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* SecurityPkg/TPM: Import PeiDxeTpmPlatformHierarchyLib.c from edk2-platformsStefan Berger2021-09-132-0/+311
| | | | | | | Import PeiDxeTpmPlatformHierarchyLib from edk2-platforms without any modifications. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
* SecurityPkg: Fix GetSupportedAndActivePcrs counter calculationRodrigo Gonzalez del Cueto2021-08-091-17/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2855 The Tpm2GetCapabilitySupportedAndActivePcrs function prints a count number that should reflect the *supported and currently active* PCR banks, but the implementation in place displays instead the count of the *supported PCR banks* retrieved directly from the Tpm2GetCapabilityPcrs() TPML_PCR_SELECTION output. The counter should only take into account those PCRs banks which are active. Replaced usage of EFI_D_* for DEBUG_* definitions in debug messages. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Qi Zhang <qi1.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Gonzalez del Cueto <rodrigo.gonzalez.del.cueto@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg: Create library for enrolling Secure Boot variables.Grzegorz Bernacki2021-08-033-0/+576
| | | | | | | | | | | This commits add library, which consist functions to enrolll Secure Boot keys and initialize Secure Boot default variables. Some of the functions was moved from SecureBootConfigImpl.c file. Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Bernacki <gjb@semihalf.com> Reviewed-by: Sunny Wang <sunny.wang@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg: Create SecureBootVariableLib.Grzegorz Bernacki2021-08-033-0/+605
| | | | | | | | | | This commits add library, which consist helper functions related to creation/removal Secure Boot variables. Some of the functions was moved from SecureBootConfigImpl.c file. Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Bernacki <gjb@semihalf.com> Reviewed-by: Sunny Wang <sunny.wang@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg: TcgStorageOpalLib: Initialize SupportedAttributes parameter.Scottie Kuo2021-06-151-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3408 The value of SupportedAttributes in OpalGetSupportedAttributesInfo () is left undetermined, if the caller doesn't initialize it. Initialize it in the function entry. Signed-off-by: Scottie Kuo <scottie.kuo@intel.com> Cc: Qi Zhang <qi1.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Maggie Chu <maggie.chu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com> Acked-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg: Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm: Introduce StandaloneMm instanceKun Qin2021-02-019-84/+274
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This change added a new instance of Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm to support drivers of type MM_STANDALONE. It abstracts dynamic Pcd access into separate file for different instances to avoid dynamic usage for StandaloneMm modules. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Qi Zhang <qi1.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kun Qin <kun.q@outlook.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg: Tcg2PpVendorLibNull: Added support for MM_STANDALONE typeKun Qin2021-02-011-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This change extends this null instance of Tcg2PpVendorLib to support MM_STANDALONE drivers. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Qi Zhang <qi1.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kun Qin <kun.q@outlook.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg: Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLib: Introduce StandaloneMm instanceKun Qin2021-02-016-367/+543
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This change added a new instance of Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLib to support MM_STANDALONE type drivers. It centralizes the common routines into shared files and abstract the library constructor into corresponding files to implement each constructor function prototypes. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Qi Zhang <qi1.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kun Qin <kun.q@outlook.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* Revert "SecurityPkg: Add RPMC Index to the RpmcLib"gaoliming2020-11-261-5/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 6c8dd15c4ae42501438a525ec41299f365f223cb. Based on the discussion https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/67764, this change is regarded as the feature request. But, it doesn't pass reviewed before 202011 stable tag soft feature freeze. So, it should not be merged into 202011 stable tag. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Nishant C Mistry <nishant.c.mistry@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn> Acked-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg: Add RPMC Index to the RpmcLibNishant Mistry2020-11-191-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2594 The re-design requires multiple RPMC counter usages. The consumer will be capable of selecting amongst multiple counters. Signed-off-by: Nishant C Mistry <nishant.c.mistry@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg: Allow VariablePolicy state to delete authenticated variablesBret Barkelew2020-11-172-6/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2522 Causes AuthService to check IsVariablePolicyEnabled() before enforcing write protections to allow variable deletion when policy engine is disabled. Only allows deletion, not modification. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Bret Barkelew <brbarkel@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Bret Barkelew <brbarkel@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com> Acked-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLib: Fix incorrect TCG VER comparisionTerry Lee2020-10-181-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2697 Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibConstructor set the module variable mIsTcg2PPVerLowerThan_1_3 with incorrect TCG version comparision. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/PeiTpmMeasurementLib: remove gEfiTpmDeviceSelectedGuidQi Zhang2020-09-161-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2963 Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Qi Zhang <qi1.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: Disable SHA1 base on MACROZhichao Gao2020-09-071-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2943 Disable SHA1 base on the MACRO DISABLE_SHA1_DEPRECATED_INTERFACES. SHA1 is deprecated function and the MACRO is used to remove the whole implementation of the SHA1. For the platforms that do not need SHA1 for security, the MACRO should works for DxeImageVerificationLib as well. Signed-off-by: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Cc: Qi Zhang <qi1.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: catch alignment overflow (CVE-2019-14562)Laszlo Ersek2020-09-021-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The DxeImageVerificationHandler() function currently checks whether "SecDataDir" has enough room for "WinCertificate->dwLength". However, for advancing "OffSet", "WinCertificate->dwLength" is aligned to the next multiple of 8. If "WinCertificate->dwLength" is large enough, the alignment will return 0, and "OffSet" will be stuck at the same value. Check whether "SecDataDir" has room left for both "WinCertificate->dwLength" and the alignment. Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Cc: Wenyi Xie <xiewenyi2@huawei.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2215 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200901091221.20948-4-lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Tested-by: Wenyi Xie <xiewenyi2@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Min M Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: assign WinCertificate after size checkLaszlo Ersek2020-09-021-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently the (SecDataDirLeft <= sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE)) check only guards the de-referencing of the "WinCertificate" pointer. It does not guard the calculation of the pointer itself: WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + OffSet); This is wrong; if we don't know for sure that we have enough room for a WIN_CERTIFICATE, then even creating such a pointer, not just de-referencing it, may invoke undefined behavior. Move the pointer calculation after the size check. Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Cc: Wenyi Xie <xiewenyi2@huawei.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2215 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200901091221.20948-3-lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Tested-by: Wenyi Xie <xiewenyi2@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Min M Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: extract SecDataDirEnd, SecDataDirLeftLaszlo Ersek2020-09-021-4/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The following two quantities: SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet are used multiple times in DxeImageVerificationHandler(). Introduce helper variables for them: "SecDataDirEnd" and "SecDataDirLeft", respectively. This saves us multiple calculations and significantly simplifies the code. Note that all three summands above have type UINT32, therefore the new variables are also of type UINT32. This patch does not change behavior. (Note that the code already handles the case when the SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size UINT32 addition overflows -- namely, in that case, the certificate loop is never entered, and the corruption check right after the loop fires.) Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Cc: Wenyi Xie <xiewenyi2@huawei.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2215 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200901091221.20948-2-lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Tested-by: Wenyi Xie <xiewenyi2@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Min M Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/TcgEventLogRecordLib: add new lib for firmware measurementQi Zhang2020-08-263-0/+254
| | | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2376 Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Qi Zhang <qi1.zhang@intel.com> Message-Id: <20200818062618.3698-2-qi1.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg: Fix spelling mistake for occurredMichael D Kinney2020-08-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2361 Cc: Qi Zhang <qi1.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Maciej Rabeda <maciej.rabeda@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/Tpm2CommandLib: add a new functionZhang, Qi2020-07-281-0/+40
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Tpm2GetCapabilityIsCommandImplemented REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2793 check if the commad is supported by comparing the command code with command index. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Qi Zhang <qi1.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/PeiTpmMeasurementLib: Add PEI instance.Jiewen Yao2020-07-233-0/+141
| | | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2841 Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Qi Zhang <qi1.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Qi Zhang <qi1.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg: Change default value sourceMaggie Chu2020-05-215-9/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2713 In current code, If TCG2_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE_FLAGS_VARIABLE variable is not exist, code will get default value from two places. This fix is to make the default value comes from the PCD gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTcg2PhysicalPresenceFlags Signed-off-by: Maggie Chu <maggie.chu@intel.com> Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: Mark the File parameter as OPTIONALGuomin Jiang2020-04-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2652 According to the File description, the File is optional and can be NULL. Signed-off-by: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageAuth: Mark the File parameter as OPTIONALGuomin Jiang2020-04-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2652 According to the File description, The File is optional and can be NULL. Signed-off-by: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/TPM: measure UEFI images without associated device paths againGuomin Jiang2020-04-222-20/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2652 DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler() and DxeTpmMeasureBootHandler() functions may receive a FileBuffer argument that is not associated with any particular device path (e.g., because the UEFI image has not been loaded from any particular device path). Therefore rejecting (File==NULL) at the top of the function is invalid. Fixes: 4b026f0d5af36faf3a3629a3ad49c51b5b3be12f Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Guomin Jiang <guomin.jiang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg: add null version of VariableKeyLibJian J Wang2020-03-272-0/+100
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2594 Add null version of VariableKeyLib instance. The full version should be provided by platforms which supports key generator. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Nishant C Mistry <nishant.c.mistry@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kubacki <michael.kubacki@microsoft.com>
* SecurityPkg: add null version of RpmcLibJian J Wang2020-03-272-0/+80
| | | | | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2594 Add null version of RpmcLib instance. The full version should be provided by platform which supports RPMC device. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Nishant C Mistry <nishant.c.mistry@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: change IsCertHashFoundInDatabase name ↵Jian J Wang2020-02-191-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | (CVE-2019-14575) IsCertHashFoundInDatabase() is actually used only for searching dbx, according to the function logic, its comments and its use cases. Changing it to IsCertHashFoundInDbx to avoid confusion. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1608 Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: Differentiate error/search result (2) ↵Jian J Wang2020-02-191-19/+58
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (CVE-2019-14575) REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1608 To avoid false-negative issue in check hash against dbx, both error condition (as return value) and check result (as out parameter) of IsSignatureFoundInDatabase() are added. So the caller of this function will know exactly if a failure is caused by a black list hit or other error happening, and enforce a more secure operation to prevent secure boot from being bypassed. For a white list check (db), there's no such necessity. All intermediate results inside this function will be checked and returned immediately upon any failure or error, like out-of-resource, hash calculation error or certificate retrieval failure. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: plug Data leak in IsForbiddenByDbx() ↵Laszlo Ersek2020-02-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | (CVE-2019-14575) REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1608 If the second GetVariable() call for "dbx" fails, in IsForbiddenByDbx(), we have to free Data. Jump to "Done" for that. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: tighten default result (CVE-2019-14575)Jian J Wang2020-02-191-1/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1608 All intermediate results inside this function will be checked and returned immediately upon any failure or error, like out-of-resource, hash calculation error or certificate retrieval failure. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: Differentiate error/search result (1) ↵Jian J Wang2020-02-191-22/+42
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (CVE-2019-14575) REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1608 To avoid false-negative issue in check hash against dbx, both error condition (as return value) and check result (as out parameter) of IsCertHashFoundInDatabase() are added. So the caller of this function will know exactly if a failure is caused by a black list hit or other error happening, and enforce a more secure operation to prevent secure boot from being bypassed. For a white list check (db), there's no such necessity. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: refactor db/dbx fetching code ↵Jian J Wang2020-02-191-61/+83
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (CVE-2019-14575) REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1608 The dbx fetching code inside the while/for-loop causes code hard to understand. Since there's no need to get dbx more than once, this patch simplify the code logic by moving related code to be outside the while- loop. db fetching code is also refined accordingly to reduce the indent level of code. More comments are also added or refined to explain more details. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: avoid bypass in fetching dbx ↵Jian J Wang2020-02-191-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (CVE-2019-14575) REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1608 In timestamp check after the cert is found in db, the original code jumps to 'Done' if any error happens in fetching dbx variable. At any of the jump, VerifyStatus equals to TRUE, which means allowed-by-db. This should not be allowed except to EFI_NOT_FOUND case (meaning dbx doesn't exist), because it could be used to bypass timestamp check. This patch add code to change VerifyStatus to FALSE in the case of memory allocation failure and dbx fetching failure to avoid potential bypass issue. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: fix wrong fetch dbx in IsAllowedByDb ↵Jian J Wang2020-02-191-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (CVE-2019-14575) REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1608 Normally two times of calling gRT->GetVariable() are needed to get the data of a variable: get the variable size by passing zero variable size, and then allocate enough memory and pass the correct variable size and buffer. But in the inner loop in IsAllowedByDb(), the DbxDataSize was not initialized to zero before calling gRT->GetVariable(). It won't cause problem if dbx does not exist. But it will give wrong result if dbx exists and the DbxDataSize happens to be a small enough value. In this situation, EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL will be returned. Then the result check code followed will jump to 'Done', which is not correct because it's actually the value expected. if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { goto Done; } Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: reject CertStack.CertNumber==0 per DBX ↵Jian J Wang2020-02-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | (CVE-2019-14575) In case the signers' certificate stack, retrieved from the PE/COFF image's Authenticode blob, has zero elements (=there are zero signer certificates), then we should consider the image forbidden by DBX, not accepted by DBX. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: Fix memory leaks (CVE-2019-14575)Jian J Wang2020-02-191-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1608 Pointer HashCtx used in IsCertHashFoundInDatabase() is not freed inside the while-loop, if it will run more than once. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/Tcg: Fix various typosAntoine Coeur2020-02-102-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix various typos in documentation, comments and debug strings. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Antoine Coeur <coeur@gmx.fr> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200207010831.9046-66-philmd@redhat.com> [lersek@redhat.com: replace EFI_D_xxx w/ DEBUG_xxx to shut up PatchCheck]
* SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm: Fix various typosAntoine Coeur2020-02-105-9/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix various typos in comments and documentation. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Antoine Coeur <coeur@gmx.fr> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200207010831.9046-65-philmd@redhat.com>
* SecurityPkg: Fix few typosAntoine Coeur2020-02-107-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix few typos in comments and documentation. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Antoine Coeur <coeur@gmx.fr> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200207010831.9046-63-philmd@redhat.com>
* SecurityPkg: Fix incorrect return value when File is NULLPhilippe Mathieu-Daudé2020-02-102-2/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The DxeTpmMeasureBootHandler and DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler handlers are SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION_HANDLER prototype. This prototype can not return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER. The prototype documentation states it returns EFI_ACCESS_DENIED if: "The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE Foundation may not use File." Correct the documentation, and add a early check, returning EFI_ACCESS_DENIED when File is NULL. Noticed while reviewing commit 6d57592740cdd0b6868baeef7929d6e6fef. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/TcgPhysicalPresenceLib: Replace the ASSERT with error codeZhichao Gao2020-02-071-6/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2472 Replace the ASSERT with the error code return in the TpmPhysicalPresence and GetTpmCapability. Add missing error checking after call TpmPhysicalPresence in TcgPhysicalPresenceLibProcessRequest. Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: fix "defer" vs. "deny" policiesLaszlo Ersek2020-01-311-3/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In DxeImageVerificationHandler(), we should return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION for a rejected image only if the platform sets DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION as the policy for the image's source. Otherwise, EFI_ACCESS_DENIED must be returned. Right now, EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION is returned for all rejected images, which is wrong -- it causes LoadImage() to hold on to rejected images (in untrusted state), for further platform actions. However, if a platform already set DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION, the platform will not expect the rejected image to stick around in memory (regardless of its untrusted state). Therefore, adhere to the platform policy in the return value of the DxeImageVerificationHandler() function. Furthermore, according to "32.4.2 Image Execution Information Table" in the UEFI v2.8 spec, and considering that edk2 only supports (AuditMode==0) at the moment: > When AuditMode==0, if the image's signature is not found in the > authorized database, or is found in the forbidden database, the image > will not be started and instead, information about it will be placed in > this table. we have to store an EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO record in both the "defer" case and the "deny" case. Thus, the AddImageExeInfo() call is not being made conditional on (Policy == DEFER_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION); the documentation is updated instead. Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129 Fixes: 5db28a6753d307cdfb1cfdeb2f63739a9f959837 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-12-lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> [lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: fix imgexec info on memalloc failLaszlo Ersek2020-01-311-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It makes no sense to call AddImageExeInfo() with (Signature == NULL) and (SignatureSize > 0). AddImageExeInfo() does not crash in such a case -- it avoids the CopyMem() call --, but it creates an invalid EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO record. Namely, the "EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO.InfoSize" field includes "SignatureSize", but the actual signature bytes are not filled in. Document and ASSERT() this condition in AddImageExeInfo(). In DxeImageVerificationHandler(), zero out "SignatureListSize" if we set "SignatureList" to NULL due to AllocateZeroPool() failure. (Another approach could be to avoid calling AddImageExeInfo() completely, in case AllocateZeroPool() fails. Unfortunately, the UEFI v2.8 spec does not seem to state clearly whether a signature is mandatory in EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO, if the "Action" field is EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED or EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND. For now, the EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO addition logic is not changed; we only make sure that the record we add is not malformed.) Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-11-lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> [lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: fix retval for (FileBuffer==NULL)Laszlo Ersek2020-01-311-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | "FileBuffer" is a non-optional input (pointer) parameter to DxeImageVerificationHandler(). Normally, when an edk2 function receives a NULL argument for such a parameter, we return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER or RETURN_INVALID_PARAMETER. However, those don't conform to the SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION_HANDLER prototype. Return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED when "FileBuffer" is NULL; it means that no image has been loaded. This patch does not change the control flow in the function, it only changes the "Status" outcome from API-incompatible error codes to EFI_ACCESS_DENIED, under some circumstances. Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129 Fixes: 570b3d1a7278df29878da87990e8366bd42d0ec5 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-10-lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> [lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: eliminate "Status" variableLaszlo Ersek2020-01-311-4/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The "Status" variable is set to EFI_ACCESS_DENIED at the top of the function. Then it is overwritten with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION under the "Failed" (earlier: "Done") label. We finally return "Status". The above covers the complete usage of "Status" in DxeImageVerificationHandler(). Remove the variable, and simply return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION in the end. This patch is a no-op, regarding behavior. Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-9-lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> [lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: unnest AddImageExeInfo() callLaszlo Ersek2020-01-311-18/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Before the "Done" label at the end of DxeImageVerificationHandler(), we now have a single access to "Status": we set "Status" to EFI_ACCESS_DENIED at the top of the function. Therefore, the (Status != EFI_SUCCESS) condition is always true under the "Done" label. Accordingly, unnest the AddImageExeInfo() call dependent on that condition, remove the condition, and also rename the "Done" label to "Failed". Functionally, this patch is a no-op. It's easier to review with: git show -b -W Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-8-lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> [lersek@redhat.com: replace EFI_D_INFO w/ DEBUG_INFO for PatchCheck.py] [lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: remove superfluous Status settingLaszlo Ersek2020-01-311-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | After the final "IsVerified" check, we set "Status" to EFI_ACCESS_DENIED. This is superfluous, as "Status" already carries EFI_ACCESS_DENIED value there, from the top of the function. Remove the assignment. Functionally, this change is a no-op. Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-7-lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> [lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: fix retval on memalloc failureLaszlo Ersek2020-01-311-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION_HANDLER function is not expected to return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES. We should only return EFI_SUCCESS, EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION, or EFI_ACCESS_DENIED. In case we run out of memory while preparing "SignatureList" for AddImageExeInfo(), we should simply stick with the EFI_ACCESS_DENIED value that is already in "Status" -- from just before the "Action" condition --, and not suppress it with EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES. This patch does not change the control flow in the function, it only changes the "Status" outcome from API-incompatible error codes to EFI_ACCESS_DENIED, under some circumstances. Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129 Fixes: 570b3d1a7278df29878da87990e8366bd42d0ec5 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-6-lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> [lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
* SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationHandler: narrow down PE/COFF hash statusLaszlo Ersek2020-01-311-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Inside the "for" loop that scans the signatures of the image, we call HashPeImageByType(), and assign its return value to "Status". Beyond the immediate retval check, this assignment is useless (never consumed). That's because a subsequent access to "Status" may only be one of the following: - the "Status" assignment when we call HashPeImageByType() in the next iteration of the loop, - the "Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED" assignment right after the final "IsVerified" check. To make it clear that the assignment is only useful for the immediate HashPeImageByType() retval check, introduce a specific helper variable, called "HashStatus". This patch is a no-op, functionally. Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2129 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200116190705.18816-5-lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> [lersek@redhat.com: push with Mike's R-b due to Chinese New Year Holiday: <https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/53429>; msgid <d3fbb76dabed4e1987c512c328c82810@intel.com>]
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