Plus, because PcdSetNxForStack is used by the DXE IPL PEIM (in the HandOffToDxeCore() function, and in the CreateIdentityMappingPageTables() function called by the former), we must change the PcdLib class resolution for that module, from the default BasePcdLibNull to PeiPcdLib. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@18469 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: prevent code execution from DXE stackLaszlo Ersek2015-08-281-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SVN rev 18166 ("MdeModulePkg DxeIpl: Add stack NX support") enables platforms to request non-executable stack for the DXE phase, by setting PcdSetNxForStack to TRUE. The PCD defaults to FALSE, because: (a) A non-executable DXE stack is a new feature and causes changes in behavior. Some platform could rely on executing code from the stack. (b) The code enabling NX in the DXE IPL PEIM enforces the PcdSetNxForStack ==> PcdDxeIplBuildPageTables implication for "64-bit PEI + 64-bit DXE" platforms, with a new ASSERT(). Some platform might not comply with this requirement immediately. Regarding (a), in none of the OVMF builds do we try to execute code from the stack. Regarding (b): - In the OvmfPkgX64.dsc build (which is where (b) applies) we simply inherit the PcdDxeIplBuildPageTables|TRUE default from "MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec". Therefore we can set PcdSetNxForStack to TRUE. - In OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc, page tables are built by default for DXE. Hence we can set PcdSetNxForStack to TRUE. - In OvmfPkgIa32.dsc, page tables used not to be necessary until now. After we set PcdSetNxForStack to TRUE in this patch, the DXE IPL will construct page tables even when it is built as part of OvmfPkgIa32.dsc, provided the (virtual) hardware supports both PAE mode and the XD bit. Should this setting cause problems in a GPU (or other device) passthru scenario, with a UEFI_DRIVER in the PCI option rom attempting to execute code from the stack, the feature can be dynamically disabled on the QEMU command line, with "-cpu <MODEL>,-nx". Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: "Zeng, Star" <star.zeng@intel.com> Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@18360 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: Build HTTP utilities driverGary Ching-Pang Lin2015-08-281-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Since SVN r18316 / git 5ca29abe5297, the HTTP driver needs the HTTP utilities driver to parse the headers of HTTP requests. Add the driver into OVMF so that the HTTP driver can work properly. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@18359 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: Link separated VarCheckUefiLib NULL class library instanceStar Zeng2015-08-251-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@18288 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: Add VarCheckLib library mappingStar Zeng2015-08-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Since Variable driver has been updated to consume the separated VarCheckLib. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@18281 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: Add HttpBoot supportGary Ching-Pang Lin2015-08-231-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This commit introdues a new build option to OvmfPkg: HTTP_BOOT_ENABLE. When HttpBoot is enabled, a new Network boot option will show in the boot manager menu with the device path like this: PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x3,0x0)/MAC(525400123456,0x1)/IPv4(0.0.0.0)/Uri() It works like the PXE one but fetches the NBP from the given http url instead of the tftp service. A simple testing environment can be set up with the QEMU tap network and dnsmasq + lighttpd. Here is the example of the dnsmasq config: interface=<tap interface> dhcp-range=192.168.111.100,192.168.111.120,12h dhcp-option=60,"HTTPClient" dhcp-boot="http://<tap ip>/<efi file>" It's similar to the PXE server settings except the tftp function is disabled, the option 60 must be "HTTPClient", and the boot uri is a http url. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@18258 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: SmbiosVersionLib: recognize SMBIOS 3.x entry pointLaszlo Ersek2015-08-061-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Also set the DocRev field the way QEMU exposes it, because MdeModulePkg/Universal/SmbiosDxe lets us control that field too. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Gabriel L. Somlo <somlo@cmu.edu> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@18182 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: introduce PcdQemuSmbiosValidatedLaszlo Ersek2015-08-061-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This dynamic PCD will enable a small code de-duplication between OvmfPkg/SmbiosPlatformDxe and OvmfPkg/Library/SmbiosVersionLib. Since both of those are also used in ArmVirtQemu.dsc, and we should avoid cross-package commits when possible, this patch declares PcdQemuSmbiosValidated first, and sets defaults for it in the OvmfPkg DSC files. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Gabriel L. Somlo <somlo@cmu.edu> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@18178 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: set SMBIOS version in DetectSmbiosVersionLib instead of PlatformPeiLaszlo Ersek2015-08-061-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch de-duplicates the logic added in commit OvmfPkg: PlatformPei: set SMBIOS entry point version dynamically (git 37baf06b, SVN r17676) by hooking DetectSmbiosVersionLib into SmbiosDxe. Although said commit was supposed to work with SMBIOS 3.0 payloads from QEMU, in practice that never worked, because the size / signature checks in SmbiosVersionInitialization() would always fail, due to the SMBIOS 3.0 entry point being structurally different. Therefore this patch doesn't regress OvmfPkg. Cc: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Gabriel L. Somlo <somlo@cmu.edu> Suggested-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@18175 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: clone PciHostBridgeDxe from PcAtChipsetPkgLaszlo Ersek2015-07-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The source code is copied verbatim, with the following two exceptions: - the UNI files are dropped, together with the corresponding UNI references in the INF file, - the INF file receives a new FILE_GUID. The OVMF DSC and FDF files are at once flipped to the cloned driver. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Regression-tested-by: Gabriel Somlo <somlo@cmu.edu> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@17951 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: Remove Ip4ConfigDxe module from OvmfPkgJiaxin Wu2015-07-101-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | Ip4ConfigDxe driver is deprecated in UEFI 2.5, so we will not support original Ip4Config Protocol, which is replace by Ip4Config2 Protocol integrated in Ip4Dxe driver(git commit 1f6729ff (SVN r17853)). Therefore we can remove Ip4ConfigDxe driver from this build. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Jiaxin Wu <jiaxin.wu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@17914 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: Use the merged Variable driverStar Zeng2015-07-011-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@17767 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: Link AuthVariableLib for following merged variable driver deployStar Zeng2015-07-011-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | AuthVariableLib and TpmMeasurementLib library classes are now linked with MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf to optionally support secure variables. For OvmfPkg, link AuthVariableLib and DxeTpmMeasurementLib in SecurityPkg when SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE = TRUE, and link AuthVariableLibNull and TpmMeasurementLibNull in MdeModulePkg when SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE = FALSE. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@17760 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-09-30 21:31:15 +0000