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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2009-01-06 17:11:39 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2009-01-06 17:11:39 -0800
commitc861ea2cb2c25c1698734d9b0540a09e253690a1 (patch)
treeb83e5313ca07a3efbcbcdd7fe33e0f6ad6284493
parent3610639d1fceb09cb418c65fcbe9136c31eee03a (diff)
parentac8cc0fa5395fe2278e305a4cbed48e90d88d878 (diff)
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Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() [ver #3] Revert "CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() [ver #2]" SELinux: shrink sizeof av_inhert selinux_class_perm and context CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() [ver #2] keys: fix sparse warning by adding __user annotation to cast smack: Add support for unlabeled network hosts and networks selinux: Deprecate and schedule the removal of the the compat_net functionality netlabel: Update kernel configuration API
-rw-r--r--Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt12
-rw-r--r--include/linux/capability.h17
-rw-r--r--include/linux/security.h41
-rw-r--r--include/net/cipso_ipv4.h6
-rw-r--r--include/net/netlabel.h86
-rw-r--r--kernel/capability.c2
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c86
-rw-r--r--net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c61
-rw-r--r--net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c67
-rw-r--r--net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.h4
-rw-r--r--net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c347
-rw-r--r--net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c26
-rw-r--r--net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h15
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c29
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c2
-rw-r--r--security/security.c26
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/Kconfig27
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c16
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c22
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c16
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/context.h2
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack.h31
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_access.c28
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c310
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c369
26 files changed, 1229 insertions, 423 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt b/Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt
index df18d87c4837..2193be53e773 100644
--- a/Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt
+++ b/Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt
@@ -315,3 +315,15 @@ When: 2.6.29 (ideally) or 2.6.30 (more likely)
Why: Deprecated by the new (standard) device driver binding model. Use
i2c_driver->probe() and ->remove() instead.
Who: Jean Delvare <khali@linux-fr.org>
+
+---------------------------
+
+What: SELinux "compat_net" functionality
+When: 2.6.30 at the earliest
+Why: In 2.6.18 the Secmark concept was introduced to replace the "compat_net"
+ network access control functionality of SELinux. Secmark offers both
+ better performance and greater flexibility than the "compat_net"
+ mechanism. Now that the major Linux distributions have moved to
+ Secmark, it is time to deprecate the older mechanism and start the
+ process of removing the old code.
+Who: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index e22f48c2a46f..02bdb768d43b 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -529,8 +529,21 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
*
* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
*/
-#define has_capability(t, cap) (security_capable((t), (cap)) == 0)
-#define has_capability_noaudit(t, cap) (security_capable_noaudit((t), (cap)) == 0)
+#define has_capability(t, cap) (security_real_capable((t), (cap)) == 0)
+
+/**
+ * has_capability_noaudit - Determine if a task has a superior capability available (unaudited)
+ * @t: The task in question
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
+ * currently in effect, false if not, but don't write an audit message for the
+ * check.
+ *
+ * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
+ */
+#define has_capability_noaudit(t, cap) \
+ (security_real_capable_noaudit((t), (cap)) == 0)
extern int capable(int cap);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index b92b5e453f64..1f2ab6353c00 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ struct audit_krule;
* These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
* as the default capabilities functions
*/
-extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit);
+extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
+ int cap, int audit);
extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
extern int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
@@ -1251,9 +1252,12 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @permitted contains the permitted capability set.
* Return 0 and update @new if permission is granted.
* @capable:
- * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability.
+ * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated
+ * credentials.
* @tsk contains the task_struct for the process.
+ * @cred contains the credentials to use.
* @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
+ * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
* Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
* @acct:
* Check permission before enabling or disabling process accounting. If
@@ -1346,7 +1350,8 @@ struct security_operations {
const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
- int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit);
+ int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
+ int cap, int audit);
int (*acct) (struct file *file);
int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table *table, int op);
int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
@@ -1628,8 +1633,9 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
-int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
+int security_capable(int cap);
+int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
+int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
int security_acct(struct file *file);
int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op);
int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
@@ -1826,14 +1832,31 @@ static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new,
return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-static inline int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+static inline int security_capable(int cap)
{
- return cap_capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ return cap_capable(current, current_cred(), cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
}
-static inline int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+static inline int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
{
- return cap_capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ int ret;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static inline
+int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), cap,
+ SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return ret;
}
static inline int security_acct(struct file *file)
diff --git a/include/net/cipso_ipv4.h b/include/net/cipso_ipv4.h
index 9909774eb998..bedc7f62e35d 100644
--- a/include/net/cipso_ipv4.h
+++ b/include/net/cipso_ipv4.h
@@ -131,7 +131,8 @@ extern int cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid;
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
-int cipso_v4_doi_add(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def);
+int cipso_v4_doi_add(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
void cipso_v4_doi_free(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def);
int cipso_v4_doi_remove(u32 doi, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
struct cipso_v4_doi *cipso_v4_doi_getdef(u32 doi);
@@ -140,7 +141,8 @@ int cipso_v4_doi_walk(u32 *skip_cnt,
int (*callback) (struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def, void *arg),
void *cb_arg);
#else
-static inline int cipso_v4_doi_add(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def)
+static inline int cipso_v4_doi_add(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 17c442a4514e..749011eedc0b 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
#include <net/netlink.h>
#include <asm/atomic.h>
@@ -353,13 +355,37 @@ static inline void netlbl_secattr_free(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
/*
* LSM configuration operations
*/
-int netlbl_cfg_map_del(const char *domain, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
-int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_add_map(const char *domain,
+int netlbl_cfg_map_del(const char *domain,
+ u16 family,
+ const void *addr,
+ const void *mask,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
+int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,
+ u16 family,
+ const void *addr,
+ const void *mask,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
-int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add_map(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
+int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
+ const char *dev_name,
+ const void *addr,
+ const void *mask,
+ u16 family,
+ u32 secid,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
+int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
+ const char *dev_name,
+ const void *addr,
+ const void *mask,
+ u16 family,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
+int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
+void netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del(u32 doi, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
+int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add(u32 doi,
const char *domain,
+ const struct in_addr *addr,
+ const struct in_addr *mask,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
-
/*
* LSM security attribute operations
*/
@@ -401,19 +427,62 @@ void netlbl_skbuff_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, int gateway);
void netlbl_cache_invalidate(void);
int netlbl_cache_add(const struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+
+/*
+ * Protocol engine operations
+ */
+struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start(int type,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
#else
static inline int netlbl_cfg_map_del(const char *domain,
+ u16 family,
+ const void *addr,
+ const void *mask,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
-static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_add_map(const char *domain,
+static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,
+ u16 family,
+ void *addr,
+ void *mask,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
-static inline int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add_map(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
+static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
+ const char *dev_name,
+ const void *addr,
+ const void *mask,
+ u16 family,
+ u32 secid,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+ return -ENOSYS;
+}
+static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
+ const char *dev_name,
+ const void *addr,
+ const void *mask,
+ u16 family,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+ return -ENOSYS;
+}
+static inline int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+ return -ENOSYS;
+}
+static inline void netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del(u32 doi,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+ return;
+}
+static inline int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add(u32 doi,
const char *domain,
+ const struct in_addr *addr,
+ const struct in_addr *mask,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
return -ENOSYS;
@@ -495,6 +564,11 @@ static inline int netlbl_cache_add(const struct sk_buff *skb,
{
return 0;
}
+static inline struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start(int type,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
#endif /* _NETLABEL_H */
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index c598d9d5be4f..688926e496be 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ int capable(int cap)
BUG();
}
- if (has_capability(current, cap)) {
+ if (security_capable(cap) == 0) {
current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
return 1;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index e52799047a5f..6bb2635b5ded 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/jhash.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/icmp.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
@@ -449,6 +450,7 @@ static struct cipso_v4_doi *cipso_v4_doi_search(u32 doi)
/**
* cipso_v4_doi_add - Add a new DOI to the CIPSO protocol engine
* @doi_def: the DOI structure
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
*
* Description:
* The caller defines a new DOI for use by the CIPSO engine and calls this
@@ -458,50 +460,78 @@ static struct cipso_v4_doi *cipso_v4_doi_search(u32 doi)
* zero on success and non-zero on failure.
*
*/
-int cipso_v4_doi_add(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def)
+int cipso_v4_doi_add(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
+ int ret_val = -EINVAL;
u32 iter;
+ u32 doi;
+ u32 doi_type;
+ struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
+
+ doi = doi_def->doi;
+ doi_type = doi_def->type;
if (doi_def == NULL || doi_def->doi == CIPSO_V4_DOI_UNKNOWN)
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto doi_add_return;
for (iter = 0; iter < CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT; iter++) {
switch (doi_def->tags[iter]) {
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBITMAP:
break;
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_RANGE:
- if (doi_def->type != CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS)
- return -EINVAL;
- break;
- case CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID:
- if (iter == 0)
- return -EINVAL;
- break;
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_ENUM:
if (doi_def->type != CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS)
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto doi_add_return;
break;
case CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL:
if (doi_def->type != CIPSO_V4_MAP_LOCAL)
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto doi_add_return;
+ break;
+ case CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID:
+ if (iter == 0)
+ goto doi_add_return;
break;
default:
- return -EINVAL;
+ goto doi_add_return;
}
}
atomic_set(&doi_def->refcount, 1);
spin_lock(&cipso_v4_doi_list_lock);
- if (cipso_v4_doi_search(doi_def->doi) != NULL)
- goto doi_add_failure;
+ if (cipso_v4_doi_search(doi_def->doi) != NULL) {
+ spin_unlock(&cipso_v4_doi_list_lock);
+ ret_val = -EEXIST;
+ goto doi_add_return;
+ }
list_add_tail_rcu(&doi_def->list, &cipso_v4_doi_list);
spin_unlock(&cipso_v4_doi_list_lock);
+ ret_val = 0;
- return 0;
+doi_add_return:
+ audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start(AUDIT_MAC_CIPSOV4_ADD, audit_info);
+ if (audit_buf != NULL) {
+ const char *type_str;
+ switch (doi_type) {
+ case CIPSO_V4_MAP_TRANS:
+ type_str = "trans";
+ break;
+ case CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS:
+ type_str = "pass";
+ break;
+ case CIPSO_V4_MAP_LOCAL:
+ type_str = "local";
+ break;
+ default:
+ type_str = "(unknown)";
+ }
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf,
+ " cipso_doi=%u cipso_type=%s res=%u",
+ doi, type_str, ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
+ audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+ }
-doi_add_failure:
- spin_unlock(&cipso_v4_doi_list_lock);
- return -EEXIST;
+ return ret_val;
}
/**
@@ -559,25 +589,39 @@ static void cipso_v4_doi_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *entry)
*/
int cipso_v4_doi_remove(u32 doi, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
+ int ret_val;
struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def;
+ struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
spin_lock(&cipso_v4_doi_list_lock);
doi_def = cipso_v4_doi_search(doi);
if (doi_def == NULL) {
spin_unlock(&cipso_v4_doi_list_lock);
- return -ENOENT;
+ ret_val = -ENOENT;
+ goto doi_remove_return;
}
if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&doi_def->refcount)) {
spin_unlock(&cipso_v4_doi_list_lock);
- return -EBUSY;
+ ret_val = -EBUSY;
+ goto doi_remove_return;
}
list_del_rcu(&doi_def->list);
spin_unlock(&cipso_v4_doi_list_lock);
cipso_v4_cache_invalidate();
call_rcu(&doi_def->rcu, cipso_v4_doi_free_rcu);
+ ret_val = 0;
+
+doi_remove_return:
+ audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start(AUDIT_MAC_CIPSOV4_DEL, audit_info);
+ if (audit_buf != NULL) {
+ audit_log_format(audit_buf,
+ " cipso_doi=%u res=%u",
+ doi, ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
+ audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+ }
- return 0;
+ return ret_val;
}
/**
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c
index fff32b70efa9..bf1ab1a6790d 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_common(struct genl_info *info,
/**
* netlbl_cipsov4_add_std - Adds a CIPSO V4 DOI definition
* @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
*
* Description:
* Create a new CIPSO_V4_MAP_TRANS DOI definition based on the given ADD
@@ -137,7 +138,8 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_common(struct genl_info *info,
* non-zero on error.
*
*/
-static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(struct genl_info *info)
+static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(struct genl_info *info,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
int ret_val = -EINVAL;
struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def = NULL;
@@ -316,7 +318,7 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(struct genl_info *info)
}
}
- ret_val = cipso_v4_doi_add(doi_def);
+ ret_val = cipso_v4_doi_add(doi_def, audit_info);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto add_std_failure;
return 0;
@@ -330,6 +332,7 @@ add_std_failure:
/**
* netlbl_cipsov4_add_pass - Adds a CIPSO V4 DOI definition
* @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
*
* Description:
* Create a new CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS DOI definition based on the given ADD message
@@ -337,7 +340,8 @@ add_std_failure:
* error.
*
*/
-static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_pass(struct genl_info *info)
+static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_pass(struct genl_info *info,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
int ret_val;
struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def = NULL;
@@ -354,7 +358,7 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_pass(struct genl_info *info)
if (ret_val != 0)
goto add_pass_failure;
- ret_val = cipso_v4_doi_add(doi_def);
+ ret_val = cipso_v4_doi_add(doi_def, audit_info);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto add_pass_failure;
return 0;
@@ -367,6 +371,7 @@ add_pass_failure:
/**
* netlbl_cipsov4_add_local - Adds a CIPSO V4 DOI definition
* @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
*
* Description:
* Create a new CIPSO_V4_MAP_LOCAL DOI definition based on the given ADD
@@ -374,7 +379,8 @@ add_pass_failure:
* non-zero on error.
*
*/
-static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_local(struct genl_info *info)
+static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_local(struct genl_info *info,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
int ret_val;
struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def = NULL;
@@ -391,7 +397,7 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add_local(struct genl_info *info)
if (ret_val != 0)
goto add_local_failure;
- ret_val = cipso_v4_doi_add(doi_def);
+ ret_val = cipso_v4_doi_add(doi_def, audit_info);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto add_local_failure;
return 0;
@@ -415,48 +421,31 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_add(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
int ret_val = -EINVAL;
- u32 type;
- u32 doi;
const char *type_str = "(unknown)";
- struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
if (!info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_DOI] ||
!info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MTYPE])
return -EINVAL;
- doi = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_DOI]);
netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(skb, &audit_info);
-
- type = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MTYPE]);
- switch (type) {
+ switch (nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MTYPE])) {
case CIPSO_V4_MAP_TRANS:
type_str = "trans";
- ret_val = netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(info);
+ ret_val = netlbl_cipsov4_add_std(info, &audit_info);
break;
case CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS:
type_str = "pass";
- ret_val = netlbl_cipsov4_add_pass(info);
+ ret_val = netlbl_cipsov4_add_pass(info, &audit_info);
break;
case CIPSO_V4_MAP_LOCAL:
type_str = "local";
- ret_val = netlbl_cipsov4_add_local(info);
+ ret_val = netlbl_cipsov4_add_local(info, &audit_info);
break;
}
if (ret_val == 0)
atomic_inc(&netlabel_mgmt_protocount);
- audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start_common(AUDIT_MAC_CIPSOV4_ADD,
- &audit_info);
- if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf,
- " cipso_doi=%u cipso_type=%s res=%u",
- doi,
- type_str,
- ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
- audit_log_end(audit_buf);
- }
-
return ret_val;
}
@@ -725,9 +714,7 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_remove_cb(struct netlbl_dom_map *entry, void *arg)
static int netlbl_cipsov4_remove(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
int ret_val = -EINVAL;
- u32 doi = 0;
struct netlbl_domhsh_walk_arg cb_arg;
- struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
u32 skip_bkt = 0;
u32 skip_chain = 0;
@@ -735,29 +722,17 @@ static int netlbl_cipsov4_remove(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
if (!info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_DOI])
return -EINVAL;
- doi = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_DOI]);
netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(skb, &audit_info);
-
- cb_arg.doi = doi;
+ cb_arg.doi = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_DOI]);
cb_arg.audit_info = &audit_info;
ret_val = netlbl_domhsh_walk(&skip_bkt, &skip_chain,
netlbl_cipsov4_remove_cb, &cb_arg);
if (ret_val == 0 || ret_val == -ENOENT) {
- ret_val = cipso_v4_doi_remove(doi, &audit_info);
+ ret_val = cipso_v4_doi_remove(cb_arg.doi, &audit_info);
if (ret_val == 0)
atomic_dec(&netlabel_mgmt_protocount);
}
- audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start_common(AUDIT_MAC_CIPSOV4_DEL,
- &audit_info);
- if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- audit_log_format(audit_buf,
- " cipso_doi=%u res=%u",
- doi,
- ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
- audit_log_end(audit_buf);
- }
-
return ret_val;
}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c
index 5fadf10e5ddf..7a10bbe02c13 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c
@@ -483,6 +483,73 @@ int netlbl_domhsh_remove_entry(struct netlbl_dom_map *entry,
}
/**
+ * netlbl_domhsh_remove_af4 - Removes an address selector entry
+ * @domain: the domain
+ * @addr: IPv4 address
+ * @mask: IPv4 address mask
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Removes an individual address selector from a domain mapping and potentially
+ * the entire mapping if it is empty. Returns zero on success, negative values
+ * on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int netlbl_domhsh_remove_af4(const char *domain,
+ const struct in_addr *addr,
+ const struct in_addr *mask,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+ struct netlbl_dom_map *entry_map;
+ struct netlbl_af4list *entry_addr;
+ struct netlbl_af4list *iter4;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ struct netlbl_af6list *iter6;
+#endif /* IPv6 */
+ struct netlbl_domaddr4_map *entry;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ if (domain)
+ entry_map = netlbl_domhsh_search(domain);
+ else
+ entry_map = netlbl_domhsh_search_def(domain);
+ if (entry_map == NULL || entry_map->type != NETLBL_NLTYPE_ADDRSELECT)
+ goto remove_af4_failure;
+
+ spin_lock(&netlbl_domhsh_lock);
+ entry_addr = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
+ &entry_map->type_def.addrsel->list4);
+ spin_unlock(&netlbl_domhsh_lock);
+
+ if (entry_addr == NULL)
+ goto remove_af4_failure;
+ netlbl_af4list_foreach_rcu(iter4, &entry_map->type_def.addrsel->list4)
+ goto remove_af4_single_addr;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ netlbl_af6list_foreach_rcu(iter6, &entry_map->type_def.addrsel->list6)
+ goto remove_af4_single_addr;
+#endif /* IPv6 */
+ /* the domain mapping is empty so remove it from the mapping table */
+ netlbl_domhsh_remove_entry(entry_map, audit_info);
+
+remove_af4_single_addr:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ /* yick, we can't use call_rcu here because we don't have a rcu head
+ * pointer but hopefully this should be a rare case so the pause
+ * shouldn't be a problem */
+ synchronize_rcu();
+ entry = netlbl_domhsh_addr4_entry(entry_addr);
+ cipso_v4_doi_putdef(entry->type_def.cipsov4);
+ kfree(entry);
+ return 0;
+
+remove_af4_failure:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+/**
* netlbl_domhsh_remove - Removes an entry from the domain hash table
* @domain: the domain to remove
* @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.h
index bfcb6763a1a1..0261dda3f2d2 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.h
@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ int netlbl_domhsh_add_default(struct netlbl_dom_map *entry,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_domhsh_remove_entry(struct netlbl_dom_map *entry,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
+int netlbl_domhsh_remove_af4(const char *domain,
+ const struct in_addr *addr,
+ const struct in_addr *mask,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_domhsh_remove(const char *domain, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
int netlbl_domhsh_remove_default(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
struct netlbl_dom_map *netlbl_domhsh_getentry(const char *domain);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index b32eceb3ab0d..fd9229db075c 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -31,7 +31,10 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
#include <asm/bug.h>
@@ -42,6 +45,7 @@
#include "netlabel_cipso_v4.h"
#include "netlabel_user.h"
#include "netlabel_mgmt.h"
+#include "netlabel_addrlist.h"
/*
* Configuration Functions
@@ -50,6 +54,9 @@
/**
* netlbl_cfg_map_del - Remove a NetLabel/LSM domain mapping
* @domain: the domain mapping to remove
+ * @family: address family
+ * @addr: IP address
+ * @mask: IP address mask
* @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
*
* Description:
@@ -58,14 +65,32 @@
* values on failure.
*
*/
-int netlbl_cfg_map_del(const char *domain, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+int netlbl_cfg_map_del(const char *domain,
+ u16 family,
+ const void *addr,
+ const void *mask,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
- return netlbl_domhsh_remove(domain, audit_info);
+ if (addr == NULL && mask == NULL) {
+ return netlbl_domhsh_remove(domain, audit_info);
+ } else if (addr != NULL && mask != NULL) {
+ switch (family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ return netlbl_domhsh_remove_af4(domain, addr, mask,
+ audit_info);
+ default:
+ return -EPFNOSUPPORT;
+ }
+ } else
+ return -EINVAL;
}
/**
- * netlbl_cfg_unlbl_add_map - Add an unlabeled NetLabel/LSM domain mapping
+ * netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add - Add a new unlabeled mapping
* @domain: the domain mapping to add
+ * @family: address family
+ * @addr: IP address
+ * @mask: IP address mask
* @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
*
* Description:
@@ -74,11 +99,19 @@ int netlbl_cfg_map_del(const char *domain, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
* negative values on failure.
*
*/
-int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_add_map(const char *domain,
+int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,
+ u16 family,
+ const void *addr,
+ const void *mask,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
int ret_val = -ENOMEM;
struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
+ struct netlbl_domaddr_map *addrmap = NULL;
+ struct netlbl_domaddr4_map *map4 = NULL;
+ struct netlbl_domaddr6_map *map6 = NULL;
+ const struct in_addr *addr4, *mask4;
+ const struct in6_addr *addr6, *mask6;
entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (entry == NULL)
@@ -86,49 +119,225 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_add_map(const char *domain,
if (domain != NULL) {
entry->domain = kstrdup(domain, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (entry->domain == NULL)
- goto cfg_unlbl_add_map_failure;
+ goto cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure;
+ }
+
+ if (addr == NULL && mask == NULL)
+ entry->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED;
+ else if (addr != NULL && mask != NULL) {
+ addrmap = kzalloc(sizeof(*addrmap), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (addrmap == NULL)
+ goto cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&addrmap->list4);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&addrmap->list6);
+
+ switch (family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ addr4 = addr;
+ mask4 = mask;
+ map4 = kzalloc(sizeof(*map4), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (map4 == NULL)
+ goto cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure;
+ map4->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED;
+ map4->list.addr = addr4->s_addr & mask4->s_addr;
+ map4->list.mask = mask4->s_addr;
+ map4->list.valid = 1;
+ ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&map4->list,
+ &addrmap->list4);
+ if (ret_val != 0)
+ goto cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure;
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ addr6 = addr;
+ mask6 = mask;
+ map6 = kzalloc(sizeof(*map6), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (map4 == NULL)
+ goto cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure;
+ map6->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED;
+ ipv6_addr_copy(&map6->list.addr, addr6);
+ map6->list.addr.s6_addr32[0] &= mask6->s6_addr32[0];
+ map6->list.addr.s6_addr32[1] &= mask6->s6_addr32[1];
+ map6->list.addr.s6_addr32[2] &= mask6->s6_addr32[2];
+ map6->list.addr.s6_addr32[3] &= mask6->s6_addr32[3];
+ ipv6_addr_copy(&map6->list.mask, mask6);
+ map6->list.valid = 1;
+ ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&map4->list,
+ &addrmap->list4);
+ if (ret_val != 0)
+ goto cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ entry->type_def.addrsel = addrmap;
+ entry->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_ADDRSELECT;
+ } else {
+ ret_val = -EINVAL;
+ goto cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure;
}
- entry->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED;
ret_val = netlbl_domhsh_add(entry, audit_info);
if (ret_val != 0)
- goto cfg_unlbl_add_map_failure;
+ goto cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure;
return 0;
-cfg_unlbl_add_map_failure:
+cfg_unlbl_map_add_failure:
if (entry != NULL)
kfree(entry->domain);
kfree(entry);
+ kfree(addrmap);
+ kfree(map4);
+ kfree(map6);
return ret_val;
}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add - Adds a new static label
+ * @net: network namespace
+ * @dev_name: interface name
+ * @addr: IP address in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
+ * @mask: address mask in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
+ * @family: address family
+ * @secid: LSM secid value for the entry
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Adds a new NetLabel static label to be used when protocol provided labels
+ * are not present on incoming traffic. If @dev_name is NULL then the default
+ * interface will be used. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
+ const char *dev_name,
+ const void *addr,
+ const void *mask,
+ u16 family,
+ u32 secid,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+ u32 addr_len;
+
+ switch (family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ addr_len = sizeof(struct in_addr);
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ addr_len = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EPFNOSUPPORT;
+ }
+
+ return netlbl_unlhsh_add(net,
+ dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ secid, audit_info);
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del - Removes an existing static label
+ * @net: network namespace
+ * @dev_name: interface name
+ * @addr: IP address in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
+ * @mask: address mask in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr)
+ * @family: address family
+ * @secid: LSM secid value for the entry
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Removes an existing NetLabel static label used when protocol provided labels
+ * are not present on incoming traffic. If @dev_name is NULL then the default
+ * interface will be used. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
+ const char *dev_name,
+ const void *addr,
+ const void *mask,
+ u16 family,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+ u32 addr_len;
+
+ switch (family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ addr_len = sizeof(struct in_addr);
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ addr_len = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EPFNOSUPPORT;
+ }
+
+ return netlbl_unlhsh_remove(net,
+ dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
+ audit_info);
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add - Add a new CIPSOv4 DOI definition
+ * @doi_def: CIPSO DOI definition
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new CIPSO DOI definition as defined by @doi_def. Returns zero on
+ * success and negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+ return cipso_v4_doi_add(doi_def, audit_info);
+}
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del - Remove an existing CIPSOv4 DOI definition
+ * @doi: CIPSO DOI
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove an existing CIPSO DOI definition matching @doi. Returns zero on
+ * success and negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+void netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del(u32 doi, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+ cipso_v4_doi_remove(doi, audit_info);
+}
+
/**
- * netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add_map - Add a new CIPSOv4 DOI definition and mapping
- * @doi_def: the DOI definition
+ * netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add - Add a new CIPSOv4 DOI mapping
+ * @doi: the CIPSO DOI
* @domain: the domain mapping to add
+ * @addr: IP address
+ * @mask: IP address mask
* @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
*
* Description:
- * Add a new CIPSOv4 DOI definition and NetLabel/LSM domain mapping for this
- * new DOI definition to the NetLabel subsystem. A @domain value of NULL adds
- * a new default domain mapping. Returns zero on success, negative values on
- * failure.
+ * Add a new NetLabel/LSM domain mapping for the given CIPSO DOI to the NetLabel
+ * subsystem. A @domain value of NULL adds a new default domain mapping.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
-int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add_map(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
+int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add(u32 doi,
const char *domain,
+ const struct in_addr *addr,
+ const struct in_addr *mask,
struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
int ret_val = -ENOMEM;
- u32 doi;
- u32 doi_type;
+ struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def;
struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
- const char *type_str;
- struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
+ struct netlbl_domaddr_map *addrmap = NULL;
+ struct netlbl_domaddr4_map *addrinfo = NULL;
- doi = doi_def->doi;
- doi_type = doi_def->type;
+ doi_def = cipso_v4_doi_getdef(doi);
+ if (doi_def == NULL)
+ return -ENOENT;
entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (entry == NULL)
@@ -136,56 +345,52 @@ int netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add_map(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
if (domain != NULL) {
entry->domain = kstrdup(domain, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (entry->domain == NULL)
- goto cfg_cipsov4_add_map_failure;
+ goto cfg_cipsov4_map_add_failure;
}
- ret_val = cipso_v4_doi_add(doi_def);
- if (ret_val != 0)
- goto cfg_cipsov4_add_map_failure_remove_doi;
- entry->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4;
- entry->type_def.cipsov4 = cipso_v4_doi_getdef(doi);
- if (entry->type_def.cipsov4 == NULL) {
- ret_val = -ENOENT;
- goto cfg_cipsov4_add_map_failure_remove_doi;
+ if (addr == NULL && mask == NULL) {
+ entry->type_def.cipsov4 = doi_def;
+ entry->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4;
+ } else if (addr != NULL && mask != NULL) {
+ addrmap = kzalloc(sizeof(*addrmap), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (addrmap == NULL)
+ goto cfg_cipsov4_map_add_failure;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&addrmap->list4);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&addrmap->list6);
+
+ addrinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(*addrinfo), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (addrinfo == NULL)
+ goto cfg_cipsov4_map_add_failure;
+ addrinfo->type_def.cipsov4 = doi_def;
+ addrinfo->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4;
+ addrinfo->list.addr = addr->s_addr & mask->s_addr;
+ addrinfo->list.mask = mask->s_addr;
+ addrinfo->list.valid = 1;
+ ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&addrinfo->list, &addrmap->list4);
+ if (ret_val != 0)
+ goto cfg_cipsov4_map_add_failure;
+
+ entry->type_def.addrsel = addrmap;
+ entry->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_ADDRSELECT;
+ } else {
+ ret_val = -EINVAL;
+ goto cfg_cipsov4_map_add_failure;
}
+
ret_val = netlbl_domhsh_add(entry, audit_info);
if (ret_val != 0)
- goto cfg_cipsov4_add_map_failure_release_doi;
-
-cfg_cipsov4_add_map_return:
- audit_buf = netlbl_audit_start_common(AUDIT_MAC_CIPSOV4_ADD,
- audit_info);
- if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- switch (doi_type) {
- case CIPSO_V4_MAP_TRANS:
- type_str = "trans";
- break;
- case CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS:
- type_str = "pass";
- break;
- case CIPSO_V4_MAP_LOCAL:
- type_str = "local";
- break;
- default:
- type_str = "(unknown)";
- }
- audit_log_format(audit_buf,
- " cipso_doi=%u cipso_type=%s res=%u",
- doi, type_str, ret_val == 0 ? 1 : 0);
- audit_log_end(audit_buf);
- }
+ goto cfg_cipsov4_map_add_failure;
- return ret_val;
+ return 0;
-cfg_cipsov4_add_map_failure_release_doi:
+cfg_cipsov4_map_add_failure:
cipso_v4_doi_putdef(doi_def);
-cfg_cipsov4_add_map_failure_remove_doi:
- cipso_v4_doi_remove(doi, audit_info);
-cfg_cipsov4_add_map_failure:
if (entry != NULL)
kfree(entry->domain);
kfree(entry);
- goto cfg_cipsov4_add_map_return;
+ kfree(addrmap);
+ kfree(addrinfo);
+ return ret_val;
}
/*
@@ -691,6 +896,28 @@ int netlbl_cache_add(const struct sk_buff *skb,
}
/*
+ * Protocol Engine Functions
+ */
+
+/**
+ * netlbl_audit_start - Start an audit message
+ * @type: audit message type
+ * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Start an audit message using the type specified in @type and fill the audit
+ * message with some fields common to all NetLabel audit messages. This
+ * function should only be used by protocol engines, not LSMs. Returns a
+ * pointer to the audit buffer on success, NULL on failure.
+ *
+ */
+struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start(int type,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+{
+ return netlbl_audit_start_common(type, audit_info);
+}
+
+/*
* Setup Functions
*/
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 8c0308032178..f3c5c68c6848 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -450,13 +450,13 @@ add_iface_failure:
* success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
-static int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
- const char *dev_name,
- const void *addr,
- const void *mask,
- u32 addr_len,
- u32 secid,
- struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
+ const char *dev_name,
+ const void *addr,
+ const void *mask,
+ u32 addr_len,
+ u32 secid,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
int ret_val;
int ifindex;
@@ -720,12 +720,12 @@ unlhsh_condremove_failure:
* Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
*
*/
-static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
- const char *dev_name,
- const void *addr,
- const void *mask,
- u32 addr_len,
- struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
+int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
+ const char *dev_name,
+ const void *addr,
+ const void *mask,
+ u32 addr_len,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
{
int ret_val;
struct net_device *dev;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
index 06b1301ac072..7aba63595137 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h
@@ -221,6 +221,21 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_genl_init(void);
/* General Unlabeled init function */
int netlbl_unlabel_init(u32 size);
+/* Static/Fallback label management functions */
+int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
+ const char *dev_name,
+ const void *addr,
+ const void *mask,
+ u32 addr_len,
+ u32 secid,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
+int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net,
+ const char *dev_name,
+ const void *addr,
+ const void *mask,
+ u32 addr_len,
+ struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
+
/* Process Unlabeled incoming network packets */
int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family,
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 69fc9952650f..7cd61a5f5205 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -45,26 +45,22 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
/**
* cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
* @tsk: The task to query
+ * @cred: The credentials to use
* @cap: The capability to check for
* @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
*
* Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
* its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
*
- * NOTE WELL: cap_capable() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
- * function. That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable() returns 0
- * when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable() returns 1 for this
- * case.
+ * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
+ * and has_capability() functions. That is, it has the reverse semantics:
+ * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
+ * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
*/
-int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
+int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, int cap,
+ int audit)
{
- __u32 cap_raised;
-
- /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
- rcu_read_lock();
- cap_raised = cap_raised(__task_cred(tsk)->cap_effective, cap);
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return cap_raised ? 0 : -EPERM;
+ return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
}
/**
@@ -160,7 +156,8 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
* capability
*/
- if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
+ if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP,
+ SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
return 0;
#endif
return 1;
@@ -869,7 +866,8 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
& (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
|| ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
|| (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
- || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
+ || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP,
+ SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
/*
* [1] no changing of bits that are locked
* [2] no unlocking of locks
@@ -950,7 +948,8 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int cap_sys_admin = 0;
- if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
+ if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+ SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 6688765bd8b9..09796797d122 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1294,7 +1294,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_keyctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY:
return keyctl_get_security((key_serial_t) arg2,
- (char *) arg3,
+ (char __user *) arg3,
(size_t) arg4);
default:
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 678d4d07b852..c3586c0d97e2 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -154,14 +154,32 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+int security_capable(int cap)
{
- return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ return security_ops->capable(current, current_cred(), cap,
+ SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
}
-int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
{
- return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ const struct cred *cred;
+ int ret;
+
+ cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
+ ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ put_cred(cred);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred;
+ int ret;
+
+ cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
+ ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ put_cred(cred);
+ return ret;
}
int security_acct(struct file *file)
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index 26301dd651d3..bca1b74a4a2f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -94,33 +94,6 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
-config SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT
- bool "NSA SELinux enable new secmark network controls by default"
- depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
- default n
- help
- This option determines whether the new secmark-based network
- controls will be enabled by default. If not, the old internal
- per-packet controls will be enabled by default, preserving
- old behavior.
-
- If you enable the new controls, you will need updated
- SELinux userspace libraries, tools and policy. Typically,
- your distribution will provide these and enable the new controls
- in the kernel they also distribute.
-
- Note that this option can be overridden at boot with the
- selinux_compat_net parameter, and after boot via
- /selinux/compat_net. See Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
- for details on this parameter.
-
- If you enable the new network controls, you will likely
- also require the SECMARK and CONNSECMARK targets, as
- well as any conntrack helpers for protocols which you
- wish to control.
-
- If you are unsure what to do here, select N.
-
config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
bool "NSA SELinux maximum supported policy format version"
depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index d43bd6baeeaa..eb41f43e2772 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -53,18 +53,20 @@ static const char *class_to_string[] = {
#undef S_
static const struct av_inherit av_inherit[] = {
-#define S_(c, i, b) { c, common_##i##_perm_to_string, b },
+#define S_(c, i, b) { .tclass = c,\
+ .common_pts = common_##i##_perm_to_string,\
+ .common_base = b },
#include "av_inherit.h"
#undef S_
};
const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm = {
- av_perm_to_string,
- ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string),
- class_to_string,
- ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string),
- av_inherit,
- ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit)
+ .av_perm_to_string = av_perm_to_string,
+ .av_pts_len = ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string),
+ .class_to_string = class_to_string,
+ .cts_len = ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string),
+ .av_inherit = av_inherit,
+ .av_inherit_len = ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit)
};
#define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS 512
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index dbeaa783b2a9..00815973d412 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1433,12 +1433,13 @@ static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ const struct cred *cred,
int cap, int audit)
{
struct avc_audit_data ad;
struct av_decision avd;
u16 sclass;
- u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
+ u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
int rc;
@@ -1865,15 +1866,16 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
}
-static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
+static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
+ int cap, int audit)
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap, audit);
+ rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
if (rc)
return rc;
- return task_has_capability(tsk, cap, audit);
+ return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
}
static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
@@ -2037,7 +2039,8 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
- rc = selinux_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+ SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (rc == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -2880,7 +2883,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
* in-core context value, not a denial.
*/
- error = selinux_capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+ SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (!error)
error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
&size);
@@ -4185,7 +4189,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family)
{
- int err;
+ int err = 0;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
u32 peer_sid;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
@@ -4202,7 +4206,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (selinux_compat_net)
err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
family, addrp);
- else
+ else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
PACKET__RECV, &ad);
if (err)
@@ -4705,7 +4709,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
&ad, family, addrp))
return NF_DROP;
- } else {
+ } else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
return NF_DROP;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
index c0d314d9f8e1..bb1ec801bdfe 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
@@ -17,16 +17,16 @@ struct av_perm_to_string {
};
struct av_inherit {
- u16 tclass;
const char **common_pts;
u32 common_base;
+ u16 tclass;
};
struct selinux_class_perm {
const struct av_perm_to_string *av_perm_to_string;
u32 av_pts_len;
- const char **class_to_string;
u32 cts_len;
+ const char **class_to_string;
const struct av_inherit *av_inherit;
u32 av_inherit_len;
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 8f612c8becb5..01ec6d2c6b97 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -47,13 +47,7 @@ static char *policycap_names[] = {
unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT
-#define SELINUX_COMPAT_NET_VALUE 0
-#else
-#define SELINUX_COMPAT_NET_VALUE 1
-#endif
-
-int selinux_compat_net = SELINUX_COMPAT_NET_VALUE;
+int selinux_compat_net = 0;
static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
{
@@ -494,7 +488,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_compat_net(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
goto out;
- selinux_compat_net = new_value ? 1 : 0;
+ if (new_value) {
+ printk(KERN_NOTICE
+ "SELinux: compat_net is deprecated, please use secmark"
+ " instead\n");
+ selinux_compat_net = 1;
+ } else
+ selinux_compat_net = 0;
length = count;
out:
free_page((unsigned long) page);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
index 658c2bd17da8..d9dd7a2f6a8a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/context.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ struct context {
u32 user;
u32 role;
u32 type;
+ u32 len; /* length of string in bytes */
struct mls_range range;
char *str; /* string representation if context cannot be mapped. */
- u32 len; /* length of string in bytes */
};
static inline void mls_context_init(struct context *c)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 31dce559595a..b79582e4fbfd 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
/*
@@ -39,6 +40,7 @@ struct superblock_smack {
struct socket_smack {
char *smk_out; /* outbound label */
char *smk_in; /* inbound label */
+ int smk_labeled; /* label scheme */
char smk_packet[SMK_LABELLEN]; /* TCP peer label */
};
@@ -80,6 +82,16 @@ struct smack_cipso {
};
/*
+ * An entry in the table identifying hosts.
+ */
+struct smk_netlbladdr {
+ struct smk_netlbladdr *smk_next;
+ struct sockaddr_in smk_host; /* network address */
+ struct in_addr smk_mask; /* network mask */
+ char *smk_label; /* label */
+};
+
+/*
* This is the repository for labels seen so that it is
* not necessary to keep allocating tiny chuncks of memory
* and so that they can be shared.
@@ -127,6 +139,20 @@ struct smack_known {
#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT
/*
+ * How communications on this socket are treated.
+ * Usually it's determined by the underlying netlabel code
+ * but there are certain cases, including single label hosts
+ * and potentially single label interfaces for which the
+ * treatment can not be known in advance.
+ *
+ * The possibility of additional labeling schemes being
+ * introduced in the future exists as well.
+ */
+#define SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET 0
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET 1
+
+/*
+ * smackfs magic number
* smackfs macic number
*/
#define SMACK_MAGIC 0x43415d53 /* "SMAC" */
@@ -141,6 +167,7 @@ struct smack_known {
* CIPSO defaults.
*/
#define SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT 3 /* Historical */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_INVALID -1 /* Not a DOI */
#define SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT 250 /* Arbitrary */
#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATVAL 63 /* Bigger gets harder */
#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL 255 /* CIPSO 2.2 standard */
@@ -176,7 +203,6 @@ u32 smack_to_secid(const char *);
* Shared data.
*/
extern int smack_cipso_direct;
-extern int smack_net_nltype;
extern char *smack_net_ambient;
extern char *smack_onlycap;
@@ -186,9 +212,10 @@ extern struct smack_known smack_known_hat;
extern struct smack_known smack_known_huh;
extern struct smack_known smack_known_invalid;
extern struct smack_known smack_known_star;
-extern struct smack_known smack_known_unset;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_web;
extern struct smk_list_entry *smack_list;
+extern struct smk_netlbladdr *smack_netlbladdrs;
extern struct security_operations smack_ops;
/*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 247cec3b5a43..2e0b83e77ffe 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -15,15 +15,8 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include "smack.h"
-struct smack_known smack_known_unset = {
- .smk_next = NULL,
- .smk_known = "UNSET",
- .smk_secid = 1,
- .smk_cipso = NULL,
-};
-
struct smack_known smack_known_huh = {
- .smk_next = &smack_known_unset,
+ .smk_next = NULL,
.smk_known = "?",
.smk_secid = 2,
.smk_cipso = NULL,
@@ -57,7 +50,14 @@ struct smack_known smack_known_invalid = {
.smk_cipso = NULL,
};
-struct smack_known *smack_known = &smack_known_invalid;
+struct smack_known smack_known_web = {
+ .smk_next = &smack_known_invalid,
+ .smk_known = "@",
+ .smk_secid = 7,
+ .smk_cipso = NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known *smack_known = &smack_known_web;
/*
* The initial value needs to be bigger than any of the
@@ -99,6 +99,16 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request)
strcmp(subject_label, smack_known_star.smk_known) == 0)
return -EACCES;
/*
+ * An internet object can be accessed by any subject.
+ * Tasks cannot be assigned the internet label.
+ * An internet subject can access any object.
+ */
+ if (object_label == smack_known_web.smk_known ||
+ subject_label == smack_known_web.smk_known ||
+ strcmp(object_label, smack_known_web.smk_known) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(subject_label, smack_known_web.smk_known) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ /*
* A star object can be accessed by any subject.
*/
if (object_label == smack_known_star.smk_known ||
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 848212fd4845..0278bc083044 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1277,6 +1277,7 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
ssp->smk_in = csp;
ssp->smk_out = csp;
+ ssp->smk_labeled = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
sk->sk_security = ssp;
@@ -1341,45 +1342,69 @@ static void smack_to_secattr(char *smack, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlsp)
struct smack_cipso cipso;
int rc;
- switch (smack_net_nltype) {
- case NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4:
- nlsp->domain = smack;
- nlsp->flags = NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
+ nlsp->domain = smack;
+ nlsp->flags = NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
- rc = smack_to_cipso(smack, &cipso);
- if (rc == 0) {
- nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = cipso.smk_level;
- smack_set_catset(cipso.smk_catset, nlsp);
- } else {
- nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = smack_cipso_direct;
- smack_set_catset(smack, nlsp);
- }
- break;
- default:
- break;
+ rc = smack_to_cipso(smack, &cipso);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = cipso.smk_level;
+ smack_set_catset(cipso.smk_catset, nlsp);
+ } else {
+ nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = smack_cipso_direct;
+ smack_set_catset(smack, nlsp);
}
}
/**
* smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
* @sk: the socket
+ * @labeled: socket label scheme
*
* Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
* secattr and attach it to the socket.
*
* Returns 0 on success or an error code
*/
-static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk)
+static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
{
struct socket_smack *ssp;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- int rc;
+ int rc = 0;
ssp = sk->sk_security;
- netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
- smack_to_secattr(ssp->smk_out, &secattr);
- rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, &secattr);
- netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+ /*
+ * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the
+ * packet labeling based on the label.
+ * The case of a single label host is different, because
+ * a single label host should never get a labeled packet
+ * even though the label is usually associated with a packet
+ * label.
+ */
+ local_bh_disable();
+ bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
+
+ if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient ||
+ labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
+ netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
+ else {
+ netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+ smack_to_secattr(ssp->smk_out, &secattr);
+ rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, &secattr);
+ netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+ }
+
+ bh_unlock_sock(sk);
+ local_bh_enable();
+ /*
+ * Remember the label scheme used so that it is not
+ * necessary to do the netlabel setting if it has not
+ * changed the next time through.
+ *
+ * The -EDESTADDRREQ case is an indication that there's
+ * a single level host involved.
+ */
+ if (rc == 0)
+ ssp->smk_labeled = labeled;
return rc;
}
@@ -1432,7 +1457,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
ssp->smk_in = sp;
else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
ssp->smk_out = sp;
- rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk);
+ rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
if (rc != 0)
printk(KERN_WARNING "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
__func__, -rc);
@@ -1462,7 +1487,108 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
/*
* Set the outbound netlbl.
*/
- return smack_netlabel(sock->sk);
+ return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smack_host_label - check host based restrictions
+ * @sip: the object end
+ *
+ * looks for host based access restrictions
+ *
+ * This version will only be appropriate for really small
+ * sets of single label hosts. Because of the masking
+ * it cannot shortcut out on the first match. There are
+ * numerious ways to address the problem, but none of them
+ * have been applied here.
+ *
+ * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
+ */
+static char *smack_host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
+{
+ struct smk_netlbladdr *snp;
+ char *bestlabel = NULL;
+ struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
+ struct in_addr *liap;
+ struct in_addr *miap;
+ struct in_addr bestmask;
+
+ if (siap->s_addr == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ bestmask.s_addr = 0;
+
+ for (snp = smack_netlbladdrs; snp != NULL; snp = snp->smk_next) {
+ liap = &snp->smk_host.sin_addr;
+ miap = &snp->smk_mask;
+ /*
+ * If the addresses match after applying the list entry mask
+ * the entry matches the address. If it doesn't move along to
+ * the next entry.
+ */
+ if ((liap->s_addr & miap->s_addr) !=
+ (siap->s_addr & miap->s_addr))
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * If the list entry mask identifies a single address
+ * it can't get any more specific.
+ */
+ if (miap->s_addr == 0xffffffff)
+ return snp->smk_label;
+ /*
+ * If the list entry mask is less specific than the best
+ * already found this entry is uninteresting.
+ */
+ if ((miap->s_addr | bestmask.s_addr) == bestmask.s_addr)
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * This is better than any entry found so far.
+ */
+ bestmask.s_addr = miap->s_addr;
+ bestlabel = snp->smk_label;
+ }
+
+ return bestlabel;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @sap: the other end
+ * @addrlen: size of sap
+ *
+ * Verifies that a connection may be possible
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
+ int addrlen)
+{
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ char *hostsp;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (sock->sk == NULL || sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hostsp = smack_host_label((struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
+ if (hostsp == NULL) {
+ if (ssp->smk_labeled != SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET)
+ return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (ssp->smk_labeled != SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
+ return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET);
+ return 0;
}
/**
@@ -2101,8 +2227,14 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
if (newsmack == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
+ */
+ if (newsmack == smack_known_web.smk_known)
+ return -EPERM;
+
new = prepare_creds();
- if (!new)
+ if (new == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
new->security = newsmack;
commit_creds(new);
@@ -2144,6 +2276,49 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
}
/**
+ * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @msghdr: the message
+ * @size: the size of the message
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination
+ * host. This is only a question if the destination is a single
+ * label host.
+ */
+static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+ int size)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ char *hostsp;
+ int rc;
+
+ /*
+ * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
+ */
+ if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != PF_INET)
+ return 0;
+
+ hostsp = smack_host_label(sip);
+ if (hostsp == NULL) {
+ if (ssp->smk_labeled != SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET)
+ return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (ssp->smk_labeled != SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
+ return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET);
+
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+
+/**
* smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat
* pair to smack
* @sap: netlabel secattr
@@ -2154,44 +2329,66 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
static void smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, char *sip)
{
char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
+ char *sp;
int pcat;
- if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) == 0) {
+ if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
/*
+ * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
* If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
* behaving the way we expect it to.
*
+ * Get the categories, if any
* Without guidance regarding the smack value
* for the packet fall back on the network
* ambient value.
*/
- strncpy(sip, smack_net_ambient, SMK_MAXLEN);
+ memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
+ if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) != 0)
+ for (pcat = -1;;) {
+ pcat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(
+ sap->attr.mls.cat, pcat + 1);
+ if (pcat < 0)
+ break;
+ smack_catset_bit(pcat, smack);
+ }
+ /*
+ * If it is CIPSO using smack direct mapping
+ * we are already done. WeeHee.
+ */
+ if (sap->attr.mls.lvl == smack_cipso_direct) {
+ memcpy(sip, smack, SMK_MAXLEN);
+ return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Look it up in the supplied table if it is not
+ * a direct mapping.
+ */
+ smack_from_cipso(sap->attr.mls.lvl, smack, sip);
return;
}
- /*
- * Get the categories, if any
- */
- memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
- if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) != 0)
- for (pcat = -1;;) {
- pcat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
- pcat + 1);
- if (pcat < 0)
- break;
- smack_catset_bit(pcat, smack);
- }
- /*
- * If it is CIPSO using smack direct mapping
- * we are already done. WeeHee.
- */
- if (sap->attr.mls.lvl == smack_cipso_direct) {
- memcpy(sip, smack, SMK_MAXLEN);
+ if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
+ */
+ sp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+ /*
+ * This has got to be a bug because it is
+ * impossible to specify a fallback without
+ * specifying the label, which will ensure
+ * it has a secid, and the only way to get a
+ * secid is from a fallback.
+ */
+ BUG_ON(sp == NULL);
+ strncpy(sip, sp, SMK_MAXLEN);
return;
}
/*
- * Look it up in the supplied table if it is not a direct mapping.
+ * Without guidance regarding the smack value
+ * for the packet fall back on the network
+ * ambient value.
*/
- smack_from_cipso(sap->attr.mls.lvl, smack, sip);
+ strncpy(sip, smack_net_ambient, SMK_MAXLEN);
return;
}
@@ -2207,6 +2404,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
+ char *csp;
int rc;
if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
@@ -2215,21 +2413,24 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
/*
* Translate what netlabel gave us.
*/
- memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
- if (rc == 0)
+ if (rc == 0) {
smack_from_secattr(&secattr, smack);
- else
- strncpy(smack, smack_net_ambient, SMK_MAXLEN);
+ csp = smack;
+ } else
+ csp = smack_net_ambient;
+
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+
/*
* Receiving a packet requires that the other end
* be able to write here. Read access is not required.
* This is the simplist possible security model
* for networking.
*/
- rc = smk_access(smack, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_access(csp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE);
if (rc != 0)
netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
return rc;
@@ -2298,7 +2499,6 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
/*
* Translate what netlabel gave us.
*/
- memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
if (rc == 0)
@@ -2341,7 +2541,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = current_security();
ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
- rc = smack_netlabel(sk);
+ rc = smack_netlabel(sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
if (rc != 0)
printk(KERN_WARNING "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
__func__, -rc);
@@ -2367,7 +2567,6 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (skb == NULL)
return -EACCES;
- memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
netlbl_secattr_init(&skb_secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &skb_secattr);
if (rc == 0)
@@ -2732,6 +2931,8 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.unix_may_send = smack_unix_may_send,
.socket_post_create = smack_socket_post_create,
+ .socket_connect = smack_socket_connect,
+ .socket_sendmsg = smack_socket_sendmsg,
.socket_sock_rcv_skb = smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
.socket_getpeersec_stream = smack_socket_getpeersec_stream,
.socket_getpeersec_dgram = smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
@@ -2783,7 +2984,6 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
/*
* Initialize locks
*/
- spin_lock_init(&smack_known_unset.smk_cipsolock);
spin_lock_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_cipsolock);
spin_lock_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_cipsolock);
spin_lock_init(&smack_known_star.smk_cipsolock);
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 247dc9ebbc71..bf107a389ac1 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
@@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ enum smk_inos {
SMK_DOI = 5, /* CIPSO DOI */
SMK_DIRECT = 6, /* CIPSO level indicating direct label */
SMK_AMBIENT = 7, /* internet ambient label */
- SMK_NLTYPE = 8, /* label scheme to use by default */
+ SMK_NETLBLADDR = 8, /* single label hosts */
SMK_ONLYCAP = 9, /* the only "capable" label */
};
@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ enum smk_inos {
static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_list_lock);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_cipso_lock);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ambient_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock);
/*
* This is the "ambient" label for network traffic.
@@ -57,12 +59,6 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ambient_lock);
char *smack_net_ambient = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
/*
- * This is the default packet marking scheme for network traffic.
- * It can be reset via smackfs/nltype
- */
-int smack_net_nltype = NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4;
-
-/*
* This is the level in a CIPSO header that indicates a
* smack label is contained directly in the category set.
* It can be reset via smackfs/direct
@@ -79,6 +75,13 @@ int smack_cipso_direct = SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT;
*/
char *smack_onlycap;
+/*
+ * Certain IP addresses may be designated as single label hosts.
+ * Packets are sent there unlabeled, but only from tasks that
+ * can write to the specified label.
+ */
+struct smk_netlbladdr *smack_netlbladdrs;
+
static int smk_cipso_doi_value = SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT;
struct smk_list_entry *smack_list;
@@ -104,6 +107,24 @@ struct smk_list_entry *smack_list;
#define SMK_ACCESSLEN (sizeof(SMK_ACCESS) - 1)
#define SMK_LOADLEN (SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_ACCESSLEN)
+/**
+ * smk_netlabel_audit_set - fill a netlbl_audit struct
+ * @nap: structure to fill
+ */
+static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
+{
+ nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
+ nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+ nap->secid = smack_to_secid(current_security());
+}
+
+/*
+ * Values for parsing single label host rules
+ * "1.2.3.4 X"
+ * "192.168.138.129/32 abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvw"
+ */
+#define SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN 9
+#define SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX 42
/*
* Seq_file read operations for /smack/load
@@ -344,13 +365,11 @@ static void smk_cipso_doi(void)
{
int rc;
struct cipso_v4_doi *doip;
- struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+ struct netlbl_audit nai;
- audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
- audit_info.sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
- audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current_security());
+ smk_netlabel_audit_set(&nai);
- rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(NULL, &audit_info);
+ rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(NULL, PF_INET, NULL, NULL, &nai);
if (rc != 0)
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d remove rc = %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, rc);
@@ -365,11 +384,19 @@ static void smk_cipso_doi(void)
for (rc = 1; rc < CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT; rc++)
doip->tags[rc] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID;
- rc = netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add_map(doip, NULL, &audit_info);
+ rc = netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add(doip, &nai);
if (rc != 0) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d add rc = %d\n",
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d cipso add rc = %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, rc);
kfree(doip);
+ return;
+ }
+ rc = netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add(doip->doi, NULL, NULL, NULL, &nai);
+ if (rc != 0) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d map add rc = %d\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, rc);
+ kfree(doip);
+ return;
}
}
@@ -379,20 +406,19 @@ static void smk_cipso_doi(void)
static void smk_unlbl_ambient(char *oldambient)
{
int rc;
- struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+ struct netlbl_audit nai;
- audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
- audit_info.sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
- audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current_security());
+ smk_netlabel_audit_set(&nai);
if (oldambient != NULL) {
- rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(oldambient, &audit_info);
+ rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(oldambient, PF_INET, NULL, NULL, &nai);
if (rc != 0)
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d remove rc = %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, rc);
}
- rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_add_map(smack_net_ambient, &audit_info);
+ rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(smack_net_ambient, PF_INET,
+ NULL, NULL, &nai);
if (rc != 0)
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d add rc = %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, rc);
@@ -603,6 +629,201 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_cipso_ops = {
.release = seq_release,
};
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/netlabel
+ */
+
+static void *netlbladdr_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ if (*pos == SEQ_READ_FINISHED)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return smack_netlbladdrs;
+}
+
+static void *netlbladdr_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ struct smk_netlbladdr *skp = ((struct smk_netlbladdr *) v)->smk_next;
+
+ if (skp == NULL)
+ *pos = SEQ_READ_FINISHED;
+
+ return skp;
+}
+/*
+#define BEMASK 0x80000000
+*/
+#define BEMASK 0x00000001
+#define BEBITS (sizeof(__be32) * 8)
+
+/*
+ * Print host/label pairs
+ */
+static int netlbladdr_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct smk_netlbladdr *skp = (struct smk_netlbladdr *) v;
+ unsigned char *hp = (char *) &skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr;
+ __be32 bebits;
+ int maskn = 0;
+
+ for (bebits = BEMASK; bebits != 0; maskn++, bebits <<= 1)
+ if ((skp->smk_mask.s_addr & bebits) == 0)
+ break;
+
+ seq_printf(s, "%u.%u.%u.%u/%d %s\n",
+ hp[0], hp[1], hp[2], hp[3], maskn, skp->smk_label);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void netlbladdr_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ /* No-op */
+}
+
+static struct seq_operations netlbladdr_seq_ops = {
+ .start = netlbladdr_seq_start,
+ .stop = netlbladdr_seq_stop,
+ .next = netlbladdr_seq_next,
+ .show = netlbladdr_seq_show,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_netlbladdr - open() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "netlabel" file pointer
+ *
+ * Connect our netlbladdr_seq_* operations with /smack/netlabel
+ * file_operations
+ */
+static int smk_open_netlbladdr(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &netlbladdr_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_netlbladdr - write() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Accepts only one netlbladdr per write call.
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct smk_netlbladdr *skp;
+ struct sockaddr_in newname;
+ char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
+ char *sp;
+ char data[SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX];
+ char *host = (char *)&newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+ int rc;
+ struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+ struct in_addr mask;
+ unsigned int m;
+ __be32 bebits = BEMASK;
+ __be32 nsa;
+
+ /*
+ * Must have privilege.
+ * No partial writes.
+ * Enough data must be present.
+ * "<addr/mask, as a.b.c.d/e><space><label>"
+ * "<addr, as a.b.c.d><space><label>"
+ */
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN || count > SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ data[count] = '\0';
+
+ rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd/%d %s",
+ &host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], &m, smack);
+ if (rc != 6) {
+ rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd %s",
+ &host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], smack);
+ if (rc != 5)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ m = BEBITS;
+ }
+ if (m > BEBITS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ sp = smk_import(smack, 0);
+ if (sp == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ for (mask.s_addr = 0; m > 0; m--) {
+ mask.s_addr |= bebits;
+ bebits <<= 1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Only allow one writer at a time. Writes should be
+ * quite rare and small in any case.
+ */
+ mutex_lock(&smk_netlbladdr_lock);
+
+ nsa = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+ for (skp = smack_netlbladdrs; skp != NULL; skp = skp->smk_next)
+ if (skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr == nsa &&
+ skp->smk_mask.s_addr == mask.s_addr)
+ break;
+
+ smk_netlabel_audit_set(&audit_info);
+
+ if (skp == NULL) {
+ skp = kzalloc(sizeof(*skp), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (skp == NULL)
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ else {
+ rc = 0;
+ skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+ skp->smk_mask.s_addr = mask.s_addr;
+ skp->smk_next = smack_netlbladdrs;
+ skp->smk_label = sp;
+ smack_netlbladdrs = skp;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(&init_net, NULL,
+ &skp->smk_host.sin_addr, &skp->smk_mask,
+ PF_INET, &audit_info);
+ skp->smk_label = sp;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now tell netlabel about the single label nature of
+ * this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
+ */
+
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
+ &skp->smk_host.sin_addr, &skp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
+ smack_to_secid(skp->smk_label), &audit_info);
+
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = count;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&smk_netlbladdr_lock);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_netlbladdr_ops = {
+ .open = smk_open_netlbladdr,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .write = smk_write_netlbladdr,
+ .release = seq_release,
+};
+
/**
* smk_read_doi - read() for /smack/doi
* @filp: file pointer, not actually used
@@ -891,110 +1112,6 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_onlycap_ops = {
.write = smk_write_onlycap,
};
-struct option_names {
- int o_number;
- char *o_name;
- char *o_alias;
-};
-
-static struct option_names netlbl_choices[] = {
- { NETLBL_NLTYPE_RIPSO,
- NETLBL_NLTYPE_RIPSO_NAME, "ripso" },
- { NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4,
- NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4_NAME, "cipsov4" },
- { NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4,
- NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4_NAME, "cipso" },
- { NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV6,
- NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV6_NAME, "cipsov6" },
- { NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED,
- NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED_NAME, "unlabeled" },
-};
-
-/**
- * smk_read_nltype - read() for /smack/nltype
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
- * @buf: where to put the result
- * @count: maximum to send along
- * @ppos: where to start
- *
- * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
- */
-static ssize_t smk_read_nltype(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
- size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
-{
- char bound[40];
- ssize_t rc;
- int i;
-
- if (count < SMK_LABELLEN)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if (*ppos != 0)
- return 0;
-
- sprintf(bound, "unknown");
-
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(netlbl_choices); i++)
- if (smack_net_nltype == netlbl_choices[i].o_number) {
- sprintf(bound, "%s", netlbl_choices[i].o_name);
- break;
- }
-
- rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, bound, strlen(bound));
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-/**
- * smk_write_nltype - write() for /smack/nltype
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
- * @buf: where to get the data from
- * @count: bytes sent
- * @ppos: where to start
- *
- * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
- */
-static ssize_t smk_write_nltype(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
- size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
-{
- char bound[40];
- char *cp;
- int i;
-
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
-
- if (count >= 40)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if (copy_from_user(bound, buf, count) != 0)
- return -EFAULT;
-
- bound[count] = '\0';
- cp = strchr(bound, ' ');
- if (cp != NULL)
- *cp = '\0';
- cp = strchr(bound, '\n');
- if (cp != NULL)
- *cp = '\0';
-
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(netlbl_choices); i++)
- if (strcmp(bound, netlbl_choices[i].o_name) == 0 ||
- strcmp(bound, netlbl_choices[i].o_alias) == 0) {
- smack_net_nltype = netlbl_choices[i].o_number;
- return count;
- }
- /*
- * Not a valid choice.
- */
- return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-static const struct file_operations smk_nltype_ops = {
- .read = smk_read_nltype,
- .write = smk_write_nltype,
-};
-
/**
* smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock
* @sb: the empty superblock
@@ -1021,8 +1138,8 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{"direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
[SMK_AMBIENT] =
{"ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
- [SMK_NLTYPE] =
- {"nltype", &smk_nltype_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_NETLBLADDR] =
+ {"netlabel", &smk_netlbladdr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
[SMK_ONLYCAP] =
{"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
/* last one */ {""}