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* OvmfPkg/Sec: Add #VC exception handling for Sec phaseTom Lendacky2020-08-171-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2198 An SEV-ES guest will generate a #VC exception when it encounters a non-automatic exit (NAE) event. It is expected that the #VC exception handler will communicate with the hypervisor using the GHCB to handle the NAE event. NAE events can occur during the Sec phase, so initialize exception handling early in the OVMF Sec support. Before establishing the exception handling, validate that the supported version of the SEV-ES protocol in OVMF is supported by the hypervisor. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg: Replace BSD License with BSD+Patent LicenseMichael D Kinney2019-04-091-7/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1373 Replace BSD 2-Clause License with BSD+Patent License. This change is based on the following emails: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-February/036260.html https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2018-October/030385.html RFCs with detailed process for the license change: V3: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-March/038116.html V2: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-March/037669.html V1: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-March/037500.html Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg: Removing ipf which is no longer supported from edk2.chenc22018-06-291-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Removing rules for Ipf sources file: * Remove the source file which path with "ipf" and also listed in [Sources.IPF] section of INF file. * Remove the source file which listed in [Components.IPF] section of DSC file and not listed in any other [Components] section. * Remove the embedded Ipf code for MDE_CPU_IPF. Removing rules for Inf file: * Remove IPF from VALID_ARCHITECTURES comments. * Remove DXE_SAL_DRIVER from LIBRARY_CLASS in [Defines] section. * Remove the INF which only listed in [Components.IPF] section in DSC. * Remove statements from [BuildOptions] that provide IPF specific flags. * Remove any IPF sepcific sections. Removing rules for Dec file: * Remove [Includes.IPF] section from Dec. Removing rules for Dsc file: * Remove IPF from SUPPORTED_ARCHITECTURES in [Defines] section of DSC. * Remove any IPF specific sections. * Remove statements from [BuildOptions] that provide IPF specific flags. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Chen A Chen <chen.a.chen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
* OvmfPkg/Sec/Ia32: seed the temporary RAM with PcdInitValueInTempStackLaszlo Ersek2017-11-171-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This allows the PEI core to report the maximum temporary SEC/PEI stack usage on the DEBUG_INFO level, in the PeiCheckAndSwitchStack() function [MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/Dispatcher/Dispatcher.c]: * Normal boot: > Temp Stack : BaseAddress=0x814000 Length=0x4000 > Temp Heap : BaseAddress=0x810000 Length=0x4000 > Total temporary memory: 32768 bytes. > temporary memory stack ever used: 3664 bytes. <---- > temporary memory heap used for HobList: 5904 bytes. > temporary memory heap occupied by memory pages: 0 bytes. * S3 resume (with PEI decompression / SMM): > Temp Stack : BaseAddress=0x814000 Length=0x4000 > Temp Heap : BaseAddress=0x810000 Length=0x4000 > Total temporary memory: 32768 bytes. > temporary memory stack ever used: 3428 bytes. <---- > temporary memory heap used for HobList: 4816 bytes. > temporary memory heap occupied by memory pages: 0 bytes. I unit-tested this change by transitorily adding an infinite loop right after the "rep stosd", and dumping the guest's temp SEC/PEI RAM (32KB currently) while the guest was stuck in the loop. The dump includes one dword from before and after the temp SEC/PEI RAM: > $ virsh qemu-monitor-command GUEST_NAME --hmp 'xp /8194wx 0x80FFFC' > > 000000000080fffc: 0x00000000 0x5aa55aa5 0x5aa55aa5 0x5aa55aa5 > 000000000081000c: 0x5aa55aa5 0x5aa55aa5 0x5aa55aa5 0x5aa55aa5 > ... > 0000000000817fec: 0x5aa55aa5 0x5aa55aa5 0x5aa55aa5 0x5aa55aa5 > 0000000000817ffc: 0x5aa55aa5 0x00000000 Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=747 Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
* OvmfPkg: decompress FVs on S3 resume if SMM_REQUIRE is setLaszlo Ersek2015-11-301-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If OVMF was built with -D SMM_REQUIRE, that implies that the runtime OS is not trusted and we should defend against it tampering with the firmware's data. One such datum is the PEI firmware volume (PEIFV). Normally PEIFV is decompressed on the first boot by SEC, then the OS preserves it across S3 suspend-resume cycles; at S3 resume SEC just reuses the originally decompressed PEIFV. However, if we don't trust the OS, then SEC must decompress PEIFV from the pristine flash every time, lest we execute OS-injected code or work with OS-injected data. Due to how FVMAIN_COMPACT is organized, we can't decompress just PEIFV; the decompression brings DXEFV with itself, plus it uses a temporary output buffer and a scratch buffer too, which even reach above the end of the finally installed DXEFV. For this reason we must keep away a non-malicious OS from DXEFV too, plus the memory up to PcdOvmfDecomprScratchEnd. The delay introduced by the LZMA decompression on S3 resume is negligible. If -D SMM_REQUIRE is not specified, then PcdSmmSmramRequire remains FALSE (from the DEC file), and then this patch has no effect (not counting some changed debug messages). If QEMU doesn't support S3 (or the user disabled it on the QEMU command line), then this patch has no effect also. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19037 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: Sec: assert the build-time calculated end of the scratch bufferLaszlo Ersek2015-11-301-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The DecompressMemFvs() function in "OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c" uses more memory, temporarily, than what PEIFV and DXEFV will ultimately need. First, it uses an output buffer for decompression, second, the decompression itself needs a scratch buffer (and this scratch buffer is the highest area that SEC uses). DecompressMemFvs() used to be called on normal boots only (ie. not on S3 resume), which is why the decompression output buffer and the scratch buffer were allowed to scribble over RAM. However, we'll soon start to worry during S3 resume that the runtime OS might tamper with the pre-decompressed PEIFV, and we'll decompress the firmware volumes on S3 resume too, from pristine flash. For this we'll need to know the end of the scratch buffer in advance, so we can prepare a non-malicious OS for it. Calculate the end of the scratch buffer statically in the FDF files, and assert in DecompressMemFvs() that the runtime decompression will match it. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19036 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: Sec: force reinit of BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib handler tableLaszlo Ersek2015-11-301-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib uses a table at the static physical address PcdGuidedExtractHandlerTableAddress, and modules that are linked against BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib are expected to work together on that table. Namely, some modules can register handlers for GUIDed sections, some other modules can decode such sections with the pre-registered handlers. The table carries persistent information between these modules. BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib checks a table signature whenever it is used (by whichever module that is linked against it), and at the first use (identified by a signature mismatch) it initializes the table. One of the module types that BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib can be used with is SEC, if the SEC module in question runs with the platform's RAM already available. In such cases the question emerges whether the initial contents of the RAM (ie. contents that predate the very first signature check) can be trusted. Normally RAM starts out with all zeroes (leading to a signature mismatch on the first check); however a malicious runtime OS can populate the area with some payload, then force a warm platform reset or an S3 suspend-and-resume. In such cases the signature check in the SEC module might not fire, and ExtractGuidedSectionDecode() might run code injected by the runtime OS, as part of SEC (ie. with high privileges). Therefore we clear the handler table in SEC. See also git commit ad43bc6b2e (SVN rev 15433) -- this patch secures the (d) and (e) code paths examined in that commit. Furthermore, a non-malicious runtime OS will observe no change in behavior; see case (c) in said commit. Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> [michael.d.kinney@intel.com: prevent VS20xx loop intrinsic with volatile] Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19035 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: Sec: Fix SOURCE_DEBUG_ENABLE ASSERT()Michael Kinney2015-10-161-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The update to the LocalApicLib instances to make sure the Local APIC is initialized before use (SVN r18595 / git commit 6d72ff7d9daf) generates an ASSERT() when SOURCE_DEBUG_ENABLE is enabled for OVMF. The fix is to initialize the Local APIC Timer and mask it before initializing the DebugAgent. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> [lersek@redhat.com: rewrap code comment, rewrap commit msg, add precise commit ref] Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@18622 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg Sec: Convert X64/SecEntry.asm to NASMJordan Justen2014-10-311-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The BaseTools/Scripts/ConvertMasmToNasm.py script was used to convert X64/SecEntry.asm to X64/SecEntry.nasm Note: Manually collapsed .inf sources Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@16292 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg Sec: Convert Ia32/SecEntry.asm to NASMJordan Justen2014-10-311-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The BaseTools/Scripts/ConvertMasmToNasm.py script was used to convert Ia32/SecEntry.asm to Ia32/SecEntry.nasm Note: Manually collapsed .inf sources Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@16291 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: Split MAINFV into a separate PEI and DXE FVsJordan Justen2014-01-211-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | By splitting the PEI and DXE phases into separate FVs, we can only reserve the PEI FV for ACPI S3 support. This should save about 7MB. Unfortunately, this all has to happen in a single commit. DEC: * Remove PcdOvmfMemFv(Base|Size) * Add PcdOvmfPeiMemFv(Base|Size) * Add PcdOvmfDxeMemFv(Base|Size) FDF: * Add new PEIFV. Move PEI modules here. * Remove MAINFV * Add PEIFV and DXEFV into FVMAIN_COMPACT - They are added as 2 sections of a file, and compressed together so they should retain good compression * PcdOvmf(Pei|Dxe)MemFv(Base|Size) are set SEC: * Find both the PEI and DXE FVs after decompression. - Copy them separately to their memory locations. Platform PEI driver: * Fv.c: Publish both FVs as appropriate * MemDetect.c: PcdOvmfMemFv(Base|Size) => PcdOvmfDxeMemFv(Base|Size) OVMF.fd before: Non-volatile data storage FVMAIN_COMPACT uncompressed FV FFS file LZMA compressed MAINFV uncompressed individual PEI modules uncompressed FV FFS file compressed with PI_NONE DXEFV uncompressed individual DXE modules uncompressed SECFV uncompressed OVMF.fd after: Non-volatile data storage FVMAIN_COMPACT uncompressed FV FFS file LZMA compressed PEIFV uncompressed individual PEI modules uncompressed DXEFV uncompressed individual DXE modules uncompressed SECFV uncompressed Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@15151 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: Move SEC/PEI Temporary RAM from 0x70000 to 0x810000Jordan Justen2014-01-211-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Note: The Temporary RAM memory size is being reduced from 64KB to 32KB. This still appears to be more than adequate for OVMF's early PEI phase. We will be adding another 32KB range of RAM just above this range for use on S3 resume. The range is declared as part of MEMFD, so it is easier to identify the memory range. We also now assign PCDs to the memory range. The PCDs are used to set the initial SEC/PEI stack in SEC's assembly code. The PCDs are also used in the SEC C code to setup the Temporary RAM PPI. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@15147 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg X64 ResetVector: Move page tables from 512KB to 8MBJordan Justen2014-01-211-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | To help consolidate OVMF fixed memory uses, we declare this range in MEMFD and thereby move it to 8MB. We also now declare the table range in the FDF to set PCDs. This allows us to ASSERT that CR3 is set as expected in OVMF SEC. OvmfPkgIa32.fdf and OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf are updated simply for consistency. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@15146 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* Clean up SEC implementation for Ovmf.mdkinney2010-08-031-10/+15
| | | | git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@10770 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* Update the copyright notice formathhtian2010-04-281-2/+2
| | | | git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@10439 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* 1. Correct File header to ## @filelgao42010-02-231-3/+3
| | | | | | 2. Remove unnecessary .common] postfix on section. git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@10051 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* Remove unnecessary use of FixedPcdxxx() functions and [FixedPcd] INF ↵mdkinney2010-01-301-4/+2
| | | | | | | | | | sections. These should only be used for PCDs that are used to pre-init global variables, pre-init global structures, or size arrays. Do some minor clean ups to INF files git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@9870 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OVMF: Update OVMF FD/FV build to minimize ROM sizejljusten2010-01-041-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | * Only SEC is uncompressed now * The MAIN FV with PEI & DXE can easily shrink and grow as needed * The final output will now be OVMF.Fv rather than OVMF.fd * The final output size will be a multiple of 64kb git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@9672 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OVMF SEC: Modify to match new interface of reset vector modulejljusten2009-12-161-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Previously the interface to the SEC module was: ESI/RSI - SEC Core entry point EDI/RDI - PEI Core entry point EBP/RBP - Start of BFV Now it is: RAX/EAX Initial value of the EAX register (BIST: Built-in Self Test) DI 'BP': boot-strap processor, or 'AP': application processor RBP/EBP Address of Boot Firmware Volume (BFV) git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@9572 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* Use InitializeFloatingPointUnits() from UefiCpuLib to initialize floating ↵qhuang82009-11-251-0/+3
| | | | | | point units in SEC phase. git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@9481 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* Add initial version of Open Virtual Machine Firmware (OVMF) platform.jljusten2009-05-271-0/+58
git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@8398 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
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