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* OvmfPkg: Update code to be more C11 compliant by using __func__Rebecca Cran2023-04-101-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | __FUNCTION__ is a pre-standard extension that gcc and Visual C++ among others support, while __func__ was standardized in C99. Since it's more standard, replace __FUNCTION__ with __func__ throughout OvmfPkg. Signed-off-by: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com> Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@ventanamicro.com>
* OvmfPkg: Apply uncrustify changesMichael Kubacki2021-12-074-111/+169
| | | | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3737 Apply uncrustify changes to .c/.h files in the OvmfPkg package Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com> Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki <michael.kubacki@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com>
* OvmfPkg: replace old EFI_D_ debug levels with new DEBUG_ onesRebecca Cran2020-04-301-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Generated mechanically with: find OvmfPkg -type f -exec sed -i -e 's/EFI_D_/DEBUG_/g' {} \; Signed-off-by: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com> Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200429215327.606467-1-rebecca@bsdio.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/SmmAccess: close and lock SMRAM at default SMBASELaszlo Ersek2020-02-056-0/+48
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | During normal boot, when EFI_DXE_SMM_READY_TO_LOCK_PROTOCOL is installed by platform BDS, the SMM IPL locks SMRAM (TSEG) through EFI_SMM_ACCESS2_PROTOCOL.Lock(). See SmmIplReadyToLockEventNotify() in "MdeModulePkg/Core/PiSmmCore/PiSmmIpl.c". During S3 resume, S3Resume2Pei locks SMRAM (TSEG) through PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI.Lock(), before executing the boot script. See S3ResumeExecuteBootScript() in "UefiCpuPkg/Universal/Acpi/S3Resume2Pei/S3Resume.c". Those are precisely the places where the SMRAM at the default SMBASE should be locked too. Add such an action to SmramAccessLock(). Notes: - The SMRAM at the default SMBASE doesn't support the "closed and unlocked" state (and so it can't be closed without locking it, and it cannot be opened after closing it). - The SMRAM at the default SMBASE isn't (and shouldn't) be exposed with another EFI_SMRAM_DESCRIPTOR in the GetCapabilities() members of EFI_SMM_ACCESS2_PROTOCOL / PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI. That's because the SMRAM in question is not "general purpose"; it's only QEMU's solution to protect the initial SMI handler from the OS, when a VCPU is hot-plugged. Consequently, the state of the SMRAM at the default SMBASE is not reflected in the "OpenState" / "LockState" fields of the protocol and PPI. - An alternative to extending SmramAccessLock() would be to register an EFI_DXE_SMM_READY_TO_LOCK_PROTOCOL notify in SmmAccess2Dxe (for locking at normal boot), and an EDKII_S3_SMM_INIT_DONE_GUID PPI notify in SmmAccessPei (for locking at S3 resume). Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1512 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Message-Id: <20200129214412.2361-10-lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
* OvmfPkg: Replace BSD License with BSD+Patent LicenseMichael D Kinney2019-04-096-42/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1373 Replace BSD 2-Clause License with BSD+Patent License. This change is based on the following emails: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-February/036260.html https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2018-October/030385.html RFCs with detailed process for the license change: V3: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-March/038116.html V2: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-March/037669.html V1: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2019-March/037500.html Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
* OvmfPkg/SmmAccess: support extended TSEG sizeLaszlo Ersek2017-07-052-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In SmmAccessPeiEntryPoint(), map TSEG megabyte counts different from 1, 2 and 8 to the MCH_ESMRAMC_TSEG_EXT bit pattern (introduced in the previous patch), for the ESMRAMC.TSEG_SZ bit-field register. (Suggested by Jordan.) In SmramAccessGetCapabilities() -- backing both PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI.GetCapabilities() and EFI_SMM_ACCESS2_PROTOCOL.GetCapabilities() --, map the MCH_ESMRAMC_TSEG_EXT bit pattern found in the ESMRAMC.TSEG_SZ bit-field register to a byte count of (mQ35TsegMbytes * SIZE_1MB). (MCH_ESMRAMC_TSEG_EXT is the only possible pattern if none of MCH_ESMRAMC_TSEG_1MB, MCH_ESMRAMC_TSEG_2MB, and MCH_ESMRAMC_TSEG_8MB match.) The new code paths are not exercised just yet; for that, PlatformPei is going to have to set PcdQ35TsegMbytes (and consequently, SmramInternal's "mQ35TsegMbytes") to a value different from 1, 2, and 8. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
* OvmfPkg/SmmAccess: prepare for PcdQ35TsegMbytes becoming dynamicLaszlo Ersek2017-07-056-5/+40
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In one of the next patches we'll turn PcdQ35TsegMbytes into a dynamic PCD, to be set by PlatformPei. Jordan suggested to use gEfiPeiMemoryDiscoveredPpiGuid as SmmAccessPei's DEPEX for making sure that PlatformPei sets the PCD before SmmAccessPei consumes it. (PlatformPei installs the permanent PEI RAM.) Such a DEPEX is supposed to mirror physical firmware, where anything related to SMRAM cannot run before said platform's physical RAM is discovered (signaled by the presence of gEfiPeiMemoryDiscoveredPpiGuid). Introduce the InitQ35TsegMbytes() function and the "mQ35TsegMbytes" extern variable to "SmramInternal.h" and "SmramInternal.c": - Both SmmAccess modules (PEIM and DXE driver) are supposed to call InitQ35TsegMbytes() in their respective entry point functions, saving PcdQ35TsegMbytes into "mQ35TsegMbytes". This way dynamic PCD fetches can be kept out of PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI and EFI_SMM_ACCESS2_PROTOCOL member functions later (when we add support for extended TSEG size). - We can thus replace the current PcdQ35TsegMbytes fetches in SmmAccessPei's entry point function as well, with reads from "mQ35TsegMbytes". Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
* OvmfPkg: widen PcdQ35TsegMbytes to UINT16Laszlo Ersek2017-07-051-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | Widen PcdQ35TsegMbytes to UINT16, in preparation for setting it dynamically to the QEMU-advertized extended TSEG size (which is 16-bits wide). Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
* OvmfPkg: add DXE_DRIVER for providing TSEG-as-SMRAM during boot-time DXELaszlo Ersek2015-11-302-0/+214
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The SMM core depends on EFI_SMM_ACCESS2_PROTOCOL. This small driver (which is a thin wrapper around "OvmfPkg/SmmAccess/SmramInternal.c" that was added in the previous patch) provides that protocol. Notably, EFI_SMM_ACCESS2_PROTOCOL is for boot time only, therefore our MODULE_TYPE is not DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19041 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
* OvmfPkg: add PEIM for providing TSEG-as-SMRAM during PEILaszlo Ersek2015-11-304-0/+739
"MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxPeiLib.inf" is the LockBoxLib instance with SMRAM access for the PEI phase. Said library instance must, and can, access the LockBox data in SMRAM directly if it is invoked before SMBASE relocation / SMI handler installation. In that case, it only needs PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI from the platform, and it doesn't depend on EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI. OVMF satisfies the description in SVN r18823 ("MdeModulePkg: SmmLockBoxPeiLib: work without EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI"): in OVMF, only S3Resume2Pei links against SmmLockBoxPeiLib. Therefore, introduce a PEIM that produces the PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI interface, enabling SmmLockBoxPeiLib to work; we can omit including "UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCommunication/PiSmmCommunicationPei.inf". The load / installation order of S3Resume2Pei and SmmAccessPei is indifferent. SmmAccessPei produces the gEfiAcpiVariableGuid HOB during its installation (which happens during PEI), but S3Resume2Pei accesses the HOB only when the DXE IPL calls its S3RestoreConfig2 PPI member, as last act of PEI. MCH_SMRAM_D_LCK and MCH_ESMRAMC_T_EN are masked out the way they are, in SmmAccessPeiEntryPoint() and SmramAccessOpen() respectively, in order to prevent VS20xx from warning about the (otherwise fully intentional) truncation in the UINT8 casts. (Warnings reported by Michael Kinney.) Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19040 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-21 17:59:30 +0000