diff options
author | Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> | 2022-05-19 20:35:15 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2022-06-16 13:01:55 +0200 |
commit | ac87ab4460f35b5064b2b9db1be146def2941fee (patch) | |
tree | 1159f6cc92d689cd2ff4b08a0ebf1edfa706b4aa | |
parent | 532c3a51316b6b1fdc6cb01926e2d139ef7e25da (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-ac87ab4460f35b5064b2b9db1be146def2941fee.tar.gz linux-stable-ac87ab4460f35b5064b2b9db1be146def2941fee.tar.bz2 linux-stable-ac87ab4460f35b5064b2b9db1be146def2941fee.zip |
KVM: x86/speculation: Disable Fill buffer clear within guests
commit 027bbb884be006b05d9c577d6401686053aa789e upstream
The enumeration of MD_CLEAR in CPUID(EAX=7,ECX=0).EDX{bit 10} is not an
accurate indicator on all CPUs of whether the VERW instruction will
overwrite fill buffers. FB_CLEAR enumeration in
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES{bit 17} covers the case of CPUs that are not
vulnerable to MDS/TAA, indicating that microcode does overwrite fill
buffers.
Guests running in VMM environments may not be aware of all the
capabilities/vulnerabilities of the host CPU. Specifically, a guest may
apply MDS/TAA mitigations when a virtual CPU is enumerated as vulnerable
to MDS/TAA even when the physical CPU is not. On CPUs that enumerate
FB_CLEAR_CTRL the VMM may set FB_CLEAR_DIS to skip overwriting of fill
buffers by the VERW instruction. This is done by setting FB_CLEAR_DIS
during VMENTER and resetting on VMEXIT. For guests that enumerate
FB_CLEAR (explicitly asking for fill buffer clear capability) the VMM
will not use FB_CLEAR_DIS.
Irrespective of guest state, host overwrites CPU buffers before VMENTER
to protect itself from an MMIO capable guest, as part of mitigation for
MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[cascardo: arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c has been split and context adjustment at
vmx_vcpu_run]
[cascardo: moved functions so they are after struct vcpu_vmx definition]
[cascardo: fb_clear is disabled/enabled around __vmx_vcpu_run]
[cascardo: conflict context fixups]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 74 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 |
3 files changed, 83 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 9de1e8a6acf9..c090d8e8fbb3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -115,6 +115,11 @@ * VERW clears CPU fill buffer * even on MDS_NO CPUs. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL BIT(18) /* + * MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[FB_CLEAR_DIS] + * bit available to control VERW + * behavior. + */ #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b #define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /* @@ -132,6 +137,7 @@ /* SRBDS support */ #define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL 0x00000123 #define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0) +#define FB_CLEAR_DIS BIT(3) /* CPU Fill buffer clear disable */ #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175 diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index c342ddb50a6c..6a6d3cccae9a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -214,6 +214,9 @@ static const struct { #define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4 static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages; +/* Control for disabling CPU Fill buffer clear */ +static bool __read_mostly vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available; + static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf) { struct page *page; @@ -820,6 +823,8 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { */ u64 msr_ia32_feature_control; u64 msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits; + u64 msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl; + bool disable_fb_clear; }; enum segment_cache_field { @@ -1628,6 +1633,60 @@ static inline void __invept(unsigned long ext, u64 eptp, gpa_t gpa) : : "a" (&operand), "c" (ext) : "cc", "memory"); } +static void vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl(void) +{ + u64 msr; + + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES) && + !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) && + !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) { + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, msr); + if (msr & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) + vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available = true; + } +} + +static __always_inline void vmx_disable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + u64 msr; + + if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear) + return; + + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr); + msr |= FB_CLEAR_DIS; + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr); + /* Cache the MSR value to avoid reading it later */ + vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl = msr; +} + +static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear) + return; + + vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl &= ~FB_CLEAR_DIS; + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl); +} + +static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + vmx->disable_fb_clear = vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available; + + /* + * If guest will not execute VERW, there is no need to set FB_CLEAR_DIS + * at VMEntry. Skip the MSR read/write when a guest has no use case to + * execute VERW. + */ + if ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) || + ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && + (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) && + (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO) && + (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO) && + (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO))) + vmx->disable_fb_clear = false; +} + static struct shared_msr_entry *find_msr_entry(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr) { int i; @@ -3700,9 +3759,13 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) } break; } - ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info); + ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info); } + /* FB_CLEAR may have changed, also update the FB_CLEAR_DIS behavior */ + if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES) + vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(vcpu, vmx); + return ret; } @@ -6008,6 +6071,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) update_exception_bitmap(vcpu); vpid_sync_context(vmx->vpid); + + vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(vcpu, vmx); } /* @@ -9783,6 +9848,8 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm)) mds_clear_cpu_buffers(); + vmx_disable_fb_clear(vmx); + asm( /* Store host registers */ "push %%" _ASM_DX "; push %%" _ASM_BP ";" @@ -9900,6 +9967,8 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) #endif ); + vmx_enable_fb_clear(vmx); + /* * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and @@ -12924,8 +12993,11 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void) } } + vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl(); + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu)); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu, cpu)); spin_lock_init(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, cpu)); } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 0690155f42b2..acdb08136464 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -1127,6 +1127,10 @@ u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void) /* KVM does not emulate MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL. */ data &= ~ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR; + + /* Guests don't need to know "Fill buffer clear control" exists */ + data &= ~ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL; + return data; } |