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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-08-13 17:54:17 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-08-13 17:54:17 -0700 |
commit | eac341194426ba7ead3444923b9eba491ae4feeb (patch) | |
tree | 7daa0ba9c1fc21b603dd45e738e5887f80db939b | |
parent | d191c82d4d9bd0bb3b945fc458cc65053ef868a0 (diff) | |
parent | d878efce73fe86db34ddb2013260adf571a701a7 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-eac341194426ba7ead3444923b9eba491ae4feeb.tar.gz linux-stable-eac341194426ba7ead3444923b9eba491ae4feeb.tar.bz2 linux-stable-eac341194426ba7ead3444923b9eba491ae4feeb.zip |
Merge branch 'x86/pti' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 PTI updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"The Speck brigade sadly provides yet another large set of patches
destroying the perfomance which we carefully built and preserved
- PTI support for 32bit PAE. The missing counter part to the 64bit
PTI code implemented by Joerg.
- A set of fixes for the Global Bit mechanics for non PCID CPUs which
were setting the Global Bit too widely and therefore possibly
exposing interesting memory needlessly.
- Protection against userspace-userspace SpectreRSB
- Support for the upcoming Enhanced IBRS mode, which is preferred
over IBRS. Unfortunately we dont know the performance impact of
this, but it's expected to be less horrible than the IBRS
hammering.
- Cleanups and simplifications"
* 'x86/pti' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (60 commits)
x86/mm/pti: Move user W+X check into pti_finalize()
x86/relocs: Add __end_rodata_aligned to S_REL
x86/mm/pti: Clone kernel-image on PTE level for 32 bit
x86/mm/pti: Don't clear permissions in pti_clone_pmd()
x86/mm/pti: Fix 32 bit PCID check
x86/mm/init: Remove freed kernel image areas from alias mapping
x86/mm/init: Add helper for freeing kernel image pages
x86/mm/init: Pass unconverted symbol addresses to free_init_pages()
mm: Allow non-direct-map arguments to free_reserved_area()
x86/mm/pti: Clear Global bit more aggressively
x86/speculation: Support Enhanced IBRS on future CPUs
x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB
x86/kexec: Allocate 8k PGDs for PTI
Revert "perf/core: Make sure the ring-buffer is mapped in all page-tables"
x86/mm: Remove in_nmi() warning from vmalloc_fault()
x86/entry/32: Check for VM86 mode in slow-path check
perf/core: Make sure the ring-buffer is mapped in all page-tables
x86/pti: Check the return value of pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd()
x86/pti: Check the return value of pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d()
x86/entry/32: Add debug code to check entry/exit CR3
...
45 files changed, 1271 insertions, 413 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S index c371bfee137a..2767c625a52c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ # define preempt_stop(clobbers) DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(clobbers); TRACE_IRQS_OFF #else # define preempt_stop(clobbers) -# define resume_kernel restore_all +# define resume_kernel restore_all_kernel #endif .macro TRACE_IRQS_IRET @@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ #endif .endm +#define PTI_SWITCH_MASK (1 << PAGE_SHIFT) + /* * User gs save/restore * @@ -154,7 +156,52 @@ #endif /* CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS */ -.macro SAVE_ALL pt_regs_ax=%eax +/* Unconditionally switch to user cr3 */ +.macro SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3 scratch_reg:req + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI + + movl %cr3, \scratch_reg + orl $PTI_SWITCH_MASK, \scratch_reg + movl \scratch_reg, %cr3 +.Lend_\@: +.endm + +.macro BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 no_user_check=0 +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI + .if \no_user_check == 0 + /* coming from usermode? */ + testl $SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, PT_CS(%esp) + jz .Lend_\@ + .endif + /* On user-cr3? */ + movl %cr3, %eax + testl $PTI_SWITCH_MASK, %eax + jnz .Lend_\@ + /* From userspace with kernel cr3 - BUG */ + ud2 +.Lend_\@: +#endif +.endm + +/* + * Switch to kernel cr3 if not already loaded and return current cr3 in + * \scratch_reg + */ +.macro SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI + movl %cr3, \scratch_reg + /* Test if we are already on kernel CR3 */ + testl $PTI_SWITCH_MASK, \scratch_reg + jz .Lend_\@ + andl $(~PTI_SWITCH_MASK), \scratch_reg + movl \scratch_reg, %cr3 + /* Return original CR3 in \scratch_reg */ + orl $PTI_SWITCH_MASK, \scratch_reg +.Lend_\@: +.endm + +.macro SAVE_ALL pt_regs_ax=%eax switch_stacks=0 cld PUSH_GS pushl %fs @@ -173,6 +220,29 @@ movl $(__KERNEL_PERCPU), %edx movl %edx, %fs SET_KERNEL_GS %edx + + /* Switch to kernel stack if necessary */ +.if \switch_stacks > 0 + SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_STACK +.endif + +.endm + +.macro SAVE_ALL_NMI cr3_reg:req + SAVE_ALL + + BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 + + /* + * Now switch the CR3 when PTI is enabled. + * + * We can enter with either user or kernel cr3, the code will + * store the old cr3 in \cr3_reg and switches to the kernel cr3 + * if necessary. + */ + SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=\cr3_reg + +.Lend_\@: .endm /* @@ -221,6 +291,349 @@ POP_GS_EX .endm +.macro RESTORE_ALL_NMI cr3_reg:req pop=0 + /* + * Now switch the CR3 when PTI is enabled. + * + * We enter with kernel cr3 and switch the cr3 to the value + * stored on \cr3_reg, which is either a user or a kernel cr3. + */ + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lswitched_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI + + testl $PTI_SWITCH_MASK, \cr3_reg + jz .Lswitched_\@ + + /* User cr3 in \cr3_reg - write it to hardware cr3 */ + movl \cr3_reg, %cr3 + +.Lswitched_\@: + + BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 + + RESTORE_REGS pop=\pop +.endm + +.macro CHECK_AND_APPLY_ESPFIX +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32 +#define GDT_ESPFIX_SS PER_CPU_VAR(gdt_page) + (GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS * 8) + + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_BUG_ESPFIX + + movl PT_EFLAGS(%esp), %eax # mix EFLAGS, SS and CS + /* + * Warning: PT_OLDSS(%esp) contains the wrong/random values if we + * are returning to the kernel. + * See comments in process.c:copy_thread() for details. + */ + movb PT_OLDSS(%esp), %ah + movb PT_CS(%esp), %al + andl $(X86_EFLAGS_VM | (SEGMENT_TI_MASK << 8) | SEGMENT_RPL_MASK), %eax + cmpl $((SEGMENT_LDT << 8) | USER_RPL), %eax + jne .Lend_\@ # returning to user-space with LDT SS + + /* + * Setup and switch to ESPFIX stack + * + * We're returning to userspace with a 16 bit stack. The CPU will not + * restore the high word of ESP for us on executing iret... This is an + * "official" bug of all the x86-compatible CPUs, which we can work + * around to make dosemu and wine happy. We do this by preloading the + * high word of ESP with the high word of the userspace ESP while + * compensating for the offset by changing to the ESPFIX segment with + * a base address that matches for the difference. + */ + mov %esp, %edx /* load kernel esp */ + mov PT_OLDESP(%esp), %eax /* load userspace esp */ + mov %dx, %ax /* eax: new kernel esp */ + sub %eax, %edx /* offset (low word is 0) */ + shr $16, %edx + mov %dl, GDT_ESPFIX_SS + 4 /* bits 16..23 */ + mov %dh, GDT_ESPFIX_SS + 7 /* bits 24..31 */ + pushl $__ESPFIX_SS + pushl %eax /* new kernel esp */ + /* + * Disable interrupts, but do not irqtrace this section: we + * will soon execute iret and the tracer was already set to + * the irqstate after the IRET: + */ + DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY) + lss (%esp), %esp /* switch to espfix segment */ +.Lend_\@: +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32 */ +.endm + +/* + * Called with pt_regs fully populated and kernel segments loaded, + * so we can access PER_CPU and use the integer registers. + * + * We need to be very careful here with the %esp switch, because an NMI + * can happen everywhere. If the NMI handler finds itself on the + * entry-stack, it will overwrite the task-stack and everything we + * copied there. So allocate the stack-frame on the task-stack and + * switch to it before we do any copying. + */ + +#define CS_FROM_ENTRY_STACK (1 << 31) +#define CS_FROM_USER_CR3 (1 << 30) + +.macro SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_STACK + + ALTERNATIVE "", "jmp .Lend_\@", X86_FEATURE_XENPV + + BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 + + SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%eax + + /* + * %eax now contains the entry cr3 and we carry it forward in + * that register for the time this macro runs + */ + + /* Are we on the entry stack? Bail out if not! */ + movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_entry_area), %ecx + addl $CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack + SIZEOF_entry_stack, %ecx + subl %esp, %ecx /* ecx = (end of entry_stack) - esp */ + cmpl $SIZEOF_entry_stack, %ecx + jae .Lend_\@ + + /* Load stack pointer into %esi and %edi */ + movl %esp, %esi + movl %esi, %edi + + /* Move %edi to the top of the entry stack */ + andl $(MASK_entry_stack), %edi + addl $(SIZEOF_entry_stack), %edi + + /* Load top of task-stack into %edi */ + movl TSS_entry2task_stack(%edi), %edi + + /* + * Clear unused upper bits of the dword containing the word-sized CS + * slot in pt_regs in case hardware didn't clear it for us. + */ + andl $(0x0000ffff), PT_CS(%esp) + + /* Special case - entry from kernel mode via entry stack */ +#ifdef CONFIG_VM86 + movl PT_EFLAGS(%esp), %ecx # mix EFLAGS and CS + movb PT_CS(%esp), %cl + andl $(X86_EFLAGS_VM | SEGMENT_RPL_MASK), %ecx +#else + movl PT_CS(%esp), %ecx + andl $SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, %ecx +#endif + cmpl $USER_RPL, %ecx + jb .Lentry_from_kernel_\@ + + /* Bytes to copy */ + movl $PTREGS_SIZE, %ecx + +#ifdef CONFIG_VM86 + testl $X86_EFLAGS_VM, PT_EFLAGS(%esi) + jz .Lcopy_pt_regs_\@ + + /* + * Stack-frame contains 4 additional segment registers when + * coming from VM86 mode + */ + addl $(4 * 4), %ecx + +#endif +.Lcopy_pt_regs_\@: + + /* Allocate frame on task-stack */ + subl %ecx, %edi + + /* Switch to task-stack */ + movl %edi, %esp + + /* + * We are now on the task-stack and can safely copy over the + * stack-frame + */ + shrl $2, %ecx + cld + rep movsl + + jmp .Lend_\@ + +.Lentry_from_kernel_\@: + + /* + * This handles the case when we enter the kernel from + * kernel-mode and %esp points to the entry-stack. When this + * happens we need to switch to the task-stack to run C code, + * but switch back to the entry-stack again when we approach + * iret and return to the interrupted code-path. This usually + * happens when we hit an exception while restoring user-space + * segment registers on the way back to user-space or when the + * sysenter handler runs with eflags.tf set. + * + * When we switch to the task-stack here, we can't trust the + * contents of the entry-stack anymore, as the exception handler + * might be scheduled out or moved to another CPU. Therefore we + * copy the complete entry-stack to the task-stack and set a + * marker in the iret-frame (bit 31 of the CS dword) to detect + * what we've done on the iret path. + * + * On the iret path we copy everything back and switch to the + * entry-stack, so that the interrupted kernel code-path + * continues on the same stack it was interrupted with. + * + * Be aware that an NMI can happen anytime in this code. + * + * %esi: Entry-Stack pointer (same as %esp) + * %edi: Top of the task stack + * %eax: CR3 on kernel entry + */ + + /* Calculate number of bytes on the entry stack in %ecx */ + movl %esi, %ecx + + /* %ecx to the top of entry-stack */ + andl $(MASK_entry_stack), %ecx + addl $(SIZEOF_entry_stack), %ecx + + /* Number of bytes on the entry stack to %ecx */ + sub %esi, %ecx + + /* Mark stackframe as coming from entry stack */ + orl $CS_FROM_ENTRY_STACK, PT_CS(%esp) + + /* + * Test the cr3 used to enter the kernel and add a marker + * so that we can switch back to it before iret. + */ + testl $PTI_SWITCH_MASK, %eax + jz .Lcopy_pt_regs_\@ + orl $CS_FROM_USER_CR3, PT_CS(%esp) + + /* + * %esi and %edi are unchanged, %ecx contains the number of + * bytes to copy. The code at .Lcopy_pt_regs_\@ will allocate + * the stack-frame on task-stack and copy everything over + */ + jmp .Lcopy_pt_regs_\@ + +.Lend_\@: +.endm + +/* + * Switch back from the kernel stack to the entry stack. + * + * The %esp register must point to pt_regs on the task stack. It will + * first calculate the size of the stack-frame to copy, depending on + * whether we return to VM86 mode or not. With that it uses 'rep movsl' + * to copy the contents of the stack over to the entry stack. + * + * We must be very careful here, as we can't trust the contents of the + * task-stack once we switched to the entry-stack. When an NMI happens + * while on the entry-stack, the NMI handler will switch back to the top + * of the task stack, overwriting our stack-frame we are about to copy. + * Therefore we switch the stack only after everything is copied over. + */ +.macro SWITCH_TO_ENTRY_STACK + + ALTERNATIVE "", "jmp .Lend_\@", X86_FEATURE_XENPV + + /* Bytes to copy */ + movl $PTREGS_SIZE, %ecx + +#ifdef CONFIG_VM86 + testl $(X86_EFLAGS_VM), PT_EFLAGS(%esp) + jz .Lcopy_pt_regs_\@ + + /* Additional 4 registers to copy when returning to VM86 mode */ + addl $(4 * 4), %ecx + +.Lcopy_pt_regs_\@: +#endif + + /* Initialize source and destination for movsl */ + movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0), %edi + subl %ecx, %edi + movl %esp, %esi + + /* Save future stack pointer in %ebx */ + movl %edi, %ebx + + /* Copy over the stack-frame */ + shrl $2, %ecx + cld + rep movsl + + /* + * Switch to entry-stack - needs to happen after everything is + * copied because the NMI handler will overwrite the task-stack + * when on entry-stack + */ + movl %ebx, %esp + +.Lend_\@: +.endm + +/* + * This macro handles the case when we return to kernel-mode on the iret + * path and have to switch back to the entry stack and/or user-cr3 + * + * See the comments below the .Lentry_from_kernel_\@ label in the + * SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_STACK macro for more details. + */ +.macro PARANOID_EXIT_TO_KERNEL_MODE + + /* + * Test if we entered the kernel with the entry-stack. Most + * likely we did not, because this code only runs on the + * return-to-kernel path. + */ + testl $CS_FROM_ENTRY_STACK, PT_CS(%esp) + jz .Lend_\@ + + /* Unlikely slow-path */ + + /* Clear marker from stack-frame */ + andl $(~CS_FROM_ENTRY_STACK), PT_CS(%esp) + + /* Copy the remaining task-stack contents to entry-stack */ + movl %esp, %esi + movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0), %edi + + /* Bytes on the task-stack to ecx */ + movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp1), %ecx + subl %esi, %ecx + + /* Allocate stack-frame on entry-stack */ + subl %ecx, %edi + + /* + * Save future stack-pointer, we must not switch until the + * copy is done, otherwise the NMI handler could destroy the + * contents of the task-stack we are about to copy. + */ + movl %edi, %ebx + + /* Do the copy */ + shrl $2, %ecx + cld + rep movsl + + /* Safe to switch to entry-stack now */ + movl %ebx, %esp + + /* + * We came from entry-stack and need to check if we also need to + * switch back to user cr3. + */ + testl $CS_FROM_USER_CR3, PT_CS(%esp) + jz .Lend_\@ + + /* Clear marker from stack-frame */ + andl $(~CS_FROM_USER_CR3), PT_CS(%esp) + + SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3 scratch_reg=%eax + +.Lend_\@: +.endm /* * %eax: prev task * %edx: next task @@ -351,9 +764,9 @@ ENTRY(resume_kernel) DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY) .Lneed_resched: cmpl $0, PER_CPU_VAR(__preempt_count) - jnz restore_all + jnz restore_all_kernel testl $X86_EFLAGS_IF, PT_EFLAGS(%esp) # interrupts off (exception path) ? - jz restore_all + jz restore_all_kernel call preempt_schedule_irq jmp .Lneed_resched END(resume_kernel) @@ -412,7 +825,21 @@ ENTRY(xen_sysenter_target) * 0(%ebp) arg6 */ ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_32) - movl TSS_sysenter_sp0(%esp), %esp + /* + * On entry-stack with all userspace-regs live - save and + * restore eflags and %eax to use it as scratch-reg for the cr3 + * switch. + */ + pushfl + pushl %eax + BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 no_user_check=1 + SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%eax + popl %eax + popfl + + /* Stack empty again, switch to task stack */ + movl TSS_entry2task_stack(%esp), %esp + .Lsysenter_past_esp: pushl $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */ pushl %ebp /* pt_regs->sp (stashed in bp) */ @@ -421,7 +848,7 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_32) pushl $__USER_CS /* pt_regs->cs */ pushl $0 /* pt_regs->ip = 0 (placeholder) */ pushl %eax /* pt_regs->orig_ax */ - SAVE_ALL pt_regs_ax=$-ENOSYS /* save rest */ + SAVE_ALL pt_regs_ax=$-ENOSYS /* save rest, stack already switched */ /* * SYSENTER doesn't filter flags, so we need to clear NT, AC @@ -460,25 +887,49 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_32) /* Opportunistic SYSEXIT */ TRACE_IRQS_ON /* User mode traces as IRQs on. */ + + /* + * Setup entry stack - we keep the pointer in %eax and do the + * switch after almost all user-state is restored. + */ + + /* Load entry stack pointer and allocate frame for eflags/eax */ + movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0), %eax + subl $(2*4), %eax + + /* Copy eflags and eax to entry stack */ + movl PT_EFLAGS(%esp), %edi + movl PT_EAX(%esp), %esi + movl %edi, (%eax) + movl %esi, 4(%eax) + + /* Restore user registers and segments */ movl PT_EIP(%esp), %edx /* pt_regs->ip */ movl PT_OLDESP(%esp), %ecx /* pt_regs->sp */ 1: mov PT_FS(%esp), %fs PTGS_TO_GS + popl %ebx /* pt_regs->bx */ addl $2*4, %esp /* skip pt_regs->cx and pt_regs->dx */ popl %esi /* pt_regs->si */ popl %edi /* pt_regs->di */ popl %ebp /* pt_regs->bp */ - popl %eax /* pt_regs->ax */ + + /* Switch to entry stack */ + movl %eax, %esp + + /* Now ready to switch the cr3 */ + SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3 scratch_reg=%eax /* * Restore all flags except IF. (We restore IF separately because * STI gives a one-instruction window in which we won't be interrupted, * whereas POPF does not.) */ - addl $PT_EFLAGS-PT_DS, %esp /* point esp at pt_regs->flags */ btrl $X86_EFLAGS_IF_BIT, (%esp) + BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 no_user_check=1 popfl + popl %eax /* * Return back to the vDSO, which will pop ecx and edx. @@ -532,7 +983,8 @@ ENDPROC(entry_SYSENTER_32) ENTRY(entry_INT80_32) ASM_CLAC pushl %eax /* pt_regs->orig_ax */ - SAVE_ALL pt_regs_ax=$-ENOSYS /* save rest */ + + SAVE_ALL pt_regs_ax=$-ENOSYS switch_stacks=1 /* save rest */ /* * User mode is traced as though IRQs are on, and the interrupt gate @@ -546,24 +998,17 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_32) restore_all: TRACE_IRQS_IRET + SWITCH_TO_ENTRY_STACK .Lrestore_all_notrace: -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32 - ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lrestore_nocheck", "", X86_BUG_ESPFIX - - movl PT_EFLAGS(%esp), %eax # mix EFLAGS, SS and CS - /* - * Warning: PT_OLDSS(%esp) contains the wrong/random values if we - * are returning to the kernel. - * See comments in process.c:copy_thread() for details. - */ - movb PT_OLDSS(%esp), %ah - movb PT_CS(%esp), %al - andl $(X86_EFLAGS_VM | (SEGMENT_TI_MASK << 8) | SEGMENT_RPL_MASK), %eax - cmpl $((SEGMENT_LDT << 8) | USER_RPL), %eax - je .Lldt_ss # returning to user-space with LDT SS -#endif + CHECK_AND_APPLY_ESPFIX .Lrestore_nocheck: - RESTORE_REGS 4 # skip orig_eax/error_code + /* Switch back to user CR3 */ + SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3 scratch_reg=%eax + + BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 + + /* Restore user state */ + RESTORE_REGS pop=4 # skip orig_eax/error_code .Lirq_return: /* * ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE rely on IRET core serialization @@ -572,46 +1017,33 @@ restore_all: */ INTERRUPT_RETURN +restore_all_kernel: + TRACE_IRQS_IRET + PARANOID_EXIT_TO_KERNEL_MODE + BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 + RESTORE_REGS 4 + jmp .Lirq_return + .section .fixup, "ax" ENTRY(iret_exc ) pushl $0 # no error code pushl $do_iret_error - jmp common_exception -.previous - _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lirq_return, iret_exc) -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32 -.Lldt_ss: -/* - * Setup and switch to ESPFIX stack - * - * We're returning to userspace with a 16 bit stack. The CPU will not - * restore the high word of ESP for us on executing iret... This is an - * "official" bug of all the x86-compatible CPUs, which we can work - * around to make dosemu and wine happy. We do this by preloading the - * high word of ESP with the high word of the userspace ESP while - * compensating for the offset by changing to the ESPFIX segment with - * a base address that matches for the difference. - */ -#define GDT_ESPFIX_SS PER_CPU_VAR(gdt_page) + (GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS * 8) - mov %esp, %edx /* load kernel esp */ - mov PT_OLDESP(%esp), %eax /* load userspace esp */ - mov %dx, %ax /* eax: new kernel esp */ - sub %eax, %edx /* offset (low word is 0) */ - shr $16, %edx - mov %dl, GDT_ESPFIX_SS + 4 /* bits 16..23 */ - mov %dh, GDT_ESPFIX_SS + 7 /* bits 24..31 */ - pushl $__ESPFIX_SS - pushl %eax /* new kernel esp */ +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY /* - * Disable interrupts, but do not irqtrace this section: we - * will soon execute iret and the tracer was already set to - * the irqstate after the IRET: + * The stack-frame here is the one that iret faulted on, so its a + * return-to-user frame. We are on kernel-cr3 because we come here from + * the fixup code. This confuses the CR3 checker, so switch to user-cr3 + * as the checker expects it. */ - DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY) - lss (%esp), %esp /* switch to espfix segment */ - jmp .Lrestore_nocheck + pushl %eax + SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3 scratch_reg=%eax + popl %eax #endif + + jmp common_exception +.previous + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lirq_return, iret_exc) ENDPROC(entry_INT80_32) .macro FIXUP_ESPFIX_STACK @@ -671,7 +1103,8 @@ END(irq_entries_start) common_interrupt: ASM_CLAC addl $-0x80, (%esp) /* Adjust vector into the [-256, -1] range */ - SAVE_ALL + + SAVE_ALL switch_stacks=1 ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER TRACE_IRQS_OFF movl %esp, %eax @@ -679,16 +1112,16 @@ common_interrupt: jmp ret_from_intr ENDPROC(common_interrupt) -#define BUILD_INTERRUPT3(name, nr, fn) \ -ENTRY(name) \ - ASM_CLAC; \ - pushl $~(nr); \ - SAVE_ALL; \ - ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER; \ - TRACE_IRQS_OFF \ - movl %esp, %eax; \ - call fn; \ - jmp ret_from_intr; \ +#define BUILD_INTERRUPT3(name, nr, fn) \ +ENTRY(name) \ + ASM_CLAC; \ + pushl $~(nr); \ + SAVE_ALL switch_stacks=1; \ + ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER; \ + TRACE_IRQS_OFF \ + movl %esp, %eax; \ + call fn; \ + jmp ret_from_intr; \ ENDPROC(name) #define BUILD_INTERRUPT(name, nr) \ @@ -920,16 +1353,20 @@ common_exception: pushl %es pushl %ds pushl %eax + movl $(__USER_DS), %eax + movl %eax, %ds + movl %eax, %es + movl $(__KERNEL_PERCPU), %eax + movl %eax, %fs pushl %ebp pushl %edi pushl %esi pushl %edx pushl %ecx pushl %ebx + SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_STACK ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER cld - movl $(__KERNEL_PERCPU), %ecx - movl %ecx, %fs UNWIND_ESPFIX_STACK GS_TO_REG %ecx movl PT_GS(%esp), %edi # get the function address @@ -937,9 +1374,6 @@ common_exception: movl $-1, PT_ORIG_EAX(%esp) # no syscall to restart REG_TO_PTGS %ecx SET_KERNEL_GS %ecx - movl $(__USER_DS), %ecx - movl %ecx, %ds - movl %ecx, %es TRACE_IRQS_OFF movl %esp, %eax # pt_regs pointer CALL_NOSPEC %edi @@ -948,40 +1382,12 @@ END(common_exception) ENTRY(debug) /* - * #DB can happen at the first instruction of - * entry_SYSENTER_32 or in Xen's SYSENTER prologue. If this - * happens, then we will be running on a very small stack. We - * need to detect this condition and switch to the thread - * stack before calling any C code at all. - * - * If you edit this code, keep in mind that NMIs can happen in here. + * Entry from sysenter is now handled in common_exception */ ASM_CLAC pushl $-1 # mark this as an int - SAVE_ALL - ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER - xorl %edx, %edx # error code 0 - movl %esp, %eax # pt_regs pointer - - /* Are we currently on the SYSENTER stack? */ - movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_entry_area), %ecx - addl $CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack + SIZEOF_entry_stack, %ecx - subl %eax, %ecx /* ecx = (end of entry_stack) - esp */ - cmpl $SIZEOF_entry_stack, %ecx - jb .Ldebug_from_sysenter_stack - - TRACE_IRQS_OFF - call do_debug - jmp ret_from_exception - -.Ldebug_from_sysenter_stack: - /* We're on the SYSENTER stack. Switch off. */ - movl %esp, %ebx - movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %esp - TRACE_IRQS_OFF - call do_debug - movl %ebx, %esp - jmp ret_from_exception + pushl $do_debug + jmp common_exception END(debug) /* @@ -993,6 +1399,7 @@ END(debug) */ ENTRY(nmi) ASM_CLAC + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32 pushl %eax movl %ss, %eax @@ -1002,7 +1409,7 @@ ENTRY(nmi) #endif pushl %eax # pt_regs->orig_ax - SAVE_ALL + SAVE_ALL_NMI cr3_reg=%edi ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER xorl %edx, %edx # zero error code movl %esp, %eax # pt_regs pointer @@ -1016,7 +1423,7 @@ ENTRY(nmi) /* Not on SYSENTER stack. */ call do_nmi - jmp .Lrestore_all_notrace + jmp .Lnmi_return .Lnmi_from_sysenter_stack: /* @@ -1027,7 +1434,11 @@ ENTRY(nmi) movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %esp call do_nmi movl %ebx, %esp - jmp .Lrestore_all_notrace + +.Lnmi_return: + CHECK_AND_APPLY_ESPFIX + RESTORE_ALL_NMI cr3_reg=%edi pop=4 + jmp .Lirq_return #ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32 .Lnmi_espfix_stack: @@ -1042,12 +1453,12 @@ ENTRY(nmi) pushl 16(%esp) .endr pushl %eax - SAVE_ALL + SAVE_ALL_NMI cr3_reg=%edi ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER FIXUP_ESPFIX_STACK # %eax == %esp xorl %edx, %edx # zero error code call do_nmi - RESTORE_REGS + RESTORE_ALL_NMI cr3_reg=%edi lss 12+4(%esp), %esp # back to espfix stack jmp .Lirq_return #endif @@ -1056,7 +1467,8 @@ END(nmi) ENTRY(int3) ASM_CLAC pushl $-1 # mark this as an int - SAVE_ALL + + SAVE_ALL switch_stacks=1 ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER TRACE_IRQS_OFF xorl %edx, %edx # zero error code diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 7fff98fa5855..b5c60faf8429 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ #define X86_FEATURE_STIBP ( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ #define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 (Zen) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED ( 7*32+29) /* Enhanced IBRS */ /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */ #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h index bbc796eb0a3b..eeeb9289c764 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h @@ -71,12 +71,7 @@ struct ldt_struct { static inline void *ldt_slot_va(int slot) { -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 return (void *)(LDT_BASE_ADDR + LDT_SLOT_STRIDE * slot); -#else - BUG(); - return (void *)fix_to_virt(FIX_HOLE); -#endif } /* diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index f6f6c63da62f..fd2a8c1b88bc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation { SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD, SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD, - SPECTRE_V2_IBRS, + SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED, }; /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-2level.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-2level.h index 685ffe8a0eaf..c399ea5eea41 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-2level.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-2level.h @@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ static inline void native_set_pte(pte_t *ptep , pte_t pte) static inline void native_set_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd) { +#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION + pmd.pud.p4d.pgd = pti_set_user_pgtbl(&pmdp->pud.p4d.pgd, pmd.pud.p4d.pgd); +#endif *pmdp = pmd; } @@ -58,6 +61,9 @@ static inline pte_t native_ptep_get_and_clear(pte_t *xp) #ifdef CONFIG_SMP static inline pmd_t native_pmdp_get_and_clear(pmd_t *xp) { +#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION + pti_set_user_pgtbl(&xp->pud.p4d.pgd, __pgd(0)); +#endif return __pmd(xchg((pmdval_t *)xp, 0)); } #else @@ -67,6 +73,9 @@ static inline pmd_t native_pmdp_get_and_clear(pmd_t *xp) #ifdef CONFIG_SMP static inline pud_t native_pudp_get_and_clear(pud_t *xp) { +#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION + pti_set_user_pgtbl(&xp->p4d.pgd, __pgd(0)); +#endif return __pud(xchg((pudval_t *)xp, 0)); } #else diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-2level_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-2level_types.h index f982ef808e7e..6deb6cd236e3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-2level_types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-2level_types.h @@ -35,4 +35,7 @@ typedef union { #define PTRS_PER_PTE 1024 +/* This covers all VMSPLIT_* and VMSPLIT_*_OPT variants */ +#define PGD_KERNEL_START (CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET >> PGDIR_SHIFT) + #endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_2LEVEL_DEFS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h index f24df59c40b2..f2ca3139ca22 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h @@ -98,6 +98,9 @@ static inline void native_set_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd) static inline void native_set_pud(pud_t *pudp, pud_t pud) { +#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION + pud.p4d.pgd = pti_set_user_pgtbl(&pudp->p4d.pgd, pud.p4d.pgd); +#endif set_64bit((unsigned long long *)(pudp), native_pud_val(pud)); } @@ -229,6 +232,10 @@ static inline pud_t native_pudp_get_and_clear(pud_t *pudp) { union split_pud res, *orig = (union split_pud *)pudp; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION + pti_set_user_pgtbl(&pudp->p4d.pgd, __pgd(0)); +#endif + /* xchg acts as a barrier before setting of the high bits */ res.pud_low = xchg(&orig->pud_low, 0); res.pud_high = orig->pud_high; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level_types.h index 6a59a6d0cc50..858358a82b14 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level_types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level_types.h @@ -21,9 +21,10 @@ typedef union { #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT -#define SHARED_KERNEL_PMD (pv_info.shared_kernel_pmd) +#define SHARED_KERNEL_PMD ((!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) && \ + (pv_info.shared_kernel_pmd))) #else -#define SHARED_KERNEL_PMD 1 +#define SHARED_KERNEL_PMD (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) #endif /* @@ -45,5 +46,6 @@ typedef union { #define PTRS_PER_PTE 512 #define MAX_POSSIBLE_PHYSMEM_BITS 36 +#define PGD_KERNEL_START (CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET >> PGDIR_SHIFT) #endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_3LEVEL_DEFS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h index 5715647fc4fe..a1cb3339da8d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -30,11 +30,14 @@ int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd); void ptdump_walk_pgd_level(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd); void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd, bool user); void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx(void); +void ptdump_walk_user_pgd_level_checkwx(void); #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_WX -#define debug_checkwx() ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx() +#define debug_checkwx() ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx() +#define debug_checkwx_user() ptdump_walk_user_pgd_level_checkwx() #else -#define debug_checkwx() do { } while (0) +#define debug_checkwx() do { } while (0) +#define debug_checkwx_user() do { } while (0) #endif /* @@ -640,8 +643,31 @@ static inline int is_new_memtype_allowed(u64 paddr, unsigned long size, pmd_t *populate_extra_pmd(unsigned long vaddr); pte_t *populate_extra_pte(unsigned long vaddr); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION +pgd_t __pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd); + +/* + * Take a PGD location (pgdp) and a pgd value that needs to be set there. + * Populates the user and returns the resulting PGD that must be set in + * the kernel copy of the page tables. + */ +static inline pgd_t pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd) +{ + if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) + return pgd; + return __pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgdp, pgd); +} +#else /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */ +static inline pgd_t pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd) +{ + return pgd; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */ + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 # include <asm/pgtable_32.h> #else @@ -1154,6 +1180,70 @@ static inline pmd_t pmdp_establish(struct vm_area_struct *vma, } } #endif +/* + * Page table pages are page-aligned. The lower half of the top + * level is used for userspace and the top half for the kernel. + * + * Returns true for parts of the PGD that map userspace and + * false for the parts that map the kernel. + */ +static inline bool pgdp_maps_userspace(void *__ptr) +{ + unsigned long ptr = (unsigned long)__ptr; + + return (((ptr & ~PAGE_MASK) / sizeof(pgd_t)) < PGD_KERNEL_START); +} + +static inline int pgd_large(pgd_t pgd) { return 0; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION +/* + * All top-level PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION page tables are order-1 pages + * (8k-aligned and 8k in size). The kernel one is at the beginning 4k and + * the user one is in the last 4k. To switch between them, you + * just need to flip the 12th bit in their addresses. + */ +#define PTI_PGTABLE_SWITCH_BIT PAGE_SHIFT + +/* + * This generates better code than the inline assembly in + * __set_bit(). + */ +static inline void *ptr_set_bit(void *ptr, int bit) +{ + unsigned long __ptr = (unsigned long)ptr; + + __ptr |= BIT(bit); + return (void *)__ptr; +} +static inline void *ptr_clear_bit(void *ptr, int bit) +{ + unsigned long __ptr = (unsigned long)ptr; + + __ptr &= ~BIT(bit); + return (void *)__ptr; +} + +static inline pgd_t *kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd_t *pgdp) +{ + return ptr_set_bit(pgdp, PTI_PGTABLE_SWITCH_BIT); +} + +static inline pgd_t *user_to_kernel_pgdp(pgd_t *pgdp) +{ + return ptr_clear_bit(pgdp, PTI_PGTABLE_SWITCH_BIT); +} + +static inline p4d_t *kernel_to_user_p4dp(p4d_t *p4dp) +{ + return ptr_set_bit(p4dp, PTI_PGTABLE_SWITCH_BIT); +} + +static inline p4d_t *user_to_kernel_p4dp(p4d_t *p4dp) +{ + return ptr_clear_bit(p4dp, PTI_PGTABLE_SWITCH_BIT); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */ /* * clone_pgd_range(pgd_t *dst, pgd_t *src, int count); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32.h index 88a056b01db4..b3ec519e3982 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32.h @@ -34,8 +34,6 @@ static inline void check_pgt_cache(void) { } void paging_init(void); void sync_initial_page_table(void); -static inline int pgd_large(pgd_t pgd) { return 0; } - /* * Define this if things work differently on an i386 and an i486: * it will (on an i486) warn about kernel memory accesses that are diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h index d9a001a4a872..b0bc0fff5f1f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h @@ -50,13 +50,18 @@ extern bool __vmalloc_start_set; /* set once high_memory is set */ ((FIXADDR_TOT_START - PAGE_SIZE * (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES + 1)) \ & PMD_MASK) -#define PKMAP_BASE \ +#define LDT_BASE_ADDR \ ((CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE - PAGE_SIZE) & PMD_MASK) +#define LDT_END_ADDR (LDT_BASE_ADDR + PMD_SIZE) + +#define PKMAP_BASE \ + ((LDT_BASE_ADDR - PAGE_SIZE) & PMD_MASK) + #ifdef CONFIG_HIGHMEM # define VMALLOC_END (PKMAP_BASE - 2 * PAGE_SIZE) #else -# define VMALLOC_END (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE - 2 * PAGE_SIZE) +# define VMALLOC_END (LDT_BASE_ADDR - 2 * PAGE_SIZE) #endif #define MODULES_VADDR VMALLOC_START diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h index 3c5385f9a88f..acb6970e7bcf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h @@ -132,90 +132,6 @@ static inline pud_t native_pudp_get_and_clear(pud_t *xp) #endif } -#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION -/* - * All top-level PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION page tables are order-1 pages - * (8k-aligned and 8k in size). The kernel one is at the beginning 4k and - * the user one is in the last 4k. To switch between them, you - * just need to flip the 12th bit in their addresses. - */ -#define PTI_PGTABLE_SWITCH_BIT PAGE_SHIFT - -/* - * This generates better code than the inline assembly in - * __set_bit(). - */ -static inline void *ptr_set_bit(void *ptr, int bit) -{ - unsigned long __ptr = (unsigned long)ptr; - - __ptr |= BIT(bit); - return (void *)__ptr; -} -static inline void *ptr_clear_bit(void *ptr, int bit) -{ - unsigned long __ptr = (unsigned long)ptr; - - __ptr &= ~BIT(bit); - return (void *)__ptr; -} - -static inline pgd_t *kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd_t *pgdp) -{ - return ptr_set_bit(pgdp, PTI_PGTABLE_SWITCH_BIT); -} - -static inline pgd_t *user_to_kernel_pgdp(pgd_t *pgdp) -{ - return ptr_clear_bit(pgdp, PTI_PGTABLE_SWITCH_BIT); -} - -static inline p4d_t *kernel_to_user_p4dp(p4d_t *p4dp) -{ - return ptr_set_bit(p4dp, PTI_PGTABLE_SWITCH_BIT); -} - -static inline p4d_t *user_to_kernel_p4dp(p4d_t *p4dp) -{ - return ptr_clear_bit(p4dp, PTI_PGTABLE_SWITCH_BIT); -} -#endif /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */ - -/* - * Page table pages are page-aligned. The lower half of the top - * level is used for userspace and the top half for the kernel. - * - * Returns true for parts of the PGD that map userspace and - * false for the parts that map the kernel. - */ -static inline bool pgdp_maps_userspace(void *__ptr) -{ - unsigned long ptr = (unsigned long)__ptr; - - return (ptr & ~PAGE_MASK) < (PAGE_SIZE / 2); -} - -#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION -pgd_t __pti_set_user_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd); - -/* - * Take a PGD location (pgdp) and a pgd value that needs to be set there. - * Populates the user and returns the resulting PGD that must be set in - * the kernel copy of the page tables. - */ -static inline pgd_t pti_set_user_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd) -{ - if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) - return pgd; - return __pti_set_user_pgd(pgdp, pgd); -} -#else -static inline pgd_t pti_set_user_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd) -{ - return pgd; -} -#endif - static inline void native_set_p4d(p4d_t *p4dp, p4d_t p4d) { pgd_t pgd; @@ -226,7 +142,7 @@ static inline void native_set_p4d(p4d_t *p4dp, p4d_t p4d) } pgd = native_make_pgd(native_p4d_val(p4d)); - pgd = pti_set_user_pgd((pgd_t *)p4dp, pgd); + pgd = pti_set_user_pgtbl((pgd_t *)p4dp, pgd); *p4dp = native_make_p4d(native_pgd_val(pgd)); } @@ -237,7 +153,7 @@ static inline void native_p4d_clear(p4d_t *p4d) static inline void native_set_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd) { - *pgdp = pti_set_user_pgd(pgdp, pgd); + *pgdp = pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgdp, pgd); } static inline void native_pgd_clear(pgd_t *pgd) @@ -255,7 +171,6 @@ extern void sync_global_pgds(unsigned long start, unsigned long end); /* * Level 4 access. */ -static inline int pgd_large(pgd_t pgd) { return 0; } #define mk_kernel_pgd(address) __pgd((address) | _KERNPG_TABLE) /* PUD - Level3 access */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h index 054765ab2da2..04edd2d58211 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ extern unsigned int ptrs_per_p4d; #define LDT_PGD_ENTRY_L5 -112UL #define LDT_PGD_ENTRY (pgtable_l5_enabled() ? LDT_PGD_ENTRY_L5 : LDT_PGD_ENTRY_L4) #define LDT_BASE_ADDR (LDT_PGD_ENTRY << PGDIR_SHIFT) +#define LDT_END_ADDR (LDT_BASE_ADDR + PGDIR_SIZE) #define __VMALLOC_BASE_L4 0xffffc90000000000UL #define __VMALLOC_BASE_L5 0xffa0000000000000UL @@ -153,4 +154,6 @@ extern unsigned int ptrs_per_p4d; #define EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES 64 +#define PGD_KERNEL_START ((PAGE_SIZE / 2) / sizeof(pgd_t)) + #endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_64_DEFS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h index 99fff853c944..b64acb08a62b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ #define _PAGE_GLOBAL (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_GLOBAL) #define _PAGE_SOFTW1 (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW1) #define _PAGE_SOFTW2 (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW2) +#define _PAGE_SOFTW3 (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3) #define _PAGE_PAT (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PAT) #define _PAGE_PAT_LARGE (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PAT_LARGE) #define _PAGE_SPECIAL (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_SPECIAL) @@ -266,14 +267,37 @@ typedef struct pgprot { pgprotval_t pgprot; } pgprot_t; typedef struct { pgdval_t pgd; } pgd_t; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE + +/* + * PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK might be non-constant when SME is compiled in, so we can't + * use it here. + */ + +#define PGD_PAE_PAGE_MASK ((signed long)PAGE_MASK) +#define PGD_PAE_PHYS_MASK (((1ULL << __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT)-1) & PGD_PAE_PAGE_MASK) + +/* + * PAE allows Base Address, P, PWT, PCD and AVL bits to be set in PGD entries. + * All other bits are Reserved MBZ + */ +#define PGD_ALLOWED_BITS (PGD_PAE_PHYS_MASK | _PAGE_PRESENT | \ + _PAGE_PWT | _PAGE_PCD | \ + _PAGE_SOFTW1 | _PAGE_SOFTW2 | _PAGE_SOFTW3) + +#else +/* No need to mask any bits for !PAE */ +#define PGD_ALLOWED_BITS (~0ULL) +#endif + static inline pgd_t native_make_pgd(pgdval_t val) { - return (pgd_t) { val }; + return (pgd_t) { val & PGD_ALLOWED_BITS }; } static inline pgdval_t native_pgd_val(pgd_t pgd) { - return pgd.pgd; + return pgd.pgd & PGD_ALLOWED_BITS; } static inline pgdval_t pgd_flags(pgd_t pgd) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h index 625a52a5594f..02c2cbda4a74 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h @@ -39,10 +39,6 @@ #define CR3_PCID_MASK 0xFFFull #define CR3_NOFLUSH BIT_ULL(63) -#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION -# define X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT 11 -#endif - #else /* * CR3_ADDR_MASK needs at least bits 31:5 set on PAE systems, and we save @@ -53,4 +49,8 @@ #define CR3_NOFLUSH 0 #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION +# define X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT 11 +#endif + #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_FLAGS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h index cfd29ee8c3da..59663c08c949 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -966,6 +966,7 @@ static inline uint32_t hypervisor_cpuid_base(const char *sig, uint32_t leaves) extern unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp); extern void free_init_pages(char *what, unsigned long begin, unsigned long end); +extern void free_kernel_image_pages(void *begin, void *end); void default_idle(void); #ifdef CONFIG_XEN diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h index 38a17f1d5c9d..5df09a0b80b8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h @@ -6,10 +6,9 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION extern void pti_init(void); extern void pti_check_boottime_disable(void); -extern void pti_clone_kernel_text(void); +extern void pti_finalize(void); #else static inline void pti_check_boottime_disable(void) { } -static inline void pti_clone_kernel_text(void) { } #endif #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h index 5c019d23d06b..4a911a382ade 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ extern char __brk_base[], __brk_limit[]; extern struct exception_table_entry __stop___ex_table[]; +extern char __end_rodata_aligned[]; #if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) extern char __end_rodata_hpage_align[]; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h index bd090367236c..34cffcef7375 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ int set_memory_np(unsigned long addr, int numpages); int set_memory_4k(unsigned long addr, int numpages); int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages); int set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages); +int set_memory_np_noalias(unsigned long addr, int numpages); int set_memory_array_uc(unsigned long *addr, int addrinarray); int set_memory_array_wc(unsigned long *addr, int addrinarray); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h index eb5f7999a893..36bd243843d6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h @@ -87,15 +87,25 @@ static inline void refresh_sysenter_cs(struct thread_struct *thread) #endif /* This is used when switching tasks or entering/exiting vm86 mode. */ -static inline void update_sp0(struct task_struct *task) +static inline void update_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) { - /* On x86_64, sp0 always points to the entry trampoline stack, which is constant: */ + /* sp0 always points to the entry trampoline stack, which is constant: */ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 - load_sp0(task->thread.sp0); + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) + load_sp0(task->thread.sp0); + else + this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.sp1, task->thread.sp0); #else + /* + * x86-64 updates x86_tss.sp1 via cpu_current_top_of_stack. That + * doesn't work on x86-32 because sp1 and + * cpu_current_top_of_stack have different values (because of + * the non-zero stack-padding on 32bit). + */ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) load_sp0(task_top_of_stack(task)); #endif + } #endif /* _ASM_X86_SWITCH_TO_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c index dcb008c320fe..01de31db300d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c @@ -103,4 +103,9 @@ void common(void) { OFFSET(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_trampoline, cpu_entry_area, entry_trampoline); OFFSET(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack, cpu_entry_area, entry_stack_page); DEFINE(SIZEOF_entry_stack, sizeof(struct entry_stack)); + DEFINE(MASK_entry_stack, (~(sizeof(struct entry_stack) - 1))); + + /* Offset for sp0 and sp1 into the tss_struct */ + OFFSET(TSS_sp0, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp0); + OFFSET(TSS_sp1, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp1); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c index a4a3be399f4b..82826f2275cc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_32.c @@ -46,8 +46,14 @@ void foo(void) OFFSET(saved_context_gdt_desc, saved_context, gdt_desc); BLANK(); - /* Offset from the sysenter stack to tss.sp0 */ - DEFINE(TSS_sysenter_sp0, offsetof(struct cpu_entry_area, tss.x86_tss.sp0) - + /* + * Offset from the entry stack to task stack stored in TSS. Kernel entry + * happens on the per-cpu entry-stack, and the asm code switches to the + * task-stack pointer stored in x86_tss.sp1, which is a copy of + * task->thread.sp0 where entry code can find it. + */ + DEFINE(TSS_entry2task_stack, + offsetof(struct cpu_entry_area, tss.x86_tss.sp1) - offsetofend(struct cpu_entry_area, entry_stack_page.stack)); #ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_64.c index b2dcd161f514..3b9405e7ba2b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets_64.c @@ -65,8 +65,6 @@ int main(void) #undef ENTRY OFFSET(TSS_ist, tss_struct, x86_tss.ist); - OFFSET(TSS_sp0, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp0); - OFFSET(TSS_sp1, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp1); BLANK(); #ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 5c0ea39311fe..405a9a61bb89 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = { [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD] = "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline", [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline", [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline", + [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", }; #undef pr_fmt @@ -313,23 +314,6 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) return cmd; } -/* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */ -static bool __init is_skylake_era(void) -{ - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL && - boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) { - switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) { - case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE: - case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP: - case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X: - case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE: - case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP: - return true; - } - } - return false; -} - static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) { enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(); @@ -349,6 +333,13 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE: case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO: + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) { + mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED; + /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ + x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + goto specv2_set_mode; + } if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) goto retpoline_auto; break; @@ -386,26 +377,20 @@ retpoline_auto: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE); } +specv2_set_mode: spectre_v2_enabled = mode; pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]); /* - * If neither SMEP nor PTI are available, there is a risk of - * hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch - * from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill - * the entire RSB, even when using IBRS. + * If spectre v2 protection has been enabled, unconditionally fill + * RSB during a context switch; this protects against two independent + * issues: * - * Skylake era CPUs have a separate issue with *underflow* of the - * RSB, when they will predict 'ret' targets from the generic BTB. - * The proper mitigation for this is IBRS. If IBRS is not supported - * or deactivated in favour of retpolines the RSB fill on context - * switch is required. + * - RSB underflow (and switch to BTB) on Skylake+ + * - SpectreRSB variant of spectre v2 on X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 CPUs */ - if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) && - !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) { - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW); - pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n"); - } + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW); + pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n"); /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { @@ -415,9 +400,16 @@ retpoline_auto: /* * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect - * branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS to protect that. + * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted + * speculation around firmware calls only when Enhanced IBRS isn't + * supported. + * + * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because + * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if + * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not + * enable IBRS around firmware calls. */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) { + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n"); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index eb4cb3efd20e..df28e931d732 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1005,6 +1005,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS); + if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED); + if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown)) return; @@ -1804,11 +1807,12 @@ void cpu_init(void) enter_lazy_tlb(&init_mm, curr); /* - * Initialize the TSS. Don't bother initializing sp0, as the initial - * task never enters user mode. + * Initialize the TSS. sp0 points to the entry trampoline stack + * regardless of what task is running. */ set_tss_desc(cpu, &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->tss.x86_tss); load_TR_desc(); + load_sp0((unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(cpu) + 1)); load_mm_ldt(&init_mm); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S index abe6df15a8fb..30f9cb2c0b55 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S @@ -512,11 +512,18 @@ ENTRY(initial_code) ENTRY(setup_once_ref) .long setup_once +#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION +#define PGD_ALIGN (2 * PAGE_SIZE) +#define PTI_USER_PGD_FILL 1024 +#else +#define PGD_ALIGN (PAGE_SIZE) +#define PTI_USER_PGD_FILL 0 +#endif /* * BSS section */ __PAGE_ALIGNED_BSS - .align PAGE_SIZE + .align PGD_ALIGN #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE .globl initial_pg_pmd initial_pg_pmd: @@ -526,14 +533,17 @@ initial_pg_pmd: initial_page_table: .fill 1024,4,0 #endif + .align PGD_ALIGN initial_pg_fixmap: .fill 1024,4,0 -.globl empty_zero_page -empty_zero_page: - .fill 4096,1,0 .globl swapper_pg_dir + .align PGD_ALIGN swapper_pg_dir: .fill 1024,4,0 + .fill PTI_USER_PGD_FILL,4,0 +.globl empty_zero_page +empty_zero_page: + .fill 4096,1,0 EXPORT_SYMBOL(empty_zero_page) /* @@ -542,7 +552,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(empty_zero_page) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE __PAGE_ALIGNED_DATA /* Page-aligned for the benefit of paravirt? */ - .align PAGE_SIZE + .align PGD_ALIGN ENTRY(initial_page_table) .long pa(initial_pg_pmd+PGD_IDENT_ATTR),0 /* low identity map */ # if KPMDS == 3 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c index c9b14020f4dd..733e6ace0fa4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c @@ -100,6 +100,102 @@ static struct ldt_struct *alloc_ldt_struct(unsigned int num_entries) return new_ldt; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION + +static void do_sanity_check(struct mm_struct *mm, + bool had_kernel_mapping, + bool had_user_mapping) +{ + if (mm->context.ldt) { + /* + * We already had an LDT. The top-level entry should already + * have been allocated and synchronized with the usermode + * tables. + */ + WARN_ON(!had_kernel_mapping); + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) + WARN_ON(!had_user_mapping); + } else { + /* + * This is the first time we're mapping an LDT for this process. + * Sync the pgd to the usermode tables. + */ + WARN_ON(had_kernel_mapping); + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) + WARN_ON(had_user_mapping); + } +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE + +static pmd_t *pgd_to_pmd_walk(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long va) +{ + p4d_t *p4d; + pud_t *pud; + + if (pgd->pgd == 0) + return NULL; + + p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, va); + if (p4d_none(*p4d)) + return NULL; + + pud = pud_offset(p4d, va); + if (pud_none(*pud)) + return NULL; + + return pmd_offset(pud, va); +} + +static void map_ldt_struct_to_user(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + pgd_t *k_pgd = pgd_offset(mm, LDT_BASE_ADDR); + pgd_t *u_pgd = kernel_to_user_pgdp(k_pgd); + pmd_t *k_pmd, *u_pmd; + + k_pmd = pgd_to_pmd_walk(k_pgd, LDT_BASE_ADDR); + u_pmd = pgd_to_pmd_walk(u_pgd, LDT_BASE_ADDR); + + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) && !mm->context.ldt) + set_pmd(u_pmd, *k_pmd); +} + +static void sanity_check_ldt_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + pgd_t *k_pgd = pgd_offset(mm, LDT_BASE_ADDR); + pgd_t *u_pgd = kernel_to_user_pgdp(k_pgd); + bool had_kernel, had_user; + pmd_t *k_pmd, *u_pmd; + + k_pmd = pgd_to_pmd_walk(k_pgd, LDT_BASE_ADDR); + u_pmd = pgd_to_pmd_walk(u_pgd, LDT_BASE_ADDR); + had_kernel = (k_pmd->pmd != 0); + had_user = (u_pmd->pmd != 0); + + do_sanity_check(mm, had_kernel, had_user); +} + +#else /* !CONFIG_X86_PAE */ + +static void map_ldt_struct_to_user(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + pgd_t *pgd = pgd_offset(mm, LDT_BASE_ADDR); + + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) && !mm->context.ldt) + set_pgd(kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd), *pgd); +} + +static void sanity_check_ldt_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + pgd_t *pgd = pgd_offset(mm, LDT_BASE_ADDR); + bool had_kernel = (pgd->pgd != 0); + bool had_user = (kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd)->pgd != 0); + + do_sanity_check(mm, had_kernel, had_user); +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_PAE */ + /* * If PTI is enabled, this maps the LDT into the kernelmode and * usermode tables for the given mm. @@ -115,9 +211,8 @@ static struct ldt_struct *alloc_ldt_struct(unsigned int num_entries) static int map_ldt_struct(struct mm_struct *mm, struct ldt_struct *ldt, int slot) { -#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION - bool is_vmalloc, had_top_level_entry; unsigned long va; + bool is_vmalloc; spinlock_t *ptl; pgd_t *pgd; int i; @@ -131,13 +226,15 @@ map_ldt_struct(struct mm_struct *mm, struct ldt_struct *ldt, int slot) */ WARN_ON(ldt->slot != -1); + /* Check if the current mappings are sane */ + sanity_check_ldt_mapping(mm); + /* * Did we already have the top level entry allocated? We can't * use pgd_none() for this because it doens't do anything on * 4-level page table kernels. */ pgd = pgd_offset(mm, LDT_BASE_ADDR); - had_top_level_entry = (pgd->pgd != 0); is_vmalloc = is_vmalloc_addr(ldt->entries); @@ -172,41 +269,31 @@ map_ldt_struct(struct mm_struct *mm, struct ldt_struct *ldt, int slot) pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl); } - if (mm->context.ldt) { - /* - * We already had an LDT. The top-level entry should already - * have been allocated and synchronized with the usermode - * tables. - */ - WARN_ON(!had_top_level_entry); - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) - WARN_ON(!kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd)->pgd); - } else { - /* - * This is the first time we're mapping an LDT for this process. - * Sync the pgd to the usermode tables. - */ - WARN_ON(had_top_level_entry); - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) { - WARN_ON(kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd)->pgd); - set_pgd(kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd), *pgd); - } - } + /* Propagate LDT mapping to the user page-table */ + map_ldt_struct_to_user(mm); va = (unsigned long)ldt_slot_va(slot); flush_tlb_mm_range(mm, va, va + LDT_SLOT_STRIDE, 0); ldt->slot = slot; -#endif return 0; } +#else /* !CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */ + +static int +map_ldt_struct(struct mm_struct *mm, struct ldt_struct *ldt, int slot) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */ + static void free_ldt_pgtables(struct mm_struct *mm) { #ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION struct mmu_gather tlb; unsigned long start = LDT_BASE_ADDR; - unsigned long end = start + (1UL << PGDIR_SHIFT); + unsigned long end = LDT_END_ADDR; if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) return; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c index d1ab07ec8c9a..5409c2800ab5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static void load_segments(void) static void machine_kexec_free_page_tables(struct kimage *image) { - free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pgd); + free_pages((unsigned long)image->arch.pgd, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER); image->arch.pgd = NULL; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pmd0); @@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ static void machine_kexec_free_page_tables(struct kimage *image) static int machine_kexec_alloc_page_tables(struct kimage *image) { - image->arch.pgd = (pgd_t *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); + image->arch.pgd = (pgd_t *)__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO, + PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE image->arch.pmd0 = (pmd_t *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); image->arch.pmd1 = (pmd_t *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index 30ca2d1a9231..c93fcfdf1673 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -57,14 +57,12 @@ __visible DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct tss_struct, cpu_tss_rw) = { */ .sp0 = (1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG-1)) + 1, -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /* * .sp1 is cpu_current_top_of_stack. The init task never * runs user code, but cpu_current_top_of_stack should still * be well defined before the first context switch. */ .sp1 = TOP_OF_INIT_STACK, -#endif #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 .ss0 = __KERNEL_DS, diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c index 0ae659de21eb..2924fd447e61 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c @@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p) * current_thread_info(). Refresh the SYSENTER configuration in * case prev or next is vm86. */ - update_sp0(next_p); + update_task_stack(next_p); refresh_sysenter_cs(next); this_cpu_write(cpu_current_top_of_stack, (unsigned long)task_stack_page(next_p) + diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c index 12bb445fb98d..476e3ddf8890 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c @@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p) this_cpu_write(cpu_current_top_of_stack, task_top_of_stack(next_p)); /* Reload sp0. */ - update_sp0(next_p); + update_task_stack(next_p); /* * Now maybe reload the debug registers and handle I/O bitmaps diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c index 9d0b5af7db91..1c03e4aa6474 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ void save_v86_state(struct kernel_vm86_regs *regs, int retval) preempt_disable(); tsk->thread.sp0 = vm86->saved_sp0; tsk->thread.sysenter_cs = __KERNEL_CS; - update_sp0(tsk); + update_task_stack(tsk); refresh_sysenter_cs(&tsk->thread); vm86->saved_sp0 = 0; preempt_enable(); @@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *user_vm86, bool plus) refresh_sysenter_cs(&tsk->thread); } - update_sp0(tsk); + update_task_stack(tsk); preempt_enable(); if (vm86->flags & VM86_SCREEN_BITMAP) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index 5e1458f609a1..8bde0a419f86 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -55,19 +55,22 @@ jiffies_64 = jiffies; * so we can enable protection checks as well as retain 2MB large page * mappings for kernel text. */ -#define X64_ALIGN_RODATA_BEGIN . = ALIGN(HPAGE_SIZE); +#define X86_ALIGN_RODATA_BEGIN . = ALIGN(HPAGE_SIZE); -#define X64_ALIGN_RODATA_END \ +#define X86_ALIGN_RODATA_END \ . = ALIGN(HPAGE_SIZE); \ - __end_rodata_hpage_align = .; + __end_rodata_hpage_align = .; \ + __end_rodata_aligned = .; #define ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_BEGIN . = ALIGN(PMD_SIZE); #define ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_END . = ALIGN(PMD_SIZE); #else -#define X64_ALIGN_RODATA_BEGIN -#define X64_ALIGN_RODATA_END +#define X86_ALIGN_RODATA_BEGIN +#define X86_ALIGN_RODATA_END \ + . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); \ + __end_rodata_aligned = .; #define ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_BEGIN #define ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_END @@ -141,9 +144,9 @@ SECTIONS /* .text should occupy whole number of pages */ . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); - X64_ALIGN_RODATA_BEGIN + X86_ALIGN_RODATA_BEGIN RO_DATA(PAGE_SIZE) - X64_ALIGN_RODATA_END + X86_ALIGN_RODATA_END /* Data */ .data : AT(ADDR(.data) - LOAD_OFFSET) { diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c index 2f3c9196b834..a12afff146d1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c @@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ static struct addr_marker address_markers[] = { [END_OF_SPACE_NR] = { -1, NULL } }; +#define INIT_PGD ((pgd_t *) &init_top_pgt) + #else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ enum address_markers_idx { @@ -121,6 +123,9 @@ enum address_markers_idx { #ifdef CONFIG_HIGHMEM PKMAP_BASE_NR, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL + LDT_NR, +#endif CPU_ENTRY_AREA_NR, FIXADDR_START_NR, END_OF_SPACE_NR, @@ -134,11 +139,16 @@ static struct addr_marker address_markers[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_HIGHMEM [PKMAP_BASE_NR] = { 0UL, "Persistent kmap() Area" }, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL + [LDT_NR] = { 0UL, "LDT remap" }, +#endif [CPU_ENTRY_AREA_NR] = { 0UL, "CPU entry area" }, [FIXADDR_START_NR] = { 0UL, "Fixmap area" }, [END_OF_SPACE_NR] = { -1, NULL } }; +#define INIT_PGD (swapper_pg_dir) + #endif /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */ /* Multipliers for offsets within the PTEs */ @@ -496,11 +506,7 @@ static inline bool is_hypervisor_range(int idx) static void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd, bool checkwx, bool dmesg) { -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - pgd_t *start = (pgd_t *) &init_top_pgt; -#else - pgd_t *start = swapper_pg_dir; -#endif + pgd_t *start = INIT_PGD; pgprotval_t prot, eff; int i; struct pg_state st = {}; @@ -563,12 +569,13 @@ void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd, bool user) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs); -static void ptdump_walk_user_pgd_level_checkwx(void) +void ptdump_walk_user_pgd_level_checkwx(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION - pgd_t *pgd = (pgd_t *) &init_top_pgt; + pgd_t *pgd = INIT_PGD; - if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) + if (!(__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX) || + !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) return; pr_info("x86/mm: Checking user space page tables\n"); @@ -580,7 +587,6 @@ static void ptdump_walk_user_pgd_level_checkwx(void) void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx(void) { ptdump_walk_pgd_level_core(NULL, NULL, true, false); - ptdump_walk_user_pgd_level_checkwx(); } static int __init pt_dump_init(void) @@ -609,6 +615,9 @@ static int __init pt_dump_init(void) # endif address_markers[FIXADDR_START_NR].start_address = FIXADDR_START; address_markers[CPU_ENTRY_AREA_NR].start_address = CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE; +# ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL + address_markers[LDT_NR].start_address = LDT_BASE_ADDR; +# endif #endif return 0; } diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 2aafa6ab6103..db1c042e9853 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -317,8 +317,6 @@ static noinline int vmalloc_fault(unsigned long address) if (!(address >= VMALLOC_START && address < VMALLOC_END)) return -1; - WARN_ON_ONCE(in_nmi()); - /* * Synchronize this task's top level page-table * with the 'reference' page table. diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c index cee58a972cb2..74b157ac078d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c @@ -773,13 +773,44 @@ void free_init_pages(char *what, unsigned long begin, unsigned long end) } } +/* + * begin/end can be in the direct map or the "high kernel mapping" + * used for the kernel image only. free_init_pages() will do the + * right thing for either kind of address. + */ +void free_kernel_image_pages(void *begin, void *end) +{ + unsigned long begin_ul = (unsigned long)begin; + unsigned long end_ul = (unsigned long)end; + unsigned long len_pages = (end_ul - begin_ul) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + + + free_init_pages("unused kernel image", begin_ul, end_ul); + + /* + * PTI maps some of the kernel into userspace. For performance, + * this includes some kernel areas that do not contain secrets. + * Those areas might be adjacent to the parts of the kernel image + * being freed, which may contain secrets. Remove the "high kernel + * image mapping" for these freed areas, ensuring they are not even + * potentially vulnerable to Meltdown regardless of the specific + * optimizations PTI is currently using. + * + * The "noalias" prevents unmapping the direct map alias which is + * needed to access the freed pages. + * + * This is only valid for 64bit kernels. 32bit has only one mapping + * which can't be treated in this way for obvious reasons. + */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) + set_memory_np_noalias(begin_ul, len_pages); +} + void __ref free_initmem(void) { e820__reallocate_tables(); - free_init_pages("unused kernel", - (unsigned long)(&__init_begin), - (unsigned long)(&__init_end)); + free_kernel_image_pages(&__init_begin, &__init_end); } #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c index a688617c727e..dd519f372169 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c @@ -1283,20 +1283,10 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void) set_memory_ro(start, (end-start) >> PAGE_SHIFT); #endif - free_init_pages("unused kernel", - (unsigned long) __va(__pa_symbol(text_end)), - (unsigned long) __va(__pa_symbol(rodata_start))); - free_init_pages("unused kernel", - (unsigned long) __va(__pa_symbol(rodata_end)), - (unsigned long) __va(__pa_symbol(_sdata))); + free_kernel_image_pages((void *)text_end, (void *)rodata_start); + free_kernel_image_pages((void *)rodata_end, (void *)_sdata); debug_checkwx(); - - /* - * Do this after all of the manipulation of the - * kernel text page tables are complete. - */ - pti_clone_kernel_text(); } int kern_addr_valid(unsigned long addr) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c index 3bded76e8d5c..0a74996a1149 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(cpa_lock); #define CPA_FLUSHTLB 1 #define CPA_ARRAY 2 #define CPA_PAGES_ARRAY 4 +#define CPA_NO_CHECK_ALIAS 8 /* Do not search for aliases */ #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS static unsigned long direct_pages_count[PG_LEVEL_NUM]; @@ -1486,6 +1487,9 @@ static int change_page_attr_set_clr(unsigned long *addr, int numpages, /* No alias checking for _NX bit modifications */ checkalias = (pgprot_val(mask_set) | pgprot_val(mask_clr)) != _PAGE_NX; + /* Has caller explicitly disabled alias checking? */ + if (in_flag & CPA_NO_CHECK_ALIAS) + checkalias = 0; ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, checkalias); @@ -1772,6 +1776,15 @@ int set_memory_np(unsigned long addr, int numpages) return change_page_attr_clear(&addr, numpages, __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT), 0); } +int set_memory_np_noalias(unsigned long addr, int numpages) +{ + int cpa_flags = CPA_NO_CHECK_ALIAS; + + return change_page_attr_set_clr(&addr, numpages, __pgprot(0), + __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT), 0, + cpa_flags, NULL); +} + int set_memory_4k(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return change_page_attr_set_clr(&addr, numpages, __pgprot(0), @@ -1784,6 +1797,12 @@ int set_memory_nonglobal(unsigned long addr, int numpages) __pgprot(_PAGE_GLOBAL), 0); } +int set_memory_global(unsigned long addr, int numpages) +{ + return change_page_attr_set(&addr, numpages, + __pgprot(_PAGE_GLOBAL), 0); +} + static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc) { struct cpa_data cpa; diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c index 0f1683fcb196..3ef095c70ae3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c @@ -182,6 +182,14 @@ static void pgd_dtor(pgd_t *pgd) */ #define PREALLOCATED_PMDS UNSHARED_PTRS_PER_PGD +/* + * We allocate separate PMDs for the kernel part of the user page-table + * when PTI is enabled. We need them to map the per-process LDT into the + * user-space page-table. + */ +#define PREALLOCATED_USER_PMDS (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) ? \ + KERNEL_PGD_PTRS : 0) + void pud_populate(struct mm_struct *mm, pud_t *pudp, pmd_t *pmd) { paravirt_alloc_pmd(mm, __pa(pmd) >> PAGE_SHIFT); @@ -202,14 +210,14 @@ void pud_populate(struct mm_struct *mm, pud_t *pudp, pmd_t *pmd) /* No need to prepopulate any pagetable entries in non-PAE modes. */ #define PREALLOCATED_PMDS 0 - +#define PREALLOCATED_USER_PMDS 0 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_PAE */ -static void free_pmds(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmds[]) +static void free_pmds(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmds[], int count) { int i; - for(i = 0; i < PREALLOCATED_PMDS; i++) + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) if (pmds[i]) { pgtable_pmd_page_dtor(virt_to_page(pmds[i])); free_page((unsigned long)pmds[i]); @@ -217,7 +225,7 @@ static void free_pmds(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmds[]) } } -static int preallocate_pmds(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmds[]) +static int preallocate_pmds(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmds[], int count) { int i; bool failed = false; @@ -226,7 +234,7 @@ static int preallocate_pmds(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmds[]) if (mm == &init_mm) gfp &= ~__GFP_ACCOUNT; - for(i = 0; i < PREALLOCATED_PMDS; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { pmd_t *pmd = (pmd_t *)__get_free_page(gfp); if (!pmd) failed = true; @@ -241,7 +249,7 @@ static int preallocate_pmds(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmds[]) } if (failed) { - free_pmds(mm, pmds); + free_pmds(mm, pmds, count); return -ENOMEM; } @@ -254,23 +262,38 @@ static int preallocate_pmds(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmds[]) * preallocate which never got a corresponding vma will need to be * freed manually. */ +static void mop_up_one_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgdp) +{ + pgd_t pgd = *pgdp; + + if (pgd_val(pgd) != 0) { + pmd_t *pmd = (pmd_t *)pgd_page_vaddr(pgd); + + *pgdp = native_make_pgd(0); + + paravirt_release_pmd(pgd_val(pgd) >> PAGE_SHIFT); + pmd_free(mm, pmd); + mm_dec_nr_pmds(mm); + } +} + static void pgd_mop_up_pmds(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgdp) { int i; - for(i = 0; i < PREALLOCATED_PMDS; i++) { - pgd_t pgd = pgdp[i]; + for (i = 0; i < PREALLOCATED_PMDS; i++) + mop_up_one_pmd(mm, &pgdp[i]); - if (pgd_val(pgd) != 0) { - pmd_t *pmd = (pmd_t *)pgd_page_vaddr(pgd); +#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION - pgdp[i] = native_make_pgd(0); + if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) + return; - paravirt_release_pmd(pgd_val(pgd) >> PAGE_SHIFT); - pmd_free(mm, pmd); - mm_dec_nr_pmds(mm); - } - } + pgdp = kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgdp); + + for (i = 0; i < PREALLOCATED_USER_PMDS; i++) + mop_up_one_pmd(mm, &pgdp[i + KERNEL_PGD_BOUNDARY]); +#endif } static void pgd_prepopulate_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd, pmd_t *pmds[]) @@ -296,6 +319,38 @@ static void pgd_prepopulate_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd, pmd_t *pmds[]) } } +#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION +static void pgd_prepopulate_user_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, + pgd_t *k_pgd, pmd_t *pmds[]) +{ + pgd_t *s_pgd = kernel_to_user_pgdp(swapper_pg_dir); + pgd_t *u_pgd = kernel_to_user_pgdp(k_pgd); + p4d_t *u_p4d; + pud_t *u_pud; + int i; + + u_p4d = p4d_offset(u_pgd, 0); + u_pud = pud_offset(u_p4d, 0); + + s_pgd += KERNEL_PGD_BOUNDARY; + u_pud += KERNEL_PGD_BOUNDARY; + + for (i = 0; i < PREALLOCATED_USER_PMDS; i++, u_pud++, s_pgd++) { + pmd_t *pmd = pmds[i]; + + memcpy(pmd, (pmd_t *)pgd_page_vaddr(*s_pgd), + sizeof(pmd_t) * PTRS_PER_PMD); + + pud_populate(mm, u_pud, pmd); + } + +} +#else +static void pgd_prepopulate_user_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, + pgd_t *k_pgd, pmd_t *pmds[]) +{ +} +#endif /* * Xen paravirt assumes pgd table should be in one page. 64 bit kernel also * assumes that pgd should be in one page. @@ -340,7 +395,8 @@ static inline pgd_t *_pgd_alloc(void) * We allocate one page for pgd. */ if (!SHARED_KERNEL_PMD) - return (pgd_t *)__get_free_page(PGALLOC_GFP); + return (pgd_t *)__get_free_pages(PGALLOC_GFP, + PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER); /* * Now PAE kernel is not running as a Xen domain. We can allocate @@ -352,7 +408,7 @@ static inline pgd_t *_pgd_alloc(void) static inline void _pgd_free(pgd_t *pgd) { if (!SHARED_KERNEL_PMD) - free_page((unsigned long)pgd); + free_pages((unsigned long)pgd, PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER); else kmem_cache_free(pgd_cache, pgd); } @@ -372,6 +428,7 @@ static inline void _pgd_free(pgd_t *pgd) pgd_t *pgd_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm) { pgd_t *pgd; + pmd_t *u_pmds[PREALLOCATED_USER_PMDS]; pmd_t *pmds[PREALLOCATED_PMDS]; pgd = _pgd_alloc(); @@ -381,12 +438,15 @@ pgd_t *pgd_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm) mm->pgd = pgd; - if (preallocate_pmds(mm, pmds) != 0) + if (preallocate_pmds(mm, pmds, PREALLOCATED_PMDS) != 0) goto out_free_pgd; - if (paravirt_pgd_alloc(mm) != 0) + if (preallocate_pmds(mm, u_pmds, PREALLOCATED_USER_PMDS) != 0) goto out_free_pmds; + if (paravirt_pgd_alloc(mm) != 0) + goto out_free_user_pmds; + /* * Make sure that pre-populating the pmds is atomic with * respect to anything walking the pgd_list, so that they @@ -396,13 +456,16 @@ pgd_t *pgd_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm) pgd_ctor(mm, pgd); pgd_prepopulate_pmd(mm, pgd, pmds); + pgd_prepopulate_user_pmd(mm, pgd, u_pmds); spin_unlock(&pgd_lock); return pgd; +out_free_user_pmds: + free_pmds(mm, u_pmds, PREALLOCATED_USER_PMDS); out_free_pmds: - free_pmds(mm, pmds); + free_pmds(mm, pmds, PREALLOCATED_PMDS); out_free_pgd: _pgd_free(pgd); out: diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c index 4d418e705878..d58b4aba9510 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c @@ -54,6 +54,16 @@ #define __GFP_NOTRACK 0 #endif +/* + * Define the page-table levels we clone for user-space on 32 + * and 64 bit. + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +#define PTI_LEVEL_KERNEL_IMAGE PTI_CLONE_PMD +#else +#define PTI_LEVEL_KERNEL_IMAGE PTI_CLONE_PTE +#endif + static void __init pti_print_if_insecure(const char *reason) { if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN)) @@ -117,7 +127,7 @@ enable: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PTI); } -pgd_t __pti_set_user_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd) +pgd_t __pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd) { /* * Changes to the high (kernel) portion of the kernelmode page @@ -176,7 +186,7 @@ static p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address) if (pgd_none(*pgd)) { unsigned long new_p4d_page = __get_free_page(gfp); - if (!new_p4d_page) + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!new_p4d_page)) return NULL; set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_p4d_page))); @@ -195,13 +205,17 @@ static p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address) static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address) { gfp_t gfp = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO); - p4d_t *p4d = pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(address); + p4d_t *p4d; pud_t *pud; + p4d = pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(address); + if (!p4d) + return NULL; + BUILD_BUG_ON(p4d_large(*p4d) != 0); if (p4d_none(*p4d)) { unsigned long new_pud_page = __get_free_page(gfp); - if (!new_pud_page) + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!new_pud_page)) return NULL; set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pud_page))); @@ -215,7 +229,7 @@ static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address) } if (pud_none(*pud)) { unsigned long new_pmd_page = __get_free_page(gfp); - if (!new_pmd_page) + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!new_pmd_page)) return NULL; set_pud(pud, __pud(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pmd_page))); @@ -224,7 +238,6 @@ static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address) return pmd_offset(pud, address); } -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION /* * Walk the shadow copy of the page tables (optionally) trying to allocate * page table pages on the way down. Does not support large pages. @@ -237,9 +250,13 @@ static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address) static __init pte_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte(unsigned long address) { gfp_t gfp = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO); - pmd_t *pmd = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(address); + pmd_t *pmd; pte_t *pte; + pmd = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(address); + if (!pmd) + return NULL; + /* We can't do anything sensible if we hit a large mapping. */ if (pmd_large(*pmd)) { WARN_ON(1); @@ -262,6 +279,7 @@ static __init pte_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte(unsigned long address) return pte; } +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION static void __init pti_setup_vsyscall(void) { pte_t *pte, *target_pte; @@ -282,8 +300,14 @@ static void __init pti_setup_vsyscall(void) static void __init pti_setup_vsyscall(void) { } #endif +enum pti_clone_level { + PTI_CLONE_PMD, + PTI_CLONE_PTE, +}; + static void -pti_clone_pmds(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, pmdval_t clear) +pti_clone_pgtable(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, + enum pti_clone_level level) { unsigned long addr; @@ -291,59 +315,105 @@ pti_clone_pmds(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, pmdval_t clear) * Clone the populated PMDs which cover start to end. These PMD areas * can have holes. */ - for (addr = start; addr < end; addr += PMD_SIZE) { + for (addr = start; addr < end;) { + pte_t *pte, *target_pte; pmd_t *pmd, *target_pmd; pgd_t *pgd; p4d_t *p4d; pud_t *pud; + /* Overflow check */ + if (addr < start) + break; + pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr); if (WARN_ON(pgd_none(*pgd))) return; p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr); if (WARN_ON(p4d_none(*p4d))) return; + pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr); - if (pud_none(*pud)) + if (pud_none(*pud)) { + addr += PUD_SIZE; continue; + } + pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr); - if (pmd_none(*pmd)) + if (pmd_none(*pmd)) { + addr += PMD_SIZE; continue; + } - target_pmd = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(addr); - if (WARN_ON(!target_pmd)) - return; - - /* - * Only clone present PMDs. This ensures only setting - * _PAGE_GLOBAL on present PMDs. This should only be - * called on well-known addresses anyway, so a non- - * present PMD would be a surprise. - */ - if (WARN_ON(!(pmd_flags(*pmd) & _PAGE_PRESENT))) - return; - - /* - * Setting 'target_pmd' below creates a mapping in both - * the user and kernel page tables. It is effectively - * global, so set it as global in both copies. Note: - * the X86_FEATURE_PGE check is not _required_ because - * the CPU ignores _PAGE_GLOBAL when PGE is not - * supported. The check keeps consistentency with - * code that only set this bit when supported. - */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE)) - *pmd = pmd_set_flags(*pmd, _PAGE_GLOBAL); - - /* - * Copy the PMD. That is, the kernelmode and usermode - * tables will share the last-level page tables of this - * address range - */ - *target_pmd = pmd_clear_flags(*pmd, clear); + if (pmd_large(*pmd) || level == PTI_CLONE_PMD) { + target_pmd = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(addr); + if (WARN_ON(!target_pmd)) + return; + + /* + * Only clone present PMDs. This ensures only setting + * _PAGE_GLOBAL on present PMDs. This should only be + * called on well-known addresses anyway, so a non- + * present PMD would be a surprise. + */ + if (WARN_ON(!(pmd_flags(*pmd) & _PAGE_PRESENT))) + return; + + /* + * Setting 'target_pmd' below creates a mapping in both + * the user and kernel page tables. It is effectively + * global, so set it as global in both copies. Note: + * the X86_FEATURE_PGE check is not _required_ because + * the CPU ignores _PAGE_GLOBAL when PGE is not + * supported. The check keeps consistentency with + * code that only set this bit when supported. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE)) + *pmd = pmd_set_flags(*pmd, _PAGE_GLOBAL); + + /* + * Copy the PMD. That is, the kernelmode and usermode + * tables will share the last-level page tables of this + * address range + */ + *target_pmd = *pmd; + + addr += PMD_SIZE; + + } else if (level == PTI_CLONE_PTE) { + + /* Walk the page-table down to the pte level */ + pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, addr); + if (pte_none(*pte)) { + addr += PAGE_SIZE; + continue; + } + + /* Only clone present PTEs */ + if (WARN_ON(!(pte_flags(*pte) & _PAGE_PRESENT))) + return; + + /* Allocate PTE in the user page-table */ + target_pte = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte(addr); + if (WARN_ON(!target_pte)) + return; + + /* Set GLOBAL bit in both PTEs */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE)) + *pte = pte_set_flags(*pte, _PAGE_GLOBAL); + + /* Clone the PTE */ + *target_pte = *pte; + + addr += PAGE_SIZE; + + } else { + BUG(); + } } } +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /* * Clone a single p4d (i.e. a top-level entry on 4-level systems and a * next-level entry on 5-level systems. @@ -354,6 +424,9 @@ static void __init pti_clone_p4d(unsigned long addr) pgd_t *kernel_pgd; user_p4d = pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(addr); + if (!user_p4d) + return; + kernel_pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr); kernel_p4d = p4d_offset(kernel_pgd, addr); *user_p4d = *kernel_p4d; @@ -367,6 +440,25 @@ static void __init pti_clone_user_shared(void) pti_clone_p4d(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE); } +#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ + +/* + * On 32 bit PAE systems with 1GB of Kernel address space there is only + * one pgd/p4d for the whole kernel. Cloning that would map the whole + * address space into the user page-tables, making PTI useless. So clone + * the page-table on the PMD level to prevent that. + */ +static void __init pti_clone_user_shared(void) +{ + unsigned long start, end; + + start = CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE; + end = start + (PAGE_SIZE * CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES); + + pti_clone_pgtable(start, end, PTI_CLONE_PMD); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ + /* * Clone the ESPFIX P4D into the user space visible page table */ @@ -380,11 +472,11 @@ static void __init pti_setup_espfix64(void) /* * Clone the populated PMDs of the entry and irqentry text and force it RO. */ -static void __init pti_clone_entry_text(void) +static void pti_clone_entry_text(void) { - pti_clone_pmds((unsigned long) __entry_text_start, - (unsigned long) __irqentry_text_end, - _PAGE_RW); + pti_clone_pgtable((unsigned long) __entry_text_start, + (unsigned long) __irqentry_text_end, + PTI_CLONE_PMD); } /* @@ -435,10 +527,17 @@ static inline bool pti_kernel_image_global_ok(void) } /* + * This is the only user for these and it is not arch-generic + * like the other set_memory.h functions. Just extern them. + */ +extern int set_memory_nonglobal(unsigned long addr, int numpages); +extern int set_memory_global(unsigned long addr, int numpages); + +/* * For some configurations, map all of kernel text into the user page * tables. This reduces TLB misses, especially on non-PCID systems. */ -void pti_clone_kernel_text(void) +static void pti_clone_kernel_text(void) { /* * rodata is part of the kernel image and is normally @@ -446,7 +545,8 @@ void pti_clone_kernel_text(void) * clone the areas past rodata, they might contain secrets. */ unsigned long start = PFN_ALIGN(_text); - unsigned long end = (unsigned long)__end_rodata_hpage_align; + unsigned long end_clone = (unsigned long)__end_rodata_aligned; + unsigned long end_global = PFN_ALIGN((unsigned long)__stop___ex_table); if (!pti_kernel_image_global_ok()) return; @@ -458,14 +558,18 @@ void pti_clone_kernel_text(void) * pti_set_kernel_image_nonglobal() did to clear the * global bit. */ - pti_clone_pmds(start, end, _PAGE_RW); + pti_clone_pgtable(start, end_clone, PTI_LEVEL_KERNEL_IMAGE); + + /* + * pti_clone_pgtable() will set the global bit in any PMDs + * that it clones, but we also need to get any PTEs in + * the last level for areas that are not huge-page-aligned. + */ + + /* Set the global bit for normal non-__init kernel text: */ + set_memory_global(start, (end_global - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT); } -/* - * This is the only user for it and it is not arch-generic like - * the other set_memory.h functions. Just extern it. - */ -extern int set_memory_nonglobal(unsigned long addr, int numpages); void pti_set_kernel_image_nonglobal(void) { /* @@ -477,9 +581,11 @@ void pti_set_kernel_image_nonglobal(void) unsigned long start = PFN_ALIGN(_text); unsigned long end = ALIGN((unsigned long)_end, PMD_PAGE_SIZE); - if (pti_kernel_image_global_ok()) - return; - + /* + * This clears _PAGE_GLOBAL from the entire kernel image. + * pti_clone_kernel_text() map put _PAGE_GLOBAL back for + * areas that are mapped to userspace. + */ set_memory_nonglobal(start, (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT); } @@ -493,6 +599,28 @@ void __init pti_init(void) pr_info("enabled\n"); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 + /* + * We check for X86_FEATURE_PCID here. But the init-code will + * clear the feature flag on 32 bit because the feature is not + * supported on 32 bit anyway. To print the warning we need to + * check with cpuid directly again. + */ + if (cpuid_ecx(0x1) & BIT(17)) { + /* Use printk to work around pr_fmt() */ + printk(KERN_WARNING "\n"); + printk(KERN_WARNING "************************************************************\n"); + printk(KERN_WARNING "** WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! **\n"); + printk(KERN_WARNING "** **\n"); + printk(KERN_WARNING "** You are using 32-bit PTI on a 64-bit PCID-capable CPU. **\n"); + printk(KERN_WARNING "** Your performance will increase dramatically if you **\n"); + printk(KERN_WARNING "** switch to a 64-bit kernel! **\n"); + printk(KERN_WARNING "** **\n"); + printk(KERN_WARNING "** WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! WARNING! **\n"); + printk(KERN_WARNING "************************************************************\n"); + } +#endif + pti_clone_user_shared(); /* Undo all global bits from the init pagetables in head_64.S: */ @@ -502,3 +630,22 @@ void __init pti_init(void) pti_setup_espfix64(); pti_setup_vsyscall(); } + +/* + * Finalize the kernel mappings in the userspace page-table. Some of the + * mappings for the kernel image might have changed since pti_init() + * cloned them. This is because parts of the kernel image have been + * mapped RO and/or NX. These changes need to be cloned again to the + * userspace page-table. + */ +void pti_finalize(void) +{ + /* + * We need to clone everything (again) that maps parts of the + * kernel image. + */ + pti_clone_entry_text(); + pti_clone_kernel_text(); + + debug_checkwx_user(); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/tools/relocs.c b/arch/x86/tools/relocs.c index 220e97841e49..3a6c8ebc8032 100644 --- a/arch/x86/tools/relocs.c +++ b/arch/x86/tools/relocs.c @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static const char * const sym_regex_kernel[S_NSYMTYPES] = { "__tracedata_(start|end)|" "__(start|stop)_notes|" "__end_rodata|" + "__end_rodata_aligned|" "__initramfs_start|" "(jiffies|jiffies_64)|" #if ELF_BITS == 64 diff --git a/include/linux/pti.h b/include/linux/pti.h index 0174883a935a..1a941efcaa62 100644 --- a/include/linux/pti.h +++ b/include/linux/pti.h @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include <asm/pti.h> #else static inline void pti_init(void) { } +static inline void pti_finalize(void) { } #endif #endif diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c index 5e13c544bbf4..f86b64c35d38 100644 --- a/init/main.c +++ b/init/main.c @@ -1065,6 +1065,13 @@ static int __ref kernel_init(void *unused) jump_label_invalidate_initmem(); free_initmem(); mark_readonly(); + + /* + * Kernel mappings are now finalized - update the userspace page-table + * to finalize PTI. + */ + pti_finalize(); + system_state = SYSTEM_RUNNING; numa_default_policy(); diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c index a790ef4be74e..3222193c46c6 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -6939,9 +6939,21 @@ unsigned long free_reserved_area(void *start, void *end, int poison, char *s) start = (void *)PAGE_ALIGN((unsigned long)start); end = (void *)((unsigned long)end & PAGE_MASK); for (pos = start; pos < end; pos += PAGE_SIZE, pages++) { + struct page *page = virt_to_page(pos); + void *direct_map_addr; + + /* + * 'direct_map_addr' might be different from 'pos' + * because some architectures' virt_to_page() + * work with aliases. Getting the direct map + * address ensures that we get a _writeable_ + * alias for the memset(). + */ + direct_map_addr = page_address(page); if ((unsigned int)poison <= 0xFF) - memset(pos, poison, PAGE_SIZE); - free_reserved_page(virt_to_page(pos)); + memset(direct_map_addr, poison, PAGE_SIZE); + + free_reserved_page(page); } if (pages && s) diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index c4302067a3ad..afa91c6f06bb 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode" default y - depends on X86_64 && !UML + depends on X86 && !UML help This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped |