diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-01-17 19:13:15 -0800 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-01-17 19:13:15 -0800 |
commit | 5807fcaa9bf7dd87241df739161c119cf78a6bc4 (patch) | |
tree | 4ed1e647a0ae0f315db3b9066c9235020c439649 | |
parent | 2d663b55816e5c1d211a77fff90687053fe78aac (diff) | |
parent | acb2cfdb316ddc3fac8183c0f71edd1680713b10 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-5807fcaa9bf7dd87241df739161c119cf78a6bc4.tar.gz linux-stable-5807fcaa9bf7dd87241df739161c119cf78a6bc4.tar.bz2 linux-stable-5807fcaa9bf7dd87241df739161c119cf78a6bc4.zip |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
- EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel
(EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring.
- Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for
sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks.
- Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2.
- Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits)
selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix
KEYS: refcount bug fix
ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
IMA: policy can be updated zero times
selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
selinux: export validatetrans decisions
gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid
selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options
tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions
tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing
tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup
tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code
...
53 files changed, 1281 insertions, 374 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt b/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt index e105ae97a4f5..324ddf5223b3 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt +++ b/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt @@ -27,17 +27,26 @@ Usage: keyctl print keyid options: - keyhandle= ascii hex value of sealing key default 0x40000000 (SRK) - keyauth= ascii hex auth for sealing key default 0x00...i - (40 ascii zeros) - blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00... - (40 ascii zeros) - blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00... - (40 ascii zeros) - pcrinfo= ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default) - pcrlock= pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob - migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values, - default 1 (resealing allowed) + keyhandle= ascii hex value of sealing key default 0x40000000 (SRK) + keyauth= ascii hex auth for sealing key default 0x00...i + (40 ascii zeros) + blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00... + (40 ascii zeros) + blobauth= ascii hex auth for sealed data default 0x00... + (40 ascii zeros) + pcrinfo= ascii hex of PCR_INFO or PCR_INFO_LONG (no default) + pcrlock= pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob + migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values, + default 1 (resealing allowed) + hash= hash algorithm name as a string. For TPM 1.x the only + allowed value is sha1. For TPM 2.x the allowed values + are sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512 and sm3-256. + policydigest= digest for the authorization policy. must be calculated + with the same hash algorithm as specified by the 'hash=' + option. + policyhandle= handle to an authorization policy session that defines the + same policy and with the same hash algorithm as was used to + seal the key. "keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard TPM_STORED_DATA format. The key length for new keys are always in bytes. diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c index 2a44b3752471..9e9e5a6a9ed6 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c @@ -321,6 +321,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) goto error_free_cert; } else if (!prep->trusted) { ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_system_trusted_keyring()); + if (ret) + ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_ima_mok_keyring()); if (!ret) prep->trusted = 1; } diff --git a/crypto/hash_info.c b/crypto/hash_info.c index 3e7ff46f26e8..7b1e0b188ce6 100644 --- a/crypto/hash_info.c +++ b/crypto/hash_info.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ const char *const hash_algo_name[HASH_ALGO__LAST] = { [HASH_ALGO_TGR_128] = "tgr128", [HASH_ALGO_TGR_160] = "tgr160", [HASH_ALGO_TGR_192] = "tgr192", + [HASH_ALGO_SM3_256] = "sm3-256", }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hash_algo_name); @@ -52,5 +53,6 @@ const int hash_digest_size[HASH_ALGO__LAST] = { [HASH_ALGO_TGR_128] = TGR128_DIGEST_SIZE, [HASH_ALGO_TGR_160] = TGR160_DIGEST_SIZE, [HASH_ALGO_TGR_192] = TGR192_DIGEST_SIZE, + [HASH_ALGO_SM3_256] = SM3256_DIGEST_SIZE, }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hash_digest_size); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c index c50637db3a8a..e2fa89c88304 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c @@ -310,10 +310,12 @@ unsigned long tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip, { int duration_idx = TPM_UNDEFINED; int duration = 0; - u8 category = (ordinal >> 24) & 0xFF; - if ((category == TPM_PROTECTED_COMMAND && ordinal < TPM_MAX_ORDINAL) || - (category == TPM_CONNECTION_COMMAND && ordinal < TSC_MAX_ORDINAL)) + /* + * We only have a duration table for protected commands, where the upper + * 16 bits are 0. For the few other ordinals the fallback will be used. + */ + if (ordinal < TPM_MAX_ORDINAL) duration_idx = tpm_ordinal_duration[ordinal]; if (duration_idx != TPM_UNDEFINED) @@ -501,6 +503,21 @@ int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip) struct duration_t *duration_cap; ssize_t rc; + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { + /* Fixed timeouts for TPM2 */ + chip->vendor.timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_A); + chip->vendor.timeout_b = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_B); + chip->vendor.timeout_c = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_C); + chip->vendor.timeout_d = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_D); + chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] = + msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_SHORT); + chip->vendor.duration[TPM_MEDIUM] = + msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_MEDIUM); + chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG] = + msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_LONG); + return 0; + } + tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header; tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP; tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index a4257a32964f..542a80cbfd9c 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -83,16 +83,20 @@ enum tpm2_structures { }; enum tpm2_return_codes { - TPM2_RC_INITIALIZE = 0x0100, - TPM2_RC_TESTING = 0x090A, + TPM2_RC_HASH = 0x0083, /* RC_FMT1 */ + TPM2_RC_INITIALIZE = 0x0100, /* RC_VER1 */ TPM2_RC_DISABLED = 0x0120, + TPM2_RC_TESTING = 0x090A, /* RC_WARN */ }; enum tpm2_algorithms { TPM2_ALG_SHA1 = 0x0004, TPM2_ALG_KEYEDHASH = 0x0008, TPM2_ALG_SHA256 = 0x000B, - TPM2_ALG_NULL = 0x0010 + TPM2_ALG_SHA384 = 0x000C, + TPM2_ALG_SHA512 = 0x000D, + TPM2_ALG_NULL = 0x0010, + TPM2_ALG_SM3_256 = 0x0012, }; enum tpm2_command_codes { @@ -138,7 +142,6 @@ struct tpm_vendor_specific { unsigned long base; /* TPM base address */ int irq; - int probed_irq; int region_size; int have_region; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index c12130485fc1..45a634016f95 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ */ #include "tpm.h" +#include <crypto/hash_info.h> #include <keys/trusted-type.h> enum tpm2_object_attributes { @@ -104,6 +105,19 @@ struct tpm2_cmd { union tpm2_cmd_params params; } __packed; +struct tpm2_hash { + unsigned int crypto_id; + unsigned int tpm_id; +}; + +static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { + {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM2_ALG_SHA1}, + {HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM2_ALG_SHA256}, + {HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM2_ALG_SHA384}, + {HASH_ALGO_SHA512, TPM2_ALG_SHA512}, + {HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM2_ALG_SM3_256}, +}; + /* * Array with one entry per ordinal defining the maximum amount * of time the chip could take to return the result. The values @@ -429,8 +443,20 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, { unsigned int blob_len; struct tpm_buf buf; + u32 hash; + int i; int rc; + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) { + if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) { + hash = tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id; + break; + } + } + + if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map)) + return -EINVAL; + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE); if (rc) return rc; @@ -452,12 +478,26 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable); /* public */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14); + if (options->policydigest) + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->digest_len); + else + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM2_ALG_KEYEDHASH); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM2_ALG_SHA256); - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_ATTR_USER_WITH_AUTH); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); /* policy digest size */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash); + + /* policy */ + if (options->policydigest) { + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->digest_len); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest, + options->digest_len); + } else { + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_ATTR_USER_WITH_AUTH); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + } + + /* public parameters */ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM2_ALG_NULL); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); @@ -488,8 +528,12 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, out: tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - if (rc > 0) - rc = -EPERM; + if (rc > 0) { + if ((rc & TPM2_RC_HASH) == TPM2_RC_HASH) + rc = -EINVAL; + else + rc = -EPERM; + } return rc; } @@ -583,7 +627,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, blob_handle); - tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW, + tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, + options->policyhandle ? + options->policyhandle : TPM2_RS_PW, NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0 /* session_attributes */, options->blobauth /* hmac */, diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c index 4bb9727c1047..8342cf51ffdc 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c @@ -284,17 +284,9 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device) chip->vendor.priv = priv; - /* Default timeouts and durations */ - chip->vendor.timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_A); - chip->vendor.timeout_b = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_B); - chip->vendor.timeout_c = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_C); - chip->vendor.timeout_d = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_D); - chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] = - msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_SHORT); - chip->vendor.duration[TPM_MEDIUM] = - msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_MEDIUM); - chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG] = - msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_LONG); + rc = tpm_get_timeouts(chip); + if (rc) + return rc; chip->acpi_dev_handle = device->handle; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c index 3e6a22658b63..b0a9a9e34241 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count) return 0; } - sig = wait_event_interruptible(ibmvtpm->wq, ibmvtpm->res_len != 0); + sig = wait_event_interruptible(ibmvtpm->wq, !ibmvtpm->tpm_processing_cmd); if (sig) return -EINTR; @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count) struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm; struct ibmvtpm_crq crq; __be64 *word = (__be64 *)&crq; - int rc; + int rc, sig; ibmvtpm = (struct ibmvtpm_dev *)TPM_VPRIV(chip); @@ -141,18 +141,35 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count) return -EIO; } + if (ibmvtpm->tpm_processing_cmd) { + dev_info(ibmvtpm->dev, + "Need to wait for TPM to finish\n"); + /* wait for previous command to finish */ + sig = wait_event_interruptible(ibmvtpm->wq, !ibmvtpm->tpm_processing_cmd); + if (sig) + return -EINTR; + } + spin_lock(&ibmvtpm->rtce_lock); + ibmvtpm->res_len = 0; memcpy((void *)ibmvtpm->rtce_buf, (void *)buf, count); crq.valid = (u8)IBMVTPM_VALID_CMD; crq.msg = (u8)VTPM_TPM_COMMAND; crq.len = cpu_to_be16(count); crq.data = cpu_to_be32(ibmvtpm->rtce_dma_handle); + /* + * set the processing flag before the Hcall, since we may get the + * result (interrupt) before even being able to check rc. + */ + ibmvtpm->tpm_processing_cmd = true; + rc = ibmvtpm_send_crq(ibmvtpm->vdev, be64_to_cpu(word[0]), be64_to_cpu(word[1])); if (rc != H_SUCCESS) { dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev, "tpm_ibmvtpm_send failed rc=%d\n", rc); rc = 0; + ibmvtpm->tpm_processing_cmd = false; } else rc = count; @@ -515,6 +532,7 @@ static void ibmvtpm_crq_process(struct ibmvtpm_crq *crq, case VTPM_TPM_COMMAND_RES: /* len of the data in rtce buffer */ ibmvtpm->res_len = be16_to_cpu(crq->len); + ibmvtpm->tpm_processing_cmd = false; wake_up_interruptible(&ibmvtpm->wq); return; default: diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h index 6af92890518f..91dfe766d080 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ struct ibmvtpm_dev { wait_queue_head_t wq; u16 res_len; u32 vtpm_version; + bool tpm_processing_cmd; }; #define CRQ_RES_BUF_SIZE PAGE_SIZE diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c index 65f7eecc45b0..8a3509cb10da 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c @@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ static void disable_interrupts(struct tpm_chip *chip) iowrite32(intmask, chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality)); - free_irq(chip->vendor.irq, chip); + devm_free_irq(chip->pdev, chip->vendor.irq, chip); chip->vendor.irq = 0; } @@ -461,11 +461,8 @@ static int tpm_tis_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len) chip->vendor.irq = irq; if (!priv->irq_tested) msleep(1); - if (!priv->irq_tested) { + if (!priv->irq_tested) disable_interrupts(chip); - dev_err(chip->pdev, - FW_BUG "TPM interrupt not working, polling instead\n"); - } priv->irq_tested = true; return rc; } @@ -570,26 +567,6 @@ static const struct tpm_class_ops tpm_tis = { .req_canceled = tpm_tis_req_canceled, }; -static irqreturn_t tis_int_probe(int irq, void *dev_id) -{ - struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_id; - u32 interrupt; - - interrupt = ioread32(chip->vendor.iobase + - TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality)); - - if (interrupt == 0) - return IRQ_NONE; - - chip->vendor.probed_irq = irq; - - /* Clear interrupts handled with TPM_EOI */ - iowrite32(interrupt, - chip->vendor.iobase + - TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality)); - return IRQ_HANDLED; -} - static irqreturn_t tis_int_handler(int dummy, void *dev_id) { struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_id; @@ -622,6 +599,84 @@ static irqreturn_t tis_int_handler(int dummy, void *dev_id) return IRQ_HANDLED; } +/* Register the IRQ and issue a command that will cause an interrupt. If an + * irq is seen then leave the chip setup for IRQ operation, otherwise reverse + * everything and leave in polling mode. Returns 0 on success. + */ +static int tpm_tis_probe_irq_single(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 intmask, + int flags, int irq) +{ + struct priv_data *priv = chip->vendor.priv; + u8 original_int_vec; + + if (devm_request_irq(chip->pdev, irq, tis_int_handler, flags, + chip->devname, chip) != 0) { + dev_info(chip->pdev, "Unable to request irq: %d for probe\n", + irq); + return -1; + } + chip->vendor.irq = irq; + + original_int_vec = ioread8(chip->vendor.iobase + + TPM_INT_VECTOR(chip->vendor.locality)); + iowrite8(irq, + chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_INT_VECTOR(chip->vendor.locality)); + + /* Clear all existing */ + iowrite32(ioread32(chip->vendor.iobase + + TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality)), + chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality)); + + /* Turn on */ + iowrite32(intmask | TPM_GLOBAL_INT_ENABLE, + chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality)); + + priv->irq_tested = false; + + /* Generate an interrupt by having the core call through to + * tpm_tis_send + */ + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) + tpm2_gen_interrupt(chip); + else + tpm_gen_interrupt(chip); + + /* tpm_tis_send will either confirm the interrupt is working or it + * will call disable_irq which undoes all of the above. + */ + if (!chip->vendor.irq) { + iowrite8(original_int_vec, + chip->vendor.iobase + + TPM_INT_VECTOR(chip->vendor.locality)); + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Try to find the IRQ the TPM is using. This is for legacy x86 systems that + * do not have ACPI/etc. We typically expect the interrupt to be declared if + * present. + */ +static void tpm_tis_probe_irq(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 intmask) +{ + u8 original_int_vec; + int i; + + original_int_vec = ioread8(chip->vendor.iobase + + TPM_INT_VECTOR(chip->vendor.locality)); + + if (!original_int_vec) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86)) + for (i = 3; i <= 15; i++) + if (!tpm_tis_probe_irq_single(chip, intmask, 0, + i)) + return; + } else if (!tpm_tis_probe_irq_single(chip, intmask, 0, + original_int_vec)) + return; +} + static bool interrupts = true; module_param(interrupts, bool, 0444); MODULE_PARM_DESC(interrupts, "Enable interrupts"); @@ -644,8 +699,7 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_info *tpm_info, acpi_handle acpi_dev_handle) { u32 vendor, intfcaps, intmask; - int rc, i, irq_s, irq_e, probe; - int irq_r = -1; + int rc, probe; struct tpm_chip *chip; struct priv_data *priv; @@ -677,6 +731,15 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_info *tpm_info, goto out_err; } + /* Take control of the TPM's interrupt hardware and shut it off */ + intmask = ioread32(chip->vendor.iobase + + TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality)); + intmask |= TPM_INTF_CMD_READY_INT | TPM_INTF_LOCALITY_CHANGE_INT | + TPM_INTF_DATA_AVAIL_INT | TPM_INTF_STS_VALID_INT; + intmask &= ~TPM_GLOBAL_INT_ENABLE; + iowrite32(intmask, + chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality)); + if (request_locality(chip, 0) != 0) { rc = -ENODEV; goto out_err; @@ -731,126 +794,31 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_info *tpm_info, if (intfcaps & TPM_INTF_DATA_AVAIL_INT) dev_dbg(dev, "\tData Avail Int Support\n"); + /* Very early on issue a command to the TPM in polling mode to make + * sure it works. May as well use that command to set the proper + * timeouts for the driver. + */ + if (tpm_get_timeouts(chip)) { + dev_err(dev, "Could not get TPM timeouts and durations\n"); + rc = -ENODEV; + goto out_err; + } + /* INTERRUPT Setup */ init_waitqueue_head(&chip->vendor.read_queue); init_waitqueue_head(&chip->vendor.int_queue); - - intmask = - ioread32(chip->vendor.iobase + - TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality)); - - intmask |= TPM_INTF_CMD_READY_INT - | TPM_INTF_LOCALITY_CHANGE_INT | TPM_INTF_DATA_AVAIL_INT - | TPM_INTF_STS_VALID_INT; - - iowrite32(intmask, - chip->vendor.iobase + - TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality)); - if (interrupts) - chip->vendor.irq = tpm_info->irq; - if (interrupts && !chip->vendor.irq) { - irq_s = - ioread8(chip->vendor.iobase + - TPM_INT_VECTOR(chip->vendor.locality)); - irq_r = irq_s; - if (irq_s) { - irq_e = irq_s; - } else { - irq_s = 3; - irq_e = 15; - } - - for (i = irq_s; i <= irq_e && chip->vendor.irq == 0; i++) { - iowrite8(i, chip->vendor.iobase + - TPM_INT_VECTOR(chip->vendor.locality)); - if (devm_request_irq - (dev, i, tis_int_probe, IRQF_SHARED, - chip->devname, chip) != 0) { - dev_info(chip->pdev, - "Unable to request irq: %d for probe\n", - i); - continue; - } - - /* Clear all existing */ - iowrite32(ioread32 - (chip->vendor.iobase + - TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality)), - chip->vendor.iobase + - TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality)); - - /* Turn on */ - iowrite32(intmask | TPM_GLOBAL_INT_ENABLE, - chip->vendor.iobase + - TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality)); - - chip->vendor.probed_irq = 0; - - /* Generate Interrupts */ - if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) - tpm2_gen_interrupt(chip); - else - tpm_gen_interrupt(chip); - - chip->vendor.irq = chip->vendor.probed_irq; - - /* free_irq will call into tis_int_probe; - clear all irqs we haven't seen while doing - tpm_gen_interrupt */ - iowrite32(ioread32 - (chip->vendor.iobase + - TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality)), - chip->vendor.iobase + - TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality)); - - /* Turn off */ - iowrite32(intmask, - chip->vendor.iobase + - TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality)); - - devm_free_irq(dev, i, chip); - } + if (interrupts) { + if (tpm_info->irq) { + tpm_tis_probe_irq_single(chip, intmask, IRQF_SHARED, + tpm_info->irq); + if (!chip->vendor.irq) + dev_err(chip->pdev, FW_BUG + "TPM interrupt not working, polling instead\n"); + } else + tpm_tis_probe_irq(chip, intmask); } - if (chip->vendor.irq) { - iowrite8(chip->vendor.irq, - chip->vendor.iobase + - TPM_INT_VECTOR(chip->vendor.locality)); - if (devm_request_irq - (dev, chip->vendor.irq, tis_int_handler, IRQF_SHARED, - chip->devname, chip) != 0) { - dev_info(chip->pdev, - "Unable to request irq: %d for use\n", - chip->vendor.irq); - chip->vendor.irq = 0; - } else { - /* Clear all existing */ - iowrite32(ioread32 - (chip->vendor.iobase + - TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality)), - chip->vendor.iobase + - TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality)); - - /* Turn on */ - iowrite32(intmask | TPM_GLOBAL_INT_ENABLE, - chip->vendor.iobase + - TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality)); - } - } else if (irq_r != -1) - iowrite8(irq_r, chip->vendor.iobase + - TPM_INT_VECTOR(chip->vendor.locality)); if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { - chip->vendor.timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_A); - chip->vendor.timeout_b = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_B); - chip->vendor.timeout_c = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_C); - chip->vendor.timeout_d = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_D); - chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] = - msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_SHORT); - chip->vendor.duration[TPM_MEDIUM] = - msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_MEDIUM); - chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG] = - msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_LONG); - rc = tpm2_do_selftest(chip); if (rc == TPM2_RC_INITIALIZE) { dev_warn(dev, "Firmware has not started TPM\n"); @@ -866,12 +834,6 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_info *tpm_info, goto out_err; } } else { - if (tpm_get_timeouts(chip)) { - dev_err(dev, "Could not get TPM timeouts and durations\n"); - rc = -ENODEV; - goto out_err; - } - if (tpm_do_selftest(chip)) { dev_err(dev, "TPM self test failed\n"); rc = -ENODEV; diff --git a/fs/gfs2/glops.c b/fs/gfs2/glops.c index f348cfb6b69a..437fd73e381e 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/glops.c +++ b/fs/gfs2/glops.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include <linux/gfs2_ondisk.h> #include <linux/bio.h> #include <linux/posix_acl.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include "gfs2.h" #include "incore.h" @@ -262,6 +263,7 @@ static void inode_go_inval(struct gfs2_glock *gl, int flags) if (ip) { set_bit(GIF_INVALID, &ip->i_flags); forget_all_cached_acls(&ip->i_inode); + security_inode_invalidate_secctx(&ip->i_inode); gfs2_dir_hash_inval(ip); } } diff --git a/include/crypto/hash_info.h b/include/crypto/hash_info.h index e1e5a3e5dd1b..56f217d41f12 100644 --- a/include/crypto/hash_info.h +++ b/include/crypto/hash_info.h @@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ #define TGR160_DIGEST_SIZE 20 #define TGR192_DIGEST_SIZE 24 +/* not defined in include/crypto/ */ +#define SM3256_DIGEST_SIZE 32 + extern const char *const hash_algo_name[HASH_ALGO__LAST]; extern const int hash_digest_size[HASH_ALGO__LAST]; diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h index b20cd885c1fd..39fd38cfa8c9 100644 --- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h +++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h @@ -35,4 +35,28 @@ extern int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len, enum key_being_used_for usage); #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MOK_KEYRING +extern struct key *ima_mok_keyring; +extern struct key *ima_blacklist_keyring; + +static inline struct key *get_ima_mok_keyring(void) +{ + return ima_mok_keyring; +} +static inline struct key *get_ima_blacklist_keyring(void) +{ + return ima_blacklist_keyring; +} +#else +static inline struct key *get_ima_mok_keyring(void) +{ + return NULL; +} +static inline struct key *get_ima_blacklist_keyring(void) +{ + return NULL; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_MOK_KEYRING */ + + #endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */ diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index f91ecd9d1bb1..42cf2d991bf4 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128 #define MAX_BLOB_SIZE 512 #define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 64 +#define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64 struct trusted_key_payload { struct rcu_head rcu; @@ -36,6 +37,10 @@ struct trusted_key_options { uint32_t pcrinfo_len; unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; int pcrlock; + uint32_t hash; + uint32_t digest_len; + unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t policyhandle; }; extern struct key_type key_type_trusted; diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 476bc1237ec2..b40ed5df5542 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ extern void __audit_getname(struct filename *name); extern void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags); extern void __audit_file(const struct file *); -extern void __audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent, +extern void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, const struct dentry *dentry, const unsigned char type); extern void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code); @@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ static inline void audit_inode_parent_hidden(struct filename *name, __audit_inode(name, dentry, AUDIT_INODE_PARENT | AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN); } -static inline void audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent, +static inline void audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, const struct dentry *dentry, const unsigned char type) { if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context())) @@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static inline void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) { } -static inline void __audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent, +static inline void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, const struct dentry *dentry, const unsigned char type) { } @@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ static inline void audit_file(struct file *file) static inline void audit_inode_parent_hidden(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry) { } -static inline void audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent, +static inline void audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, const struct dentry *dentry, const unsigned char type) { } diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index af9f0b9e80e6..f314275d4e3f 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -145,24 +145,24 @@ static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c) return dest; } -static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a) +static inline bool cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a) { unsigned __capi; CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { if (a.cap[__capi] != 0) - return 0; + return false; } - return 1; + return true; } /* * Check if "a" is a subset of "set". - * return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set" - * cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1 - * return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set" - * cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0 + * return true if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set" + * cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return true + * return false if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set" + * cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return false */ -static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set) +static inline bool cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set) { kernel_cap_t dest; dest = cap_drop(a, set); @@ -171,12 +171,6 @@ static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set) /* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */ -static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap) -{ - const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET; - return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]); -} - static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a) { const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET; diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index 1fcb88ca88de..35ed9a8a403a 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache; #ifdef CONFIG_EVM +extern int evm_set_key(void *key, size_t keylen); extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, void *xattr_value, @@ -42,6 +43,12 @@ static inline int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattrname) } #endif #else + +static inline int evm_set_key(void *key, size_t keylen) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h index 66f705243985..7321ab8ef949 100644 --- a/include/linux/key.h +++ b/include/linux/key.h @@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ struct key { #define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY 9 /* set if keyring only accepts links to trusted keys */ #define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN 10 /* set if key is builtin */ #define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL 11 /* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */ +#define KEY_FLAG_KEEP 12 /* set if key should not be removed */ /* the key type and key description string * - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index ec3a6bab29de..71969de4058c 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -1261,6 +1261,10 @@ * audit_rule_init. * @rule contains the allocated rule * + * @inode_invalidate_secctx: + * Notify the security module that it must revalidate the security context + * of an inode. + * * @inode_notifysecctx: * Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode * should be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the @@ -1413,14 +1417,14 @@ union security_list_options { int (*inode_removexattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name); int (*inode_need_killpriv)(struct dentry *dentry); int (*inode_killpriv)(struct dentry *dentry); - int (*inode_getsecurity)(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, + int (*inode_getsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc); int (*inode_setsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags); int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size); - void (*inode_getsecid)(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid); + void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid); int (*file_permission)(struct file *file, int mask); int (*file_alloc_security)(struct file *file); @@ -1516,6 +1520,7 @@ union security_list_options { int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid); void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen); + void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode); int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen); @@ -1757,6 +1762,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads { struct list_head secid_to_secctx; struct list_head secctx_to_secid; struct list_head release_secctx; + struct list_head inode_invalidate_secctx; struct list_head inode_notifysecctx; struct list_head inode_setsecctx; struct list_head inode_getsecctx; diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 2f4c1f7aa7db..4824a4ccaf1c 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -270,10 +270,10 @@ int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry); int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name); int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry); int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry); -int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc); +int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc); int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags); int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size); -void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid); +void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid); int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask); int security_file_alloc(struct file *file); void security_file_free(struct file *file); @@ -353,6 +353,7 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen); int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid); void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen); +void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode); int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen); @@ -719,7 +720,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) return cap_inode_killpriv(dentry); } -static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) +static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } @@ -734,7 +735,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, return 0; } -static inline void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) { *secid = 0; } @@ -1093,6 +1094,10 @@ static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) { } +static inline void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) +{ +} + static inline int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/hash_info.h b/include/uapi/linux/hash_info.h index ca18c45f8304..ebf8fd885dd5 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/hash_info.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/hash_info.h @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ enum hash_algo { HASH_ALGO_TGR_128, HASH_ALGO_TGR_160, HASH_ALGO_TGR_192, + HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, HASH_ALGO__LAST }; diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index d6dd95cc59e6..3a3e5deeda8d 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -1719,7 +1719,7 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */ void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry, - const struct inode *inode) + struct inode *inode) { name->ino = inode->i_ino; name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h index de6cbb7cf547..cbbe6bb6496e 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.h +++ b/kernel/audit.h @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ extern u32 audit_ever_enabled; extern void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry, - const struct inode *inode); + struct inode *inode); extern void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap); extern void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index b86cc04959de..195ffaee50b9 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -1754,7 +1754,7 @@ void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; - const struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct audit_names *n; bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT; @@ -1848,12 +1848,12 @@ void __audit_file(const struct file *file) * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during * unsuccessful attempts. */ -void __audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent, +void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, const struct dentry *dentry, const unsigned char type) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; - const struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name; struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL; diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig index 73c457bf5a4a..21d756832b75 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig @@ -41,6 +41,17 @@ config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS This option enables digital signature verification using asymmetric keys. +config INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + bool "Require all keys on the integrity keyrings be signed" + depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + select KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS + default y + help + This option requires that all keys added to the .ima and + .evm keyrings be signed by a key on the system trusted + keyring. + config INTEGRITY_AUDIT bool "Enables integrity auditing support " depends on AUDIT diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 5be9ffbe90ba..8ef15118cc78 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -24,15 +24,22 @@ static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX]; static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = { +#ifndef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING "_evm", - "_module", -#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING "_ima", #else + ".evm", ".ima", #endif + "_module", }; +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING +static bool init_keyring __initdata = true; +#else +static bool init_keyring __initdata; +#endif + int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, const char *digest, int digestlen) { @@ -68,6 +75,9 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); int err = 0; + if (!init_keyring) + return 0; + keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), cred, ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c index 4fec1816a2b3..5ade2a7517a6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include <linux/key-type.h> #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> +#include <keys/system_keyring.h> #include "integrity.h" @@ -32,9 +33,22 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid) pr_debug("key search: \"%s\"\n", name); + key = get_ima_blacklist_keyring(); + if (key) { + key_ref_t kref; + + kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(key, 1), + &key_type_asymmetric, name); + if (!IS_ERR(kref)) { + pr_err("Key '%s' is in ima_blacklist_keyring\n", name); + return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED); + } + } + if (keyring) { /* search in specific keyring */ key_ref_t kref; + kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1), &key_type_asymmetric, name); if (IS_ERR(kref)) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig index bf19723cf117..e825e0ae78e7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig @@ -42,3 +42,20 @@ config EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM labeled file systems to be relabeled. +config EVM_LOAD_X509 + bool "Load an X509 certificate onto the '.evm' trusted keyring" + depends on EVM && INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + default n + help + Load an X509 certificate onto the '.evm' trusted keyring. + + This option enables X509 certificate loading from the kernel + onto the '.evm' trusted keyring. A public key can be used to + verify EVM integrity starting from the 'init' process. + +config EVM_X509_PATH + string "EVM X509 certificate path" + depends on EVM_LOAD_X509 + default "/etc/keys/x509_evm.der" + help + This option defines X509 certificate path. diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index 88bfe77efa1c..f5f12727771a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ #include "../integrity.h" +#define EVM_INIT_HMAC 0x0001 +#define EVM_INIT_X509 0x0002 + extern int evm_initialized; extern char *evm_hmac; extern char *evm_hash; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 461f8d891579..30b6b7d0429f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/crypto.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> +#include <linux/evm.h> #include <keys/encrypted-type.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> #include "evm.h" @@ -32,6 +33,44 @@ struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm; static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex); +#define EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY 0 + +static unsigned long evm_set_key_flags; + +/** + * evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel + * @key: pointer to a buffer with the key data + * @size: length of the key data + * + * This function allows setting the EVM HMAC key from the kernel + * without using the "encrypted" key subsystem keys. It can be used + * by the crypto HW kernel module which has its own way of managing + * keys. + * + * key length should be between 32 and 128 bytes long + */ +int evm_set_key(void *key, size_t keylen) +{ + int rc; + + rc = -EBUSY; + if (test_and_set_bit(EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY, &evm_set_key_flags)) + goto busy; + rc = -EINVAL; + if (keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) + goto inval; + memcpy(evmkey, key, keylen); + evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_HMAC; + pr_info("key initialized\n"); + return 0; +inval: + clear_bit(EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY, &evm_set_key_flags); +busy: + pr_err("key initialization failed\n"); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_set_key); + static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type) { long rc; @@ -40,6 +79,10 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type) struct shash_desc *desc; if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) { + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) { + pr_err("HMAC key is not set\n"); + return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); + } tfm = &hmac_tfm; algo = evm_hmac; } else { @@ -240,7 +283,7 @@ int evm_init_key(void) { struct key *evm_key; struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp; - int rc = 0; + int rc; evm_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, EVMKEY, NULL); if (IS_ERR(evm_key)) @@ -248,12 +291,9 @@ int evm_init_key(void) down_read(&evm_key->sem); ekp = evm_key->payload.data[0]; - if (ekp->decrypted_datalen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) { - rc = -EINVAL; - goto out; - } - memcpy(evmkey, ekp->decrypted_data, ekp->decrypted_datalen); -out: + + rc = evm_set_key(ekp->decrypted_data, ekp->decrypted_datalen); + /* burn the original key contents */ memset(ekp->decrypted_data, 0, ekp->decrypted_datalen); up_read(&evm_key->sem); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 1334e02ae8f4..f7160253f17f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -358,6 +358,15 @@ int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } +static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + + iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); + if (iint) + iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; +} + /** * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry @@ -378,6 +387,8 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))) return; + evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); + evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } @@ -396,6 +407,8 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) return; + evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); + evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } @@ -472,21 +485,34 @@ out: } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security); +#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509 +void __init evm_load_x509(void) +{ + int rc; + + rc = integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH); + if (!rc) + evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_X509; +} +#endif + static int __init init_evm(void) { int error; evm_init_config(); + error = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM); + if (error) + return error; + error = evm_init_secfs(); if (error < 0) { pr_info("Error registering secfs\n"); - goto err; + return error; } return 0; -err: - return error; } /* diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index cf12a04717d3..c8dccd54d501 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -62,9 +62,9 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { char temp[80]; - int i, error; + int i; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || evm_initialized) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) return -EPERM; if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0) @@ -78,12 +78,8 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if ((sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1) || (i != 1)) return -EINVAL; - error = evm_init_key(); - if (!error) { - evm_initialized = 1; - pr_info("initialized\n"); - } else - pr_err("initialization failed\n"); + evm_init_key(); + return count; } diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index c2e3ccd4b510..8f1ab37f2897 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -255,4 +255,5 @@ out: void __init integrity_load_keys(void) { ima_load_x509(); + evm_load_x509(); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index df303346029b..e54a8a8dae94 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -107,6 +107,27 @@ config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH default "sha512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512 default "wp512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512 +config IMA_WRITE_POLICY + bool "Enable multiple writes to the IMA policy" + depends on IMA + default n + help + IMA policy can now be updated multiple times. The new rules get + appended to the original policy. Have in mind that the rules are + scanned in FIFO order so be careful when you design and add new ones. + + If unsure, say N. + +config IMA_READ_POLICY + bool "Enable reading back the current IMA policy" + depends on IMA + default y if IMA_WRITE_POLICY + default n if !IMA_WRITE_POLICY + help + It is often useful to be able to read back the IMA policy. It is + even more important after introducing CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY. + This option allows the root user to see the current policy rules. + config IMA_APPRAISE bool "Appraise integrity measurements" depends on IMA @@ -123,14 +144,35 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE If unsure, say N. config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING - bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed" + bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed (deprecated)" depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + select INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING default y help This option requires that all keys added to the .ima keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring. + This option is deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + +config IMA_MOK_KEYRING + bool "Create IMA machine owner keys (MOK) and blacklist keyrings" + depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING + default n + help + This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings. IMA MOK is an + intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings, + effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy. To successfully import a + key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system + keyring. On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be + signed by CA in either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty + at kernel boot. + + IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys. It is consulted + before any other keyring. If the search is successful the requested + operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller. + config IMA_LOAD_X509 bool "Load X509 certificate onto the '.ima' trusted keyring" depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile index d79263d2fdbf..a8539f9e060f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile @@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o +obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_MOK_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index e2a60c30df44..585af61ed399 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -166,6 +166,11 @@ void ima_update_policy(void); void ima_update_policy_flag(void); ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *); void ima_delete_rules(void); +int ima_check_policy(void); +void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos); +void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos); +void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v); +int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); /* Appraise integrity measurements */ #define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01 @@ -250,17 +255,12 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, { return -EINVAL; } -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */ +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING */ -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING -static inline int ima_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) -{ - return integrity_init_keyring(id); -} +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY +#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS (S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR) #else -static inline int ima_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) -{ - return 0; -} -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING */ -#endif +#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS S_IWUSR +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY */ + +#endif /* __LINUX_IMA_H */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 816d175da79a..f355231997b4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ #include "ima.h" +static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_write_mutex); + static int valid_policy = 1; #define TMPBUFLEN 12 static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(char __user *buf, size_t count, @@ -259,7 +261,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = { static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos) { - char *data = NULL; + char *data; ssize_t result; if (datalen >= PAGE_SIZE) @@ -279,13 +281,20 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, result = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(data, buf, datalen)) - goto out; + goto out_free; + result = mutex_lock_interruptible(&ima_write_mutex); + if (result < 0) + goto out_free; result = ima_parse_add_rule(data); + mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex); + +out_free: + kfree(data); out: if (result < 0) valid_policy = 0; - kfree(data); + return result; } @@ -302,14 +311,31 @@ enum ima_fs_flags { static unsigned long ima_fs_flags; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY +static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = { + .start = ima_policy_start, + .next = ima_policy_next, + .stop = ima_policy_stop, + .show = ima_policy_show, +}; +#endif + /* * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file */ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { - /* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */ - if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) + if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) { +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY return -EACCES; +#else + if ((filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY) + return -EACCES; + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + return seq_open(filp, &ima_policy_seqops); +#endif + } if (test_and_set_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags)) return -EBUSY; return 0; @@ -326,6 +352,14 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed"; + if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) + return 0; + + if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy() < 0) { + cause = "failed"; + valid_policy = 0; + } + pr_info("IMA: policy update %s\n", cause); integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, "policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0); @@ -336,15 +370,21 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); return 0; } + ima_update_policy(); +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY securityfs_remove(ima_policy); ima_policy = NULL; +#else + clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); +#endif return 0; } static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = { .open = ima_open_policy, .write = ima_write_policy, + .read = seq_read, .release = ima_release_policy, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; @@ -382,8 +422,7 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) if (IS_ERR(violations)) goto out; - ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy", - S_IWUSR, + ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS, ima_dir, NULL, &ima_measure_policy_ops); if (IS_ERR(ima_policy)) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index e600cadd231c..bd79f254d204 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void) if (!ima_used_chip) pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n"); - rc = ima_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA); + rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA); if (rc) return rc; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..676885e4320e --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2015 Juniper Networks, Inc. + * + * Author: + * Petko Manolov <petko.manolov@konsulko.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + * + */ + +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> + + +struct key *ima_mok_keyring; +struct key *ima_blacklist_keyring; + +/* + * Allocate the IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings + */ +__init int ima_mok_init(void) +{ + pr_notice("Allocating IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings.\n"); + + ima_mok_keyring = keyring_alloc(".ima_mok", + KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(), + (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | + KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH, + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); + + ima_blacklist_keyring = keyring_alloc(".ima_blacklist", + KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(), + (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | + KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH, + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); + + if (IS_ERR(ima_mok_keyring) || IS_ERR(ima_blacklist_keyring)) + panic("Can't allocate IMA MOK or blacklist keyrings."); + set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &ima_mok_keyring->flags); + + set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &ima_blacklist_keyring->flags); + set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &ima_blacklist_keyring->flags); + return 0; +} +device_initcall(ima_mok_init); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 3997e206f82d..0a3b781f18e5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ #include <linux/magic.h> #include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/rculist.h> #include <linux/genhd.h> +#include <linux/seq_file.h> #include "ima.h" @@ -38,6 +40,7 @@ #define AUDIT 0x0040 int ima_policy_flag; +static int temp_ima_appraise; #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, @@ -135,11 +138,11 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = { static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules); static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules); +static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules); static struct list_head *ima_rules; -static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_rules_mutex); - static int ima_policy __initdata; + static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str) { if (ima_policy) @@ -171,21 +174,18 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str) __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup); /* - * Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be - * reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old, - * stale LSM policy. - * - * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy. - * We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if they don't. + * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring + * to the old, stale LSM policy. Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect + * the reloaded LSM policy. We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if + * they don't. */ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void) { - struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp; + struct ima_rule_entry *entry; int result; int i; - mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex); - list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) { + list_for_each_entry(entry, &ima_policy_rules, list) { for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { if (!entry->lsm[i].rule) continue; @@ -196,7 +196,6 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void) BUG_ON(!entry->lsm[i].rule); } } - mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex); } /** @@ -319,9 +318,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func) * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type) * conditions. * - * (There is no need for locking when walking the policy list, - * as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list - * change.) + * Since the IMA policy may be updated multiple times we need to lock the + * list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous + * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. */ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags) @@ -329,7 +328,8 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, struct ima_rule_entry *entry; int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1); - list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) { + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) { if (!(entry->action & actmask)) continue; @@ -351,6 +351,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, if (!actmask) break; } + rcu_read_unlock(); return action; } @@ -365,12 +366,12 @@ void ima_update_policy_flag(void) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry; - ima_policy_flag = 0; list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) { if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK) ima_policy_flag |= entry->action; } + ima_appraise |= temp_ima_appraise; if (!ima_appraise) ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE; } @@ -415,16 +416,48 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) ima_rules = &ima_default_rules; } +/* Make sure we have a valid policy, at least containing some rules. */ +int ima_check_policy() +{ + if (list_empty(&ima_temp_rules)) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; +} + /** * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules * * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new - * policy. Once updated, the policy is locked, no additional rules can be - * added to the policy. + * policy. What we do here is to splice ima_policy_rules and ima_temp_rules so + * they make a queue. The policy may be updated multiple times and this is the + * RCU updater. + * + * Policy rules are never deleted so ima_policy_flag gets zeroed only once when + * we switch from the default policy to user defined. */ void ima_update_policy(void) { - ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules; + struct list_head *first, *last, *policy; + + /* append current policy with the new rules */ + first = (&ima_temp_rules)->next; + last = (&ima_temp_rules)->prev; + policy = &ima_policy_rules; + + synchronize_rcu(); + + last->next = policy; + rcu_assign_pointer(list_next_rcu(policy->prev), first); + first->prev = policy->prev; + policy->prev = last; + + /* prepare for the next policy rules addition */ + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ima_temp_rules); + + if (ima_rules != policy) { + ima_policy_flag = 0; + ima_rules = policy; + } ima_update_policy_flag(); } @@ -436,8 +469,8 @@ enum { Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type, Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type, Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, - Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner, - Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_permit_directio + Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner, + Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio }; static match_table_t policy_tokens = { @@ -734,9 +767,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN)) result = -EINVAL; else if (entry->func == MODULE_CHECK) - ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES; + temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES; else if (entry->func == FIRMWARE_CHECK) - ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE; + temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE; audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result); audit_log_end(ab); return result; @@ -746,7 +779,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules * @rule - ima measurement policy rule * - * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers. + * Avoid locking by allowing just one writer at a time in ima_write_policy() * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure */ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) @@ -782,26 +815,230 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) return result; } - mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex); - list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules); - mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex); + list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_temp_rules); return len; } -/* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */ +/** + * ima_delete_rules() called to cleanup invalid in-flight policy. + * We don't need locking as we operate on the temp list, which is + * different from the active one. There is also only one user of + * ima_delete_rules() at a time. + */ void ima_delete_rules(void) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp; int i; - mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex); - list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) { + temp_ima_appraise = 0; + list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) { for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p); list_del(&entry->list); kfree(entry); } - mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY +enum { + mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append +}; + +static char *mask_tokens[] = { + "MAY_EXEC", + "MAY_WRITE", + "MAY_READ", + "MAY_APPEND" +}; + +enum { + func_file = 0, func_mmap, func_bprm, + func_module, func_firmware, func_post +}; + +static char *func_tokens[] = { + "FILE_CHECK", + "MMAP_CHECK", + "BPRM_CHECK", + "MODULE_CHECK", + "FIRMWARE_CHECK", + "POST_SETATTR" +}; + +void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) +{ + loff_t l = *pos; + struct ima_rule_entry *entry; + + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) { + if (!l--) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + return entry; + } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + return NULL; +} + +void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos) +{ + struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v; + + rcu_read_lock(); + entry = list_entry_rcu(entry->list.next, struct ima_rule_entry, list); + rcu_read_unlock(); + (*pos)++; + + return (&entry->list == ima_rules) ? NULL : entry; +} + +void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v) +{ +} + +#define pt(token) policy_tokens[token + Opt_err].pattern +#define mt(token) mask_tokens[token] +#define ft(token) func_tokens[token] + +int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) +{ + struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v; + int i = 0; + char tbuf[64] = {0,}; + + rcu_read_lock(); + + if (entry->action & MEASURE) + seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_measure)); + if (entry->action & DONT_MEASURE) + seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_measure)); + if (entry->action & APPRAISE) + seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_appraise)); + if (entry->action & DONT_APPRAISE) + seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_appraise)); + if (entry->action & AUDIT) + seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_audit)); + + seq_puts(m, " "); + + if (entry->flags & IMA_FUNC) { + switch (entry->func) { + case FILE_CHECK: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_file)); + break; + case MMAP_CHECK: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_mmap)); + break; + case BPRM_CHECK: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_bprm)); + break; + case MODULE_CHECK: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_module)); + break; + case FIRMWARE_CHECK: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_firmware)); + break; + case POST_SETATTR: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_post)); + break; + default: + snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->func); + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), tbuf); + break; + } + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + + if (entry->flags & IMA_MASK) { + if (entry->mask & MAY_EXEC) + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_exec)); + if (entry->mask & MAY_WRITE) + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_write)); + if (entry->mask & MAY_READ) + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_read)); + if (entry->mask & MAY_APPEND) + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_append)); + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + + if (entry->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) { + snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "0x%lx", entry->fsmagic); + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fsmagic), tbuf); + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + + if (entry->flags & IMA_FSUUID) { + seq_puts(m, "fsuuid="); + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(entry->fsuuid); ++i) { + switch (i) { + case 4: + case 6: + case 8: + case 10: + seq_puts(m, "-"); + } + seq_printf(m, "%x", entry->fsuuid[i]); + } + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + + if (entry->flags & IMA_UID) { + snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid)); + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid), tbuf); + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + + if (entry->flags & IMA_EUID) { + snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid)); + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid), tbuf); + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + + if (entry->flags & IMA_FOWNER) { + snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->fowner)); + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner), tbuf); + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { + if (entry->lsm[i].rule) { + switch (i) { + case LSM_OBJ_USER: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user), + (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); + break; + case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_role), + (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); + break; + case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_type), + (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); + break; + case LSM_SUBJ_USER: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_user), + (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); + break; + case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_role), + (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); + break; + case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_type), + (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); + break; + } + } + } + if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) + seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig "); + if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) + seq_puts(m, "permit_directio "); + rcu_read_unlock(); + seq_puts(m, "\n"); + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */ diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 9c6168709d3b..5efe2ecc538d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -125,8 +125,8 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data); #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM 0 -#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MODULE 1 -#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA 2 +#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA 1 +#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MODULE 2 #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX 3 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE @@ -149,7 +149,6 @@ static inline int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) { return 0; } - #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE */ #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS @@ -171,6 +170,14 @@ static inline void ima_load_x509(void) } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509 +void __init evm_load_x509(void); +#else +static inline void evm_load_x509(void) +{ +} +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT /* declarations */ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index 72483b8f1be5..fe4d74e126a7 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS select CRYPTO select CRYPTO_HMAC select CRYPTO_SHA1 + select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO help This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index ab7997ded725..07a87311055c 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -429,8 +429,11 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, awaken = 1; /* and link it into the destination keyring */ - if (keyring) + if (keyring) { + set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags); + __key_link(key, _edit); + } /* disable the authorisation key */ if (authkey) diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 1c3872aeed14..ed73c6c1c326 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -358,11 +358,14 @@ error: * and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected after a * certain amount of time (/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay). * + * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be revoked. + * * If successful, 0 is returned. */ long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id) { key_ref_t key_ref; + struct key *key; long ret; key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE); @@ -377,8 +380,12 @@ long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id) } } - key_revoke(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)); + key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); ret = 0; + if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags)) + ret = -EPERM; + else + key_revoke(key); key_ref_put(key_ref); error: @@ -392,11 +399,14 @@ error: * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected * immediately. * + * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be invalidated. + * * If successful, 0 is returned. */ long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id) { key_ref_t key_ref; + struct key *key; long ret; kenter("%d", id); @@ -420,8 +430,12 @@ long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id) } invalidate: - key_invalidate(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)); + key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); ret = 0; + if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags)) + ret = -EPERM; + else + key_invalidate(key); error_put: key_ref_put(key_ref); error: @@ -433,12 +447,13 @@ error: * Clear the specified keyring, creating an empty process keyring if one of the * special keyring IDs is used. * - * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission for this to work. If - * successful, 0 will be returned. + * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission and not have + * KEY_FLAG_KEEP set for this to work. If successful, 0 will be returned. */ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid) { key_ref_t keyring_ref; + struct key *keyring; long ret; keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE); @@ -460,7 +475,11 @@ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid) } clear: - ret = keyring_clear(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref)); + keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref); + if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &keyring->flags)) + ret = -EPERM; + else + ret = keyring_clear(keyring); error_put: key_ref_put(keyring_ref); error: @@ -511,11 +530,14 @@ error: * itself need not grant the caller anything. If the last link to a key is * removed then that key will be scheduled for destruction. * + * Keys or keyrings with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be unlinked. + * * If successful, 0 will be returned. */ long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid) { key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref; + struct key *keyring, *key; long ret; keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE); @@ -530,7 +552,13 @@ long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid) goto error2; } - ret = key_unlink(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)); + keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref); + key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); + if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &keyring->flags) && + test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags)) + ret = -EPERM; + else + ret = key_unlink(keyring, key); key_ref_put(key_ref); error2: @@ -1289,6 +1317,8 @@ error: * the current time. The key and any links to the key will be automatically * garbage collected after the timeout expires. * + * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be timed out. + * * If successful, 0 is returned. */ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout) @@ -1320,10 +1350,13 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout) okay: key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); - key_set_timeout(key, timeout); + ret = 0; + if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags)) + ret = -EPERM; + else + key_set_timeout(key, timeout); key_put(key); - ret = 0; error: return ret; } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index 16dec53184b6..0dcab20cdacd 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ * See Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt */ +#include <crypto/hash_info.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/init.h> @@ -710,7 +711,10 @@ enum { Opt_err = -1, Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update, Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth, - Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable + Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable, + Opt_hash, + Opt_policydigest, + Opt_policyhandle, }; static const match_table_t key_tokens = { @@ -723,6 +727,9 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = { {Opt_pcrinfo, "pcrinfo=%s"}, {Opt_pcrlock, "pcrlock=%s"}, {Opt_migratable, "migratable=%s"}, + {Opt_hash, "hash=%s"}, + {Opt_policydigest, "policydigest=%s"}, + {Opt_policyhandle, "policyhandle=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -736,11 +743,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, int res; unsigned long handle; unsigned long lock; + unsigned long token_mask = 0; + int i; + int tpm2; + + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); + if (tpm2 < 0) + return tpm2; + + opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; + opt->digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash]; while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) { if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t') continue; token = match_token(p, key_tokens, args); + if (test_and_set_bit(token, &token_mask)) + return -EINVAL; switch (token) { case Opt_pcrinfo: @@ -787,6 +806,41 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return -EINVAL; opt->pcrlock = lock; break; + case Opt_hash: + if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask)) + return -EINVAL; + for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { + if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { + opt->hash = i; + opt->digest_len = + hash_digest_size[opt->hash]; + break; + } + } + if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST) + return -EINVAL; + if (!tpm2 && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1) { + pr_info("trusted_key: TPM 1.x only supports SHA-1.\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + break; + case Opt_policydigest: + if (!tpm2 || + strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * opt->digest_len)) + return -EINVAL; + res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from, + opt->digest_len); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + break; + case Opt_policyhandle: + if (!tpm2) + return -EINVAL; + res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + opt->policyhandle = handle; + break; default: return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 46f405ce6b0f..e8ffd92ae2eb 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, dentry); } -int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) +int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity); -void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) { call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid); } @@ -1161,6 +1161,12 @@ void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx); +void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) +{ + call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx); + int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) { return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen); @@ -1763,6 +1769,8 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = { LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid), .release_secctx = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.release_secctx), + .inode_invalidate_secctx = + LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_invalidate_secctx), .inode_notifysecctx = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_notifysecctx), .inode_setsecctx = diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index d0cfaa9f19d0..f8110cfd80ff 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -242,6 +242,72 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) return 0; } +static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry); + +/* + * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The + * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is + * allowed; when set to false, returns ERR_PTR(-ECHILD) when the label is + * invalid. The @opt_dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode; + * when no dentry is available, set it to NULL instead. + */ +static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode, + struct dentry *opt_dentry, + bool may_sleep) +{ + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; + + might_sleep_if(may_sleep); + + if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INVALID) { + if (!may_sleep) + return -ECHILD; + + /* + * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if + * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be + * found; in that case, continue using the old label. + */ + inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, opt_dentry); + } + return 0; +} + +static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode) +{ + return inode->i_security; +} + +static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu) +{ + int error; + + error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu); + if (error) + return ERR_PTR(error); + return inode->i_security; +} + +/* + * Get the security label of an inode. + */ +static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode) +{ + __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true); + return inode->i_security; +} + +/* + * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode. + */ +static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); + + __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true); + return inode->i_security; +} + static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) { struct inode_security_struct *isec; @@ -345,8 +411,6 @@ static const char *labeling_behaviors[7] = { "uses native labeling", }; -static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry); - static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode) { return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL); @@ -565,8 +629,8 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb, opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT; } if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) { - struct inode *root = d_backing_inode(sbsec->sb->s_root); - struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security; + struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root; + struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root); rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len); if (rc) @@ -621,8 +685,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, int rc = 0, i; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; const char *name = sb->s_type->name; - struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(sbsec->sb->s_root); - struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security; + struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root; + struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = backing_inode_security(root); u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0; u32 defcontext_sid = 0; char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts; @@ -802,7 +866,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, goto out; root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid; - root_isec->initialized = 1; + root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; } if (defcontext_sid) { @@ -852,8 +916,8 @@ static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb, if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid) goto mismatch; if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) { - struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = d_backing_inode(oldsb->s_root)->i_security; - struct inode_security_struct *newroot = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root)->i_security; + struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root); + struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root); if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid) goto mismatch; } @@ -903,17 +967,14 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, if (!set_fscontext) newsbsec->sid = sid; if (!set_rootcontext) { - struct inode *newinode = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root); - struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security; + struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root); newisec->sid = sid; } newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid; } if (set_rootcontext) { - const struct inode *oldinode = d_backing_inode(oldsb->s_root); - const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security; - struct inode *newinode = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root); - struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security; + const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root); + struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root); newisec->sid = oldisec->sid; } @@ -1293,11 +1354,11 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent unsigned len = 0; int rc = 0; - if (isec->initialized) + if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED) goto out; mutex_lock(&isec->lock); - if (isec->initialized) + if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED) goto out_unlock; sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; @@ -1469,7 +1530,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent break; } - isec->initialized = 1; + isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&isec->lock); @@ -1640,6 +1701,7 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; + __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true); return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); } @@ -1655,6 +1717,7 @@ static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; ad.u.path = *path; + __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true); return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); } @@ -1712,13 +1775,13 @@ out: /* * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned. */ -static int selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct inode *dir, +static int selinux_determine_inode_label(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass, u32 *_new_isid) { const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; - const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = dir->i_security; + const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir); const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && @@ -1747,7 +1810,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct common_audit_data ad; int rc; - dsec = dir->i_security; + dsec = inode_security(dir); sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; sid = tsec->sid; @@ -1800,8 +1863,8 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir, u32 av; int rc; - dsec = dir->i_security; - isec = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security; + dsec = inode_security(dir); + isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; @@ -1844,10 +1907,10 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, int old_is_dir, new_is_dir; int rc; - old_dsec = old_dir->i_security; - old_isec = d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_security; + old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir); + old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry); old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry); - new_dsec = new_dir->i_security; + new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; @@ -1875,7 +1938,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, if (rc) return rc; if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) { - new_isec = d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_security; + new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry); new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry); rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid, new_isec->sclass, @@ -2011,8 +2074,8 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, { u32 sid = task_sid(to); struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; - struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry); - struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; + struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; + struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); struct common_audit_data ad; int rc; @@ -2028,7 +2091,7 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, return rc; } - if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file), @@ -2217,7 +2280,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) old_tsec = current_security(); new_tsec = bprm->cred->security; - isec = inode->i_security; + isec = inode_security(inode); /* Default to the current task SID. */ new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; @@ -2639,7 +2702,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) break; case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: { struct inode_security_struct *root_isec; - root_isec = d_backing_inode(sb->s_root)->i_security; + root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root); if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid)) goto out_bad_option; @@ -2753,13 +2816,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, void **value, size_t *len) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); - struct inode_security_struct *dsec; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 sid, newsid, clen; int rc; char *context; - dsec = dir->i_security; sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; sid = tsec->sid; @@ -2777,7 +2838,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; - isec->initialized = 1; + isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; } if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) @@ -2858,7 +2919,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; sid = cred_sid(cred); - isec = inode->i_security; + isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu); + if (IS_ERR(isec)) + return PTR_ERR(isec); return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad, rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0); @@ -2910,7 +2973,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask); sid = cred_sid(cred); - isec = inode->i_security; + isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK); + if (IS_ERR(isec)) + return PTR_ERR(isec); rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd); audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc, @@ -2980,7 +3045,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); - struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; + struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; struct common_audit_data ad; u32 newsid, sid = current_sid(); @@ -3057,7 +3122,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, int flags) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); - struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; + struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(dentry); u32 newsid; int rc; @@ -3076,7 +3141,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; - isec->initialized = 1; + isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; return; } @@ -3110,12 +3175,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) * * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook. */ -static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) +static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) { u32 size; int error; char *context = NULL; - struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode); if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -3154,7 +3219,7 @@ out_nofree: static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { - struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode); u32 newsid; int rc; @@ -3170,7 +3235,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; - isec->initialized = 1; + isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; return 0; } @@ -3182,9 +3247,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t return len; } -static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) { - struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode); *secid = isec->sid; } @@ -3207,13 +3272,14 @@ static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; - struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; + struct inode_security_struct *isec; u32 sid = current_sid(); if (!mask) /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ return 0; + isec = inode_security(inode); if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno()) /* No change since file_open check. */ @@ -3242,7 +3308,7 @@ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, struct common_audit_data ad; struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); - struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode); struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl; u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred); int rc; @@ -3506,7 +3572,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) struct inode_security_struct *isec; fsec = file->f_security; - isec = file_inode(file)->i_security; + isec = inode_security(file_inode(file)); /* * Save inode label and policy sequence number * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission @@ -3624,7 +3690,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) */ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) { - struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode); struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security; u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; @@ -3748,7 +3814,7 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, u32 sid = task_sid(p); isec->sid = sid; - isec->initialized = 1; + isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; } /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ @@ -4065,7 +4131,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); - struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock)); struct sk_security_struct *sksec; int err = 0; @@ -4079,7 +4145,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, return err; } - isec->initialized = 1; + isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; if (sock->sk) { sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; @@ -4265,12 +4331,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) if (err) return err; - newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security; + newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock)); - isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; + isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock)); newisec->sclass = isec->sclass; newisec->sid = isec->sid; - newisec->initialized = 1; + newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; return 0; } @@ -4605,7 +4671,8 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) { - struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security; + struct inode_security_struct *isec = + inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent)); struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 || @@ -4785,11 +4852,12 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm); if (err) { if (err == -EINVAL) { - printk(KERN_WARNING - "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:" - " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s\n", + pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink" + " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s" + " pig=%d comm=%s\n", sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, - secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name); + secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name, + task_pid_nr(current), current->comm); if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown()) err = 0; } @@ -5762,6 +5830,15 @@ static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) kfree(secdata); } +static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; + + mutex_lock(&isec->lock); + isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID; + mutex_unlock(&isec->lock); +} + /* * called with inode->i_mutex locked */ @@ -5993,6 +6070,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx), diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index 5a4eef59aeff..ef83c4b85a33 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { { "compute_av", "compute_create", "compute_member", "check_context", "load_policy", "compute_relabel", "compute_user", "setenforce", "setbool", "setsecparam", - "setcheckreqprot", "read_policy", NULL } }, + "setcheckreqprot", "read_policy", "validate_trans", NULL } }, { "process", { "fork", "transition", "sigchld", "sigkill", "sigstop", "signull", "signal", "ptrace", "getsched", "setsched", diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index 81fa718d5cb3..a2ae05414ba1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -37,6 +37,12 @@ struct task_security_struct { u32 sockcreate_sid; /* fscreate SID */ }; +enum label_initialized { + LABEL_MISSING, /* not initialized */ + LABEL_INITIALIZED, /* inizialized */ + LABEL_INVALID /* invalid */ +}; + struct inode_security_struct { struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode object */ union { diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 223e9fd15d66..38feb55d531a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -187,6 +187,9 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen, int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, u16 tclass); +int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, + u16 tclass); + int security_bounded_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid); int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid); diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 73c60baa90a4..732c1c77dccd 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ enum sel_inos { SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown deny handling to userspace */ SEL_STATUS, /* export current status using mmap() */ SEL_POLICY, /* allow userspace to read the in kernel policy */ + SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS, /* compute validatetrans decision */ SEL_INO_NEXT, /* The next inode number to use */ }; @@ -632,6 +633,83 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_checkreqprot_ops = { .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; +static ssize_t sel_write_validatetrans(struct file *file, + const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + char *oldcon = NULL, *newcon = NULL, *taskcon = NULL; + char *req = NULL; + u32 osid, nsid, tsid; + u16 tclass; + int rc; + + rc = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__VALIDATE_TRANS); + if (rc) + goto out; + + rc = -ENOMEM; + if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) + goto out; + + /* No partial writes. */ + rc = -EINVAL; + if (*ppos != 0) + goto out; + + rc = -ENOMEM; + req = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) + goto out; + + rc = -EFAULT; + if (copy_from_user(req, buf, count)) + goto out; + + rc = -ENOMEM; + oldcon = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!oldcon) + goto out; + + newcon = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!newcon) + goto out; + + taskcon = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!taskcon) + goto out; + + rc = -EINVAL; + if (sscanf(req, "%s %s %hu %s", oldcon, newcon, &tclass, taskcon) != 4) + goto out; + + rc = security_context_str_to_sid(oldcon, &osid, GFP_KERNEL); + if (rc) + goto out; + + rc = security_context_str_to_sid(newcon, &nsid, GFP_KERNEL); + if (rc) + goto out; + + rc = security_context_str_to_sid(taskcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL); + if (rc) + goto out; + + rc = security_validate_transition_user(osid, nsid, tsid, tclass); + if (!rc) + rc = count; +out: + kfree(req); + kfree(oldcon); + kfree(newcon); + kfree(taskcon); + return rc; +} + +static const struct file_operations sel_transition_ops = { + .write = sel_write_validatetrans, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; + /* * Remaining nodes use transaction based IO methods like nfsd/nfsctl.c */ @@ -1727,6 +1805,8 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) [SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO}, [SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, S_IRUGO}, [SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUGO}, + [SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS] = {"validatetrans", &sel_transition_ops, + S_IWUGO}, /* last one */ {""} }; ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index ebb5eb3c318c..ebda97333f1b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -778,8 +778,8 @@ out: return -EPERM; } -int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, - u16 orig_tclass) +static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, + u16 orig_tclass, bool user) { struct context *ocontext; struct context *ncontext; @@ -794,11 +794,12 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, read_lock(&policy_rwlock); - tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass); + if (!user) + tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass); + else + tclass = orig_tclass; if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %d\n", - __func__, tclass); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } @@ -832,8 +833,13 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, while (constraint) { if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext, constraint->expr)) { - rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, ncontext, - tcontext, tclass); + if (user) + rc = -EPERM; + else + rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, + ncontext, + tcontext, + tclass); goto out; } constraint = constraint->next; @@ -844,6 +850,20 @@ out: return rc; } +int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, + u16 tclass) +{ + return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid, + tclass, true); +} + +int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, + u16 orig_tclass) +{ + return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid, + orig_tclass, false); +} + /* * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given * transition is directed to bounded, or not. diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 37fdd5416a64..8d85435a45d7 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1465,7 +1465,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) * * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code */ -static int smack_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, +static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) { @@ -1536,7 +1536,7 @@ static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, * @inode: inode to extract the info from * @secid: where result will be saved */ -static void smack_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) { struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security; @@ -1858,12 +1858,34 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) int may = 0; struct smk_audit_info ad; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + struct socket *sock; + struct task_smack *tsp; + struct socket_smack *ssp; if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); + + if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) { + sock = SOCKET_I(inode); + ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + tsp = current_security(); + /* + * If the receiving process can't write to the + * passed socket or if the passed socket can't + * write to the receiving process don't accept + * the passed socket. + */ + rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, ssp->smk_out, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_in, tsp->smk_task, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc); + return rc; + } /* * This code relies on bitmasks. */ @@ -3756,7 +3778,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, if (sip == NULL) return 0; - switch (sip->sin_family) { + switch (sock->sk->sk_family) { case AF_INET: rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip); break; |