Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "The main change in this kernel is Casey's generalized LSM stacking
  work, which removes the hard-coding of Capabilities and Yama stacking,
  allowing multiple arbitrary "small" LSMs to be stacked with a default
  monolithic module (e.g.  SELinux, Smack, AppArmor).

  See
        https://lwn.net/Articles/636056/

  This will allow smaller, simpler LSMs to be incorporated into the
  mainline kernel and arbitrarily stacked by users.  Also, this is a
  useful cleanup of the LSM code in its own right"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits)
  tpm, tpm_crb: fix le64_to_cpu conversions in crb_acpi_add()
  vTPM: set virtual device before passing to ibmvtpm_reset_crq
  tpm_ibmvtpm: remove unneccessary message level.
  ima: update builtin policies
  ima: extend "mask" policy matching support
  ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition
  ima: fix ima_show_template_data_ascii()
  Smack: freeing an error pointer in smk_write_revoke_subj()
  selinux: fix setting of security labels on NFS
  selinux: Remove unused permission definitions
  selinux: enable genfscon labeling for sysfs and pstore files
  selinux: enable per-file labeling for debugfs files.
  selinux: update netlink socket classes
  signals: don't abuse __flush_signals() in selinux_bprm_committed_creds()
  selinux: Print 'sclass' as string when unrecognized netlink message occurs
  Smack: allow multiple labels in onlycap
  Smack: fix seq operations in smackfs
  ima: pass iint to ima_add_violation()
  ima: wrap event related data to the new ima_event_data structure
  integrity: add validity checks for 'path' parameter
  ...

42 files changed, 3741 insertions, 4089 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index d0d0c578324c..0a378a88217a 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -20,17 +20,19 @@ Description:
 		action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise | audit
 		condition:= base | lsm  [option]
 			base:	[[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=]
-				 [fowner]]
+				[euid=] [fowner=]]
 			lsm:	[[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
 				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
 			option:	[[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio]
 
 		base: 	func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
 				[FIRMWARE_CHECK]
-			mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
+			mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
+			       [[^]MAY_EXEC]
 			fsmagic:= hex value
 			fsuuid:= file system UUID (e.g 8bcbe394-4f13-4144-be8e-5aa9ea2ce2f6)
 			uid:= decimal value
+			euid:= decimal value
 			fowner:=decimal value
 		lsm:  	are LSM specific
 		option:	appraise_type:= [imasig]
@@ -49,11 +51,25 @@ Description:
 			dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
 			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994
 			# RAMFS_MAGIC
-			dont_measure fsmagic=0x858458f6
 			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6
+			# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x1cd1
+			# BINFMTFS_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x42494e4d
 			# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
 			dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
 			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673
+			# SELINUX_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+			# CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x27e0eb
+			# NSFS_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x6e736673
 
 			measure func=BPRM_CHECK
 			measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
@@ -70,10 +86,6 @@ Description:
 		Examples of LSM specific definitions:
 
 		SELinux:
-			# SELINUX_MAGIC
-			dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
-			dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
-
 			dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
 			dont_appraise obj_type=var_log_t
 			dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 8bb54c95cece..afe7e2bbbc23 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1413,7 +1413,15 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 			The list of supported hash algorithms is defined
 			in crypto/hash_info.h.
 
-	ima_tcb		[IMA]
+	ima_policy=	[IMA]
+			The builtin measurement policy to load during IMA
+			setup.  Specyfing "tcb" as the value, measures all
+			programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files
+			opened with the read mode bit set by either the
+			effective uid (euid=0) or uid=0.
+			Format: "tcb"
+
+	ima_tcb		[IMA] Deprecated.  Use ima_policy= instead.
 			Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted
 			Computing Base.  This means IMA will measure all
 			programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files
@@ -1421,7 +1429,7 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 
 	ima_template=   [IMA]
 			Select one of defined IMA measurements template formats.
-			Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" }
+			Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" | "ima-sig" }
 			Default: "ima-ng"
 
 	ima_template_fmt=
diff --git a/Documentation/security/Smack.txt b/Documentation/security/Smack.txt
index abc82f85215b..de5e1aeca7fb 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/Smack.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/Smack.txt
@@ -206,11 +206,11 @@ netlabel
 	label. The format accepted on write is:
 		"%d.%d.%d.%d label" or "%d.%d.%d.%d/%d label".
 onlycap
-	This contains the label processes must have for CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+	This contains labels processes must have for CAP_MAC_ADMIN
 	and CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE to be effective. If this file is empty
 	these capabilities are effective at for processes with any
-	label. The value is set by writing the desired label to the
-	file or cleared by writing "-" to the file.
+	label. The values are set by writing the desired labels, separated
+	by spaces, to the file or cleared by writing "-" to the file.
 ptrace
 	This is used to define the current ptrace policy
 	0 - default: this is the policy that relies on Smack access rules.
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
index f97330886d58..3f5b537ab33e 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
 
 extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id);
 
+extern int __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id,
+					  struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id,
+					  size_t hexlen);
 static inline
 const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key)
 {
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index bcbbbd794e1d..b0e4ed23d668 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -104,6 +104,15 @@ static bool asymmetric_match_key_ids(
 	return false;
 }
 
+/* helper function can be called directly with pre-allocated memory */
+inline int __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id,
+				   struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id,
+				   size_t hexlen)
+{
+	match_id->len = hexlen;
+	return hex2bin(match_id->data, id, hexlen);
+}
+
 /**
  * asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id - Convert a hex string into a key ID.
  * @id: The ID as a hex string.
@@ -111,21 +120,20 @@ static bool asymmetric_match_key_ids(
 struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id)
 {
 	struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id;
-	size_t hexlen;
+	size_t asciihexlen;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (!*id)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-	hexlen = strlen(id);
-	if (hexlen & 1)
+	asciihexlen = strlen(id);
+	if (asciihexlen & 1)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
-	match_id = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + hexlen / 2,
+	match_id = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + asciihexlen / 2,
 			   GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!match_id)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-	match_id->len = hexlen / 2;
-	ret = hex2bin(match_id->data, id, hexlen / 2);
+	ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(id, match_id, asciihexlen / 2);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		kfree(match_id);
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index a6c42031628e..24f17e6c5904 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -28,17 +28,30 @@ static bool use_builtin_keys;
 static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
 
 #ifndef MODULE
+static struct {
+	struct asymmetric_key_id id;
+	unsigned char data[10];
+} cakey;
+
 static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
 {
 	if (!str)		/* default system keyring */
 		return 1;
 
 	if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
-		struct asymmetric_key_id *p;
-		p = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3);
-		if (p == ERR_PTR(-EINVAL))
-			pr_err("Unparsable hex string in ca_keys\n");
-		else if (!IS_ERR(p))
+		struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id;
+		size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2;
+		int ret;
+
+		if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) {
+			pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n");
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n");
+		else
 			ca_keyid = p;	/* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
 	} else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
 		use_builtin_keys = true;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
index b26ceee3585e..44f9d20c19ac 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device)
 
 	memcpy_fromio(&pa, &priv->cca->cmd_pa, 8);
 	pa = le64_to_cpu(pa);
-	priv->cmd = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, le64_to_cpu(pa),
+	priv->cmd = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, pa,
 					 ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_size));
 	if (!priv->cmd) {
 		dev_err(dev, "ioremap of the command buffer failed\n");
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device)
 
 	memcpy_fromio(&pa, &priv->cca->rsp_pa, 8);
 	pa = le64_to_cpu(pa);
-	priv->rsp = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, le64_to_cpu(pa),
+	priv->rsp = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, pa,
 					 ioread32(&priv->cca->rsp_size));
 	if (!priv->rsp) {
 		dev_err(dev, "ioremap of the response buffer failed\n");
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
index 42ffa5e7a1e0..27ebf9511cb4 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c
@@ -578,6 +578,9 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev,
 		goto cleanup;
 	}
 
+	ibmvtpm->dev = dev;
+	ibmvtpm->vdev = vio_dev;
+
 	crq_q = &ibmvtpm->crq_queue;
 	crq_q->crq_addr = (struct ibmvtpm_crq *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!crq_q->crq_addr) {
@@ -622,8 +625,6 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev,
 
 	crq_q->index = 0;
 
-	ibmvtpm->dev = dev;
-	ibmvtpm->vdev = vio_dev;
 	TPM_VPRIV(chip) = (void *)ibmvtpm;
 
 	spin_lock_init(&ibmvtpm->rtce_lock);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c
index c002d1bd9caf..eebe6256918f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ int read_log(struct tpm_bios_log *log)
 
 	basep = of_get_property(np, "linux,sml-base", NULL);
 	if (basep == NULL) {
-		pr_err(KERN_ERR "%s: ERROR - SML not found\n", __func__);
+		pr_err("%s: ERROR - SML not found\n", __func__);
 		goto cleanup_eio;
 	}
 
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index 4ef698549e31..072fee1258dd 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -298,18 +298,18 @@ vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 
 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	error = security_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
-	if (error) {
-		mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
-		return error;
-	}
+	if (error)
+		goto out;
 
 	error = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, name);
-	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 
 	if (!error) {
 		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
 		evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
 	}
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	return error;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_removexattr);
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9429f054c323
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1888 @@
+/*
+ * Linux Security Module interfaces
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 James Morris <jmorris@intercode.com.au>
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 Silicon Graphics, Inc. (Trust Technology Group)
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Intel Corporation.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ *	(at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *	Due to this file being licensed under the GPL there is controversy over
+ *	whether this permits you to write a module that #includes this file
+ *	without placing your module under the GPL.  Please consult a lawyer for
+ *	advice before doing this.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H
+#define __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+
+/**
+ * Security hooks for program execution operations.
+ *
+ * @bprm_set_creds:
+ *	Save security information in the bprm->security field, typically based
+ *	on information about the bprm->file, for later use by the apply_creds
+ *	hook.  This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for
+ *	transitions between security domains).
+ *	This hook may be called multiple times during a single execve, e.g. for
+ *	interpreters.  The hook can tell whether it has already been called by
+ *	checking to see if @bprm->security is non-NULL.  If so, then the hook
+ *	may decide either to retain the security information saved earlier or
+ *	to replace it.
+ *	@bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
+ *	Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
+ * @bprm_check_security:
+ *	This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will
+ *	begin.  It allows a check the @bprm->security value which is set in the
+ *	preceding set_creds call.  The primary difference from set_creds is
+ *	that the argv list and envp list are reliably available in @bprm.  This
+ *	hook may be called multiple times during a single execve; and in each
+ *	pass set_creds is called first.
+ *	@bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
+ *	Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
+ * @bprm_committing_creds:
+ *	Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being
+ *	transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials
+ *	pointed to by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by
+ *	the bprm_set_creds hook.  @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure.
+ *	This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such
+ *	as closing open file descriptors to which access will no longer be
+ *	granted when the attributes are changed.  This is called immediately
+ *	before commit_creds().
+ * @bprm_committed_creds:
+ *	Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a
+ *	process being transformed by an execve operation.  The new credentials
+ *	have, by this point, been set to @current->cred.  @bprm points to the
+ *	linux_binprm structure.  This hook is a good place to perform state
+ *	changes on the process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal
+ *	state.  This is called immediately after commit_creds().
+ * @bprm_secureexec:
+ *	Return a boolean value (0 or 1) indicating whether a "secure exec"
+ *	is required.  The flag is passed in the auxiliary table
+ *	on the initial stack to the ELF interpreter to indicate whether libc
+ *	should enable secure mode.
+ *	@bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for filesystem operations.
+ *
+ * @sb_alloc_security:
+ *	Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field.
+ *	The s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is
+ *	allocated.
+ *	@sb contains the super_block structure to be modified.
+ *	Return 0 if operation was successful.
+ * @sb_free_security:
+ *	Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field.
+ *	@sb contains the super_block structure to be modified.
+ * @sb_statfs:
+ *	Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt
+ *	mountpoint.
+ *	@dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sb_mount:
+ *	Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on
+ *	the mount point named by @nd.  For an ordinary mount, @dev_name
+ *	identifies a device if the file system type requires a device.  For a
+ *	remount (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant.  For a
+ *	loopback/bind mount (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the
+ *	pathname of the object being mounted.
+ *	@dev_name contains the name for object being mounted.
+ *	@path contains the path for mount point object.
+ *	@type contains the filesystem type.
+ *	@flags contains the mount flags.
+ *	@data contains the filesystem-specific data.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sb_copy_data:
+ *	Allow mount option data to be copied prior to parsing by the filesystem,
+ *	so that the security module can extract security-specific mount
+ *	options cleanly (a filesystem may modify the data e.g. with strsep()).
+ *	This also allows the original mount data to be stripped of security-
+ *	specific options to avoid having to make filesystems aware of them.
+ *	@type the type of filesystem being mounted.
+ *	@orig the original mount data copied from userspace.
+ *	@copy copied data which will be passed to the security module.
+ *	Returns 0 if the copy was successful.
+ * @sb_remount:
+ *	Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes
+ *	are being made to those options.
+ *	@sb superblock being remounted
+ *	@data contains the filesystem-specific data.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sb_umount:
+ *	Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted.
+ *	@mnt contains the mounted file system.
+ *	@flags contains the unmount flags, e.g. MNT_FORCE.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sb_pivotroot:
+ *	Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem.
+ *	@old_path contains the path for the new location of the
+ *	current root (put_old).
+ *	@new_path contains the path for the new root (new_root).
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sb_set_mnt_opts:
+ *	Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock
+ *	@sb the superblock to set security mount options for
+ *	@opts binary data structure containing all lsm mount data
+ * @sb_clone_mnt_opts:
+ *	Copy all security options from a given superblock to another
+ *	@oldsb old superblock which contain information to clone
+ *	@newsb new superblock which needs filled in
+ * @sb_parse_opts_str:
+ *	Parse a string of security data filling in the opts structure
+ *	@options string containing all mount options known by the LSM
+ *	@opts binary data structure usable by the LSM
+ * @dentry_init_security:
+ *	Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available
+ *	since NFSv4 has no label backed by an EA anyway.
+ *	@dentry dentry to use in calculating the context.
+ *	@mode mode used to determine resource type.
+ *	@name name of the last path component used to create file
+ *	@ctx pointer to place the pointer to the resulting context in.
+ *	@ctxlen point to place the length of the resulting context.
+ *
+ *
+ * Security hooks for inode operations.
+ *
+ * @inode_alloc_security:
+ *	Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security.  The
+ *	i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is
+ *	allocated.
+ *	@inode contains the inode structure.
+ *	Return 0 if operation was successful.
+ * @inode_free_security:
+ *	@inode contains the inode structure.
+ *	Deallocate the inode security structure and set @inode->i_security to
+ *	NULL.
+ * @inode_init_security:
+ *	Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly
+ *	created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode.
+ *	This hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation
+ *	transaction and provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike
+ *	the post_create/mkdir/... hooks called by the VFS.  The hook function
+ *	is expected to allocate the name and value via kmalloc, with the caller
+ *	being responsible for calling kfree after using them.
+ *	If the security module does not use security attributes or does
+ *	not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode,
+ *	then it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing.
+ *	@inode contains the inode structure of the newly created inode.
+ *	@dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory.
+ *	@qstr contains the last path component of the new object
+ *	@name will be set to the allocated name suffix (e.g. selinux).
+ *	@value will be set to the allocated attribute value.
+ *	@len will be set to the length of the value.
+ *	Returns 0 if @name and @value have been successfully set,
+ *		-EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is needed, or
+ *		-ENOMEM on memory allocation failure.
+ * @inode_create:
+ *	Check permission to create a regular file.
+ *	@dir contains inode structure of the parent of the new file.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file to be created.
+ *	@mode contains the file mode of the file to be created.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_link:
+ *	Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file.
+ *	@old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing
+ *	link to the file.
+ *	@dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory
+ *	of the new link.
+ *	@new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_link:
+ *	Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file.
+ *	@old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing link
+ *	to the file.
+ *	@new_dir contains the path structure of the parent directory of
+ *	the new link.
+ *	@new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_unlink:
+ *	Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file.
+ *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the file.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_unlink:
+ *	Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file.
+ *	@dir contains the path structure of parent directory of the file.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_symlink:
+ *	Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
+ *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of
+ *	the symbolic link.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link.
+ *	@old_name contains the pathname of file.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_symlink:
+ *	Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
+ *	@dir contains the path structure of parent directory of
+ *	the symbolic link.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link.
+ *	@old_name contains the pathname of file.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_mkdir:
+ *	Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory
+ *	associated with inode structure @dir.
+ *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory
+ *	to be created.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory.
+ *	@mode contains the mode of new directory.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_mkdir:
+ *	Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory
+ *	associated with path structure @path.
+ *	@dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory
+ *	to be created.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory.
+ *	@mode contains the mode of new directory.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_rmdir:
+ *	Check the permission to remove a directory.
+ *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory
+ *	to be removed.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_rmdir:
+ *	Check the permission to remove a directory.
+ *	@dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory to be
+ *	removed.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_mknod:
+ *	Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo
+ *	file created via the mknod system call).  Note that if mknod operation
+ *	is being done for a regular file, then the create hook will be called
+ *	and not this hook.
+ *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent of the new file.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file.
+ *	@mode contains the mode of the new file.
+ *	@dev contains the device number.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_mknod:
+ *	Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called
+ *	even if mknod operation is being done for a regular file.
+ *	@dir contains the path structure of parent of the new file.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file.
+ *	@mode contains the mode of the new file.
+ *	@dev contains the undecoded device number. Use new_decode_dev() to get
+ *	the decoded device number.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_rename:
+ *	Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
+ *	@old_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the old link.
+ *	@old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link.
+ *	@new_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the new link.
+ *	@new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_rename:
+ *	Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
+ *	@old_dir contains the path structure for parent of the old link.
+ *	@old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link.
+ *	@new_dir contains the path structure for parent of the new link.
+ *	@new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_chmod:
+ *	Check for permission to change DAC's permission of a file or directory.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure.
+ *	@mnt contains the vfsmnt structure.
+ *	@mode contains DAC's mode.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_chown:
+ *	Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory.
+ *	@path contains the path structure.
+ *	@uid contains new owner's ID.
+ *	@gid contains new group's ID.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_chroot:
+ *	Check for permission to change root directory.
+ *	@path contains the path structure.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_readlink:
+ *	Check the permission to read the symbolic link.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file link.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_follow_link:
+ *	Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the link.
+ *	@inode contains the inode, which itself is not stable in RCU-walk
+ *	@rcu indicates whether we are in RCU-walk mode.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_permission:
+ *	Check permission before accessing an inode.  This hook is called by the
+ *	existing Linux permission function, so a security module can use it to
+ *	provide additional checking for existing Linux permission checks.
+ *	Notice that this hook is called when a file is opened (as well as many
+ *	other operations), whereas the file_security_ops permission hook is
+ *	called when the actual read/write operations are performed.
+ *	@inode contains the inode structure to check.
+ *	@mask contains the permission mask.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_setattr:
+ *	Check permission before setting file attributes.  Note that the kernel
+ *	call to notify_change is performed from several locations, whenever
+ *	file attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod
+ *	operations, transferring disk quotas, etc).
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file.
+ *	@attr is the iattr structure containing the new file attributes.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_truncate:
+ *	Check permission before truncating a file.
+ *	@path contains the path structure for the file.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_getattr:
+ *	Check permission before obtaining file attributes.
+ *	@mnt is the vfsmount where the dentry was looked up
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_setxattr:
+ *	Check permission before setting the extended attributes
+ *	@value identified by @name for @dentry.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_post_setxattr:
+ *	Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation.
+ *	@value identified by @name for @dentry.
+ * @inode_getxattr:
+ *	Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes
+ *	identified by @name for @dentry.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_listxattr:
+ *	Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute
+ *	names for @dentry.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_removexattr:
+ *	Check permission before removing the extended attribute
+ *	identified by @name for @dentry.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_getsecurity:
+ *	Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the
+ *	security label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer.  Note that
+ *	@name is the remainder of the attribute name after the security prefix
+ *	has been removed. @alloc is used to specify of the call should return a
+ *	value via the buffer or just the value length Return size of buffer on
+ *	success.
+ * @inode_setsecurity:
+ *	Set the security label associated with @name for @inode from the
+ *	extended attribute value @value.  @size indicates the size of the
+ *	@value in bytes.  @flags may be XATTR_CREATE, XATTR_REPLACE, or 0.
+ *	Note that @name is the remainder of the attribute name after the
+ *	security. prefix has been removed.
+ *	Return 0 on success.
+ * @inode_listsecurity:
+ *	Copy the extended attribute names for the security labels
+ *	associated with @inode into @buffer.  The maximum size of @buffer
+ *	is specified by @buffer_size.  @buffer may be NULL to request
+ *	the size of the buffer required.
+ *	Returns number of bytes used/required on success.
+ * @inode_need_killpriv:
+ *	Called when an inode has been changed.
+ *	@dentry is the dentry being changed.
+ *	Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation.
+ *	Return 0 if inode_killpriv does not need to be called.
+ *	Return >0 if inode_killpriv does need to be called.
+ * @inode_killpriv:
+ *	The setuid bit is being removed.  Remove similar security labels.
+ *	Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held.
+ *	@dentry is the dentry being changed.
+ *	Return 0 on success.  If error is returned, then the operation
+ *	causing setuid bit removal is failed.
+ * @inode_getsecid:
+ *	Get the secid associated with the node.
+ *	@inode contains a pointer to the inode.
+ *	@secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
+ *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for file operations
+ *
+ * @file_permission:
+ *	Check file permissions before accessing an open file.  This hook is
+ *	called by various operations that read or write files.  A security
+ *	module can use this hook to perform additional checking on these
+ *	operations, e.g.  to revalidate permissions on use to support privilege
+ *	bracketing or policy changes.  Notice that this hook is used when the
+ *	actual read/write operations are performed, whereas the
+ *	inode_security_ops hook is called when a file is opened (as well as
+ *	many other operations).
+ *	Caveat:  Although this hook can be used to revalidate permissions for
+ *	various system call operations that read or write files, it does not
+ *	address the revalidation of permissions for memory-mapped files.
+ *	Security modules must handle this separately if they need such
+ *	revalidation.
+ *	@file contains the file structure being accessed.
+ *	@mask contains the requested permissions.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_alloc_security:
+ *	Allocate and attach a security structure to the file->f_security field.
+ *	The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first
+ *	created.
+ *	@file contains the file structure to secure.
+ *	Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
+ * @file_free_security:
+ *	Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security.
+ *	@file contains the file structure being modified.
+ * @file_ioctl:
+ *	@file contains the file structure.
+ *	@cmd contains the operation to perform.
+ *	@arg contains the operational arguments.
+ *	Check permission for an ioctl operation on @file.  Note that @arg
+ *	sometimes represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a
+ *	simple integer value.  When @arg represents a user space pointer, it
+ *	should never be used by the security module.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @mmap_addr :
+ *	Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr.
+ *	@addr contains virtual address that will be used for the operation.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @mmap_file :
+ *	Check permissions for a mmap operation.  The @file may be NULL, e.g.
+ *	if mapping anonymous memory.
+ *	@file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
+ *	@reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
+ *	@prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ *	@flags contains the operational flags.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_mprotect:
+ *	Check permissions before changing memory access permissions.
+ *	@vma contains the memory region to modify.
+ *	@reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
+ *	@prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_lock:
+ *	Check permission before performing file locking operations.
+ *	Note: this hook mediates both flock and fcntl style locks.
+ *	@file contains the file structure.
+ *	@cmd contains the posix-translated lock operation to perform
+ *	(e.g. F_RDLCK, F_WRLCK).
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_fcntl:
+ *	Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd
+ *	from being performed on the file @file.  Note that @arg sometimes
+ *	represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple
+ *	integer value.  When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should
+ *	never be used by the security module.
+ *	@file contains the file structure.
+ *	@cmd contains the operation to be performed.
+ *	@arg contains the operational arguments.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_set_fowner:
+ *	Save owner security information (typically from current->security) in
+ *	file->f_security for later use by the send_sigiotask hook.
+ *	@file contains the file structure to update.
+ *	Return 0 on success.
+ * @file_send_sigiotask:
+ *	Check permission for the file owner @fown to send SIGIO or SIGURG to the
+ *	process @tsk.  Note that this hook is sometimes called from interrupt.
+ *	Note that the fown_struct, @fown, is never outside the context of a
+ *	struct file, so the file structure (and associated security information)
+ *	can always be obtained:
+ *		container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner)
+ *	@tsk contains the structure of task receiving signal.
+ *	@fown contains the file owner information.
+ *	@sig is the signal that will be sent.  When 0, kernel sends SIGIO.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_receive:
+ *	This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process
+ *	to receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC.
+ *	@file contains the file structure being received.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_open
+ *	Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon
+ *	file_permission, and recheck access if anything has changed
+ *	since inode_permission.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for task operations.
+ *
+ * @task_create:
+ *	Check permission before creating a child process.  See the clone(2)
+ *	manual page for definitions of the @clone_flags.
+ *	@clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_free:
+ *	@task task being freed
+ *	Handle release of task-related resources. (Note that this can be called
+ *	from interrupt context.)
+ * @cred_alloc_blank:
+ *	@cred points to the credentials.
+ *	@gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations.
+ *	Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that
+ *	cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM.
+ * @cred_free:
+ *	@cred points to the credentials.
+ *	Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials.
+ * @cred_prepare:
+ *	@new points to the new credentials.
+ *	@old points to the original credentials.
+ *	@gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations.
+ *	Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set.
+ * @cred_transfer:
+ *	@new points to the new credentials.
+ *	@old points to the original credentials.
+ *	Transfer data from original creds to new creds
+ * @kernel_act_as:
+ *	Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
+ *	@new points to the credentials to be modified.
+ *	@secid specifies the security ID to be set
+ *	The current task must be the one that nominated @secid.
+ *	Return 0 if successful.
+ * @kernel_create_files_as:
+ *	Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same as
+ *	the objective context of the specified inode.
+ *	@new points to the credentials to be modified.
+ *	@inode points to the inode to use as a reference.
+ *	The current task must be the one that nominated @inode.
+ *	Return 0 if successful.
+ * @kernel_fw_from_file:
+ *	Load firmware from userspace (not called for built-in firmware).
+ *	@file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing
+ *	the firmware to load. This argument will be NULL if the firmware
+ *	was loaded via the uevent-triggered blob-based interface exposed
+ *	by CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER.
+ *	@buf pointer to buffer containing firmware contents.
+ *	@size length of the firmware contents.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @kernel_module_request:
+ *	Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for
+ *	userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
+ *	@kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel
+ *	Return 0 if successful.
+ * @kernel_module_from_file:
+ *	Load a kernel module from userspace.
+ *	@file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing
+ *	the kernel module to load. If the module is being loaded from a blob,
+ *	this argument will be NULL.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_fix_setuid:
+ *	Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user
+ *	identity attributes of the current process.  The @flags parameter
+ *	indicates which of the set*uid system calls invoked this hook.  If
+ *	@new is the set of credentials that will be installed.  Modifications
+ *	should be made to this rather than to @current->cred.
+ *	@old is the set of credentials that are being replaces
+ *	@flags contains one of the LSM_SETID_* values.
+ *	Return 0 on success.
+ * @task_setpgid:
+ *	Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the
+ *	process @p to @pgid.
+ *	@p contains the task_struct for process being modified.
+ *	@pgid contains the new pgid.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_getpgid:
+ *	Check permission before getting the process group identifier of the
+ *	process @p.
+ *	@p contains the task_struct for the process.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_getsid:
+ *	Check permission before getting the session identifier of the process
+ *	@p.
+ *	@p contains the task_struct for the process.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_getsecid:
+ *	Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p.
+ *	@p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid.
+ *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ *
+ * @task_setnice:
+ *	Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice.
+ *	@p contains the task_struct of process.
+ *	@nice contains the new nice value.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_setioprio
+ *	Check permission before setting the ioprio value of @p to @ioprio.
+ *	@p contains the task_struct of process.
+ *	@ioprio contains the new ioprio value
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_getioprio
+ *	Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p.
+ *	@p contains the task_struct of process.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_setrlimit:
+ *	Check permission before setting the resource limits of the current
+ *	process for @resource to @new_rlim.  The old resource limit values can
+ *	be examined by dereferencing (current->signal->rlim + resource).
+ *	@resource contains the resource whose limit is being set.
+ *	@new_rlim contains the new limits for @resource.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_setscheduler:
+ *	Check permission before setting scheduling policy and/or parameters of
+ *	process @p based on @policy and @lp.
+ *	@p contains the task_struct for process.
+ *	@policy contains the scheduling policy.
+ *	@lp contains the scheduling parameters.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_getscheduler:
+ *	Check permission before obtaining scheduling information for process
+ *	@p.
+ *	@p contains the task_struct for process.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_movememory
+ *	Check permission before moving memory owned by process @p.
+ *	@p contains the task_struct for process.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_kill:
+ *	Check permission before sending signal @sig to @p.  @info can be NULL,
+ *	the constant 1, or a pointer to a siginfo structure.  If @info is 1 or
+ *	SI_FROMKERNEL(info) is true, then the signal should be viewed as coming
+ *	from the kernel and should typically be permitted.
+ *	SIGIO signals are handled separately by the send_sigiotask hook in
+ *	file_security_ops.
+ *	@p contains the task_struct for process.
+ *	@info contains the signal information.
+ *	@sig contains the signal value.
+ *	@secid contains the sid of the process where the signal originated
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_wait:
+ *	Check permission before allowing a process to reap a child process @p
+ *	and collect its status information.
+ *	@p contains the task_struct for process.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_prctl:
+ *	Check permission before performing a process control operation on the
+ *	current process.
+ *	@option contains the operation.
+ *	@arg2 contains a argument.
+ *	@arg3 contains a argument.
+ *	@arg4 contains a argument.
+ *	@arg5 contains a argument.
+ *	Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value to
+ *	cause prctl() to return immediately with that value.
+ * @task_to_inode:
+ *	Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's
+ *	security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes.
+ *	@p contains the task_struct for the task.
+ *	@inode contains the inode structure for the inode.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for Netlink messaging.
+ *
+ * @netlink_send:
+ *	Save security information for a netlink message so that permission
+ *	checking can be performed when the message is processed.  The security
+ *	information can be saved using the eff_cap field of the
+ *	netlink_skb_parms structure.  Also may be used to provide fine
+ *	grained control over message transmission.
+ *	@sk associated sock of task sending the message.
+ *	@skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message.
+ *	Return 0 if the information was successfully saved and message
+ *	is allowed to be transmitted.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for Unix domain networking.
+ *
+ * @unix_stream_connect:
+ *	Check permissions before establishing a Unix domain stream connection
+ *	between @sock and @other.
+ *	@sock contains the sock structure.
+ *	@other contains the peer sock structure.
+ *	@newsk contains the new sock structure.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @unix_may_send:
+ *	Check permissions before connecting or sending datagrams from @sock to
+ *	@other.
+ *	@sock contains the socket structure.
+ *	@other contains the peer socket structure.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ *
+ * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because
+ * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix
+ * domain sockets.  Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name
+ * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod
+ * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to
+ * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated.  Sufficient
+ * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible
+ * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target
+ * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for socket operations.
+ *
+ * @socket_create:
+ *	Check permissions prior to creating a new socket.
+ *	@family contains the requested protocol family.
+ *	@type contains the requested communications type.
+ *	@protocol contains the requested protocol.
+ *	@kern set to 1 if a kernel socket.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_post_create:
+ *	This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security
+ *	structure. Note that the security field was not added directly to the
+ *	socket structure, but rather, the socket security information is stored
+ *	in the associated inode.  Typically, the inode alloc_security hook will
+ *	allocate and and attach security information to
+ *	sock->inode->i_security.  This hook may be used to update the
+ *	sock->inode->i_security field with additional information that wasn't
+ *	available when the inode was allocated.
+ *	@sock contains the newly created socket structure.
+ *	@family contains the requested protocol family.
+ *	@type contains the requested communications type.
+ *	@protocol contains the requested protocol.
+ *	@kern set to 1 if a kernel socket.
+ * @socket_bind:
+ *	Check permission before socket protocol layer bind operation is
+ *	performed and the socket @sock is bound to the address specified in the
+ *	@address parameter.
+ *	@sock contains the socket structure.
+ *	@address contains the address to bind to.
+ *	@addrlen contains the length of address.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_connect:
+ *	Check permission before socket protocol layer connect operation
+ *	attempts to connect socket @sock to a remote address, @address.
+ *	@sock contains the socket structure.
+ *	@address contains the address of remote endpoint.
+ *	@addrlen contains the length of address.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_listen:
+ *	Check permission before socket protocol layer listen operation.
+ *	@sock contains the socket structure.
+ *	@backlog contains the maximum length for the pending connection queue.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_accept:
+ *	Check permission before accepting a new connection.  Note that the new
+ *	socket, @newsock, has been created and some information copied to it,
+ *	but the accept operation has not actually been performed.
+ *	@sock contains the listening socket structure.
+ *	@newsock contains the newly created server socket for connection.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_sendmsg:
+ *	Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket.
+ *	@sock contains the socket structure.
+ *	@msg contains the message to be transmitted.
+ *	@size contains the size of message.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_recvmsg:
+ *	Check permission before receiving a message from a socket.
+ *	@sock contains the socket structure.
+ *	@msg contains the message structure.
+ *	@size contains the size of message structure.
+ *	@flags contains the operational flags.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_getsockname:
+ *	Check permission before the local address (name) of the socket object
+ *	@sock is retrieved.
+ *	@sock contains the socket structure.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_getpeername:
+ *	Check permission before the remote address (name) of a socket object
+ *	@sock is retrieved.
+ *	@sock contains the socket structure.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_getsockopt:
+ *	Check permissions before retrieving the options associated with socket
+ *	@sock.
+ *	@sock contains the socket structure.
+ *	@level contains the protocol level to retrieve option from.
+ *	@optname contains the name of option to retrieve.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_setsockopt:
+ *	Check permissions before setting the options associated with socket
+ *	@sock.
+ *	@sock contains the socket structure.
+ *	@level contains the protocol level to set options for.
+ *	@optname contains the name of the option to set.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_shutdown:
+ *	Checks permission before all or part of a connection on the socket
+ *	@sock is shut down.
+ *	@sock contains the socket structure.
+ *	@how contains the flag indicating how future sends and receives
+ *	are handled.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_sock_rcv_skb:
+ *	Check permissions on incoming network packets.  This hook is distinct
+ *	from Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the
+ *	incoming sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk.
+ *	Must not sleep inside this hook because some callers hold spinlocks.
+ *	@sk contains the sock (not socket) associated with the incoming sk_buff.
+ *	@skb contains the incoming network data.
+ * @socket_getpeersec_stream:
+ *	This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security
+ *	state for unix or connected tcp sockets to userspace via getsockopt
+ *	SO_GETPEERSEC.  For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the
+ *	socket is associated with an ipsec SA.
+ *	@sock is the local socket.
+ *	@optval userspace memory where the security state is to be copied.
+ *	@optlen userspace int where the module should copy the actual length
+ *	of the security state.
+ *	@len as input is the maximum length to copy to userspace provided
+ *	by the caller.
+ *	Return 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return
+ *	values.
+ * @socket_getpeersec_dgram:
+ *	This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security
+ *	state for udp sockets on a per-packet basis to userspace via
+ *	getsockopt SO_GETPEERSEC.  The application must first have indicated
+ *	the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt.  It can then retrieve the
+ *	security state returned by this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY
+ *	ancillary message type.
+ *	@skb is the skbuff for the packet being queried
+ *	@secdata is a pointer to a buffer in which to copy the security data
+ *	@seclen is the maximum length for @secdata
+ *	Return 0 on success, error on failure.
+ * @sk_alloc_security:
+ *	Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field,
+ *	which is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets.
+ * @sk_free_security:
+ *	Deallocate security structure.
+ * @sk_clone_security:
+ *	Clone/copy security structure.
+ * @sk_getsecid:
+ *	Retrieve the LSM-specific secid for the sock to enable caching
+ *	of network authorizations.
+ * @sock_graft:
+ *	Sets the socket's isec sid to the sock's sid.
+ * @inet_conn_request:
+ *	Sets the openreq's sid to socket's sid with MLS portion taken
+ *	from peer sid.
+ * @inet_csk_clone:
+ *	Sets the new child socket's sid to the openreq sid.
+ * @inet_conn_established:
+ *	Sets the connection's peersid to the secmark on skb.
+ * @secmark_relabel_packet:
+ *	check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to
+ *	the given secid
+ * @security_secmark_refcount_inc
+ *	tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded
+ * @security_secmark_refcount_dec
+ *	tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded
+ * @req_classify_flow:
+ *	Sets the flow's sid to the openreq sid.
+ * @tun_dev_alloc_security:
+ *	This hook allows a module to allocate a security structure for a TUN
+ *	device.
+ *	@security pointer to a security structure pointer.
+ *	Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ * @tun_dev_free_security:
+ *	This hook allows a module to free the security structure for a TUN
+ *	device.
+ *	@security pointer to the TUN device's security structure
+ * @tun_dev_create:
+ *	Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device.
+ * @tun_dev_attach_queue:
+ *	Check permissions prior to attaching to a TUN device queue.
+ *	@security pointer to the TUN device's security structure.
+ * @tun_dev_attach:
+ *	This hook can be used by the module to update any security state
+ *	associated with the TUN device's sock structure.
+ *	@sk contains the existing sock structure.
+ *	@security pointer to the TUN device's security structure.
+ * @tun_dev_open:
+ *	This hook can be used by the module to update any security state
+ *	associated with the TUN device's security structure.
+ *	@security pointer to the TUN devices's security structure.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for XFRM operations.
+ *
+ * @xfrm_policy_alloc_security:
+ *	@ctxp is a pointer to the xfrm_sec_ctx being added to Security Policy
+ *	Database used by the XFRM system.
+ *	@sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by
+ *	the user-level policy update program (e.g., setkey).
+ *	Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security
+ *	field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated.
+ *	Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate, legal context)
+ *	@gfp is to specify the context for the allocation
+ * @xfrm_policy_clone_security:
+ *	@old_ctx contains an existing xfrm_sec_ctx.
+ *	@new_ctxp contains a new xfrm_sec_ctx being cloned from old.
+ *	Allocate a security structure in new_ctxp that contains the
+ *	information from the old_ctx structure.
+ *	Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate).
+ * @xfrm_policy_free_security:
+ *	@ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx
+ *	Deallocate xp->security.
+ * @xfrm_policy_delete_security:
+ *	@ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx.
+ *	Authorize deletion of xp->security.
+ * @xfrm_state_alloc:
+ *	@x contains the xfrm_state being added to the Security Association
+ *	Database by the XFRM system.
+ *	@sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by
+ *	the user-level SA generation program (e.g., setkey or racoon).
+ *	Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security
+ *	field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the
+ *	context to correspond to sec_ctx. Return 0 if operation was successful
+ *	(memory to allocate, legal context).
+ * @xfrm_state_alloc_acquire:
+ *	@x contains the xfrm_state being added to the Security Association
+ *	Database by the XFRM system.
+ *	@polsec contains the policy's security context.
+ *	@secid contains the secid from which to take the mls portion of the
+ *	context.
+ *	Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security
+ *	field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the
+ *	context to correspond to secid. Return 0 if operation was successful
+ *	(memory to allocate, legal context).
+ * @xfrm_state_free_security:
+ *	@x contains the xfrm_state.
+ *	Deallocate x->security.
+ * @xfrm_state_delete_security:
+ *	@x contains the xfrm_state.
+ *	Authorize deletion of x->security.
+ * @xfrm_policy_lookup:
+ *	@ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx for which the access control is being
+ *	checked.
+ *	@fl_secid contains the flow security label that is used to authorize
+ *	access to the policy xp.
+ *	@dir contains the direction of the flow (input or output).
+ *	Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing
+ *	XFRMs on a packet.  The hook is called when selecting either a
+ *	per-socket policy or a generic xfrm policy.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted, -ESRCH otherwise, or -errno
+ *	on other errors.
+ * @xfrm_state_pol_flow_match:
+ *	@x contains the state to match.
+ *	@xp contains the policy to check for a match.
+ *	@fl contains the flow to check for a match.
+ *	Return 1 if there is a match.
+ * @xfrm_decode_session:
+ *	@skb points to skb to decode.
+ *	@secid points to the flow key secid to set.
+ *	@ckall says if all xfrms used should be checked for same secid.
+ *	Return 0 if ckall is zero or all xfrms used have the same secid.
+ *
+ * Security hooks affecting all Key Management operations
+ *
+ * @key_alloc:
+ *	Permit allocation of a key and assign security data. Note that key does
+ *	not have a serial number assigned at this point.
+ *	@key points to the key.
+ *	@flags is the allocation flags
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
+ * @key_free:
+ *	Notification of destruction; free security data.
+ *	@key points to the key.
+ *	No return value.
+ * @key_permission:
+ *	See whether a specific operational right is granted to a process on a
+ *	key.
+ *	@key_ref refers to the key (key pointer + possession attribute bit).
+ *	@cred points to the credentials to provide the context against which to
+ *	evaluate the security data on the key.
+ *	@perm describes the combination of permissions required of this key.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
+ * @key_getsecurity:
+ *	Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key
+ *	for the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY.  This function
+ *	allocates the storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller
+ *	should free it.
+ *	@key points to the key to be queried.
+ *	@_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
+ *	resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
+ *	Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
+ *	an error.
+ *	May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
+ *
+ * Security hooks affecting all System V IPC operations.
+ *
+ * @ipc_permission:
+ *	Check permissions for access to IPC
+ *	@ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure
+ *	@flag contains the desired (requested) permission set
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @ipc_getsecid:
+ *	Get the secid associated with the ipc object.
+ *	@ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure.
+ *	@secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
+ *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
+ * @msg_msg_alloc_security:
+ *	Allocate and attach a security structure to the msg->security field.
+ *	The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first
+ *	created.
+ *	@msg contains the message structure to be modified.
+ *	Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
+ * @msg_msg_free_security:
+ *	Deallocate the security structure for this message.
+ *	@msg contains the message structure to be modified.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for System V IPC Message Queues
+ *
+ * @msg_queue_alloc_security:
+ *	Allocate and attach a security structure to the
+ *	msq->q_perm.security field. The security field is initialized to
+ *	NULL when the structure is first created.
+ *	@msq contains the message queue structure to be modified.
+ *	Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
+ * @msg_queue_free_security:
+ *	Deallocate security structure for this message queue.
+ *	@msq contains the message queue structure to be modified.
+ * @msg_queue_associate:
+ *	Check permission when a message queue is requested through the
+ *	msgget system call.  This hook is only called when returning the
+ *	message queue identifier for an existing message queue, not when a
+ *	new message queue is created.
+ *	@msq contains the message queue to act upon.
+ *	@msqflg contains the operation control flags.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @msg_queue_msgctl:
+ *	Check permission when a message control operation specified by @cmd
+ *	is to be performed on the message queue @msq.
+ *	The @msq may be NULL, e.g. for IPC_INFO or MSG_INFO.
+ *	@msq contains the message queue to act upon.  May be NULL.
+ *	@cmd contains the operation to be performed.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @msg_queue_msgsnd:
+ *	Check permission before a message, @msg, is enqueued on the message
+ *	queue, @msq.
+ *	@msq contains the message queue to send message to.
+ *	@msg contains the message to be enqueued.
+ *	@msqflg contains operational flags.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @msg_queue_msgrcv:
+ *	Check permission before a message, @msg, is removed from the message
+ *	queue, @msq.  The @target task structure contains a pointer to the
+ *	process that will be receiving the message (not equal to the current
+ *	process when inline receives are being performed).
+ *	@msq contains the message queue to retrieve message from.
+ *	@msg contains the message destination.
+ *	@target contains the task structure for recipient process.
+ *	@type contains the type of message requested.
+ *	@mode contains the operational flags.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for System V Shared Memory Segments
+ *
+ * @shm_alloc_security:
+ *	Allocate and attach a security structure to the shp->shm_perm.security
+ *	field.  The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is
+ *	first created.
+ *	@shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
+ *	Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
+ * @shm_free_security:
+ *	Deallocate the security struct for this memory segment.
+ *	@shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
+ * @shm_associate:
+ *	Check permission when a shared memory region is requested through the
+ *	shmget system call.  This hook is only called when returning the shared
+ *	memory region identifier for an existing region, not when a new shared
+ *	memory region is created.
+ *	@shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
+ *	@shmflg contains the operation control flags.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @shm_shmctl:
+ *	Check permission when a shared memory control operation specified by
+ *	@cmd is to be performed on the shared memory region @shp.
+ *	The @shp may be NULL, e.g. for IPC_INFO or SHM_INFO.
+ *	@shp contains shared memory structure to be modified.
+ *	@cmd contains the operation to be performed.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @shm_shmat:
+ *	Check permissions prior to allowing the shmat system call to attach the
+ *	shared memory segment @shp to the data segment of the calling process.
+ *	The attaching address is specified by @shmaddr.
+ *	@shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
+ *	@shmaddr contains the address to attach memory region to.
+ *	@shmflg contains the operational flags.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for System V Semaphores
+ *
+ * @sem_alloc_security:
+ *	Allocate and attach a security structure to the sma->sem_perm.security
+ *	field.  The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is
+ *	first created.
+ *	@sma contains the semaphore structure
+ *	Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
+ * @sem_free_security:
+ *	deallocate security struct for this semaphore
+ *	@sma contains the semaphore structure.
+ * @sem_associate:
+ *	Check permission when a semaphore is requested through the semget
+ *	system call.  This hook is only called when returning the semaphore
+ *	identifier for an existing semaphore, not when a new one must be
+ *	created.
+ *	@sma contains the semaphore structure.
+ *	@semflg contains the operation control flags.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sem_semctl:
+ *	Check permission when a semaphore operation specified by @cmd is to be
+ *	performed on the semaphore @sma.  The @sma may be NULL, e.g. for
+ *	IPC_INFO or SEM_INFO.
+ *	@sma contains the semaphore structure.  May be NULL.
+ *	@cmd contains the operation to be performed.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sem_semop
+ *	Check permissions before performing operations on members of the
+ *	semaphore set @sma.  If the @alter flag is nonzero, the semaphore set
+ *	may be modified.
+ *	@sma contains the semaphore structure.
+ *	@sops contains the operations to perform.
+ *	@nsops contains the number of operations to perform.
+ *	@alter contains the flag indicating whether changes are to be made.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ *
+ * @binder_set_context_mgr
+ *	Check whether @mgr is allowed to be the binder context manager.
+ *	@mgr contains the task_struct for the task being registered.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @binder_transaction
+ *	Check whether @from is allowed to invoke a binder transaction call
+ *	to @to.
+ *	@from contains the task_struct for the sending task.
+ *	@to contains the task_struct for the receiving task.
+ * @binder_transfer_binder
+ *	Check whether @from is allowed to transfer a binder reference to @to.
+ *	@from contains the task_struct for the sending task.
+ *	@to contains the task_struct for the receiving task.
+ * @binder_transfer_file
+ *	Check whether @from is allowed to transfer @file to @to.
+ *	@from contains the task_struct for the sending task.
+ *	@file contains the struct file being transferred.
+ *	@to contains the task_struct for the receiving task.
+ *
+ * @ptrace_access_check:
+ *	Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the
+ *	@child process.
+ *	Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check
+ *	during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of
+ *	tracing check during an execve in the bprm_set_creds hook of
+ *	binprm_security_ops if the process is being traced and its security
+ *	attributes would be changed by the execve.
+ *	@child contains the task_struct structure for the target process.
+ *	@mode contains the PTRACE_MODE flags indicating the form of access.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @ptrace_traceme:
+ *	Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the
+ *	current process before allowing the current process to present itself
+ *	to the @parent process for tracing.
+ *	@parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @capget:
+ *	Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for
+ *	the @target process.  The hook may also perform permission checking to
+ *	determine if the current process is allowed to see the capability sets
+ *	of the @target process.
+ *	@target contains the task_struct structure for target process.
+ *	@effective contains the effective capability set.
+ *	@inheritable contains the inheritable capability set.
+ *	@permitted contains the permitted capability set.
+ *	Return 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained.
+ * @capset:
+ *	Set the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for
+ *	the current process.
+ *	@new contains the new credentials structure for target process.
+ *	@old contains the current credentials structure for target process.
+ *	@effective contains the effective capability set.
+ *	@inheritable contains the inheritable capability set.
+ *	@permitted contains the permitted capability set.
+ *	Return 0 and update @new if permission is granted.
+ * @capable:
+ *	Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated
+ *	credentials.
+ *	@cred contains the credentials to use.
+ *	@ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in
+ *	@cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
+ *	@audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
+ *	Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
+ * @syslog:
+ *	Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing
+ *	logging to the console.
+ *	See the syslog(2) manual page for an explanation of the @type values.
+ *	@type contains the type of action.
+ *	@from_file indicates the context of action (if it came from /proc).
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @settime:
+ *	Check permission to change the system time.
+ *	struct timespec and timezone are defined in include/linux/time.h
+ *	@ts contains new time
+ *	@tz contains new timezone
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @vm_enough_memory:
+ *	Check permissions for allocating a new virtual mapping.
+ *	@mm contains the mm struct it is being added to.
+ *	@pages contains the number of pages.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ *
+ * @ismaclabel:
+ *	Check if the extended attribute specified by @name
+ *	represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC
+ *	attribute otherwise returns 0.
+ *	@name full extended attribute name to check against
+ *	LSM as a MAC label.
+ *
+ * @secid_to_secctx:
+ *	Convert secid to security context.  If secdata is NULL the length of
+ *	the result will be returned in seclen, but no secdata will be returned.
+ *	This does mean that the length could change between calls to check the
+ *	length and the next call which actually allocates and returns the
+ *	secdata.
+ *	@secid contains the security ID.
+ *	@secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security
+ *	context.
+ *	@seclen pointer which contains the length of the data
+ * @secctx_to_secid:
+ *	Convert security context to secid.
+ *	@secid contains the pointer to the generated security ID.
+ *	@secdata contains the security context.
+ *
+ * @release_secctx:
+ *	Release the security context.
+ *	@secdata contains the security context.
+ *	@seclen contains the length of the security context.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for Audit
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_init:
+ *	Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure.
+ *	@field contains the required Audit action.
+ *	Fields flags are defined in include/linux/audit.h
+ *	@op contains the operator the rule uses.
+ *	@rulestr contains the context where the rule will be applied to.
+ *	@lsmrule contains a pointer to receive the result.
+ *	Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set,
+ *	-EINVAL in case of an invalid rule.
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_known:
+ *	Specifies whether given @rule contains any fields related to
+ *	current LSM.
+ *	@rule contains the audit rule of interest.
+ *	Return 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise.
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_match:
+ *	Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved
+ *	by @audit_rule_known.
+ *	@secid contains the security id in question.
+ *	@field contains the field which relates to current LSM.
+ *	@op contains the operator that will be used for matching.
+ *	@rule points to the audit rule that will be checked against.
+ *	@actx points to the audit context associated with the check.
+ *	Return 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on failure.
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_free:
+ *	Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by
+ *	audit_rule_init.
+ *	@rule contains the allocated rule
+ *
+ * @inode_notifysecctx:
+ *	Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode
+ *	should be.  Initializes the incore security context managed by the
+ *	security module for this inode.  Example usage:  NFS client invokes
+ *	this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the
+ *	value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the
+ *	file's attributes to the client.
+ *
+ *	Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked.
+ *
+ *	@inode we wish to set the security context of.
+ *	@ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
+ *	@ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
+ *
+ * @inode_setsecctx:
+ *	Change the security context of an inode.  Updates the
+ *	incore security context managed by the security module and invokes the
+ *	fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing
+ *	xattrs that represent the context.  Example usage:  NFS server invokes
+ *	this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the
+ *	backing filesystem to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR
+ *	operation.
+ *
+ *	Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked.
+ *
+ *	@dentry contains the inode we wish to set the security context of.
+ *	@ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
+ *	@ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
+ *
+ * @inode_getsecctx:
+ *	On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security
+ *	context for the given @inode.
+ *
+ *	@inode we wish to get the security context of.
+ *	@ctx is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context.
+ *	@ctxlen points to the place to put the length of @ctx.
+ * This is the main security structure.
+ */
+
+union security_list_options {
+	int (*binder_set_context_mgr)(struct task_struct *mgr);
+	int (*binder_transaction)(struct task_struct *from,
+					struct task_struct *to);
+	int (*binder_transfer_binder)(struct task_struct *from,
+					struct task_struct *to);
+	int (*binder_transfer_file)(struct task_struct *from,
+					struct task_struct *to,
+					struct file *file);
+
+	int (*ptrace_access_check)(struct task_struct *child,
+					unsigned int mode);
+	int (*ptrace_traceme)(struct task_struct *parent);
+	int (*capget)(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+			kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+	int (*capset)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+			const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+			const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+			const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+	int (*capable)(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+			int cap, int audit);
+	int (*quotactl)(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
+	int (*quota_on)(struct dentry *dentry);
+	int (*syslog)(int type);
+	int (*settime)(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
+	int (*vm_enough_memory)(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
+
+	int (*bprm_set_creds)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+	int (*bprm_check_security)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+	int (*bprm_secureexec)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+	void (*bprm_committing_creds)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+	void (*bprm_committed_creds)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+
+	int (*sb_alloc_security)(struct super_block *sb);
+	void (*sb_free_security)(struct super_block *sb);
+	int (*sb_copy_data)(char *orig, char *copy);
+	int (*sb_remount)(struct super_block *sb, void *data);
+	int (*sb_kern_mount)(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data);
+	int (*sb_show_options)(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb);
+	int (*sb_statfs)(struct dentry *dentry);
+	int (*sb_mount)(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
+			const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data);
+	int (*sb_umount)(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
+	int (*sb_pivotroot)(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path);
+	int (*sb_set_mnt_opts)(struct super_block *sb,
+				struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
+				unsigned long kern_flags,
+				unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
+	int (*sb_clone_mnt_opts)(const struct super_block *oldsb,
+					struct super_block *newsb);
+	int (*sb_parse_opts_str)(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
+	int (*dentry_init_security)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+					struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
+					u32 *ctxlen);
+
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+	int (*path_unlink)(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
+	int (*path_mkdir)(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+				umode_t mode);
+	int (*path_rmdir)(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
+	int (*path_mknod)(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+				umode_t mode, unsigned int dev);
+	int (*path_truncate)(struct path *path);
+	int (*path_symlink)(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+				const char *old_name);
+	int (*path_link)(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+				struct dentry *new_dentry);
+	int (*path_rename)(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+				struct path *new_dir,
+				struct dentry *new_dentry);
+	int (*path_chmod)(struct path *path, umode_t mode);
+	int (*path_chown)(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid);
+	int (*path_chroot)(struct path *path);
+#endif
+
+	int (*inode_alloc_security)(struct inode *inode);
+	void (*inode_free_security)(struct inode *inode);
+	int (*inode_init_security)(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+					const struct qstr *qstr,
+					const char **name, void **value,
+					size_t *len);
+	int (*inode_create)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+				umode_t mode);
+	int (*inode_link)(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
+				struct dentry *new_dentry);
+	int (*inode_unlink)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
+	int (*inode_symlink)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+				const char *old_name);
+	int (*inode_mkdir)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+				umode_t mode);
+	int (*inode_rmdir)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
+	int (*inode_mknod)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+				umode_t mode, dev_t dev);
+	int (*inode_rename)(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+				struct inode *new_dir,
+				struct dentry *new_dentry);
+	int (*inode_readlink)(struct dentry *dentry);
+	int (*inode_follow_link)(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+				 bool rcu);
+	int (*inode_permission)(struct inode *inode, int mask);
+	int (*inode_setattr)(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
+	int (*inode_getattr)(const struct path *path);
+	int (*inode_setxattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+				const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
+	void (*inode_post_setxattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+					const void *value, size_t size,
+					int flags);
+	int (*inode_getxattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
+	int (*inode_listxattr)(struct dentry *dentry);
+	int (*inode_removexattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
+	int (*inode_need_killpriv)(struct dentry *dentry);
+	int (*inode_killpriv)(struct dentry *dentry);
+	int (*inode_getsecurity)(const struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+					void **buffer, bool alloc);
+	int (*inode_setsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+					const void *value, size_t size,
+					int flags);
+	int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
+					size_t buffer_size);
+	void (*inode_getsecid)(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+
+	int (*file_permission)(struct file *file, int mask);
+	int (*file_alloc_security)(struct file *file);
+	void (*file_free_security)(struct file *file);
+	int (*file_ioctl)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+				unsigned long arg);
+	int (*mmap_addr)(unsigned long addr);
+	int (*mmap_file)(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+				unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
+	int (*file_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
+				unsigned long prot);
+	int (*file_lock)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd);
+	int (*file_fcntl)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+				unsigned long arg);
+	void (*file_set_fowner)(struct file *file);
+	int (*file_send_sigiotask)(struct task_struct *tsk,
+					struct fown_struct *fown, int sig);
+	int (*file_receive)(struct file *file);
+	int (*file_open)(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
+
+	int (*task_create)(unsigned long clone_flags);
+	void (*task_free)(struct task_struct *task);
+	int (*cred_alloc_blank)(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
+	void (*cred_free)(struct cred *cred);
+	int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+				gfp_t gfp);
+	void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
+	int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+	int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
+	int (*kernel_fw_from_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+	int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
+	int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file);
+	int (*task_fix_setuid)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+				int flags);
+	int (*task_setpgid)(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
+	int (*task_getpgid)(struct task_struct *p);
+	int (*task_getsid)(struct task_struct *p);
+	void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+	int (*task_setnice)(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
+	int (*task_setioprio)(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
+	int (*task_getioprio)(struct task_struct *p);
+	int (*task_setrlimit)(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
+				struct rlimit *new_rlim);
+	int (*task_setscheduler)(struct task_struct *p);
+	int (*task_getscheduler)(struct task_struct *p);
+	int (*task_movememory)(struct task_struct *p);
+	int (*task_kill)(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+				int sig, u32 secid);
+	int (*task_wait)(struct task_struct *p);
+	int (*task_prctl)(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
+				unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
+	void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
+
+	int (*ipc_permission)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
+	void (*ipc_getsecid)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+
+	int (*msg_msg_alloc_security)(struct msg_msg *msg);
+	void (*msg_msg_free_security)(struct msg_msg *msg);
+
+	int (*msg_queue_alloc_security)(struct msg_queue *msq);
+	void (*msg_queue_free_security)(struct msg_queue *msq);
+	int (*msg_queue_associate)(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg);
+	int (*msg_queue_msgctl)(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd);
+	int (*msg_queue_msgsnd)(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+				int msqflg);
+	int (*msg_queue_msgrcv)(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+				struct task_struct *target, long type,
+				int mode);
+
+	int (*shm_alloc_security)(struct shmid_kernel *shp);
+	void (*shm_free_security)(struct shmid_kernel *shp);
+	int (*shm_associate)(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg);
+	int (*shm_shmctl)(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd);
+	int (*shm_shmat)(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
+				int shmflg);
+
+	int (*sem_alloc_security)(struct sem_array *sma);
+	void (*sem_free_security)(struct sem_array *sma);
+	int (*sem_associate)(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg);
+	int (*sem_semctl)(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd);
+	int (*sem_semop)(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
+				unsigned nsops, int alter);
+
+	int (*netlink_send)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
+
+	void (*d_instantiate)(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
+
+	int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
+	int (*setprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value,
+				size_t size);
+	int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
+	int (*secid_to_secctx)(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+	int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+	void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+
+	int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+	int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+	int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+	int (*unix_stream_connect)(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
+					struct sock *newsk);
+	int (*unix_may_send)(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other);
+
+	int (*socket_create)(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern);
+	int (*socket_post_create)(struct socket *sock, int family, int type,
+					int protocol, int kern);
+	int (*socket_bind)(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+				int addrlen);
+	int (*socket_connect)(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+				int addrlen);
+	int (*socket_listen)(struct socket *sock, int backlog);
+	int (*socket_accept)(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
+	int (*socket_sendmsg)(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+				int size);
+	int (*socket_recvmsg)(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+				int size, int flags);
+	int (*socket_getsockname)(struct socket *sock);
+	int (*socket_getpeername)(struct socket *sock);
+	int (*socket_getsockopt)(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
+	int (*socket_setsockopt)(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
+	int (*socket_shutdown)(struct socket *sock, int how);
+	int (*socket_sock_rcv_skb)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
+	int (*socket_getpeersec_stream)(struct socket *sock,
+					char __user *optval,
+					int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
+	int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram)(struct socket *sock,
+					struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
+	int (*sk_alloc_security)(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
+	void (*sk_free_security)(struct sock *sk);
+	void (*sk_clone_security)(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
+	void (*sk_getsecid)(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid);
+	void (*sock_graft)(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent);
+	int (*inet_conn_request)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+					struct request_sock *req);
+	void (*inet_csk_clone)(struct sock *newsk,
+				const struct request_sock *req);
+	void (*inet_conn_established)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
+	int (*secmark_relabel_packet)(u32 secid);
+	void (*secmark_refcount_inc)(void);
+	void (*secmark_refcount_dec)(void);
+	void (*req_classify_flow)(const struct request_sock *req,
+					struct flowi *fl);
+	int (*tun_dev_alloc_security)(void **security);
+	void (*tun_dev_free_security)(void *security);
+	int (*tun_dev_create)(void);
+	int (*tun_dev_attach_queue)(void *security);
+	int (*tun_dev_attach)(struct sock *sk, void *security);
+	int (*tun_dev_open)(void *security);
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+	int (*xfrm_policy_alloc_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+					  struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
+						gfp_t gfp);
+	int (*xfrm_policy_clone_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
+						struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctx);
+	void (*xfrm_policy_free_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
+	int (*xfrm_policy_delete_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
+	int (*xfrm_state_alloc)(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
+	int (*xfrm_state_alloc_acquire)(struct xfrm_state *x,
+					struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
+					u32 secid);
+	void (*xfrm_state_free_security)(struct xfrm_state *x);
+	int (*xfrm_state_delete_security)(struct xfrm_state *x);
+	int (*xfrm_policy_lookup)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid,
+					u8 dir);
+	int (*xfrm_state_pol_flow_match)(struct xfrm_state *x,
+						struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+						const struct flowi *fl);
+	int (*xfrm_decode_session)(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid, int ckall);
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
+
+	/* key management security hooks */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	int (*key_alloc)(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
+				unsigned long flags);
+	void (*key_free)(struct key *key);
+	int (*key_permission)(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
+				unsigned perm);
+	int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
+#endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	int (*audit_rule_init)(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+				void **lsmrule);
+	int (*audit_rule_known)(struct audit_krule *krule);
+	int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+				struct audit_context *actx);
+	void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule);
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+};
+
+struct security_hook_heads {
+	struct list_head binder_set_context_mgr;
+	struct list_head binder_transaction;
+	struct list_head binder_transfer_binder;
+	struct list_head binder_transfer_file;
+	struct list_head ptrace_access_check;
+	struct list_head ptrace_traceme;
+	struct list_head capget;
+	struct list_head capset;
+	struct list_head capable;
+	struct list_head quotactl;
+	struct list_head quota_on;
+	struct list_head syslog;
+	struct list_head settime;
+	struct list_head vm_enough_memory;
+	struct list_head bprm_set_creds;
+	struct list_head bprm_check_security;
+	struct list_head bprm_secureexec;
+	struct list_head bprm_committing_creds;
+	struct list_head bprm_committed_creds;
+	struct list_head sb_alloc_security;
+	struct list_head sb_free_security;
+	struct list_head sb_copy_data;
+	struct list_head sb_remount;
+	struct list_head sb_kern_mount;
+	struct list_head sb_show_options;
+	struct list_head sb_statfs;
+	struct list_head sb_mount;
+	struct list_head sb_umount;
+	struct list_head sb_pivotroot;
+	struct list_head sb_set_mnt_opts;
+	struct list_head sb_clone_mnt_opts;
+	struct list_head sb_parse_opts_str;
+	struct list_head dentry_init_security;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+	struct list_head path_unlink;
+	struct list_head path_mkdir;
+	struct list_head path_rmdir;
+	struct list_head path_mknod;
+	struct list_head path_truncate;
+	struct list_head path_symlink;
+	struct list_head path_link;
+	struct list_head path_rename;
+	struct list_head path_chmod;
+	struct list_head path_chown;
+	struct list_head path_chroot;
+#endif
+	struct list_head inode_alloc_security;
+	struct list_head inode_free_security;
+	struct list_head inode_init_security;
+	struct list_head inode_create;
+	struct list_head inode_link;
+	struct list_head inode_unlink;
+	struct list_head inode_symlink;
+	struct list_head inode_mkdir;
+	struct list_head inode_rmdir;
+	struct list_head inode_mknod;
+	struct list_head inode_rename;
+	struct list_head inode_readlink;
+	struct list_head inode_follow_link;
+	struct list_head inode_permission;
+	struct list_head inode_setattr;
+	struct list_head inode_getattr;
+	struct list_head inode_setxattr;
+	struct list_head inode_post_setxattr;
+	struct list_head inode_getxattr;
+	struct list_head inode_listxattr;
+	struct list_head inode_removexattr;
+	struct list_head inode_need_killpriv;
+	struct list_head inode_killpriv;
+	struct list_head inode_getsecurity;
+	struct list_head inode_setsecurity;
+	struct list_head inode_listsecurity;
+	struct list_head inode_getsecid;
+	struct list_head file_permission;
+	struct list_head file_alloc_security;
+	struct list_head file_free_security;
+	struct list_head file_ioctl;
+	struct list_head mmap_addr;
+	struct list_head mmap_file;
+	struct list_head file_mprotect;
+	struct list_head file_lock;
+	struct list_head file_fcntl;
+	struct list_head file_set_fowner;
+	struct list_head file_send_sigiotask;
+	struct list_head file_receive;
+	struct list_head file_open;
+	struct list_head task_create;
+	struct list_head task_free;
+	struct list_head cred_alloc_blank;
+	struct list_head cred_free;
+	struct list_head cred_prepare;
+	struct list_head cred_transfer;
+	struct list_head kernel_act_as;
+	struct list_head kernel_create_files_as;
+	struct list_head kernel_fw_from_file;
+	struct list_head kernel_module_request;
+	struct list_head kernel_module_from_file;
+	struct list_head task_fix_setuid;
+	struct list_head task_setpgid;
+	struct list_head task_getpgid;
+	struct list_head task_getsid;
+	struct list_head task_getsecid;
+	struct list_head task_setnice;
+	struct list_head task_setioprio;
+	struct list_head task_getioprio;
+	struct list_head task_setrlimit;
+	struct list_head task_setscheduler;
+	struct list_head task_getscheduler;
+	struct list_head task_movememory;
+	struct list_head task_kill;
+	struct list_head task_wait;
+	struct list_head task_prctl;
+	struct list_head task_to_inode;
+	struct list_head ipc_permission;
+	struct list_head ipc_getsecid;
+	struct list_head msg_msg_alloc_security;
+	struct list_head msg_msg_free_security;
+	struct list_head msg_queue_alloc_security;
+	struct list_head msg_queue_free_security;
+	struct list_head msg_queue_associate;
+	struct list_head msg_queue_msgctl;
+	struct list_head msg_queue_msgsnd;
+	struct list_head msg_queue_msgrcv;
+	struct list_head shm_alloc_security;
+	struct list_head shm_free_security;
+	struct list_head shm_associate;
+	struct list_head shm_shmctl;
+	struct list_head shm_shmat;
+	struct list_head sem_alloc_security;
+	struct list_head sem_free_security;
+	struct list_head sem_associate;
+	struct list_head sem_semctl;
+	struct list_head sem_semop;
+	struct list_head netlink_send;
+	struct list_head d_instantiate;
+	struct list_head getprocattr;
+	struct list_head setprocattr;
+	struct list_head ismaclabel;
+	struct list_head secid_to_secctx;
+	struct list_head secctx_to_secid;
+	struct list_head release_secctx;
+	struct list_head inode_notifysecctx;
+	struct list_head inode_setsecctx;
+	struct list_head inode_getsecctx;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+	struct list_head unix_stream_connect;
+	struct list_head unix_may_send;
+	struct list_head socket_create;
+	struct list_head socket_post_create;
+	struct list_head socket_bind;
+	struct list_head socket_connect;
+	struct list_head socket_listen;
+	struct list_head socket_accept;
+	struct list_head socket_sendmsg;
+	struct list_head socket_recvmsg;
+	struct list_head socket_getsockname;
+	struct list_head socket_getpeername;
+	struct list_head socket_getsockopt;
+	struct list_head socket_setsockopt;
+	struct list_head socket_shutdown;
+	struct list_head socket_sock_rcv_skb;
+	struct list_head socket_getpeersec_stream;
+	struct list_head socket_getpeersec_dgram;
+	struct list_head sk_alloc_security;
+	struct list_head sk_free_security;
+	struct list_head sk_clone_security;
+	struct list_head sk_getsecid;
+	struct list_head sock_graft;
+	struct list_head inet_conn_request;
+	struct list_head inet_csk_clone;
+	struct list_head inet_conn_established;
+	struct list_head secmark_relabel_packet;
+	struct list_head secmark_refcount_inc;
+	struct list_head secmark_refcount_dec;
+	struct list_head req_classify_flow;
+	struct list_head tun_dev_alloc_security;
+	struct list_head tun_dev_free_security;
+	struct list_head tun_dev_create;
+	struct list_head tun_dev_attach_queue;
+	struct list_head tun_dev_attach;
+	struct list_head tun_dev_open;
+	struct list_head skb_owned_by;
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+	struct list_head xfrm_policy_alloc_security;
+	struct list_head xfrm_policy_clone_security;
+	struct list_head xfrm_policy_free_security;
+	struct list_head xfrm_policy_delete_security;
+	struct list_head xfrm_state_alloc;
+	struct list_head xfrm_state_alloc_acquire;
+	struct list_head xfrm_state_free_security;
+	struct list_head xfrm_state_delete_security;
+	struct list_head xfrm_policy_lookup;
+	struct list_head xfrm_state_pol_flow_match;
+	struct list_head xfrm_decode_session;
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	struct list_head key_alloc;
+	struct list_head key_free;
+	struct list_head key_permission;
+	struct list_head key_getsecurity;
+#endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct list_head audit_rule_init;
+	struct list_head audit_rule_known;
+	struct list_head audit_rule_match;
+	struct list_head audit_rule_free;
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Security module hook list structure.
+ * For use with generic list macros for common operations.
+ */
+struct security_hook_list {
+	struct list_head		list;
+	struct list_head		*head;
+	union security_list_options	hook;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Initializing a security_hook_list structure takes
+ * up a lot of space in a source file. This macro takes
+ * care of the common case and reduces the amount of
+ * text involved.
+ */
+#define LSM_HOOK_INIT(HEAD, HOOK) \
+	{ .head = &security_hook_heads.HEAD, .hook = { .HEAD = HOOK } }
+
+extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
+
+static inline void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
+				      int count)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+		list_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+/*
+ * Assuring the safety of deleting a security module is up to
+ * the security module involved. This may entail ordering the
+ * module's hook list in a particular way, refusing to disable
+ * the module once a policy is loaded or any number of other
+ * actions better imagined than described.
+ *
+ * The name of the configuration option reflects the only module
+ * that currently uses the mechanism. Any developer who thinks
+ * disabling their module is a good idea needs to be at least as
+ * careful as the SELinux team.
+ */
+static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
+						int count)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+		list_del_rcu(&hooks[i].list);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE */
+
+extern int __init security_module_enable(const char *module);
+extern void __init capability_add_hooks(void);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
+void __init yama_add_hooks(void);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index a09ece354c64..8aa4a251742f 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -2421,7 +2421,6 @@ extern void sched_dead(struct task_struct *p);
 
 extern void proc_caches_init(void);
 extern void flush_signals(struct task_struct *);
-extern void __flush_signals(struct task_struct *);
 extern void ignore_signals(struct task_struct *);
 extern void flush_signal_handlers(struct task_struct *, int force_default);
 extern int dequeue_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, sigset_t *mask, siginfo_t *info);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 52febde52479..79d85ddf8093 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
 
 struct linux_binprm;
 struct cred;
@@ -53,9 +54,6 @@ struct xattr;
 struct xfrm_sec_ctx;
 struct mm_struct;
 
-/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
-#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX	10
-
 /* If capable should audit the security request */
 #define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0
 #define SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT 1
@@ -68,10 +66,7 @@ struct audit_krule;
 struct user_namespace;
 struct timezone;
 
-/*
- * These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
- * as the default capabilities functions
- */
+/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
 extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 		       int cap, int audit);
 extern int cap_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
@@ -113,10 +108,6 @@ struct xfrm_state;
 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx;
 struct seq_file;
 
-extern int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
-
-void reset_security_ops(void);
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 extern unsigned long mmap_min_addr;
 extern unsigned long dac_mmap_min_addr;
@@ -187,1583 +178,8 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 	opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
 }
 
-/**
- * struct security_operations - main security structure
- *
- * Security module identifier.
- *
- * @name:
- *	A string that acts as a unique identifier for the LSM with max number
- *	of characters = SECURITY_NAME_MAX.
- *
- * Security hooks for program execution operations.
- *
- * @bprm_set_creds:
- *	Save security information in the bprm->security field, typically based
- *	on information about the bprm->file, for later use by the apply_creds
- *	hook.  This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for
- *	transitions between security domains).
- *	This hook may be called multiple times during a single execve, e.g. for
- *	interpreters.  The hook can tell whether it has already been called by
- *	checking to see if @bprm->security is non-NULL.  If so, then the hook
- *	may decide either to retain the security information saved earlier or
- *	to replace it.
- *	@bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
- *	Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
- * @bprm_check_security:
- *	This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will
- *	begin.  It allows a check the @bprm->security value which is set in the
- *	preceding set_creds call.  The primary difference from set_creds is
- *	that the argv list and envp list are reliably available in @bprm.  This
- *	hook may be called multiple times during a single execve; and in each
- *	pass set_creds is called first.
- *	@bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
- *	Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
- * @bprm_committing_creds:
- *	Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being
- *	transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials
- *	pointed to by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by
- *	the bprm_set_creds hook.  @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure.
- *	This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such
- *	as closing open file descriptors to which access will no longer be
- *	granted when the attributes are changed.  This is called immediately
- *	before commit_creds().
- * @bprm_committed_creds:
- *	Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a
- *	process being transformed by an execve operation.  The new credentials
- *	have, by this point, been set to @current->cred.  @bprm points to the
- *	linux_binprm structure.  This hook is a good place to perform state
- *	changes on the process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal
- *	state.  This is called immediately after commit_creds().
- * @bprm_secureexec:
- *	Return a boolean value (0 or 1) indicating whether a "secure exec"
- *	is required.  The flag is passed in the auxiliary table
- *	on the initial stack to the ELF interpreter to indicate whether libc
- *	should enable secure mode.
- *	@bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
- *
- * Security hooks for filesystem operations.
- *
- * @sb_alloc_security:
- *	Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field.
- *	The s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is
- *	allocated.
- *	@sb contains the super_block structure to be modified.
- *	Return 0 if operation was successful.
- * @sb_free_security:
- *	Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field.
- *	@sb contains the super_block structure to be modified.
- * @sb_statfs:
- *	Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt
- *	mountpoint.
- *	@dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @sb_mount:
- *	Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on
- *	the mount point named by @nd.  For an ordinary mount, @dev_name
- *	identifies a device if the file system type requires a device.  For a
- *	remount (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant.  For a
- *	loopback/bind mount (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the
- *	pathname of the object being mounted.
- *	@dev_name contains the name for object being mounted.
- *	@path contains the path for mount point object.
- *	@type contains the filesystem type.
- *	@flags contains the mount flags.
- *	@data contains the filesystem-specific data.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @sb_copy_data:
- *	Allow mount option data to be copied prior to parsing by the filesystem,
- *	so that the security module can extract security-specific mount
- *	options cleanly (a filesystem may modify the data e.g. with strsep()).
- *	This also allows the original mount data to be stripped of security-
- *	specific options to avoid having to make filesystems aware of them.
- *	@type the type of filesystem being mounted.
- *	@orig the original mount data copied from userspace.
- *	@copy copied data which will be passed to the security module.
- *	Returns 0 if the copy was successful.
- * @sb_remount:
- *	Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes
- *	are being made to those options.
- *	@sb superblock being remounted
- *	@data contains the filesystem-specific data.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @sb_umount:
- *	Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted.
- *	@mnt contains the mounted file system.
- *	@flags contains the unmount flags, e.g. MNT_FORCE.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @sb_pivotroot:
- *	Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem.
- *	@old_path contains the path for the new location of the current root (put_old).
- *	@new_path contains the path for the new root (new_root).
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @sb_set_mnt_opts:
- *	Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock
- *	@sb the superblock to set security mount options for
- *	@opts binary data structure containing all lsm mount data
- * @sb_clone_mnt_opts:
- *	Copy all security options from a given superblock to another
- *	@oldsb old superblock which contain information to clone
- *	@newsb new superblock which needs filled in
- * @sb_parse_opts_str:
- *	Parse a string of security data filling in the opts structure
- *	@options string containing all mount options known by the LSM
- *	@opts binary data structure usable by the LSM
- * @dentry_init_security:
- *	Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available
- *	since NFSv4 has no label backed by an EA anyway.
- *	@dentry dentry to use in calculating the context.
- *	@mode mode used to determine resource type.
- *	@name name of the last path component used to create file
- *	@ctx pointer to place the pointer to the resulting context in.
- *	@ctxlen point to place the length of the resulting context.
- *
- *
- * Security hooks for inode operations.
- *
- * @inode_alloc_security:
- *	Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security.  The
- *	i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is
- *	allocated.
- *	@inode contains the inode structure.
- *	Return 0 if operation was successful.
- * @inode_free_security:
- *	@inode contains the inode structure.
- *	Deallocate the inode security structure and set @inode->i_security to
- *	NULL.
- * @inode_init_security:
- *	Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly
- *	created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode.
- *	This hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation
- *	transaction and provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike
- *	the post_create/mkdir/... hooks called by the VFS.  The hook function
- *	is expected to allocate the name and value via kmalloc, with the caller
- *	being responsible for calling kfree after using them.
- *	If the security module does not use security attributes or does
- *	not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode,
- *	then it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing.
- *	@inode contains the inode structure of the newly created inode.
- *	@dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory.
- *	@qstr contains the last path component of the new object
- *	@name will be set to the allocated name suffix (e.g. selinux).
- *	@value will be set to the allocated attribute value.
- *	@len will be set to the length of the value.
- *	Returns 0 if @name and @value have been successfully set,
- *		-EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is needed, or
- *		-ENOMEM on memory allocation failure.
- * @inode_create:
- *	Check permission to create a regular file.
- *	@dir contains inode structure of the parent of the new file.
- *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file to be created.
- *	@mode contains the file mode of the file to be created.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_link:
- *	Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file.
- *	@old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing link to the file.
- *	@dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory of the new link.
- *	@new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_link:
- *	Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file.
- *	@old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing link
- *	to the file.
- *	@new_dir contains the path structure of the parent directory of
- *	the new link.
- *	@new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_unlink:
- *	Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file.
- *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the file.
- *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_unlink:
- *	Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file.
- *	@dir contains the path structure of parent directory of the file.
- *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_symlink:
- *	Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
- *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the symbolic link.
- *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link.
- *	@old_name contains the pathname of file.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_symlink:
- *	Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
- *	@dir contains the path structure of parent directory of
- *	the symbolic link.
- *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link.
- *	@old_name contains the pathname of file.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_mkdir:
- *	Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory
- *	associated with inode structure @dir.
- *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory to be created.
- *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory.
- *	@mode contains the mode of new directory.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_mkdir:
- *	Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory
- *	associated with path structure @path.
- *	@dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory
- *	to be created.
- *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory.
- *	@mode contains the mode of new directory.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_rmdir:
- *	Check the permission to remove a directory.
- *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory to be removed.
- *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_rmdir:
- *	Check the permission to remove a directory.
- *	@dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory to be
- *	removed.
- *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_mknod:
- *	Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo
- *	file created via the mknod system call).  Note that if mknod operation
- *	is being done for a regular file, then the create hook will be called
- *	and not this hook.
- *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent of the new file.
- *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file.
- *	@mode contains the mode of the new file.
- *	@dev contains the device number.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_mknod:
- *	Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called
- *	even if mknod operation is being done for a regular file.
- *	@dir contains the path structure of parent of the new file.
- *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file.
- *	@mode contains the mode of the new file.
- *	@dev contains the undecoded device number. Use new_decode_dev() to get
- *	the decoded device number.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_rename:
- *	Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
- *	@old_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the old link.
- *	@old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link.
- *	@new_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the new link.
- *	@new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_rename:
- *	Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
- *	@old_dir contains the path structure for parent of the old link.
- *	@old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link.
- *	@new_dir contains the path structure for parent of the new link.
- *	@new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_chmod:
- *	Check for permission to change DAC's permission of a file or directory.
- *	@dentry contains the dentry structure.
- *	@mnt contains the vfsmnt structure.
- *	@mode contains DAC's mode.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_chown:
- *	Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory.
- *	@path contains the path structure.
- *	@uid contains new owner's ID.
- *	@gid contains new group's ID.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_chroot:
- *	Check for permission to change root directory.
- *	@path contains the path structure.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_readlink:
- *	Check the permission to read the symbolic link.
- *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file link.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_follow_link:
- *	Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname.
- *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the link.
- *	@inode contains the inode, which itself is not stable in RCU-walk
- *	@rcu indicates whether we are in RCU-walk mode.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_permission:
- *	Check permission before accessing an inode.  This hook is called by the
- *	existing Linux permission function, so a security module can use it to
- *	provide additional checking for existing Linux permission checks.
- *	Notice that this hook is called when a file is opened (as well as many
- *	other operations), whereas the file_security_ops permission hook is
- *	called when the actual read/write operations are performed.
- *	@inode contains the inode structure to check.
- *	@mask contains the permission mask.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_setattr:
- *	Check permission before setting file attributes.  Note that the kernel
- *	call to notify_change is performed from several locations, whenever
- *	file attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod
- *	operations, transferring disk quotas, etc).
- *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file.
- *	@attr is the iattr structure containing the new file attributes.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_truncate:
- *	Check permission before truncating a file.
- *	@path contains the path structure for the file.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_getattr:
- *	Check permission before obtaining file attributes.
- *	@mnt is the vfsmount where the dentry was looked up
- *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_setxattr:
- *	Check permission before setting the extended attributes
- *	@value identified by @name for @dentry.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_post_setxattr:
- *	Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation.
- *	@value identified by @name for @dentry.
- * @inode_getxattr:
- *	Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes
- *	identified by @name for @dentry.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_listxattr:
- *	Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute
- *	names for @dentry.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_removexattr:
- *	Check permission before removing the extended attribute
- *	identified by @name for @dentry.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_getsecurity:
- *	Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the
- *	security label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer.  Note that
- *	@name is the remainder of the attribute name after the security prefix
- *	has been removed. @alloc is used to specify of the call should return a
- *	value via the buffer or just the value length Return size of buffer on
- *	success.
- * @inode_setsecurity:
- *	Set the security label associated with @name for @inode from the
- *	extended attribute value @value.  @size indicates the size of the
- *	@value in bytes.  @flags may be XATTR_CREATE, XATTR_REPLACE, or 0.
- *	Note that @name is the remainder of the attribute name after the
- *	security. prefix has been removed.
- *	Return 0 on success.
- * @inode_listsecurity:
- *	Copy the extended attribute names for the security labels
- *	associated with @inode into @buffer.  The maximum size of @buffer
- *	is specified by @buffer_size.  @buffer may be NULL to request
- *	the size of the buffer required.
- *	Returns number of bytes used/required on success.
- * @inode_need_killpriv:
- *	Called when an inode has been changed.
- *	@dentry is the dentry being changed.
- *	Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation.
- *	Return 0 if inode_killpriv does not need to be called.
- *	Return >0 if inode_killpriv does need to be called.
- * @inode_killpriv:
- *	The setuid bit is being removed.  Remove similar security labels.
- *	Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held.
- *	@dentry is the dentry being changed.
- *	Return 0 on success.  If error is returned, then the operation
- *	causing setuid bit removal is failed.
- * @inode_getsecid:
- *	Get the secid associated with the node.
- *	@inode contains a pointer to the inode.
- *	@secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
- *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
- *
- * Security hooks for file operations
- *
- * @file_permission:
- *	Check file permissions before accessing an open file.  This hook is
- *	called by various operations that read or write files.  A security
- *	module can use this hook to perform additional checking on these
- *	operations, e.g.  to revalidate permissions on use to support privilege
- *	bracketing or policy changes.  Notice that this hook is used when the
- *	actual read/write operations are performed, whereas the
- *	inode_security_ops hook is called when a file is opened (as well as
- *	many other operations).
- *	Caveat:  Although this hook can be used to revalidate permissions for
- *	various system call operations that read or write files, it does not
- *	address the revalidation of permissions for memory-mapped files.
- *	Security modules must handle this separately if they need such
- *	revalidation.
- *	@file contains the file structure being accessed.
- *	@mask contains the requested permissions.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @file_alloc_security:
- *	Allocate and attach a security structure to the file->f_security field.
- *	The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first
- *	created.
- *	@file contains the file structure to secure.
- *	Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
- * @file_free_security:
- *	Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security.
- *	@file contains the file structure being modified.
- * @file_ioctl:
- *	@file contains the file structure.
- *	@cmd contains the operation to perform.
- *	@arg contains the operational arguments.
- *	Check permission for an ioctl operation on @file.  Note that @arg
- *	sometimes represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a
- *	simple integer value.  When @arg represents a user space pointer, it
- *	should never be used by the security module.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @mmap_addr :
- *	Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr.
- *	@addr contains virtual address that will be used for the operation.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @mmap_file :
- *	Check permissions for a mmap operation.  The @file may be NULL, e.g.
- *	if mapping anonymous memory.
- *	@file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
- *	@reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
- *	@prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
- *	@flags contains the operational flags.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @file_mprotect:
- *	Check permissions before changing memory access permissions.
- *	@vma contains the memory region to modify.
- *	@reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
- *	@prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @file_lock:
- *	Check permission before performing file locking operations.
- *	Note: this hook mediates both flock and fcntl style locks.
- *	@file contains the file structure.
- *	@cmd contains the posix-translated lock operation to perform
- *	(e.g. F_RDLCK, F_WRLCK).
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @file_fcntl:
- *	Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd
- *	from being performed on the file @file.  Note that @arg sometimes
- *	represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple
- *	integer value.  When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should
- *	never be used by the security module.
- *	@file contains the file structure.
- *	@cmd contains the operation to be performed.
- *	@arg contains the operational arguments.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @file_set_fowner:
- *	Save owner security information (typically from current->security) in
- *	file->f_security for later use by the send_sigiotask hook.
- *	@file contains the file structure to update.
- *	Return 0 on success.
- * @file_send_sigiotask:
- *	Check permission for the file owner @fown to send SIGIO or SIGURG to the
- *	process @tsk.  Note that this hook is sometimes called from interrupt.
- *	Note that the fown_struct, @fown, is never outside the context of a
- *	struct file, so the file structure (and associated security information)
- *	can always be obtained:
- *		container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner)
- *	@tsk contains the structure of task receiving signal.
- *	@fown contains the file owner information.
- *	@sig is the signal that will be sent.  When 0, kernel sends SIGIO.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @file_receive:
- *	This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process
- *	to receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC.
- *	@file contains the file structure being received.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @file_open
- *	Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon
- *	file_permission, and recheck access if anything has changed
- *	since inode_permission.
- *
- * Security hooks for task operations.
- *
- * @task_create:
- *	Check permission before creating a child process.  See the clone(2)
- *	manual page for definitions of the @clone_flags.
- *	@clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_free:
- *	@task task being freed
- *	Handle release of task-related resources. (Note that this can be called
- *	from interrupt context.)
- * @cred_alloc_blank:
- *	@cred points to the credentials.
- *	@gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations.
- *	Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that
- *	cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM.
- * @cred_free:
- *	@cred points to the credentials.
- *	Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials.
- * @cred_prepare:
- *	@new points to the new credentials.
- *	@old points to the original credentials.
- *	@gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations.
- *	Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set.
- * @cred_transfer:
- *	@new points to the new credentials.
- *	@old points to the original credentials.
- *	Transfer data from original creds to new creds
- * @kernel_act_as:
- *	Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
- *	@new points to the credentials to be modified.
- *	@secid specifies the security ID to be set
- *	The current task must be the one that nominated @secid.
- *	Return 0 if successful.
- * @kernel_create_files_as:
- *	Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same as
- *	the objective context of the specified inode.
- *	@new points to the credentials to be modified.
- *	@inode points to the inode to use as a reference.
- *	The current task must be the one that nominated @inode.
- *	Return 0 if successful.
- * @kernel_fw_from_file:
- *	Load firmware from userspace (not called for built-in firmware).
- *	@file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing
- *	the firmware to load. This argument will be NULL if the firmware
- *	was loaded via the uevent-triggered blob-based interface exposed
- *	by CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER.
- *	@buf pointer to buffer containing firmware contents.
- *	@size length of the firmware contents.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @kernel_module_request:
- *	Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for
- *	userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
- *	@kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel
- *	Return 0 if successful.
- * @kernel_module_from_file:
- *	Load a kernel module from userspace.
- *	@file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing
- *	the kernel module to load. If the module is being loaded from a blob,
- *	this argument will be NULL.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_fix_setuid:
- *	Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user
- *	identity attributes of the current process.  The @flags parameter
- *	indicates which of the set*uid system calls invoked this hook.  If
- *	@new is the set of credentials that will be installed.  Modifications
- *	should be made to this rather than to @current->cred.
- *	@old is the set of credentials that are being replaces
- *	@flags contains one of the LSM_SETID_* values.
- *	Return 0 on success.
- * @task_setpgid:
- *	Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the
- *	process @p to @pgid.
- *	@p contains the task_struct for process being modified.
- *	@pgid contains the new pgid.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_getpgid:
- *	Check permission before getting the process group identifier of the
- *	process @p.
- *	@p contains the task_struct for the process.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_getsid:
- *	Check permission before getting the session identifier of the process
- *	@p.
- *	@p contains the task_struct for the process.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_getsecid:
- *	Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p.
- *	@p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid.
- *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
- *
- * @task_setnice:
- *	Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice.
- *	@p contains the task_struct of process.
- *	@nice contains the new nice value.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_setioprio
- *	Check permission before setting the ioprio value of @p to @ioprio.
- *	@p contains the task_struct of process.
- *	@ioprio contains the new ioprio value
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_getioprio
- *	Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p.
- *	@p contains the task_struct of process.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_setrlimit:
- *	Check permission before setting the resource limits of the current
- *	process for @resource to @new_rlim.  The old resource limit values can
- *	be examined by dereferencing (current->signal->rlim + resource).
- *	@resource contains the resource whose limit is being set.
- *	@new_rlim contains the new limits for @resource.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_setscheduler:
- *	Check permission before setting scheduling policy and/or parameters of
- *	process @p based on @policy and @lp.
- *	@p contains the task_struct for process.
- *	@policy contains the scheduling policy.
- *	@lp contains the scheduling parameters.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_getscheduler:
- *	Check permission before obtaining scheduling information for process
- *	@p.
- *	@p contains the task_struct for process.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_movememory
- *	Check permission before moving memory owned by process @p.
- *	@p contains the task_struct for process.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_kill:
- *	Check permission before sending signal @sig to @p.  @info can be NULL,
- *	the constant 1, or a pointer to a siginfo structure.  If @info is 1 or
- *	SI_FROMKERNEL(info) is true, then the signal should be viewed as coming
- *	from the kernel and should typically be permitted.
- *	SIGIO signals are handled separately by the send_sigiotask hook in
- *	file_security_ops.
- *	@p contains the task_struct for process.
- *	@info contains the signal information.
- *	@sig contains the signal value.
- *	@secid contains the sid of the process where the signal originated
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_wait:
- *	Check permission before allowing a process to reap a child process @p
- *	and collect its status information.
- *	@p contains the task_struct for process.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_prctl:
- *	Check permission before performing a process control operation on the
- *	current process.
- *	@option contains the operation.
- *	@arg2 contains a argument.
- *	@arg3 contains a argument.
- *	@arg4 contains a argument.
- *	@arg5 contains a argument.
- *	Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value to
- *	cause prctl() to return immediately with that value.
- * @task_to_inode:
- *	Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's
- *	security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes.
- *	@p contains the task_struct for the task.
- *	@inode contains the inode structure for the inode.
- *
- * Security hooks for Netlink messaging.
- *
- * @netlink_send:
- *	Save security information for a netlink message so that permission
- *	checking can be performed when the message is processed.  The security
- *	information can be saved using the eff_cap field of the
- *	netlink_skb_parms structure.  Also may be used to provide fine
- *	grained control over message transmission.
- *	@sk associated sock of task sending the message.
- *	@skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message.
- *	Return 0 if the information was successfully saved and message
- *	is allowed to be transmitted.
- *
- * Security hooks for Unix domain networking.
- *
- * @unix_stream_connect:
- *	Check permissions before establishing a Unix domain stream connection
- *	between @sock and @other.
- *	@sock contains the sock structure.
- *	@other contains the peer sock structure.
- *	@newsk contains the new sock structure.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @unix_may_send:
- *	Check permissions before connecting or sending datagrams from @sock to
- *	@other.
- *	@sock contains the socket structure.
- *	@other contains the peer socket structure.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- *
- * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because
- * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix
- * domain sockets.  Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name
- * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod
- * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to
- * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated.  Sufficient
- * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible
- * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target
- * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code.
- *
- * Security hooks for socket operations.
- *
- * @socket_create:
- *	Check permissions prior to creating a new socket.
- *	@family contains the requested protocol family.
- *	@type contains the requested communications type.
- *	@protocol contains the requested protocol.
- *	@kern set to 1 if a kernel socket.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_post_create:
- *	This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security
- *	structure. Note that the security field was not added directly to the
- *	socket structure, but rather, the socket security information is stored
- *	in the associated inode.  Typically, the inode alloc_security hook will
- *	allocate and and attach security information to
- *	sock->inode->i_security.  This hook may be used to update the
- *	sock->inode->i_security field with additional information that wasn't
- *	available when the inode was allocated.
- *	@sock contains the newly created socket structure.
- *	@family contains the requested protocol family.
- *	@type contains the requested communications type.
- *	@protocol contains the requested protocol.
- *	@kern set to 1 if a kernel socket.
- * @socket_bind:
- *	Check permission before socket protocol layer bind operation is
- *	performed and the socket @sock is bound to the address specified in the
- *	@address parameter.
- *	@sock contains the socket structure.
- *	@address contains the address to bind to.
- *	@addrlen contains the length of address.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_connect:
- *	Check permission before socket protocol layer connect operation
- *	attempts to connect socket @sock to a remote address, @address.
- *	@sock contains the socket structure.
- *	@address contains the address of remote endpoint.
- *	@addrlen contains the length of address.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_listen:
- *	Check permission before socket protocol layer listen operation.
- *	@sock contains the socket structure.
- *	@backlog contains the maximum length for the pending connection queue.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_accept:
- *	Check permission before accepting a new connection.  Note that the new
- *	socket, @newsock, has been created and some information copied to it,
- *	but the accept operation has not actually been performed.
- *	@sock contains the listening socket structure.
- *	@newsock contains the newly created server socket for connection.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_sendmsg:
- *	Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket.
- *	@sock contains the socket structure.
- *	@msg contains the message to be transmitted.
- *	@size contains the size of message.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_recvmsg:
- *	Check permission before receiving a message from a socket.
- *	@sock contains the socket structure.
- *	@msg contains the message structure.
- *	@size contains the size of message structure.
- *	@flags contains the operational flags.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_getsockname:
- *	Check permission before the local address (name) of the socket object
- *	@sock is retrieved.
- *	@sock contains the socket structure.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_getpeername:
- *	Check permission before the remote address (name) of a socket object
- *	@sock is retrieved.
- *	@sock contains the socket structure.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_getsockopt:
- *	Check permissions before retrieving the options associated with socket
- *	@sock.
- *	@sock contains the socket structure.
- *	@level contains the protocol level to retrieve option from.
- *	@optname contains the name of option to retrieve.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_setsockopt:
- *	Check permissions before setting the options associated with socket
- *	@sock.
- *	@sock contains the socket structure.
- *	@level contains the protocol level to set options for.
- *	@optname contains the name of the option to set.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_shutdown:
- *	Checks permission before all or part of a connection on the socket
- *	@sock is shut down.
- *	@sock contains the socket structure.
- *	@how contains the flag indicating how future sends and receives are handled.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_sock_rcv_skb:
- *	Check permissions on incoming network packets.  This hook is distinct
- *	from Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the
- *	incoming sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk.
- *	Must not sleep inside this hook because some callers hold spinlocks.
- *	@sk contains the sock (not socket) associated with the incoming sk_buff.
- *	@skb contains the incoming network data.
- * @socket_getpeersec_stream:
- *	This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security
- *	state for unix or connected tcp sockets to userspace via getsockopt
- *	SO_GETPEERSEC.  For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the
- *	socket is associated with an ipsec SA.
- *	@sock is the local socket.
- *	@optval userspace memory where the security state is to be copied.
- *	@optlen userspace int where the module should copy the actual length
- *	of the security state.
- *	@len as input is the maximum length to copy to userspace provided
- *	by the caller.
- *	Return 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return
- *	values.
- * @socket_getpeersec_dgram:
- *	This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security
- *	state for udp sockets on a per-packet basis to userspace via
- *	getsockopt SO_GETPEERSEC.  The application must first have indicated
- *	the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt.  It can then retrieve the
- *	security state returned by this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY
- *	ancillary message type.
- *	@skb is the skbuff for the packet being queried
- *	@secdata is a pointer to a buffer in which to copy the security data
- *	@seclen is the maximum length for @secdata
- *	Return 0 on success, error on failure.
- * @sk_alloc_security:
- *	Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field,
- *	which is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets.
- * @sk_free_security:
- *	Deallocate security structure.
- * @sk_clone_security:
- *	Clone/copy security structure.
- * @sk_getsecid:
- *	Retrieve the LSM-specific secid for the sock to enable caching of network
- *	authorizations.
- * @sock_graft:
- *	Sets the socket's isec sid to the sock's sid.
- * @inet_conn_request:
- *	Sets the openreq's sid to socket's sid with MLS portion taken from peer sid.
- * @inet_csk_clone:
- *	Sets the new child socket's sid to the openreq sid.
- * @inet_conn_established:
- *	Sets the connection's peersid to the secmark on skb.
- * @secmark_relabel_packet:
- *	check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to the given secid
- * @security_secmark_refcount_inc
- *	tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded
- * @security_secmark_refcount_dec
- *	tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded
- * @req_classify_flow:
- *	Sets the flow's sid to the openreq sid.
- * @tun_dev_alloc_security:
- *	This hook allows a module to allocate a security structure for a TUN
- *	device.
- *	@security pointer to a security structure pointer.
- *	Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure.
- * @tun_dev_free_security:
- *	This hook allows a module to free the security structure for a TUN
- *	device.
- *	@security pointer to the TUN device's security structure
- * @tun_dev_create:
- *	Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device.
- * @tun_dev_attach_queue:
- *	Check permissions prior to attaching to a TUN device queue.
- *	@security pointer to the TUN device's security structure.
- * @tun_dev_attach:
- *	This hook can be used by the module to update any security state
- *	associated with the TUN device's sock structure.
- *	@sk contains the existing sock structure.
- *	@security pointer to the TUN device's security structure.
- * @tun_dev_open:
- *	This hook can be used by the module to update any security state
- *	associated with the TUN device's security structure.
- *	@security pointer to the TUN devices's security structure.
- * @skb_owned_by:
- *	This hook sets the packet's owning sock.
- *	@skb is the packet.
- *	@sk the sock which owns the packet.
- *
- * Security hooks for XFRM operations.
- *
- * @xfrm_policy_alloc_security:
- *	@ctxp is a pointer to the xfrm_sec_ctx being added to Security Policy
- *	Database used by the XFRM system.
- *	@sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by
- *	the user-level policy update program (e.g., setkey).
- *	Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security
- *	field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated.
- *	Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate, legal context)
- *	@gfp is to specify the context for the allocation
- * @xfrm_policy_clone_security:
- *	@old_ctx contains an existing xfrm_sec_ctx.
- *	@new_ctxp contains a new xfrm_sec_ctx being cloned from old.
- *	Allocate a security structure in new_ctxp that contains the
- *	information from the old_ctx structure.
- *	Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate).
- * @xfrm_policy_free_security:
- *	@ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx
- *	Deallocate xp->security.
- * @xfrm_policy_delete_security:
- *	@ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx.
- *	Authorize deletion of xp->security.
- * @xfrm_state_alloc:
- *	@x contains the xfrm_state being added to the Security Association
- *	Database by the XFRM system.
- *	@sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by
- *	the user-level SA generation program (e.g., setkey or racoon).
- *	Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security
- *	field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the
- *	context to correspond to sec_ctx. Return 0 if operation was successful
- *	(memory to allocate, legal context).
- * @xfrm_state_alloc_acquire:
- *	@x contains the xfrm_state being added to the Security Association
- *	Database by the XFRM system.
- *	@polsec contains the policy's security context.
- *	@secid contains the secid from which to take the mls portion of the
- *	context.
- *	Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security
- *	field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the
- *	context to correspond to secid. Return 0 if operation was successful
- *	(memory to allocate, legal context).
- * @xfrm_state_free_security:
- *	@x contains the xfrm_state.
- *	Deallocate x->security.
- * @xfrm_state_delete_security:
- *	@x contains the xfrm_state.
- *	Authorize deletion of x->security.
- * @xfrm_policy_lookup:
- *	@ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx for which the access control is being
- *	checked.
- *	@fl_secid contains the flow security label that is used to authorize
- *	access to the policy xp.
- *	@dir contains the direction of the flow (input or output).
- *	Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing
- *	XFRMs on a packet.  The hook is called when selecting either a
- *	per-socket policy or a generic xfrm policy.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted, -ESRCH otherwise, or -errno
- *	on other errors.
- * @xfrm_state_pol_flow_match:
- *	@x contains the state to match.
- *	@xp contains the policy to check for a match.
- *	@fl contains the flow to check for a match.
- *	Return 1 if there is a match.
- * @xfrm_decode_session:
- *	@skb points to skb to decode.
- *	@secid points to the flow key secid to set.
- *	@ckall says if all xfrms used should be checked for same secid.
- *	Return 0 if ckall is zero or all xfrms used have the same secid.
- *
- * Security hooks affecting all Key Management operations
- *
- * @key_alloc:
- *	Permit allocation of a key and assign security data. Note that key does
- *	not have a serial number assigned at this point.
- *	@key points to the key.
- *	@flags is the allocation flags
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
- * @key_free:
- *	Notification of destruction; free security data.
- *	@key points to the key.
- *	No return value.
- * @key_permission:
- *	See whether a specific operational right is granted to a process on a
- *	key.
- *	@key_ref refers to the key (key pointer + possession attribute bit).
- *	@cred points to the credentials to provide the context against which to
- *	evaluate the security data on the key.
- *	@perm describes the combination of permissions required of this key.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
- * @key_getsecurity:
- *	Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key
- *	for the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY.  This function
- *	allocates the storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller
- *	should free it.
- *	@key points to the key to be queried.
- *	@_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
- *	resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
- *	Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
- *	an error.
- *	May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
- *
- * Security hooks affecting all System V IPC operations.
- *
- * @ipc_permission:
- *	Check permissions for access to IPC
- *	@ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure
- *	@flag contains the desired (requested) permission set
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @ipc_getsecid:
- *	Get the secid associated with the ipc object.
- *	@ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure.
- *	@secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
- *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
- *
- * Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
- * @msg_msg_alloc_security:
- *	Allocate and attach a security structure to the msg->security field.
- *	The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first
- *	created.
- *	@msg contains the message structure to be modified.
- *	Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
- * @msg_msg_free_security:
- *	Deallocate the security structure for this message.
- *	@msg contains the message structure to be modified.
- *
- * Security hooks for System V IPC Message Queues
- *
- * @msg_queue_alloc_security:
- *	Allocate and attach a security structure to the
- *	msq->q_perm.security field. The security field is initialized to
- *	NULL when the structure is first created.
- *	@msq contains the message queue structure to be modified.
- *	Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
- * @msg_queue_free_security:
- *	Deallocate security structure for this message queue.
- *	@msq contains the message queue structure to be modified.
- * @msg_queue_associate:
- *	Check permission when a message queue is requested through the
- *	msgget system call.  This hook is only called when returning the
- *	message queue identifier for an existing message queue, not when a
- *	new message queue is created.
- *	@msq contains the message queue to act upon.
- *	@msqflg contains the operation control flags.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @msg_queue_msgctl:
- *	Check permission when a message control operation specified by @cmd
- *	is to be performed on the message queue @msq.
- *	The @msq may be NULL, e.g. for IPC_INFO or MSG_INFO.
- *	@msq contains the message queue to act upon.  May be NULL.
- *	@cmd contains the operation to be performed.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @msg_queue_msgsnd:
- *	Check permission before a message, @msg, is enqueued on the message
- *	queue, @msq.
- *	@msq contains the message queue to send message to.
- *	@msg contains the message to be enqueued.
- *	@msqflg contains operational flags.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @msg_queue_msgrcv:
- *	Check permission before a message, @msg, is removed from the message
- *	queue, @msq.  The @target task structure contains a pointer to the
- *	process that will be receiving the message (not equal to the current
- *	process when inline receives are being performed).
- *	@msq contains the message queue to retrieve message from.
- *	@msg contains the message destination.
- *	@target contains the task structure for recipient process.
- *	@type contains the type of message requested.
- *	@mode contains the operational flags.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- *
- * Security hooks for System V Shared Memory Segments
- *
- * @shm_alloc_security:
- *	Allocate and attach a security structure to the shp->shm_perm.security
- *	field.  The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is
- *	first created.
- *	@shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
- *	Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
- * @shm_free_security:
- *	Deallocate the security struct for this memory segment.
- *	@shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
- * @shm_associate:
- *	Check permission when a shared memory region is requested through the
- *	shmget system call.  This hook is only called when returning the shared
- *	memory region identifier for an existing region, not when a new shared
- *	memory region is created.
- *	@shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
- *	@shmflg contains the operation control flags.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @shm_shmctl:
- *	Check permission when a shared memory control operation specified by
- *	@cmd is to be performed on the shared memory region @shp.
- *	The @shp may be NULL, e.g. for IPC_INFO or SHM_INFO.
- *	@shp contains shared memory structure to be modified.
- *	@cmd contains the operation to be performed.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @shm_shmat:
- *	Check permissions prior to allowing the shmat system call to attach the
- *	shared memory segment @shp to the data segment of the calling process.
- *	The attaching address is specified by @shmaddr.
- *	@shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
- *	@shmaddr contains the address to attach memory region to.
- *	@shmflg contains the operational flags.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- *
- * Security hooks for System V Semaphores
- *
- * @sem_alloc_security:
- *	Allocate and attach a security structure to the sma->sem_perm.security
- *	field.  The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is
- *	first created.
- *	@sma contains the semaphore structure
- *	Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
- * @sem_free_security:
- *	deallocate security struct for this semaphore
- *	@sma contains the semaphore structure.
- * @sem_associate:
- *	Check permission when a semaphore is requested through the semget
- *	system call.  This hook is only called when returning the semaphore
- *	identifier for an existing semaphore, not when a new one must be
- *	created.
- *	@sma contains the semaphore structure.
- *	@semflg contains the operation control flags.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @sem_semctl:
- *	Check permission when a semaphore operation specified by @cmd is to be
- *	performed on the semaphore @sma.  The @sma may be NULL, e.g. for
- *	IPC_INFO or SEM_INFO.
- *	@sma contains the semaphore structure.  May be NULL.
- *	@cmd contains the operation to be performed.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @sem_semop
- *	Check permissions before performing operations on members of the
- *	semaphore set @sma.  If the @alter flag is nonzero, the semaphore set
- *	may be modified.
- *	@sma contains the semaphore structure.
- *	@sops contains the operations to perform.
- *	@nsops contains the number of operations to perform.
- *	@alter contains the flag indicating whether changes are to be made.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- *
- * @binder_set_context_mgr
- *	Check whether @mgr is allowed to be the binder context manager.
- *	@mgr contains the task_struct for the task being registered.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @binder_transaction
- *	Check whether @from is allowed to invoke a binder transaction call
- *	to @to.
- *	@from contains the task_struct for the sending task.
- *	@to contains the task_struct for the receiving task.
- * @binder_transfer_binder
- *	Check whether @from is allowed to transfer a binder reference to @to.
- *	@from contains the task_struct for the sending task.
- *	@to contains the task_struct for the receiving task.
- * @binder_transfer_file
- *	Check whether @from is allowed to transfer @file to @to.
- *	@from contains the task_struct for the sending task.
- *	@file contains the struct file being transferred.
- *	@to contains the task_struct for the receiving task.
- *
- * @ptrace_access_check:
- *	Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the
- *	@child process.
- *	Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check
- *	during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of
- *	tracing check during an execve in the bprm_set_creds hook of
- *	binprm_security_ops if the process is being traced and its security
- *	attributes would be changed by the execve.
- *	@child contains the task_struct structure for the target process.
- *	@mode contains the PTRACE_MODE flags indicating the form of access.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @ptrace_traceme:
- *	Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the
- *	current process before allowing the current process to present itself
- *	to the @parent process for tracing.
- *	@parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @capget:
- *	Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for
- *	the @target process.  The hook may also perform permission checking to
- *	determine if the current process is allowed to see the capability sets
- *	of the @target process.
- *	@target contains the task_struct structure for target process.
- *	@effective contains the effective capability set.
- *	@inheritable contains the inheritable capability set.
- *	@permitted contains the permitted capability set.
- *	Return 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained.
- * @capset:
- *	Set the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for
- *	the current process.
- *	@new contains the new credentials structure for target process.
- *	@old contains the current credentials structure for target process.
- *	@effective contains the effective capability set.
- *	@inheritable contains the inheritable capability set.
- *	@permitted contains the permitted capability set.
- *	Return 0 and update @new if permission is granted.
- * @capable:
- *	Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated
- *	credentials.
- *	@cred contains the credentials to use.
- *	@ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in
- *	@cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
- *	@audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
- *	Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
- * @syslog:
- *	Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing
- *	logging to the console.
- *	See the syslog(2) manual page for an explanation of the @type values.
- *	@type contains the type of action.
- *	@from_file indicates the context of action (if it came from /proc).
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @settime:
- *	Check permission to change the system time.
- *	struct timespec and timezone are defined in include/linux/time.h
- *	@ts contains new time
- *	@tz contains new timezone
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @vm_enough_memory:
- *	Check permissions for allocating a new virtual mapping.
- *	@mm contains the mm struct it is being added to.
- *	@pages contains the number of pages.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- *
- * @ismaclabel:
- *	Check if the extended attribute specified by @name
- *	represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC
- *	attribute otherwise returns 0.
- *	@name full extended attribute name to check against
- *	LSM as a MAC label.
- *
- * @secid_to_secctx:
- *	Convert secid to security context.  If secdata is NULL the length of
- *	the result will be returned in seclen, but no secdata will be returned.
- *	This does mean that the length could change between calls to check the
- *	length and the next call which actually allocates and returns the secdata.
- *	@secid contains the security ID.
- *	@secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security context.
- *	@seclen pointer which contains the length of the data
- * @secctx_to_secid:
- *	Convert security context to secid.
- *	@secid contains the pointer to the generated security ID.
- *	@secdata contains the security context.
- *
- * @release_secctx:
- *	Release the security context.
- *	@secdata contains the security context.
- *	@seclen contains the length of the security context.
- *
- * Security hooks for Audit
- *
- * @audit_rule_init:
- *	Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure.
- *	@field contains the required Audit action. Fields flags are defined in include/linux/audit.h
- *	@op contains the operator the rule uses.
- *	@rulestr contains the context where the rule will be applied to.
- *	@lsmrule contains a pointer to receive the result.
- *	Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set,
- *	-EINVAL in case of an invalid rule.
- *
- * @audit_rule_known:
- *	Specifies whether given @rule contains any fields related to current LSM.
- *	@rule contains the audit rule of interest.
- *	Return 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise.
- *
- * @audit_rule_match:
- *	Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved
- *	by @audit_rule_known.
- *	@secid contains the security id in question.
- *	@field contains the field which relates to current LSM.
- *	@op contains the operator that will be used for matching.
- *	@rule points to the audit rule that will be checked against.
- *	@actx points to the audit context associated with the check.
- *	Return 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on failure.
- *
- * @audit_rule_free:
- *	Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by
- *	audit_rule_init.
- *	@rule contains the allocated rule
- *
- * @inode_notifysecctx:
- *	Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode
- *	should be.  Initializes the incore security context managed by the
- *	security module for this inode.  Example usage:  NFS client invokes
- *	this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the
- *	value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the
- *	file's attributes to the client.
- *
- * 	Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked.
- *
- * 	@inode we wish to set the security context of.
- * 	@ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
- * 	@ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
- *
- * @inode_setsecctx:
- * 	Change the security context of an inode.  Updates the
- * 	incore security context managed by the security module and invokes the
- * 	fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing
- * 	xattrs that represent the context.  Example usage:  NFS server invokes
- * 	this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the
- * 	backing filesystem to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR
- * 	operation.
- *
- * 	Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked.
- *
- * 	@dentry contains the inode we wish to set the security context of.
- * 	@ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
- * 	@ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
- *
- * @inode_getsecctx:
- *	On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security
- *	context for the given @inode.
- *
- * 	@inode we wish to get the security context of.
- *	@ctx is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context.
- *	@ctxlen points to the place to put the length of @ctx.
- * This is the main security structure.
- */
-struct security_operations {
-	char name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
-
-	int (*binder_set_context_mgr) (struct task_struct *mgr);
-	int (*binder_transaction) (struct task_struct *from,
-				   struct task_struct *to);
-	int (*binder_transfer_binder) (struct task_struct *from,
-				       struct task_struct *to);
-	int (*binder_transfer_file) (struct task_struct *from,
-				     struct task_struct *to, struct file *file);
-
-	int (*ptrace_access_check) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
-	int (*ptrace_traceme) (struct task_struct *parent);
-	int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target,
-		       kernel_cap_t *effective,
-		       kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-	int (*capset) (struct cred *new,
-		       const struct cred *old,
-		       const kernel_cap_t *effective,
-		       const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
-		       const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-	int (*capable) (const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
-			int cap, int audit);
-	int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
-	int (*quota_on) (struct dentry *dentry);
-	int (*syslog) (int type);
-	int (*settime) (const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
-	int (*vm_enough_memory) (struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
-
-	int (*bprm_set_creds) (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-	int (*bprm_check_security) (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-	int (*bprm_secureexec) (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-	void (*bprm_committing_creds) (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-	void (*bprm_committed_creds) (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-
-	int (*sb_alloc_security) (struct super_block *sb);
-	void (*sb_free_security) (struct super_block *sb);
-	int (*sb_copy_data) (char *orig, char *copy);
-	int (*sb_remount) (struct super_block *sb, void *data);
-	int (*sb_kern_mount) (struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data);
-	int (*sb_show_options) (struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb);
-	int (*sb_statfs) (struct dentry *dentry);
-	int (*sb_mount) (const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
-			 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data);
-	int (*sb_umount) (struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
-	int (*sb_pivotroot) (struct path *old_path,
-			     struct path *new_path);
-	int (*sb_set_mnt_opts) (struct super_block *sb,
-				struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
-				unsigned long kern_flags,
-				unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
-	int (*sb_clone_mnt_opts) (const struct super_block *oldsb,
-				   struct super_block *newsb);
-	int (*sb_parse_opts_str) (char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
-	int (*dentry_init_security) (struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
-					struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
-					u32 *ctxlen);
-
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
-	int (*path_unlink) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
-	int (*path_mkdir) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode);
-	int (*path_rmdir) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
-	int (*path_mknod) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
-			   unsigned int dev);
-	int (*path_truncate) (struct path *path);
-	int (*path_symlink) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-			     const char *old_name);
-	int (*path_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
-			  struct dentry *new_dentry);
-	int (*path_rename) (struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
-			    struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
-	int (*path_chmod) (struct path *path, umode_t mode);
-	int (*path_chown) (struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid);
-	int (*path_chroot) (struct path *path);
-#endif
-
-	int (*inode_alloc_security) (struct inode *inode);
-	void (*inode_free_security) (struct inode *inode);
-	int (*inode_init_security) (struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
-				    const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
-				    void **value, size_t *len);
-	int (*inode_create) (struct inode *dir,
-			     struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode);
-	int (*inode_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry,
-			   struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
-	int (*inode_unlink) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
-	int (*inode_symlink) (struct inode *dir,
-			      struct dentry *dentry, const char *old_name);
-	int (*inode_mkdir) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode);
-	int (*inode_rmdir) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
-	int (*inode_mknod) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-			    umode_t mode, dev_t dev);
-	int (*inode_rename) (struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
-			     struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
-	int (*inode_readlink) (struct dentry *dentry);
-	int (*inode_follow_link) (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
-				  bool rcu);
-	int (*inode_permission) (struct inode *inode, int mask);
-	int (*inode_setattr)	(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
-	int (*inode_getattr) (const struct path *path);
-	int (*inode_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
-			       const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
-	void (*inode_post_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
-				     const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
-	int (*inode_getxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
-	int (*inode_listxattr) (struct dentry *dentry);
-	int (*inode_removexattr) (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
-	int (*inode_need_killpriv) (struct dentry *dentry);
-	int (*inode_killpriv) (struct dentry *dentry);
-	int (*inode_getsecurity) (const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
-	int (*inode_setsecurity) (struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
-	int (*inode_listsecurity) (struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
-	void (*inode_getsecid) (const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
-
-	int (*file_permission) (struct file *file, int mask);
-	int (*file_alloc_security) (struct file *file);
-	void (*file_free_security) (struct file *file);
-	int (*file_ioctl) (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
-			   unsigned long arg);
-	int (*mmap_addr) (unsigned long addr);
-	int (*mmap_file) (struct file *file,
-			  unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
-			  unsigned long flags);
-	int (*file_mprotect) (struct vm_area_struct *vma,
-			      unsigned long reqprot,
-			      unsigned long prot);
-	int (*file_lock) (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd);
-	int (*file_fcntl) (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
-			   unsigned long arg);
-	void (*file_set_fowner) (struct file *file);
-	int (*file_send_sigiotask) (struct task_struct *tsk,
-				    struct fown_struct *fown, int sig);
-	int (*file_receive) (struct file *file);
-	int (*file_open) (struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
-
-	int (*task_create) (unsigned long clone_flags);
-	void (*task_free) (struct task_struct *task);
-	int (*cred_alloc_blank) (struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
-	void (*cred_free) (struct cred *cred);
-	int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
-			    gfp_t gfp);
-	void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
-	int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
-	int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
-	int (*kernel_fw_from_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
-	int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
-	int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file);
-	int (*task_fix_setuid) (struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
-				int flags);
-	int (*task_setpgid) (struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
-	int (*task_getpgid) (struct task_struct *p);
-	int (*task_getsid) (struct task_struct *p);
-	void (*task_getsecid) (struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
-	int (*task_setnice) (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
-	int (*task_setioprio) (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
-	int (*task_getioprio) (struct task_struct *p);
-	int (*task_setrlimit) (struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
-			struct rlimit *new_rlim);
-	int (*task_setscheduler) (struct task_struct *p);
-	int (*task_getscheduler) (struct task_struct *p);
-	int (*task_movememory) (struct task_struct *p);
-	int (*task_kill) (struct task_struct *p,
-			  struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
-	int (*task_wait) (struct task_struct *p);
-	int (*task_prctl) (int option, unsigned long arg2,
-			   unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4,
-			   unsigned long arg5);
-	void (*task_to_inode) (struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
-
-	int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
-	void (*ipc_getsecid) (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
-
-	int (*msg_msg_alloc_security) (struct msg_msg *msg);
-	void (*msg_msg_free_security) (struct msg_msg *msg);
-
-	int (*msg_queue_alloc_security) (struct msg_queue *msq);
-	void (*msg_queue_free_security) (struct msg_queue *msq);
-	int (*msg_queue_associate) (struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg);
-	int (*msg_queue_msgctl) (struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd);
-	int (*msg_queue_msgsnd) (struct msg_queue *msq,
-				 struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg);
-	int (*msg_queue_msgrcv) (struct msg_queue *msq,
-				 struct msg_msg *msg,
-				 struct task_struct *target,
-				 long type, int mode);
-
-	int (*shm_alloc_security) (struct shmid_kernel *shp);
-	void (*shm_free_security) (struct shmid_kernel *shp);
-	int (*shm_associate) (struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg);
-	int (*shm_shmctl) (struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd);
-	int (*shm_shmat) (struct shmid_kernel *shp,
-			  char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg);
-
-	int (*sem_alloc_security) (struct sem_array *sma);
-	void (*sem_free_security) (struct sem_array *sma);
-	int (*sem_associate) (struct sem_array *sma, int semflg);
-	int (*sem_semctl) (struct sem_array *sma, int cmd);
-	int (*sem_semop) (struct sem_array *sma,
-			  struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter);
-
-	int (*netlink_send) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
-
-	void (*d_instantiate) (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
-
-	int (*getprocattr) (struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
-	int (*setprocattr) (struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
-	int (*ismaclabel) (const char *name);
-	int (*secid_to_secctx) (u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-	int (*secctx_to_secid) (const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
-	void (*release_secctx) (char *secdata, u32 seclen);
-
-	int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
-	int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
-	int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
-	int (*unix_stream_connect) (struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk);
-	int (*unix_may_send) (struct socket *sock, struct socket *other);
-
-	int (*socket_create) (int family, int type, int protocol, int kern);
-	int (*socket_post_create) (struct socket *sock, int family,
-				   int type, int protocol, int kern);
-	int (*socket_bind) (struct socket *sock,
-			    struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen);
-	int (*socket_connect) (struct socket *sock,
-			       struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen);
-	int (*socket_listen) (struct socket *sock, int backlog);
-	int (*socket_accept) (struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
-	int (*socket_sendmsg) (struct socket *sock,
-			       struct msghdr *msg, int size);
-	int (*socket_recvmsg) (struct socket *sock,
-			       struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags);
-	int (*socket_getsockname) (struct socket *sock);
-	int (*socket_getpeername) (struct socket *sock);
-	int (*socket_getsockopt) (struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
-	int (*socket_setsockopt) (struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
-	int (*socket_shutdown) (struct socket *sock, int how);
-	int (*socket_sock_rcv_skb) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
-	int (*socket_getpeersec_stream) (struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
-	int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram) (struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
-	int (*sk_alloc_security) (struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
-	void (*sk_free_security) (struct sock *sk);
-	void (*sk_clone_security) (const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
-	void (*sk_getsecid) (struct sock *sk, u32 *secid);
-	void (*sock_graft) (struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent);
-	int (*inet_conn_request) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
-				  struct request_sock *req);
-	void (*inet_csk_clone) (struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req);
-	void (*inet_conn_established) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
-	int (*secmark_relabel_packet) (u32 secid);
-	void (*secmark_refcount_inc) (void);
-	void (*secmark_refcount_dec) (void);
-	void (*req_classify_flow) (const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl);
-	int (*tun_dev_alloc_security) (void **security);
-	void (*tun_dev_free_security) (void *security);
-	int (*tun_dev_create) (void);
-	int (*tun_dev_attach_queue) (void *security);
-	int (*tun_dev_attach) (struct sock *sk, void *security);
-	int (*tun_dev_open) (void *security);
-#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
-	int (*xfrm_policy_alloc_security) (struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
-			struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, gfp_t gfp);
-	int (*xfrm_policy_clone_security) (struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctx);
-	void (*xfrm_policy_free_security) (struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
-	int (*xfrm_policy_delete_security) (struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
-	int (*xfrm_state_alloc) (struct xfrm_state *x,
-				 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
-	int (*xfrm_state_alloc_acquire) (struct xfrm_state *x,
-					 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
-					 u32 secid);
-	void (*xfrm_state_free_security) (struct xfrm_state *x);
-	int (*xfrm_state_delete_security) (struct xfrm_state *x);
-	int (*xfrm_policy_lookup) (struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
-	int (*xfrm_state_pol_flow_match) (struct xfrm_state *x,
-					  struct xfrm_policy *xp,
-					  const struct flowi *fl);
-	int (*xfrm_decode_session) (struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid, int ckall);
-#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
-
-	/* key management security hooks */
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-	int (*key_alloc) (struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags);
-	void (*key_free) (struct key *key);
-	int (*key_permission) (key_ref_t key_ref,
-			       const struct cred *cred,
-			       unsigned perm);
-	int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
-#endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
-	int (*audit_rule_init) (u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
-	int (*audit_rule_known) (struct audit_krule *krule);
-	int (*audit_rule_match) (u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
-				 struct audit_context *actx);
-	void (*audit_rule_free) (void *lsmrule);
-#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
-};
-
 /* prototypes */
 extern int security_init(void);
-extern int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops);
-extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops);
-extern void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops);
-
 
 /* Security operations */
 int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr);
@@ -2049,7 +465,7 @@ static inline int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts,
 
 static inline int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 {
-	return cap_vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
+	return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_vm_enough_memory(mm, pages));
 }
 
 static inline int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -2653,7 +1069,7 @@ static inline int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *
 
 static inline int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	return cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
@@ -3221,36 +1637,5 @@ static inline void free_secdata(void *secdata)
 { }
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA
-extern int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
-				    unsigned int mode);
-extern int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
-extern void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task);
-extern int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
-			   unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
-#else
-static inline int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
-					   unsigned int mode)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
-{
-}
-
-static inline int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2,
-				  unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4,
-				  unsigned long arg5)
-{
-	return -ENOSYS;
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA */
-
 #endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
 
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index f19833b5db3c..836df8dac6cc 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -414,21 +414,16 @@ void flush_sigqueue(struct sigpending *queue)
 }
 
 /*
- * Flush all pending signals for a task.
+ * Flush all pending signals for this kthread.
  */
-void __flush_signals(struct task_struct *t)
-{
-	clear_tsk_thread_flag(t, TIF_SIGPENDING);
-	flush_sigqueue(&t->pending);
-	flush_sigqueue(&t->signal->shared_pending);
-}
-
 void flush_signals(struct task_struct *t)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
-	__flush_signals(t);
+	clear_tsk_thread_flag(t, TIF_SIGPENDING);
+	flush_sigqueue(&t->pending);
+	flush_sigqueue(&t->signal->shared_pending);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index 05f1c934d74b..c9bfbc84ff50 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ obj-y					+= commoncap.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MMU)			+= min_addr.o
 
 # Object file lists
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o capability.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS)		+= inode.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index d97cba3e3849..dc0027b28b04 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -347,9 +347,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode
 	};
 	const char *name = NULL, *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
-	int error = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
+	int error = 0;
 
 	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
 		return 0;
@@ -531,15 +529,13 @@ cleanup:
  */
 int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm);
-
 	/* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds
 	 * and stored in bprm->unsafe.
 	 */
-	if (!ret && (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED))
-		ret = 1;
+	if (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED)
+		return 1;
 
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index e5f1561439db..5696874e8062 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  * License.
  */
 
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/mman.h>
@@ -96,19 +96,11 @@ static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
 					unsigned int mode)
 {
-	int error = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
-
 	return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode);
 }
 
 static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
-	int error = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
-
 	return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
 }
 
@@ -123,10 +115,10 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 	cred = __task_cred(target);
 	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
 
-	*effective = cred->cap_effective;
-	*inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
-	*permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
-
+	/*
+	 * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will
+	 * initialize effective and permitted.
+	 */
 	if (!unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
 		*effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
 		*permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
@@ -140,13 +132,11 @@ static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 			    int cap, int audit)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
-	/* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
-	int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
-	if (!error) {
-		profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
-		if (!unconfined(profile))
-			error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit);
-	}
+	int error = 0;
+
+	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+	if (!unconfined(profile))
+		error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit);
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -615,49 +605,46 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
 	return error;
 }
 
-static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
-	.name =				"apparmor",
-
-	.ptrace_access_check =		apparmor_ptrace_access_check,
-	.ptrace_traceme =		apparmor_ptrace_traceme,
-	.capget =			apparmor_capget,
-	.capable =			apparmor_capable,
-
-	.path_link =			apparmor_path_link,
-	.path_unlink =			apparmor_path_unlink,
-	.path_symlink =			apparmor_path_symlink,
-	.path_mkdir =			apparmor_path_mkdir,
-	.path_rmdir =			apparmor_path_rmdir,
-	.path_mknod =			apparmor_path_mknod,
-	.path_rename =			apparmor_path_rename,
-	.path_chmod =			apparmor_path_chmod,
-	.path_chown =			apparmor_path_chown,
-	.path_truncate =		apparmor_path_truncate,
-	.inode_getattr =                apparmor_inode_getattr,
-
-	.file_open =			apparmor_file_open,
-	.file_permission =		apparmor_file_permission,
-	.file_alloc_security =		apparmor_file_alloc_security,
-	.file_free_security =		apparmor_file_free_security,
-	.mmap_file =			apparmor_mmap_file,
-	.mmap_addr =			cap_mmap_addr,
-	.file_mprotect =		apparmor_file_mprotect,
-	.file_lock =			apparmor_file_lock,
-
-	.getprocattr =			apparmor_getprocattr,
-	.setprocattr =			apparmor_setprocattr,
-
-	.cred_alloc_blank =		apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
-	.cred_free =			apparmor_cred_free,
-	.cred_prepare =			apparmor_cred_prepare,
-	.cred_transfer =		apparmor_cred_transfer,
-
-	.bprm_set_creds =		apparmor_bprm_set_creds,
-	.bprm_committing_creds =	apparmor_bprm_committing_creds,
-	.bprm_committed_creds =		apparmor_bprm_committed_creds,
-	.bprm_secureexec =		apparmor_bprm_secureexec,
-
-	.task_setrlimit =		apparmor_task_setrlimit,
+static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, apparmor_bprm_secureexec),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
 };
 
 /*
@@ -898,7 +885,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
 {
 	int error;
 
-	if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) {
+	if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable("apparmor")) {
 		aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
 		apparmor_enabled = 0;
 		return 0;
@@ -913,17 +900,10 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
 	error = set_init_cxt();
 	if (error) {
 		AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
-		goto register_security_out;
-	}
-
-	error = register_security(&apparmor_ops);
-	if (error) {
-		struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
-		aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
-		cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
-		AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n");
-		goto register_security_out;
+		aa_free_root_ns();
+		goto alloc_out;
 	}
+	security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks));
 
 	/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
 	apparmor_initialized = 1;
@@ -936,9 +916,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
 
 	return error;
 
-register_security_out:
-	aa_free_root_ns();
-
 alloc_out:
 	aa_destroy_aafs();
 
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 7d3f38fe02ba..000000000000
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1158 +0,0 @@
-/*
- *  Capabilities Linux Security Module
- *
- *  This is the default security module in case no other module is loaded.
- *
- *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- *	the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
- *	(at your option) any later version.
- *
- */
-
-#include <linux/security.h>
-
-static int cap_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
-				  struct task_struct *to)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
-				      struct task_struct *to)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
-				    struct task_struct *to, struct file *file)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_syslog(int type)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
-			const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
-			       struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
-			       unsigned long kern_flags,
-			       unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
-
-{
-	if (unlikely(opts->num_mnt_opts))
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
-				  struct super_block *newsb)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
-					struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
-					u32 *ctxlen)
-{
-	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
-				   const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
-				   void **value, size_t *len)
-{
-	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_create(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
-			    umode_t mask)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *inode,
-			  struct dentry *new_dentry)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_unlink(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_symlink(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
-			     const char *name)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_mkdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
-			   umode_t mask)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_rmdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_mknod(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
-			   umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
-			    struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
-				 bool rcu)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
-				    const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name,
-				 void **buffer, bool alloc)
-{
-	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
-				 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
-{
-	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
-				  size_t buffer_size)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
-{
-	*secid = 0;
-}
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
-static int cap_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
-			  unsigned int dev)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-			    const char *old_name)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
-			 struct dentry *new_dentry)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_rename(struct path *old_path, struct dentry *old_dentry,
-			   struct path *new_path, struct dentry *new_dentry)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_truncate(struct path *path)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_chroot(struct path *root)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
-static int cap_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_file_free_security(struct file *file)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int command,
-			  unsigned long arg)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
-			     unsigned long prot)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
-			  unsigned long arg)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
-{
-	return;
-}
-
-static int cap_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
-				   struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_file_receive(struct file *file)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
-{
-	*secid = 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
-		struct rlimit *new_rlim)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-			 int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
-{
-	*secid = 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
-				int msgflg)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
-				struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
-			 int shmflg)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
-			 unsigned nsops, int alter)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
-static int cap_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
-				   struct sock *newsk)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, int type,
-				  int protocol, int kern)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
-			   int addrlen)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
-			      int addrlen)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
-			      int size, int flags)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
-					char __user *optval,
-					int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
-{
-	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
-				       struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
-{
-	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
-}
-
-static int cap_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
-				 struct request_sock *req)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
-			       const struct request_sock *req)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
-				  struct flowi *fl)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_tun_dev_create(void)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_tun_dev_open(void *security)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
-static int cap_xfrm_policy_alloc_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
-					  struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
-					  gfp_t gfp)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_xfrm_policy_clone_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
-					  struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_xfrm_policy_free_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_xfrm_policy_delete_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
-				struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
-					struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
-					u32 secid)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_xfrm_state_free_security(struct xfrm_state *x)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_xfrm_state_delete_security(struct xfrm_state *x)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
-					 struct xfrm_policy *xp,
-					 const struct flowi *fl)
-{
-	return 1;
-}
-
-static int cap_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *fl, int ckall)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
-static void cap_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
-{
-	return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-static int cap_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value,
-			   size_t size)
-{
-	return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-static int cap_ismaclabel(const char *name)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
-{
-	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-}
-
-static int cap_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
-{
-	*secid = 0;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
-{
-	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-}
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-static int cap_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
-			 unsigned long flags)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_key_free(struct key *key)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
-			      unsigned perm)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
-{
-	*_buffer = NULL;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
-static int cap_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
-				struct audit_context *actx)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
-{
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
-
-#define set_to_cap_if_null(ops, function)				\
-	do {								\
-		if (!ops->function) {					\
-			ops->function = cap_##function;			\
-			pr_debug("Had to override the " #function	\
-				 " security operation with the default.\n");\
-			}						\
-	} while (0)
-
-void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
-{
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_set_context_mgr);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_transaction);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_transfer_binder);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_transfer_file);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_access_check);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capable);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quotactl);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quota_on);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, syslog);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, settime);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, vm_enough_memory);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_set_creds);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_committing_creds);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_committed_creds);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_check_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_secureexec);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_alloc_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_free_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_copy_data);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_remount);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_kern_mount);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_show_options);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_statfs);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_mount);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_umount);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_pivotroot);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_set_mnt_opts);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_clone_mnt_opts);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_parse_opts_str);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_init_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_alloc_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_free_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_init_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_create);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_link);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_unlink);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_symlink);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_mkdir);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_rmdir);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_mknod);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_rename);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_readlink);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_follow_link);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_permission);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setattr);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getattr);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setxattr);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_post_setxattr);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getxattr);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_listxattr);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_removexattr);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_need_killpriv);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_killpriv);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecurity);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecid);
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_mknod);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_mkdir);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_rmdir);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_unlink);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_symlink);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_link);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_rename);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_truncate);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chmod);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chown);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chroot);
-#endif
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_permission);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_free_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_ioctl);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, mmap_addr);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, mmap_file);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_mprotect);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_lock);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_fcntl);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_set_fowner);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_send_sigiotask);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_open);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_free);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_alloc_blank);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_free);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_prepare);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_transfer);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_fw_from_file);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_from_file);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setpgid);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getpgid);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getsid);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getsecid);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setnice);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setioprio);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getioprio);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setrlimit);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setscheduler);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getscheduler);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_movememory);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_wait);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_kill);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_prctl);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_to_inode);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_permission);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecid);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_free_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_associate);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_msgctl);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_msgsnd);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_msgrcv);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_alloc_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_free_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_associate);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_shmctl);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_shmat);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_alloc_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_free_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_associate);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semctl);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semop);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, netlink_send);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, d_instantiate);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, getprocattr);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, setprocattr);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ismaclabel);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, release_secctx);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_notifysecctx);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setsecctx);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecctx);
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_stream_connect);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_may_send);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_create);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_post_create);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_bind);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_connect);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_listen);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_accept);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_sendmsg);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_recvmsg);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getsockname);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getpeername);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_setsockopt);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getsockopt);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_shutdown);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_sock_rcv_skb);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_stream);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_dgram);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sk_alloc_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sk_free_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sk_clone_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sk_getsecid);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sock_graft);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_conn_request);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_csk_clone);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_conn_established);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secmark_relabel_packet);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secmark_refcount_inc);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secmark_refcount_dec);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, req_classify_flow);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_alloc_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_free_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_create);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_open);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach_queue);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach);
-#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_clone_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_free_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_delete_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_alloc);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_alloc_acquire);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_free_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_delete_security);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_lookup);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_pol_flow_match);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_decode_session);
-#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_alloc);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_free);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_permission);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_getsecurity);
-#endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_known);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_match);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_free);
-#endif
-}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index f2875cd9f677..d103f5a4043d 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/mman.h>
@@ -53,11 +53,6 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname)
 	}
 }
 
-int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /**
  * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
  * @cred: The credentials to use
@@ -941,7 +936,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
  * @pages: The size of the mapping
  *
  * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current
- * task is permitted, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if not.
+ * task is permitted, returning 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not.
  */
 int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 {
@@ -950,7 +945,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 	if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
 			SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
 		cap_sys_admin = 1;
-	return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
+	return cap_sys_admin;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -981,3 +976,33 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+
+struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, cap_ptrace_access_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, cap_ptrace_traceme),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, cap_capget),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, cap_capset),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, cap_bprm_secureexec),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, cap_mmap_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, cap_task_fix_setuid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, cap_task_prctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, cap_task_setscheduler),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, cap_task_setioprio),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, cap_task_setnice),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, cap_vm_enough_memory),
+};
+
+void __init capability_add_hooks(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks));
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 5e3bd72b299a..36fb6b527829 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
 	return err;
 }
 
-int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path)
+int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
 {
 	key_ref_t key;
 	char *data;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 10f994307a04..1334e02ae8f4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -296,6 +296,17 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 		iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
 		if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
 			return 0;
+
+		/* exception for pseudo filesystems */
+		if (dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_magic == TMPFS_MAGIC
+		    || dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_magic == SYSFS_MAGIC)
+			return 0;
+
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA,
+				    dentry->d_inode, dentry->d_name.name,
+				    "update_metadata",
+				    integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
+				    -EPERM, 0);
 	}
 out:
 	if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
@@ -376,17 +387,16 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
  * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
  *
  * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect removal of the xattr.
+ *
+ * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
+ * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex.
  */
 void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 {
-	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
-
 	if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
 		return;
 
-	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
-	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index dbb6d141c3db..3d2f5b45c8cb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -213,6 +213,9 @@ int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data)
 	char *buf;
 	int rc = -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!path || !*path)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(file)) {
 		rc = PTR_ERR(file);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 8ee997dff139..e2a60c30df44 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -52,6 +52,16 @@ extern int ima_used_chip;
 extern int ima_hash_algo;
 extern int ima_appraise;
 
+/* IMA event related data */
+struct ima_event_data {
+	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct file *file;
+	const unsigned char *filename;
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value;
+	int xattr_len;
+	const char *violation;
+};
+
 /* IMA template field data definition */
 struct ima_field_data {
 	u8 *data;
@@ -61,12 +71,10 @@ struct ima_field_data {
 /* IMA template field definition */
 struct ima_template_field {
 	const char field_id[IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN];
-	int (*field_init) (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-			   const unsigned char *filename,
-			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			   int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data);
-	void (*field_show) (struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
-			    struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+	int (*field_init)(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			  struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+	void (*field_show)(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+			   struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 };
 
 /* IMA template descriptor definition */
@@ -103,10 +111,11 @@ int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
 			      struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
 void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+		       struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause);
 int ima_init_crypto(void);
 void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen);
-void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size);
+void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size);
 struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void);
 int ima_init_template(void);
 
@@ -140,10 +149,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   int xattr_len);
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
-int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			    int xattr_len, struct ima_template_entry **entry);
+int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			    struct ima_template_entry **entry);
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 		       struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename);
 void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index b8a27c5052d4..1d950fbb2aec 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -37,10 +37,8 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
 /*
  * ima_alloc_init_template - create and initialize a new template entry
  */
-int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			    int xattr_len, struct ima_template_entry **entry)
+int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			    struct ima_template_entry **entry)
 {
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
 	int i, result = 0;
@@ -55,8 +53,7 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		struct ima_template_field *field = template_desc->fields[i];
 		u32 len;
 
-		result = field->field_init(iint, file, filename,
-					   xattr_value, xattr_len,
+		result = field->field_init(event_data,
 					   &((*entry)->template_data[i]));
 		if (result != 0)
 			goto out;
@@ -129,18 +126,20 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
  * value is invalidated.
  */
 void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+		       struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause)
 {
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, file, filename, NULL, 0,
+					    cause};
 	int violation = 1;
 	int result;
 
 	/* can overflow, only indicator */
 	atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations);
 
-	result = ima_alloc_init_template(NULL, file, filename,
-					 NULL, 0, &entry);
+	result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry);
 	if (result < 0) {
 		result = -ENOMEM;
 		goto err_out;
@@ -267,13 +266,14 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	int result = -ENOMEM;
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+	struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, file, filename, xattr_value,
+					    xattr_len, NULL};
 	int violation = 0;
 
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
 		return;
 
-	result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, file, filename,
-					 xattr_value, xattr_len, &entry);
+	result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry);
 	if (result < 0) {
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
 				    op, audit_cause, result, 0);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 4df493e4b3c9..1873b5536f80 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -378,10 +378,14 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 	result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
 				   xattr_value_len);
 	if (result == 1) {
+		bool digsig;
+
 		if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST))
 			return -EINVAL;
-		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry),
-			 (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) ? 1 : 0);
+		digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG);
+		if (!digsig && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+			return -EPERM;
+		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig);
 		result = 0;
 	}
 	return result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 461215e5fd31..816d175da79a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -190,9 +190,9 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_ops = {
 	.release = seq_release,
 };
 
-void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size)
+void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size)
 {
-	int i;
+	u32 i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
 		seq_printf(m, "%02x", *(digest + i));
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 5e4c29d174ee..e600cadd231c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -24,12 +24,6 @@
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 #include "ima.h"
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH
-#define IMA_X509_PATH	CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH
-#else
-#define IMA_X509_PATH	"/etc/keys/x509_ima.der"
-#endif
-
 /* name for boot aggregate entry */
 static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate";
 int ima_used_chip;
@@ -55,6 +49,8 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
 	struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
+	struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, NULL, boot_aggregate_name,
+					    NULL, 0, NULL};
 	int result = -ENOMEM;
 	int violation = 0;
 	struct {
@@ -76,8 +72,7 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 		}
 	}
 
-	result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, NULL, boot_aggregate_name,
-					 NULL, 0, &entry);
+	result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry);
 	if (result < 0) {
 		audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
 		goto err_out;
@@ -103,7 +98,7 @@ void __init ima_load_x509(void)
 	int unset_flags = ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE;
 
 	ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags;
-	integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, IMA_X509_PATH);
+	integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH);
 	ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags;
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index eeee00dce729..c21f09bf8b99 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -106,9 +106,10 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
 	*pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf);
 
 	if (send_tomtou)
-		ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
+		ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint,
+				  "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
 	if (send_writers)
-		ima_add_violation(file, *pathname,
+		ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint,
 				  "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index d1eefb9d65fb..3997e206f82d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
 #define IMA_UID		0x0008
 #define IMA_FOWNER	0x0010
 #define IMA_FSUUID	0x0020
+#define IMA_INMASK	0x0040
+#define IMA_EUID	0x0080
 
 #define UNKNOWN		0
 #define MEASURE		0x0001	/* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -42,6 +44,8 @@ enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
 	LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
 };
 
+enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB };
+
 struct ima_rule_entry {
 	struct list_head list;
 	int action;
@@ -70,7 +74,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
  * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
  * and running executables.
  */
-static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
+static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] = {
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
@@ -79,12 +83,31 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,
+	 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}
+};
+
+static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules[] = {
 	{.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
 	{.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
-	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
-	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
+	 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+};
+
+static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] = {
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
+	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
+	 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
+	 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID},
 	{.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
 	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
 };
@@ -99,6 +122,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
 	{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
@@ -115,14 +139,29 @@ static struct list_head *ima_rules;
 
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_rules_mutex);
 
-static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata;
+static int ima_policy __initdata;
 static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
 {
-	ima_use_tcb = 1;
+	if (ima_policy)
+		return 1;
+
+	ima_policy = ORIGINAL_TCB;
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
 
+static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
+{
+	if (ima_policy)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (strcmp(str, "tcb") == 0)
+		ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup);
+
 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
 static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
 {
@@ -182,6 +221,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
 	    (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
 		return false;
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_INMASK) &&
+	    (!(rule->mask & mask) && func != POST_SETATTR))
+		return false;
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
 	    && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
 		return false;
@@ -190,6 +232,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 		return false;
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
 		return false;
+	if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) {
+		if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) {
+			if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid)
+			    && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->suid)
+			    && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
+				return false;
+		} else if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid))
+			return false;
+	}
+
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid))
 		return false;
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
@@ -333,21 +385,31 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 {
 	int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries;
 
-	/* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
-	measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
+	/* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
+	measure_entries = ima_policy ? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules) : 0;
 	appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
 			 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) {
-		if (i < measure_entries)
-			list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list,
-				      &ima_default_rules);
-		else {
-			int j = i - measure_entries;
+	for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++)
+		list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
 
-			list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[j].list,
+	switch (ima_policy) {
+	case ORIGINAL_TCB:
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules); i++)
+			list_add_tail(&original_measurement_rules[i].list,
 				      &ima_default_rules);
-		}
+		break;
+	case DEFAULT_TCB:
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules); i++)
+			list_add_tail(&default_measurement_rules[i].list,
+				      &ima_default_rules);
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
+		list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
+			      &ima_default_rules);
 	}
 
 	ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
@@ -373,7 +435,8 @@ enum {
 	Opt_audit,
 	Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
 	Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
-	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner,
+	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic,
+	Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner,
 	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_permit_directio
 };
 
@@ -394,6 +457,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
 	{Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
 	{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
+	{Opt_euid, "euid=%s"},
 	{Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
 	{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
 	{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
@@ -435,6 +499,7 @@ static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	char *from;
 	char *p;
 	int result = 0;
 
@@ -525,18 +590,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			if (entry->mask)
 				result = -EINVAL;
 
-			if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
+			from = args[0].from;
+			if (*from == '^')
+				from++;
+
+			if ((strcmp(from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
 				entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
-			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
+			else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
 				entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
-			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
+			else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
 				entry->mask = MAY_READ;
-			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
+			else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
 				entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
 			else
 				result = -EINVAL;
 			if (!result)
-				entry->flags |= IMA_MASK;
+				entry->flags |= (*args[0].from == '^')
+				     ? IMA_INMASK : IMA_MASK;
 			break;
 		case Opt_fsmagic:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from);
@@ -566,6 +636,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			break;
 		case Opt_uid:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
+		case Opt_euid:
+			if (token == Opt_euid)
+				ima_log_string(ab, "euid", args[0].from);
 
 			if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) {
 				result = -EINVAL;
@@ -574,11 +647,14 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 
 			result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
 			if (!result) {
-				entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
-				if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
+				entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(),
+						       (uid_t) lnum);
+				if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) ||
+				    (uid_t)lnum != lnum)
 					result = -EINVAL;
 				else
-					entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
+					entry->flags |= (token == Opt_uid)
+					    ? IMA_UID : IMA_EUID;
 			}
 			break;
 		case Opt_fowner:
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index bcfc36cbde6a..2934e3d377f1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
 					 enum data_formats datafmt,
 					 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
-	u8 *buf_ptr = field_data->data, buflen = field_data->len;
+	u8 *buf_ptr = field_data->data;
+	u32 buflen = field_data->len;
 
 	switch (datafmt) {
 	case DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO:
@@ -195,9 +196,7 @@ static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, u8 hash_algo,
 /*
  * This function writes the digest of an event (with size limit).
  */
-int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-			 const unsigned char *filename,
-			 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
 	struct {
@@ -211,25 +210,25 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 
 	memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
 
-	if (!iint)		/* recording a violation. */
+	if (event_data->violation)	/* recording a violation. */
 		goto out;
 
-	if (ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(iint->ima_hash->algo)) {
-		cur_digest = iint->ima_hash->digest;
-		cur_digestsize = iint->ima_hash->length;
+	if (ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo)) {
+		cur_digest = event_data->iint->ima_hash->digest;
+		cur_digestsize = event_data->iint->ima_hash->length;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (!file)		/* missing info to re-calculate the digest */
+	if (!event_data->file)	/* missing info to re-calculate the digest */
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	inode = file_inode(file);
+	inode = file_inode(event_data->file);
 	hash.hdr.algo = ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(ima_hash_algo) ?
 	    ima_hash_algo : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
-	result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
+	result = ima_calc_file_hash(event_data->file, &hash.hdr);
 	if (result) {
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
-				    filename, "collect_data",
+				    event_data->filename, "collect_data",
 				    "failed", result, 0);
 		return result;
 	}
@@ -243,48 +242,43 @@ out:
 /*
  * This function writes the digest of an event (without size limit).
  */
-int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			    int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			    struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
 	u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
 	u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
 
-	/* If iint is NULL, we are recording a violation. */
-	if (!iint)
+	if (event_data->violation)	/* recording a violation. */
 		goto out;
 
-	cur_digest = iint->ima_hash->digest;
-	cur_digestsize = iint->ima_hash->length;
+	cur_digest = event_data->iint->ima_hash->digest;
+	cur_digestsize = event_data->iint->ima_hash->length;
 
-	hash_algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
+	hash_algo = event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo;
 out:
 	return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
 					   hash_algo, field_data);
 }
 
-static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-				     struct file *file,
-				     const unsigned char *filename,
+static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 				     struct ima_field_data *field_data,
 				     bool size_limit)
 {
 	const char *cur_filename = NULL;
 	u32 cur_filename_len = 0;
 
-	BUG_ON(filename == NULL && file == NULL);
+	BUG_ON(event_data->filename == NULL && event_data->file == NULL);
 
-	if (filename) {
-		cur_filename = filename;
-		cur_filename_len = strlen(filename);
+	if (event_data->filename) {
+		cur_filename = event_data->filename;
+		cur_filename_len = strlen(event_data->filename);
 
 		if (!size_limit || cur_filename_len <= IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
 			goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (file) {
-		cur_filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
+	if (event_data->file) {
+		cur_filename = event_data->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
 		cur_filename_len = strlen(cur_filename);
 	} else
 		/*
@@ -300,36 +294,30 @@ out:
 /*
  * This function writes the name of an event (with size limit).
  */
-int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-		       const unsigned char *filename,
-		       struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 		       struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
-	return ima_eventname_init_common(iint, file, filename,
-					 field_data, true);
+	return ima_eventname_init_common(event_data, field_data, true);
 }
 
 /*
  * This function writes the name of an event (without size limit).
  */
-int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-			  const unsigned char *filename,
-			  struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			  struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
-	return ima_eventname_init_common(iint, file, filename,
-					 field_data, false);
+	return ima_eventname_init_common(event_data, field_data, false);
 }
 
 /*
  *  ima_eventsig_init - include the file signature as part of the template data
  */
-int ima_eventsig_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-		      const unsigned char *filename,
-		      struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 		      struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
 	enum data_formats fmt = DATA_FMT_HEX;
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value;
+	int xattr_len = event_data->xattr_len;
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG))
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
index 63f6b52cb1c2..c344530c1d69 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
@@ -26,24 +26,14 @@ void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 			      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 void ima_show_template_sig(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
 			   struct ima_field_data *field_data);
-int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-			 const unsigned char *filename,
-			 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			 struct ima_field_data *field_data);
-int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-		       const unsigned char *filename,
-		       struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 		       struct ima_field_data *field_data);
-int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			    struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
-			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
-			    int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data);
-int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-			  const unsigned char *filename,
-			  struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+			    struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			  struct ima_field_data *field_data);
-int ima_eventsig_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-		      const unsigned char *filename,
-		      struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 		      struct ima_field_data *field_data);
 #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 0fc9519fefa9..9c6168709d3b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 			    const char *digest, int digestlen);
 
 int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
-int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path);
+int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path);
 #else
 
 static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 04c8feca081a..595fffab48b0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/integrity.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
@@ -29,24 +29,13 @@
 
 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR	2
 
+/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
+#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX	10
+
 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
 static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
 	CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
 
-static struct security_operations *security_ops;
-static struct security_operations default_security_ops = {
-	.name	= "default",
-};
-
-static inline int __init verify(struct security_operations *ops)
-{
-	/* verify the security_operations structure exists */
-	if (!ops)
-		return -EINVAL;
-	security_fixup_ops(ops);
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static void __init do_security_initcalls(void)
 {
 	initcall_t *call;
@@ -64,20 +53,27 @@ static void __init do_security_initcalls(void)
  */
 int __init security_init(void)
 {
-	printk(KERN_INFO "Security Framework initialized\n");
+	pr_info("Security Framework initialized\n");
 
-	security_fixup_ops(&default_security_ops);
-	security_ops = &default_security_ops;
+	/*
+	 * Always load the capability module.
+	 */
+	capability_add_hooks();
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
+	/*
+	 * If Yama is configured for stacking load it next.
+	 */
+	yama_add_hooks();
+#endif
+	/*
+	 * Load the chosen module if there is one.
+	 * This will also find yama if it is stacking
+	 */
 	do_security_initcalls();
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
-void reset_security_ops(void)
-{
-	security_ops = &default_security_ops;
-}
-
 /* Save user chosen LSM */
 static int __init choose_lsm(char *str)
 {
@@ -88,7 +84,7 @@ __setup("security=", choose_lsm);
 
 /**
  * security_module_enable - Load given security module on boot ?
- * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_operations that is to be checked.
+ * @module: the name of the module
  *
  * Each LSM must pass this method before registering its own operations
  * to avoid security registration races. This method may also be used
@@ -100,84 +96,76 @@ __setup("security=", choose_lsm);
  *	 choose an alternate LSM at boot time.
  * Otherwise, return false.
  */
-int __init security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops)
+int __init security_module_enable(const char *module)
 {
-	return !strcmp(ops->name, chosen_lsm);
+	return !strcmp(module, chosen_lsm);
 }
 
-/**
- * register_security - registers a security framework with the kernel
- * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_options that is to be registered
+/*
+ * Hook list operation macros.
  *
- * This function allows a security module to register itself with the
- * kernel security subsystem.  Some rudimentary checking is done on the @ops
- * value passed to this function. You'll need to check first if your LSM
- * is allowed to register its @ops by calling security_module_enable(@ops).
+ * call_void_hook:
+ *	This is a hook that does not return a value.
  *
- * If there is already a security module registered with the kernel,
- * an error will be returned.  Otherwise %0 is returned on success.
+ * call_int_hook:
+ *	This is a hook that returns a value.
  */
-int __init register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
-{
-	if (verify(ops)) {
-		printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s could not verify "
-		       "security_operations structure.\n", __func__);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	if (security_ops != &default_security_ops)
-		return -EAGAIN;
 
-	security_ops = ops;
-
-	return 0;
-}
+#define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...)				\
+	do {							\
+		struct security_hook_list *P;			\
+								\
+		list_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list)	\
+			P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__);		\
+	} while (0)
+
+#define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({			\
+	int RC = IRC;						\
+	do {							\
+		struct security_hook_list *P;			\
+								\
+		list_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
+			RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__);		\
+			if (RC != 0)				\
+				break;				\
+		}						\
+	} while (0);						\
+	RC;							\
+})
 
 /* Security operations */
 
 int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
 {
-	return security_ops->binder_set_context_mgr(mgr);
+	return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr);
 }
 
 int security_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
 				struct task_struct *to)
 {
-	return security_ops->binder_transaction(from, to);
+	return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to);
 }
 
 int security_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
 				    struct task_struct *to)
 {
-	return security_ops->binder_transfer_binder(from, to);
+	return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to);
 }
 
 int security_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
 				  struct task_struct *to, struct file *file)
 {
-	return security_ops->binder_transfer_file(from, to, file);
+	return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file);
 }
 
 int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
-	int rc;
-	rc = yama_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-#endif
-	return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
+	return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode);
 }
 
 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
-	int rc;
-	rc = yama_ptrace_traceme(parent);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-#endif
-	return security_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
+	return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent);
 }
 
 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
@@ -185,7 +173,8 @@ int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
 		     kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
 		     kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
-	return security_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+	return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target,
+				effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
 int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -193,57 +182,75 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 		    const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
 		    const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
-	return security_ops->capset(new, old,
-				    effective, inheritable, permitted);
+	return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old,
+				effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
 int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 		     int cap)
 {
-	return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+	return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
 }
 
 int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 			     int cap)
 {
-	return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+	return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
 }
 
 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	return security_ops->quotactl(cmds, type, id, sb);
+	return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb);
 }
 
 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	return security_ops->quota_on(dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry);
 }
 
 int security_syslog(int type)
 {
-	return security_ops->syslog(type);
+	return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type);
 }
 
 int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
 {
-	return security_ops->settime(ts, tz);
+	return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz);
 }
 
 int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 {
-	return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+	int cap_sys_admin = 1;
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * The module will respond with a positive value if
+	 * it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be
+	 * made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules
+	 * agree that it should be set it will. If any module
+	 * thinks it should not be set it won't.
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) {
+		rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
+		if (rc <= 0) {
+			cap_sys_admin = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
 }
 
 int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	return security_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+	return call_int_hook(bprm_set_creds, 0, bprm);
 }
 
 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = security_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
+	ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
@@ -251,69 +258,69 @@ int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	security_ops->bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
+	call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm);
 }
 
 void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	security_ops->bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
+	call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm);
 }
 
 int security_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	return security_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm);
+	return call_int_hook(bprm_secureexec, 0, bprm);
 }
 
 int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	return security_ops->sb_alloc_security(sb);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
 }
 
 void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	security_ops->sb_free_security(sb);
+	call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb);
 }
 
 int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
 {
-	return security_ops->sb_copy_data(orig, copy);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_copy_data, 0, orig, copy);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_copy_data);
 
 int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 {
-	return security_ops->sb_remount(sb, data);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, data);
 }
 
 int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 {
-	return security_ops->sb_kern_mount(sb, flags, data);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb, flags, data);
 }
 
 int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	return security_ops->sb_show_options(m, sb);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb);
 }
 
 int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	return security_ops->sb_statfs(dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry);
 }
 
 int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
                        const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
 {
-	return security_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
 }
 
 int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 {
-	return security_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags);
 }
 
 int security_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
 {
-	return security_ops->sb_pivotroot(old_path, new_path);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path);
 }
 
 int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
@@ -321,42 +328,43 @@ int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 				unsigned long kern_flags,
 				unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 {
-	return security_ops->sb_set_mnt_opts(sb, opts, kern_flags,
-						set_kern_flags);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts,
+				opts->num_mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb,
+				opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts);
 
 int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 				struct super_block *newsb)
 {
-	return security_ops->sb_clone_mnt_opts(oldsb, newsb);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
 
 int security_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 {
-	return security_ops->sb_parse_opts_str(options, opts);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_parse_opts_str, 0, options, opts);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_parse_opts_str);
 
 int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	inode->i_security = NULL;
-	return security_ops->inode_alloc_security(inode);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode);
 }
 
 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	integrity_inode_free(inode);
-	security_ops->inode_free_security(inode);
+	call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
 }
 
 int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 					struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
 					u32 *ctxlen)
 {
-	return security_ops->dentry_init_security(dentry, mode, name,
-							ctx, ctxlen);
+	return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode,
+				name, ctx, ctxlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
 
@@ -372,11 +380,11 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 		return 0;
 
 	if (!initxattrs)
-		return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,
+		return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, 0, inode, dir, qstr,
 							 NULL, NULL, NULL);
 	memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs));
 	lsm_xattr = new_xattrs;
-	ret = security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,
+	ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr,
 						&lsm_xattr->name,
 						&lsm_xattr->value,
 						&lsm_xattr->value_len);
@@ -401,8 +409,8 @@ int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-	return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, name, value,
-						 len);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, 0, inode, dir, qstr,
+				name, value, len);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security);
 
@@ -412,7 +420,7 @@ int security_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->path_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+	return call_int_hook(path_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
 
@@ -420,7 +428,7 @@ int security_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->path_mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
+	return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir);
 
@@ -428,14 +436,14 @@ int security_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->path_rmdir(dir, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry);
 }
 
 int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->path_unlink(dir, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(path_unlink, 0, dir, dentry);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink);
 
@@ -444,7 +452,7 @@ int security_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->path_symlink(dir, dentry, old_name);
+	return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name);
 }
 
 int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
@@ -452,7 +460,7 @@ int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->path_link(old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
 }
 
 int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
@@ -464,14 +472,14 @@ int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 		return 0;
 
 	if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
-		int err = security_ops->path_rename(new_dir, new_dentry,
-						    old_dir, old_dentry);
+		int err = call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry,
+					old_dir, old_dentry);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 	}
 
-	return security_ops->path_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
-					 new_dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
+				new_dentry);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename);
 
@@ -479,26 +487,26 @@ int security_path_truncate(struct path *path)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->path_truncate(path);
+	return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path);
 }
 
 int security_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->path_chmod(path, mode);
+	return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode);
 }
 
 int security_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->path_chown(path, uid, gid);
+	return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid);
 }
 
 int security_path_chroot(struct path *path)
 {
-	return security_ops->path_chroot(path);
+	return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path);
 }
 #endif
 
@@ -506,7 +514,7 @@ int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->inode_create(dir, dentry, mode);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_create, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create);
 
@@ -515,14 +523,14 @@ int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
 }
 
 int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry);
 }
 
 int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -530,14 +538,14 @@ int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->inode_symlink(dir, dentry, old_name);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name);
 }
 
 int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->inode_mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir);
 
@@ -545,14 +553,14 @@ int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->inode_rmdir(dir, dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry);
 }
 
 int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
 }
 
 int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
@@ -564,13 +572,13 @@ int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 		return 0;
 
 	if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
-		int err = security_ops->inode_rename(new_dir, new_dentry,
+		int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry,
 						     old_dir, old_dentry);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 	}
 
-	return security_ops->inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry,
+	return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry,
 					   new_dir, new_dentry);
 }
 
@@ -578,7 +586,7 @@ int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->inode_readlink(dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry);
 }
 
 int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
@@ -586,14 +594,14 @@ int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, inode, rcu);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu);
 }
 
 int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask);
 }
 
 int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
@@ -602,7 +610,7 @@ int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	ret = security_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
+	ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	return evm_inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
@@ -613,7 +621,7 @@ int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->inode_getattr(path);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path);
 }
 
 int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
@@ -623,7 +631,15 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	ret = security_ops->inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+	/*
+	 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
+	 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
+	 */
+	ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, dentry, name, value, size,
+				flags);
+
+	if (ret == 1)
+		ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
@@ -637,7 +653,7 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return;
-	security_ops->inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+	call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
 	evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
 }
 
@@ -645,14 +661,14 @@ int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->inode_getxattr(dentry, name);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name);
 }
 
 int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->inode_listxattr(dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry);
 }
 
 int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
@@ -661,7 +677,13 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	ret = security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+	/*
+	 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
+	 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
+	 */
+	ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, dentry, name);
+	if (ret == 1)
+		ret = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
@@ -672,46 +694,48 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 
 int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	return security_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry);
 }
 
 int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	return security_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, dentry);
 }
 
 int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-	return security_ops->inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_getsecurity, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, name,
+				buffer, alloc);
 }
 
 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-	return security_ops->inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_setsecurity, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, name,
+				value, size, flags);
 }
 
 int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->inode_listsecurity(inode, buffer, buffer_size);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, 0, inode, buffer, buffer_size);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
 
 void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 {
-	security_ops->inode_getsecid(inode, secid);
+	call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
 }
 
 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = security_ops->file_permission(file, mask);
+	ret = call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -720,17 +744,17 @@ int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 
 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
 {
-	return security_ops->file_alloc_security(file);
+	return call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file);
 }
 
 void security_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
-	security_ops->file_free_security(file);
+	call_void_hook(file_free_security, file);
 }
 
 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
-	return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
+	return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg);
 }
 
 static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
@@ -770,7 +794,7 @@ int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 			unsigned long flags)
 {
 	int ret;
-	ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, prot,
+	ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot,
 					mmap_prot(file, prot), flags);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
@@ -779,46 +803,46 @@ int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 
 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
-	return security_ops->mmap_addr(addr);
+	return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr);
 }
 
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 			    unsigned long prot)
 {
-	return security_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
+	return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
 }
 
 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
-	return security_ops->file_lock(file, cmd);
+	return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd);
 }
 
 int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
-	return security_ops->file_fcntl(file, cmd, arg);
+	return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg);
 }
 
 void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
 {
-	security_ops->file_set_fowner(file);
+	call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file);
 }
 
 int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				  struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
 {
-	return security_ops->file_send_sigiotask(tsk, fown, sig);
+	return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig);
 }
 
 int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
 {
-	return security_ops->file_receive(file);
+	return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file);
 }
 
 int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = security_ops->file_open(file, cred);
+	ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file, cred);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -827,52 +851,49 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 
 int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 {
-	return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
+	return call_int_hook(task_create, 0, clone_flags);
 }
 
 void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
-	yama_task_free(task);
-#endif
-	security_ops->task_free(task);
+	call_void_hook(task_free, task);
 }
 
 int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	return security_ops->cred_alloc_blank(cred, gfp);
+	return call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
 }
 
 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
-	security_ops->cred_free(cred);
+	call_void_hook(cred_free, cred);
 }
 
 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	return security_ops->cred_prepare(new, old, gfp);
+	return call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
 }
 
 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
-	security_ops->cred_transfer(new, old);
+	call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
 }
 
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 {
-	return security_ops->kernel_act_as(new, secid);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
 }
 
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 {
-	return security_ops->kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode);
 }
 
 int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = security_ops->kernel_fw_from_file(file, buf, size);
+	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_fw_from_file, 0, file, buf, size);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	return ima_fw_from_file(file, buf, size);
@@ -881,14 +902,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_fw_from_file);
 
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
-	return security_ops->kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
 }
 
 int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = security_ops->kernel_module_from_file(file);
+	ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_from_file, 0, file);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	return ima_module_check(file);
@@ -897,259 +918,269 @@ int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			     int flags)
 {
-	return security_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags);
 }
 
 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
-	return security_ops->task_setpgid(p, pgid);
+	return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid);
 }
 
 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return security_ops->task_getpgid(p);
+	return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p);
 }
 
 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return security_ops->task_getsid(p);
+	return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
 }
 
 void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
 {
-	security_ops->task_getsecid(p, secid);
+	*secid = 0;
+	call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
 
 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
-	return security_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
+	return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice);
 }
 
 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 {
-	return security_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+	return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio);
 }
 
 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return security_ops->task_getioprio(p);
+	return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p);
 }
 
 int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
 		struct rlimit *new_rlim)
 {
-	return security_ops->task_setrlimit(p, resource, new_rlim);
+	return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim);
 }
 
 int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return security_ops->task_setscheduler(p);
+	return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p);
 }
 
 int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return security_ops->task_getscheduler(p);
+	return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p);
 }
 
 int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return security_ops->task_movememory(p);
+	return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p);
 }
 
 int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 			int sig, u32 secid)
 {
-	return security_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+	return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, secid);
 }
 
 int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return security_ops->task_wait(p);
+	return call_int_hook(task_wait, 0, p);
 }
 
 int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 			 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
-	int rc;
-	rc = yama_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
-	if (rc != -ENOSYS)
-		return rc;
-#endif
-	return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+	int thisrc;
+	int rc = -ENOSYS;
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) {
+		thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+		if (thisrc != -ENOSYS) {
+			rc = thisrc;
+			if (thisrc != 0)
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+	return rc;
 }
 
 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
 {
-	security_ops->task_to_inode(p, inode);
+	call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode);
 }
 
 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 {
-	return security_ops->ipc_permission(ipcp, flag);
+	return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
 }
 
 void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
 {
-	security_ops->ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid);
+	*secid = 0;
+	call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
 }
 
 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
-	return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
+	return call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg);
 }
 
 void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
-	security_ops->msg_msg_free_security(msg);
+	call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg);
 }
 
 int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct msg_queue *msq)
 {
-	return security_ops->msg_queue_alloc_security(msq);
+	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq);
 }
 
 void security_msg_queue_free(struct msg_queue *msq)
 {
-	security_ops->msg_queue_free_security(msq);
+	call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq);
 }
 
 int security_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
 {
-	return security_ops->msg_queue_associate(msq, msqflg);
+	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg);
 }
 
 int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
 {
-	return security_ops->msg_queue_msgctl(msq, cmd);
+	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd);
 }
 
 int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq,
 			       struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
 {
-	return security_ops->msg_queue_msgsnd(msq, msg, msqflg);
+	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg);
 }
 
 int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 			       struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
 {
-	return security_ops->msg_queue_msgrcv(msq, msg, target, type, mode);
+	return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode);
 }
 
 int security_shm_alloc(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 {
-	return security_ops->shm_alloc_security(shp);
+	return call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp);
 }
 
 void security_shm_free(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 {
-	security_ops->shm_free_security(shp);
+	call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp);
 }
 
 int security_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
 {
-	return security_ops->shm_associate(shp, shmflg);
+	return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg);
 }
 
 int security_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
 {
-	return security_ops->shm_shmctl(shp, cmd);
+	return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd);
 }
 
 int security_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
 {
-	return security_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
+	return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
 }
 
 int security_sem_alloc(struct sem_array *sma)
 {
-	return security_ops->sem_alloc_security(sma);
+	return call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma);
 }
 
 void security_sem_free(struct sem_array *sma)
 {
-	security_ops->sem_free_security(sma);
+	call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma);
 }
 
 int security_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
 {
-	return security_ops->sem_associate(sma, semflg);
+	return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg);
 }
 
 int security_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
 {
-	return security_ops->sem_semctl(sma, cmd);
+	return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd);
 }
 
 int security_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
 			unsigned nsops, int alter)
 {
-	return security_ops->sem_semop(sma, sops, nsops, alter);
+	return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter);
 }
 
 void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
 {
 	if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return;
-	security_ops->d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
+	call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate);
 
 int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
 {
-	return security_ops->getprocattr(p, name, value);
+	return call_int_hook(getprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value);
 }
 
 int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 {
-	return security_ops->setprocattr(p, name, value, size);
+	return call_int_hook(setprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value, size);
 }
 
 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	return security_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
+	return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb);
 }
 
 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
 {
-	return security_ops->ismaclabel(name);
+	return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
 
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
-	return security_ops->secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
+	return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata,
+				seclen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
 
 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 {
-	return security_ops->secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen, secid);
+	*secid = 0;
+	return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
 
 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
-	security_ops->release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+	call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
 
 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 {
-	return security_ops->inode_notifysecctx(inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
 
 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 {
-	return security_ops->inode_setsecctx(dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
 
 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
 {
-	return security_ops->inode_getsecctx(inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
 
@@ -1157,206 +1188,207 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
 
 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
 {
-	return security_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
+	return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect);
 
 int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,  struct socket *other)
 {
-	return security_ops->unix_may_send(sock, other);
+	return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send);
 
 int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
 {
-	return security_ops->socket_create(family, type, protocol, kern);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern);
 }
 
 int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 				int type, int protocol, int kern)
 {
-	return security_ops->socket_post_create(sock, family, type,
+	return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type,
 						protocol, kern);
 }
 
 int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
-	return security_ops->socket_bind(sock, address, addrlen);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
 }
 
 int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
-	return security_ops->socket_connect(sock, address, addrlen);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
 }
 
 int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
 {
-	return security_ops->socket_listen(sock, backlog);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog);
 }
 
 int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
 {
-	return security_ops->socket_accept(sock, newsock);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock);
 }
 
 int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 {
-	return security_ops->socket_sendmsg(sock, msg, size);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size);
 }
 
 int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 			    int size, int flags)
 {
-	return security_ops->socket_recvmsg(sock, msg, size, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags);
 }
 
 int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
 {
-	return security_ops->socket_getsockname(sock);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock);
 }
 
 int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
 {
-	return security_ops->socket_getpeername(sock);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock);
 }
 
 int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
 {
-	return security_ops->socket_getsockopt(sock, level, optname);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname);
 }
 
 int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
 {
-	return security_ops->socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname);
 }
 
 int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
 {
-	return security_ops->socket_shutdown(sock, how);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how);
 }
 
 int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	return security_ops->socket_sock_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
 
 int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
 				      int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
 {
-	return security_ops->socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval, optlen, len);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
+				optval, optlen, len);
 }
 
 int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
 {
-	return security_ops->socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb, secid);
+	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, 0, sock, skb, secid);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
 
 int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 {
-	return security_ops->sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
+	return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
 }
 
 void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	security_ops->sk_free_security(sk);
+	call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
 }
 
 void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
 {
-	security_ops->sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
+	call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone);
 
 void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl)
 {
-	security_ops->sk_getsecid(sk, &fl->flowi_secid);
+	call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &fl->flowi_secid);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow);
 
 void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl)
 {
-	security_ops->req_classify_flow(req, fl);
+	call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, fl);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow);
 
 void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 {
-	security_ops->sock_graft(sk, parent);
+	call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft);
 
 int security_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk,
 			struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req)
 {
-	return security_ops->inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req);
+	return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request);
 
 void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
 			const struct request_sock *req)
 {
-	security_ops->inet_csk_clone(newsk, req);
+	call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req);
 }
 
 void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
 			struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	security_ops->inet_conn_established(sk, skb);
+	call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb);
 }
 
 int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
 {
-	return security_ops->secmark_relabel_packet(secid);
+	return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
 
 void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
 {
-	security_ops->secmark_refcount_inc();
+	call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc);
 
 void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
 {
-	security_ops->secmark_refcount_dec();
+	call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec);
 
 int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
 {
-	return security_ops->tun_dev_alloc_security(security);
+	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security);
 
 void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
 {
-	security_ops->tun_dev_free_security(security);
+	call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security);
 
 int security_tun_dev_create(void)
 {
-	return security_ops->tun_dev_create();
+	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
 
 int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
 {
-	return security_ops->tun_dev_attach_queue(security);
+	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue);
 
 int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
 {
-	return security_ops->tun_dev_attach(sk, security);
+	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
 
 int security_tun_dev_open(void *security)
 {
-	return security_ops->tun_dev_open(security);
+	return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open);
 
@@ -1368,71 +1400,89 @@ int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
 			       struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
 			       gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	return security_ops->xfrm_policy_alloc_security(ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, 0, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc);
 
 int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
 			      struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
 {
-	return security_ops->xfrm_policy_clone_security(old_ctx, new_ctxp);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp);
 }
 
 void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 {
-	security_ops->xfrm_policy_free_security(ctx);
+	call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free);
 
 int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 {
-	return security_ops->xfrm_policy_delete_security(ctx);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx);
 }
 
 int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
 			      struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
 {
-	return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc(x, sec_ctx);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, 0, x, sec_ctx);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc);
 
 int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
 				      struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
 {
-	return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(x, polsec, secid);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid);
 }
 
 int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
-	return security_ops->xfrm_state_delete_security(x);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete);
 
 void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
-	security_ops->xfrm_state_free_security(x);
+	call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x);
 }
 
 int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
 {
-	return security_ops->xfrm_policy_lookup(ctx, fl_secid, dir);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid, dir);
 }
 
 int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
 				       struct xfrm_policy *xp,
 				       const struct flowi *fl)
 {
-	return security_ops->xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, fl);
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+	int rc = 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment
+	 * becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately,
+	 * we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux
+	 * supplies this call.
+	 *
+	 * For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than
+	 * using the macro
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
+				list) {
+		rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, fl);
+		break;
+	}
+	return rc;
 }
 
 int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
 {
-	return security_ops->xfrm_decode_session(skb, secid, 1);
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1);
 }
 
 void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
 {
-	int rc = security_ops->xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl->flowi_secid, 0);
+	int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &fl->flowi_secid,
+				0);
 
 	BUG_ON(rc);
 }
@@ -1445,23 +1495,24 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
 int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
 		       unsigned long flags)
 {
-	return security_ops->key_alloc(key, cred, flags);
+	return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
 }
 
 void security_key_free(struct key *key)
 {
-	security_ops->key_free(key);
+	call_void_hook(key_free, key);
 }
 
 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 			    const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
 {
-	return security_ops->key_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
+	return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, perm);
 }
 
 int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 {
-	return security_ops->key_getsecurity(key, _buffer);
+	*_buffer = NULL;
+	return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, _buffer);
 }
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
@@ -1470,23 +1521,369 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 
 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
 {
-	return security_ops->audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
 }
 
 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
 {
-	return security_ops->audit_rule_known(krule);
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
 }
 
 void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
 {
-	security_ops->audit_rule_free(lsmrule);
+	call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
 }
 
 int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
 			      struct audit_context *actx)
 {
-	return security_ops->audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, lsmrule, actx);
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule,
+				actx);
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
+struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
+	.binder_set_context_mgr =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.binder_set_context_mgr),
+	.binder_transaction =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.binder_transaction),
+	.binder_transfer_binder =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.binder_transfer_binder),
+	.binder_transfer_file =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.binder_transfer_file),
+
+	.ptrace_access_check =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ptrace_access_check),
+	.ptrace_traceme =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ptrace_traceme),
+	.capget =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.capget),
+	.capset =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.capset),
+	.capable =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.capable),
+	.quotactl =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.quotactl),
+	.quota_on =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.quota_on),
+	.syslog =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.syslog),
+	.settime =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.settime),
+	.vm_enough_memory =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory),
+	.bprm_set_creds =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_set_creds),
+	.bprm_check_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_check_security),
+	.bprm_secureexec =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_secureexec),
+	.bprm_committing_creds =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_committing_creds),
+	.bprm_committed_creds =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_committed_creds),
+	.sb_alloc_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_alloc_security),
+	.sb_free_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_free_security),
+	.sb_copy_data =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_copy_data),
+	.sb_remount =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_remount),
+	.sb_kern_mount =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_kern_mount),
+	.sb_show_options =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_show_options),
+	.sb_statfs =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_statfs),
+	.sb_mount =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_mount),
+	.sb_umount =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_umount),
+	.sb_pivotroot =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_pivotroot),
+	.sb_set_mnt_opts =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_set_mnt_opts),
+	.sb_clone_mnt_opts =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_clone_mnt_opts),
+	.sb_parse_opts_str =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_parse_opts_str),
+	.dentry_init_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+	.path_unlink =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_unlink),
+	.path_mkdir =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_mkdir),
+	.path_rmdir =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_rmdir),
+	.path_mknod =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_mknod),
+	.path_truncate =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_truncate),
+	.path_symlink =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_symlink),
+	.path_link =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_link),
+	.path_rename =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_rename),
+	.path_chmod =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_chmod),
+	.path_chown =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_chown),
+	.path_chroot =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_chroot),
+#endif
+	.inode_alloc_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_alloc_security),
+	.inode_free_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_free_security),
+	.inode_init_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_init_security),
+	.inode_create =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_create),
+	.inode_link =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_link),
+	.inode_unlink =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_unlink),
+	.inode_symlink =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_symlink),
+	.inode_mkdir =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_mkdir),
+	.inode_rmdir =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_rmdir),
+	.inode_mknod =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_mknod),
+	.inode_rename =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_rename),
+	.inode_readlink =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_readlink),
+	.inode_follow_link =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_follow_link),
+	.inode_permission =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_permission),
+	.inode_setattr =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_setattr),
+	.inode_getattr =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getattr),
+	.inode_setxattr =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_setxattr),
+	.inode_post_setxattr =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_post_setxattr),
+	.inode_getxattr =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getxattr),
+	.inode_listxattr =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_listxattr),
+	.inode_removexattr =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_removexattr),
+	.inode_need_killpriv =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_need_killpriv),
+	.inode_killpriv =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_killpriv),
+	.inode_getsecurity =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity),
+	.inode_setsecurity =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity),
+	.inode_listsecurity =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_listsecurity),
+	.inode_getsecid =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid),
+	.file_permission =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_permission),
+	.file_alloc_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_alloc_security),
+	.file_free_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_free_security),
+	.file_ioctl =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_ioctl),
+	.mmap_addr =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.mmap_addr),
+	.mmap_file =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.mmap_file),
+	.file_mprotect =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_mprotect),
+	.file_lock =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_lock),
+	.file_fcntl =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_fcntl),
+	.file_set_fowner =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_set_fowner),
+	.file_send_sigiotask =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_send_sigiotask),
+	.file_receive =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_receive),
+	.file_open =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_open),
+	.task_create =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_create),
+	.task_free =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_free),
+	.cred_alloc_blank =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.cred_alloc_blank),
+	.cred_free =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.cred_free),
+	.cred_prepare =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.cred_prepare),
+	.cred_transfer =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.cred_transfer),
+	.kernel_act_as =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as),
+	.kernel_create_files_as =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_create_files_as),
+	.kernel_fw_from_file =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_fw_from_file),
+	.kernel_module_request =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_module_request),
+	.kernel_module_from_file =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_module_from_file),
+	.task_fix_setuid =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_fix_setuid),
+	.task_setpgid =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setpgid),
+	.task_getpgid =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getpgid),
+	.task_getsid =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getsid),
+	.task_getsecid =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getsecid),
+	.task_setnice =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setnice),
+	.task_setioprio =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setioprio),
+	.task_getioprio =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getioprio),
+	.task_setrlimit =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setrlimit),
+	.task_setscheduler =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setscheduler),
+	.task_getscheduler =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getscheduler),
+	.task_movememory =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_movememory),
+	.task_kill =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_kill),
+	.task_wait =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_wait),
+	.task_prctl =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_prctl),
+	.task_to_inode =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_to_inode),
+	.ipc_permission =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ipc_permission),
+	.ipc_getsecid =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid),
+	.msg_msg_alloc_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_msg_alloc_security),
+	.msg_msg_free_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_msg_free_security),
+	.msg_queue_alloc_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_alloc_security),
+	.msg_queue_free_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_free_security),
+	.msg_queue_associate =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_associate),
+	.msg_queue_msgctl =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_msgctl),
+	.msg_queue_msgsnd =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_msgsnd),
+	.msg_queue_msgrcv =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_msgrcv),
+	.shm_alloc_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_alloc_security),
+	.shm_free_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_free_security),
+	.shm_associate =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_associate),
+	.shm_shmctl =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_shmctl),
+	.shm_shmat =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_shmat),
+	.sem_alloc_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_alloc_security),
+	.sem_free_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_free_security),
+	.sem_associate =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_associate),
+	.sem_semctl =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_semctl),
+	.sem_semop =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_semop),
+	.netlink_send =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.netlink_send),
+	.d_instantiate =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.d_instantiate),
+	.getprocattr =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.getprocattr),
+	.setprocattr =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.setprocattr),
+	.ismaclabel =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ismaclabel),
+	.secid_to_secctx =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx),
+	.secctx_to_secid =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid),
+	.release_secctx =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.release_secctx),
+	.inode_notifysecctx =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_notifysecctx),
+	.inode_setsecctx =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_setsecctx),
+	.inode_getsecctx =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+	.unix_stream_connect =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.unix_stream_connect),
+	.unix_may_send =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.unix_may_send),
+	.socket_create =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_create),
+	.socket_post_create =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_post_create),
+	.socket_bind =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_bind),
+	.socket_connect =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_connect),
+	.socket_listen =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_listen),
+	.socket_accept =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_accept),
+	.socket_sendmsg =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_sendmsg),
+	.socket_recvmsg =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_recvmsg),
+	.socket_getsockname =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getsockname),
+	.socket_getpeername =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getpeername),
+	.socket_getsockopt =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getsockopt),
+	.socket_setsockopt =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_setsockopt),
+	.socket_shutdown =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_shutdown),
+	.socket_sock_rcv_skb =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+	.socket_getpeersec_stream =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream),
+	.socket_getpeersec_dgram =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram),
+	.sk_alloc_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sk_alloc_security),
+	.sk_free_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sk_free_security),
+	.sk_clone_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sk_clone_security),
+	.sk_getsecid =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sk_getsecid),
+	.sock_graft =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sock_graft),
+	.inet_conn_request =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inet_conn_request),
+	.inet_csk_clone =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inet_csk_clone),
+	.inet_conn_established =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inet_conn_established),
+	.secmark_relabel_packet =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secmark_relabel_packet),
+	.secmark_refcount_inc =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secmark_refcount_inc),
+	.secmark_refcount_dec =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secmark_refcount_dec),
+	.req_classify_flow =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.req_classify_flow),
+	.tun_dev_alloc_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_alloc_security),
+	.tun_dev_free_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_free_security),
+	.tun_dev_create =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_create),
+	.tun_dev_attach_queue =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_attach_queue),
+	.tun_dev_attach =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_attach),
+	.tun_dev_open =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_open),
+	.skb_owned_by =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.skb_owned_by),
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+	.xfrm_policy_alloc_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_alloc_security),
+	.xfrm_policy_clone_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_clone_security),
+	.xfrm_policy_free_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_free_security),
+	.xfrm_policy_delete_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_delete_security),
+	.xfrm_state_alloc =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_alloc),
+	.xfrm_state_alloc_acquire =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
+	.xfrm_state_free_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_free_security),
+	.xfrm_state_delete_security =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_delete_security),
+	.xfrm_policy_lookup =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_lookup),
+	.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
+	.xfrm_decode_session =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_decode_session),
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	.key_alloc =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.key_alloc),
+	.key_free =	LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.key_free),
+	.key_permission =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.key_permission),
+	.key_getsecurity =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.key_getsecurity),
+#endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	.audit_rule_init =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init),
+	.audit_rule_known =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.audit_rule_known),
+	.audit_rule_match =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match),
+	.audit_rule_free =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free),
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+};
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ffa5a642629a..623108199641 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/unistd.h>
@@ -403,6 +403,7 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
 	return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
 		sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
 		sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
+		sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE ||
 		/* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
 		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
 		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
@@ -724,7 +725,12 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 	}
 
 	if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
-		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
+		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
+
+	if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
+	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
+	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
+		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
 
 	if (!sbsec->behavior) {
 		/*
@@ -1188,8 +1194,6 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
 		switch (protocol) {
 		case NETLINK_ROUTE:
 			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
-		case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
-			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
 		case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
 			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
 		case NETLINK_NFLOG:
@@ -1198,14 +1202,28 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
 			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
 		case NETLINK_SELINUX:
 			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_ISCSI:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
 		case NETLINK_AUDIT:
 			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
-		case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
-			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
 		case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
 			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
 		case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
 			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_GENERIC:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_RDMA:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
+		case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
+			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
 		default:
 			return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
 		}
@@ -1220,12 +1238,13 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
 	return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
-static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
-				u16 tclass,
-				u32 *sid)
+static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
+				 u16 tclass,
+				 u16 flags,
+				 u32 *sid)
 {
 	int rc;
+	struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_inode->i_sb;
 	char *buffer, *path;
 
 	buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1236,26 +1255,20 @@ static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (IS_ERR(path))
 		rc = PTR_ERR(path);
 	else {
-		/* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
-		 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
-		 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
-		while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
-			path[1] = '/';
-			path++;
+		if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
+			/* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
+			 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
+			 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
+			while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
+				path[1] = '/';
+				path++;
+			}
 		}
-		rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
+		rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, path, tclass, sid);
 	}
 	free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
 	return rc;
 }
-#else
-static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
-				u16 tclass,
-				u32 *sid)
-{
-	return -EINVAL;
-}
-#endif
 
 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
@@ -1412,7 +1425,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 		/* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
 		isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
 
-		if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
+		if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
 			/* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
 			 * procfs inodes */
 			if (opt_dentry)
@@ -1435,7 +1448,8 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 			if (!dentry)
 				goto out_unlock;
 			isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
-			rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid);
+			rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass,
+						   sbsec->flags, &sid);
 			dput(dentry);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out_unlock;
@@ -1990,12 +2004,6 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
 				     unsigned int mode)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
 	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
 		u32 sid = current_sid();
 		u32 csid = task_sid(child);
@@ -2007,25 +2015,13 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
 
 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
 	return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
 }
 
 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 			  kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
-	int error;
-
-	error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
-
-	return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+	return current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
 }
 
 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -2033,13 +2029,6 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			  const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
 			  const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
-	int error;
-
-	error = cap_capset(new, old,
-				      effective, inheritable, permitted);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
-
 	return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
 }
 
@@ -2056,12 +2045,6 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 			   int cap, int audit)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
 	return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
 }
 
@@ -2139,12 +2122,12 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 {
 	int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
 
-	rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
-			     SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+	rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+					SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		cap_sys_admin = 1;
 
-	return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
+	return cap_sys_admin;
 }
 
 /* binprm security operations */
@@ -2193,10 +2176,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
 	/* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
 	 * the script interpreter */
 	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
@@ -2320,7 +2299,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 					PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
 	}
 
-	return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
+	return !!atsecure;
 }
 
 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
@@ -2451,10 +2430,12 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
 			do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
 		spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
-		if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
-			__flush_signals(current);
+		if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
+			flush_sigqueue(&current->pending);
+			flush_sigqueue(&current->signal->shared_pending);
 			flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
 			sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
+			recalc_sigpending();
 		}
 		spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
 	}
@@ -3144,8 +3125,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
 	 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
 	 * in-core context value, not a denial.
 	 */
-	error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
-				SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+	error = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+			    SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+	if (!error)
+		error = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+					    SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
 	if (!error)
 		error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
 						      &size);
@@ -3330,12 +3314,7 @@ error:
 
 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	/* do DAC check on address space usage */
-	rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
+	int rc = 0;
 
 	if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
 		u32 sid = current_sid();
@@ -3651,23 +3630,11 @@ static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
 
 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
 	return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
 	return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
 }
 
@@ -3693,12 +3660,6 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
 
 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
 	return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
 }
 
@@ -4780,8 +4741,9 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		if (err == -EINVAL) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING
 			       "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:"
-			       " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%hu\n",
-			       sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
+			       " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s\n",
+			       sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
+			       secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name);
 			if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
 				err = 0;
 		}
@@ -5109,12 +5071,6 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
 
 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	int err;
-
-	err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
 	return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
 }
 
@@ -5852,218 +5808,220 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 
 #endif
 
-static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
-	.name =				"selinux",
-
-	.binder_set_context_mgr =	selinux_binder_set_context_mgr,
-	.binder_transaction =		selinux_binder_transaction,
-	.binder_transfer_binder =	selinux_binder_transfer_binder,
-	.binder_transfer_file =		selinux_binder_transfer_file,
-
-	.ptrace_access_check =		selinux_ptrace_access_check,
-	.ptrace_traceme =		selinux_ptrace_traceme,
-	.capget =			selinux_capget,
-	.capset =			selinux_capset,
-	.capable =			selinux_capable,
-	.quotactl =			selinux_quotactl,
-	.quota_on =			selinux_quota_on,
-	.syslog =			selinux_syslog,
-	.vm_enough_memory =		selinux_vm_enough_memory,
-
-	.netlink_send =			selinux_netlink_send,
-
-	.bprm_set_creds =		selinux_bprm_set_creds,
-	.bprm_committing_creds =	selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
-	.bprm_committed_creds =		selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
-	.bprm_secureexec =		selinux_bprm_secureexec,
-
-	.sb_alloc_security =		selinux_sb_alloc_security,
-	.sb_free_security =		selinux_sb_free_security,
-	.sb_copy_data =			selinux_sb_copy_data,
-	.sb_remount =			selinux_sb_remount,
-	.sb_kern_mount =		selinux_sb_kern_mount,
-	.sb_show_options =		selinux_sb_show_options,
-	.sb_statfs =			selinux_sb_statfs,
-	.sb_mount =			selinux_mount,
-	.sb_umount =			selinux_umount,
-	.sb_set_mnt_opts =		selinux_set_mnt_opts,
-	.sb_clone_mnt_opts =		selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
-	.sb_parse_opts_str = 		selinux_parse_opts_str,
-
-	.dentry_init_security =		selinux_dentry_init_security,
-
-	.inode_alloc_security =		selinux_inode_alloc_security,
-	.inode_free_security =		selinux_inode_free_security,
-	.inode_init_security =		selinux_inode_init_security,
-	.inode_create =			selinux_inode_create,
-	.inode_link =			selinux_inode_link,
-	.inode_unlink =			selinux_inode_unlink,
-	.inode_symlink =		selinux_inode_symlink,
-	.inode_mkdir =			selinux_inode_mkdir,
-	.inode_rmdir =			selinux_inode_rmdir,
-	.inode_mknod =			selinux_inode_mknod,
-	.inode_rename =			selinux_inode_rename,
-	.inode_readlink =		selinux_inode_readlink,
-	.inode_follow_link =		selinux_inode_follow_link,
-	.inode_permission =		selinux_inode_permission,
-	.inode_setattr =		selinux_inode_setattr,
-	.inode_getattr =		selinux_inode_getattr,
-	.inode_setxattr =		selinux_inode_setxattr,
-	.inode_post_setxattr =		selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
-	.inode_getxattr =		selinux_inode_getxattr,
-	.inode_listxattr =		selinux_inode_listxattr,
-	.inode_removexattr =		selinux_inode_removexattr,
-	.inode_getsecurity =		selinux_inode_getsecurity,
-	.inode_setsecurity =		selinux_inode_setsecurity,
-	.inode_listsecurity =		selinux_inode_listsecurity,
-	.inode_getsecid =		selinux_inode_getsecid,
-
-	.file_permission =		selinux_file_permission,
-	.file_alloc_security =		selinux_file_alloc_security,
-	.file_free_security =		selinux_file_free_security,
-	.file_ioctl =			selinux_file_ioctl,
-	.mmap_file =			selinux_mmap_file,
-	.mmap_addr =			selinux_mmap_addr,
-	.file_mprotect =		selinux_file_mprotect,
-	.file_lock =			selinux_file_lock,
-	.file_fcntl =			selinux_file_fcntl,
-	.file_set_fowner =		selinux_file_set_fowner,
-	.file_send_sigiotask =		selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
-	.file_receive =			selinux_file_receive,
-
-	.file_open =			selinux_file_open,
-
-	.task_create =			selinux_task_create,
-	.cred_alloc_blank =		selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
-	.cred_free =			selinux_cred_free,
-	.cred_prepare =			selinux_cred_prepare,
-	.cred_transfer =		selinux_cred_transfer,
-	.kernel_act_as =		selinux_kernel_act_as,
-	.kernel_create_files_as =	selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
-	.kernel_module_request =	selinux_kernel_module_request,
-	.task_setpgid =			selinux_task_setpgid,
-	.task_getpgid =			selinux_task_getpgid,
-	.task_getsid =			selinux_task_getsid,
-	.task_getsecid =		selinux_task_getsecid,
-	.task_setnice =			selinux_task_setnice,
-	.task_setioprio =		selinux_task_setioprio,
-	.task_getioprio =		selinux_task_getioprio,
-	.task_setrlimit =		selinux_task_setrlimit,
-	.task_setscheduler =		selinux_task_setscheduler,
-	.task_getscheduler =		selinux_task_getscheduler,
-	.task_movememory =		selinux_task_movememory,
-	.task_kill =			selinux_task_kill,
-	.task_wait =			selinux_task_wait,
-	.task_to_inode =		selinux_task_to_inode,
-
-	.ipc_permission =		selinux_ipc_permission,
-	.ipc_getsecid =			selinux_ipc_getsecid,
-
-	.msg_msg_alloc_security =	selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
-	.msg_msg_free_security =	selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
-
-	.msg_queue_alloc_security =	selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
-	.msg_queue_free_security =	selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
-	.msg_queue_associate =		selinux_msg_queue_associate,
-	.msg_queue_msgctl =		selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
-	.msg_queue_msgsnd =		selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
-	.msg_queue_msgrcv =		selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
-
-	.shm_alloc_security =		selinux_shm_alloc_security,
-	.shm_free_security =		selinux_shm_free_security,
-	.shm_associate =		selinux_shm_associate,
-	.shm_shmctl =			selinux_shm_shmctl,
-	.shm_shmat =			selinux_shm_shmat,
-
-	.sem_alloc_security =		selinux_sem_alloc_security,
-	.sem_free_security =		selinux_sem_free_security,
-	.sem_associate =		selinux_sem_associate,
-	.sem_semctl =			selinux_sem_semctl,
-	.sem_semop =			selinux_sem_semop,
-
-	.d_instantiate =		selinux_d_instantiate,
-
-	.getprocattr =			selinux_getprocattr,
-	.setprocattr =			selinux_setprocattr,
-
-	.ismaclabel =			selinux_ismaclabel,
-	.secid_to_secctx =		selinux_secid_to_secctx,
-	.secctx_to_secid =		selinux_secctx_to_secid,
-	.release_secctx =		selinux_release_secctx,
-	.inode_notifysecctx =		selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
-	.inode_setsecctx =		selinux_inode_setsecctx,
-	.inode_getsecctx =		selinux_inode_getsecctx,
-
-	.unix_stream_connect =		selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
-	.unix_may_send =		selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
-
-	.socket_create =		selinux_socket_create,
-	.socket_post_create =		selinux_socket_post_create,
-	.socket_bind =			selinux_socket_bind,
-	.socket_connect =		selinux_socket_connect,
-	.socket_listen =		selinux_socket_listen,
-	.socket_accept =		selinux_socket_accept,
-	.socket_sendmsg =		selinux_socket_sendmsg,
-	.socket_recvmsg =		selinux_socket_recvmsg,
-	.socket_getsockname =		selinux_socket_getsockname,
-	.socket_getpeername =		selinux_socket_getpeername,
-	.socket_getsockopt =		selinux_socket_getsockopt,
-	.socket_setsockopt =		selinux_socket_setsockopt,
-	.socket_shutdown =		selinux_socket_shutdown,
-	.socket_sock_rcv_skb =		selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
-	.socket_getpeersec_stream =	selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
-	.socket_getpeersec_dgram =	selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
-	.sk_alloc_security =		selinux_sk_alloc_security,
-	.sk_free_security =		selinux_sk_free_security,
-	.sk_clone_security =		selinux_sk_clone_security,
-	.sk_getsecid =			selinux_sk_getsecid,
-	.sock_graft =			selinux_sock_graft,
-	.inet_conn_request =		selinux_inet_conn_request,
-	.inet_csk_clone =		selinux_inet_csk_clone,
-	.inet_conn_established =	selinux_inet_conn_established,
-	.secmark_relabel_packet =	selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
-	.secmark_refcount_inc =		selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
-	.secmark_refcount_dec =		selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
-	.req_classify_flow =		selinux_req_classify_flow,
-	.tun_dev_alloc_security =	selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security,
-	.tun_dev_free_security =	selinux_tun_dev_free_security,
-	.tun_dev_create =		selinux_tun_dev_create,
-	.tun_dev_attach_queue =		selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue,
-	.tun_dev_attach =		selinux_tun_dev_attach,
-	.tun_dev_open =			selinux_tun_dev_open,
+static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, selinux_bprm_secureexec),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, selinux_parse_opts_str),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_create, selinux_task_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, selinux_task_wait),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, selinux_msg_msg_free_security),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
+			selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, selinux_msg_queue_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, selinux_shm_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, selinux_sem_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
+			selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
-	.xfrm_policy_alloc_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
-	.xfrm_policy_clone_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
-	.xfrm_policy_free_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
-	.xfrm_policy_delete_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
-	.xfrm_state_alloc =		selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
-	.xfrm_state_alloc_acquire =	selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
-	.xfrm_state_free_security =	selinux_xfrm_state_free,
-	.xfrm_state_delete_security =	selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
-	.xfrm_policy_lookup =		selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
-	.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match =	selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
-	.xfrm_decode_session =		selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
+			selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
+			selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-	.key_alloc =			selinux_key_alloc,
-	.key_free =			selinux_key_free,
-	.key_permission =		selinux_key_permission,
-	.key_getsecurity =		selinux_key_getsecurity,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
-	.audit_rule_init =		selinux_audit_rule_init,
-	.audit_rule_known =		selinux_audit_rule_known,
-	.audit_rule_match =		selinux_audit_rule_match,
-	.audit_rule_free =		selinux_audit_rule_free,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
 #endif
 };
 
 static __init int selinux_init(void)
 {
-	if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
+	if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
 		selinux_enabled = 0;
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -6085,8 +6043,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
 					    0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 	avc_init();
 
-	if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
-		panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
+	security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
 
 	if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
 		panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
@@ -6214,7 +6171,7 @@ int selinux_disable(void)
 	selinux_disabled = 1;
 	selinux_enabled = 0;
 
-	reset_security_ops();
+	security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
 
 	/* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
 	avc_disable();
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index eccd61b3de8a..5a4eef59aeff 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -2,12 +2,12 @@
     "getattr", "setattr", "lock", "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "append"
 
 #define COMMON_FILE_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "unlink", "link", \
-    "rename", "execute", "swapon", "quotaon", "mounton", "audit_access", \
+    "rename", "execute", "quotaon", "mounton", "audit_access", \
     "open", "execmod"
 
 #define COMMON_SOCK_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "bind", "connect", \
     "listen", "accept", "getopt", "setopt", "shutdown", "recvfrom",  \
-    "sendto", "recv_msg", "send_msg", "name_bind"
+    "sendto", "name_bind"
 
 #define COMMON_IPC_PERMS "create", "destroy", "getattr", "setattr", "read", \
 	    "write", "associate", "unix_read", "unix_write"
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	    "audit_control", "setfcap", NULL } },
 	{ "filesystem",
 	  { "mount", "remount", "unmount", "getattr",
-	    "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "transition", "associate", "quotamod",
+	    "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "associate", "quotamod",
 	    "quotaget", NULL } },
 	{ "file",
 	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS,
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "tcp_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
-	    "connectto", "newconn", "acceptfrom", "node_bind", "name_connect",
+	    "node_bind", "name_connect",
 	    NULL } },
 	{ "udp_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
@@ -76,13 +76,9 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
 	    "node_bind", NULL } },
 	{ "node",
-	  { "tcp_recv", "tcp_send", "udp_recv", "udp_send",
-	    "rawip_recv", "rawip_send", "enforce_dest",
-	    "dccp_recv", "dccp_send", "recvfrom", "sendto", NULL } },
+	  { "recvfrom", "sendto", NULL } },
 	{ "netif",
-	  {  "tcp_recv", "tcp_send", "udp_recv", "udp_send",
-	     "rawip_recv", "rawip_send", "dccp_recv", "dccp_send",
-	     "ingress", "egress", NULL } },
+	  { "ingress", "egress", NULL } },
 	{ "netlink_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "packet_socket",
@@ -90,11 +86,9 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	{ "key_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "unix_stream_socket",
-	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "connectto", "newconn", "acceptfrom", NULL
-	  } },
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "connectto", NULL } },
 	{ "unix_dgram_socket",
-	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL
-	  } },
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "sem",
 	  { COMMON_IPC_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "msg", { "send", "receive", NULL } },
@@ -107,9 +101,6 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	{ "netlink_route_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
 	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
-	{ "netlink_firewall_socket",
-	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
-	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
 	{ "netlink_tcpdiag_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
 	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
@@ -120,19 +111,32 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
 	{ "netlink_selinux_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_iscsi_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "netlink_audit_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
 	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", "nlmsg_relay", "nlmsg_readpriv",
 	    "nlmsg_tty_audit", NULL } },
-	{ "netlink_ip6fw_socket",
-	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
-	    "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_fib_lookup_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_connector_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_netfilter_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "netlink_dnrt_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "association",
 	  { "sendto", "recvfrom", "setcontext", "polmatch", NULL } },
 	{ "netlink_kobject_uevent_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_generic_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_scsitransport_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_rdma_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+	{ "netlink_crypto_socket",
+	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "appletalk_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "packet",
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index d1e0b239b602..36993ad1c067 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
 /* Non-mount related flags */
 #define SE_SBINITIALIZED	0x0100
 #define SE_SBPROC		0x0200
+#define SE_SBGENFS		0x0400
 
 #define CONTEXT_STR	"context="
 #define FSCONTEXT_STR	"fscontext="
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 49eada6266ec..244e035e5a99 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/in.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
@@ -138,6 +138,11 @@ struct smk_port_label {
 	struct smack_known	*smk_out;	/* outgoing label */
 };
 
+struct smack_onlycap {
+	struct list_head	list;
+	struct smack_known	*smk_label;
+};
+
 /*
  * Mount options
  */
@@ -249,6 +254,7 @@ int smk_netlbl_mls(int, char *, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *, int);
 struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int);
 void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp);
 struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *);
+int smack_privileged(int cap);
 
 /*
  * Shared data.
@@ -257,7 +263,6 @@ extern int smack_enabled;
 extern int smack_cipso_direct;
 extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
 extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
-extern struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
 extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
 extern struct smack_known *smack_unconfined;
@@ -276,7 +281,8 @@ extern struct mutex	smack_known_lock;
 extern struct list_head smack_known_list;
 extern struct list_head smk_netlbladdr_list;
 
-extern struct security_operations smack_ops;
+extern struct mutex     smack_onlycap_lock;
+extern struct list_head smack_onlycap_list;
 
 #define SMACK_HASH_SLOTS 16
 extern struct hlist_head smack_known_hash[SMACK_HASH_SLOTS];
@@ -334,21 +340,6 @@ static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_current(void)
 }
 
 /*
- * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
- * by the onlycap rule.
- */
-static inline int smack_privileged(int cap)
-{
-	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
-
-	if (!capable(cap))
-		return 0;
-	if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == skp)
-		return 1;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
  * logging functions
  */
 #define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 0f410fc56e33..00f6b38bffbd 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp)
  * @string: a text string that might be a Smack label
  *
  * Returns a pointer to the entry in the label list that
- * matches the passed string.
+ * matches the passed string or NULL if not found.
  */
 struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *string)
 {
@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *string)
  * @string: a text string that might contain a Smack label
  * @len: the maximum size, or zero if it is NULL terminated.
  *
- * Returns a pointer to the clean label, or NULL
+ * Returns a pointer to the clean label or an error code.
  */
 char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len)
 {
@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len)
 	 * including /smack/cipso and /smack/cipso2
 	 */
 	if (string[0] == '-')
-		return NULL;
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
 		if (string[i] > '~' || string[i] <= ' ' || string[i] == '/' ||
@@ -472,11 +472,13 @@ char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len)
 			break;
 
 	if (i == 0 || i >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
-		return NULL;
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
 	smack = kzalloc(i + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (smack != NULL)
-		strncpy(smack, string, i);
+	if (smack == NULL)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	strncpy(smack, string, i);
 
 	return smack;
 }
@@ -523,7 +525,8 @@ int smk_netlbl_mls(int level, char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
  * @len: the maximum size, or zero if it is NULL terminated.
  *
  * Returns a pointer to the entry in the label list that
- * matches the passed string, adding it if necessary.
+ * matches the passed string, adding it if necessary,
+ * or an error code.
  */
 struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len)
 {
@@ -533,8 +536,8 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len)
 	int rc;
 
 	smack = smk_parse_smack(string, len);
-	if (smack == NULL)
-		return NULL;
+	if (IS_ERR(smack))
+		return ERR_CAST(smack);
 
 	mutex_lock(&smack_known_lock);
 
@@ -543,8 +546,10 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len)
 		goto freeout;
 
 	skp = kzalloc(sizeof(*skp), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (skp == NULL)
+	if (skp == NULL) {
+		skp = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 		goto freeout;
+	}
 
 	skp->smk_known = smack;
 	skp->smk_secid = smack_next_secid++;
@@ -577,7 +582,7 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len)
 	 * smk_netlbl_mls failed.
 	 */
 	kfree(skp);
-	skp = NULL;
+	skp = ERR_PTR(rc);
 freeout:
 	kfree(smack);
 unlockout:
@@ -612,3 +617,44 @@ struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return &smack_known_invalid;
 }
+
+/*
+ * Unless a process is running with one of these labels
+ * even having CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE isn't enough to grant
+ * privilege to violate MAC policy. If no labels are
+ * designated (the empty list case) capabilities apply to
+ * everyone.
+ */
+LIST_HEAD(smack_onlycap_list);
+DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_onlycap_lock);
+
+/*
+ * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
+ * by the onlycap rule.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if the task is allowed to be privileged, 0 if it's not.
+ */
+int smack_privileged(int cap)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+	struct smack_onlycap *sop;
+
+	if (!capable(cap))
+		return 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (list_empty(&smack_onlycap_list)) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(sop, &smack_onlycap_list, list) {
+		if (sop->smk_label == skp) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index b644757886bc..a143328f75eb 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -245,8 +245,8 @@ static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
  * @ip: a pointer to the inode
  * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
  *
- * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label
- * or NULL if there was no label to fetch.
+ * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label,
+ * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code.
  */
 static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
 					struct dentry *dp)
@@ -256,14 +256,18 @@ static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
 	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
 
 	if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
-		return NULL;
+		return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
 
 	buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (buffer == NULL)
-		return NULL;
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
 	rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
-	if (rc > 0)
+	if (rc < 0)
+		skp = ERR_PTR(rc);
+	else if (rc == 0)
+		skp = NULL;
+	else
 		skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
 
 	kfree(buffer);
@@ -436,17 +440,11 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
  */
 static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
 {
-	int rc;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
-	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		return rc;
-
 	skp = smk_of_task_struct(ctp);
 
-	rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
-	return rc;
+	return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -462,10 +460,6 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
 	int rc;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
-	rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		return rc;
-
 	skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
 
 	rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
@@ -615,40 +609,44 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 		if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSHAT, strlen(SMK_FSHAT)) == 0) {
 			op += strlen(SMK_FSHAT);
 			skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
-			if (skp != NULL) {
-				sp->smk_hat = skp;
-				specified = 1;
-			}
+			if (IS_ERR(skp))
+				return PTR_ERR(skp);
+			sp->smk_hat = skp;
+			specified = 1;
+
 		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSFLOOR, strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR)) == 0) {
 			op += strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR);
 			skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
-			if (skp != NULL) {
-				sp->smk_floor = skp;
-				specified = 1;
-			}
+			if (IS_ERR(skp))
+				return PTR_ERR(skp);
+			sp->smk_floor = skp;
+			specified = 1;
+
 		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSDEFAULT,
 				   strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT)) == 0) {
 			op += strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT);
 			skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
-			if (skp != NULL) {
-				sp->smk_default = skp;
-				specified = 1;
-			}
+			if (IS_ERR(skp))
+				return PTR_ERR(skp);
+			sp->smk_default = skp;
+			specified = 1;
+
 		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSROOT, strlen(SMK_FSROOT)) == 0) {
 			op += strlen(SMK_FSROOT);
 			skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
-			if (skp != NULL) {
-				sp->smk_root = skp;
-				specified = 1;
-			}
+			if (IS_ERR(skp))
+				return PTR_ERR(skp);
+			sp->smk_root = skp;
+			specified = 1;
+
 		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSTRANS, strlen(SMK_FSTRANS)) == 0) {
 			op += strlen(SMK_FSTRANS);
 			skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
-			if (skp != NULL) {
-				sp->smk_root = skp;
-				transmute = 1;
-				specified = 1;
-			}
+			if (IS_ERR(skp))
+				return PTR_ERR(skp);
+			sp->smk_root = skp;
+			transmute = 1;
+			specified = 1;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -721,10 +719,6 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		return rc;
-
 	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -779,12 +773,11 @@ static void smack_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
-	int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm);
 
-	if (!ret && (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked))
-		ret = 1;
+	if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked)
+		return 1;
 
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1133,7 +1126,9 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 
 	if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
 		skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
-		if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
+		if (IS_ERR(skp))
+			rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+		else if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
 		    (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
 			rc = -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -1173,19 +1168,19 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
 		skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
-		if (skp != NULL)
+		if (!IS_ERR(skp))
 			isp->smk_inode = skp;
 		else
 			isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_invalid;
 	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
 		skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
-		if (skp != NULL)
+		if (!IS_ERR(skp))
 			isp->smk_task = skp;
 		else
 			isp->smk_task = &smack_known_invalid;
 	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
 		skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
-		if (skp != NULL)
+		if (!IS_ERR(skp))
 			isp->smk_mmap = skp;
 		else
 			isp->smk_mmap = &smack_known_invalid;
@@ -1673,6 +1668,9 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
 	/*
@@ -1934,12 +1932,7 @@ static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
  */
 static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
-	if (rc == 0)
-		rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
-	return rc;
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1951,12 +1944,7 @@ static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
  */
 static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
-	if (rc == 0)
-		rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
-	return rc;
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1980,12 +1968,7 @@ static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
  */
 static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
-	if (rc == 0)
-		rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
-	return rc;
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2430,8 +2413,8 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
-	if (skp == NULL)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	if (IS_ERR(skp))
+		return PTR_ERR(skp);
 
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
 		nsp->smk_inode = skp;
@@ -3204,7 +3187,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 		 */
 		dp = dget(opt_dentry);
 		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
-		if (skp != NULL)
+		if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp))
 			final = skp;
 
 		/*
@@ -3241,11 +3224,14 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 		 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
 		 */
 		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
-		if (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)
+		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
+		    skp == &smack_known_web)
 			skp = NULL;
 		isp->smk_task = skp;
+
 		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
-		if (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)
+		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
+		    skp == &smack_known_web)
 			skp = NULL;
 		isp->smk_mmap = skp;
 
@@ -3329,8 +3315,8 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
-	if (skp == NULL)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	if (IS_ERR(skp))
+		return PTR_ERR(skp);
 
 	/*
 	 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
@@ -4105,8 +4091,10 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0);
-	if (skp)
-		*rule = skp->smk_known;
+	if (IS_ERR(skp))
+		return PTR_ERR(skp);
+
+	*rule = skp->smk_known;
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -4266,147 +4254,145 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-struct security_operations smack_ops = {
-	.name =				"smack",
-
-	.ptrace_access_check =		smack_ptrace_access_check,
-	.ptrace_traceme =		smack_ptrace_traceme,
-	.syslog = 			smack_syslog,
-
-	.sb_alloc_security = 		smack_sb_alloc_security,
-	.sb_free_security = 		smack_sb_free_security,
-	.sb_copy_data = 		smack_sb_copy_data,
-	.sb_kern_mount = 		smack_sb_kern_mount,
-	.sb_statfs = 			smack_sb_statfs,
-
-	.bprm_set_creds =		smack_bprm_set_creds,
-	.bprm_committing_creds =	smack_bprm_committing_creds,
-	.bprm_secureexec =		smack_bprm_secureexec,
-
-	.inode_alloc_security = 	smack_inode_alloc_security,
-	.inode_free_security = 		smack_inode_free_security,
-	.inode_init_security = 		smack_inode_init_security,
-	.inode_link = 			smack_inode_link,
-	.inode_unlink = 		smack_inode_unlink,
-	.inode_rmdir = 			smack_inode_rmdir,
-	.inode_rename = 		smack_inode_rename,
-	.inode_permission = 		smack_inode_permission,
-	.inode_setattr = 		smack_inode_setattr,
-	.inode_getattr = 		smack_inode_getattr,
-	.inode_setxattr = 		smack_inode_setxattr,
-	.inode_post_setxattr = 		smack_inode_post_setxattr,
-	.inode_getxattr = 		smack_inode_getxattr,
-	.inode_removexattr = 		smack_inode_removexattr,
-	.inode_getsecurity = 		smack_inode_getsecurity,
-	.inode_setsecurity = 		smack_inode_setsecurity,
-	.inode_listsecurity = 		smack_inode_listsecurity,
-	.inode_getsecid =		smack_inode_getsecid,
-
-	.file_permission = 		smack_file_permission,
-	.file_alloc_security = 		smack_file_alloc_security,
-	.file_free_security = 		smack_file_free_security,
-	.file_ioctl = 			smack_file_ioctl,
-	.file_lock = 			smack_file_lock,
-	.file_fcntl = 			smack_file_fcntl,
-	.mmap_file =			smack_mmap_file,
-	.mmap_addr =			cap_mmap_addr,
-	.file_set_fowner = 		smack_file_set_fowner,
-	.file_send_sigiotask = 		smack_file_send_sigiotask,
-	.file_receive = 		smack_file_receive,
-
-	.file_open =			smack_file_open,
-
-	.cred_alloc_blank =		smack_cred_alloc_blank,
-	.cred_free =			smack_cred_free,
-	.cred_prepare =			smack_cred_prepare,
-	.cred_transfer =		smack_cred_transfer,
-	.kernel_act_as =		smack_kernel_act_as,
-	.kernel_create_files_as =	smack_kernel_create_files_as,
-	.task_setpgid = 		smack_task_setpgid,
-	.task_getpgid = 		smack_task_getpgid,
-	.task_getsid = 			smack_task_getsid,
-	.task_getsecid = 		smack_task_getsecid,
-	.task_setnice = 		smack_task_setnice,
-	.task_setioprio = 		smack_task_setioprio,
-	.task_getioprio = 		smack_task_getioprio,
-	.task_setscheduler = 		smack_task_setscheduler,
-	.task_getscheduler = 		smack_task_getscheduler,
-	.task_movememory = 		smack_task_movememory,
-	.task_kill = 			smack_task_kill,
-	.task_wait = 			smack_task_wait,
-	.task_to_inode = 		smack_task_to_inode,
-
-	.ipc_permission = 		smack_ipc_permission,
-	.ipc_getsecid =			smack_ipc_getsecid,
-
-	.msg_msg_alloc_security = 	smack_msg_msg_alloc_security,
-	.msg_msg_free_security = 	smack_msg_msg_free_security,
-
-	.msg_queue_alloc_security = 	smack_msg_queue_alloc_security,
-	.msg_queue_free_security = 	smack_msg_queue_free_security,
-	.msg_queue_associate = 		smack_msg_queue_associate,
-	.msg_queue_msgctl = 		smack_msg_queue_msgctl,
-	.msg_queue_msgsnd = 		smack_msg_queue_msgsnd,
-	.msg_queue_msgrcv = 		smack_msg_queue_msgrcv,
-
-	.shm_alloc_security = 		smack_shm_alloc_security,
-	.shm_free_security = 		smack_shm_free_security,
-	.shm_associate = 		smack_shm_associate,
-	.shm_shmctl = 			smack_shm_shmctl,
-	.shm_shmat = 			smack_shm_shmat,
-
-	.sem_alloc_security = 		smack_sem_alloc_security,
-	.sem_free_security = 		smack_sem_free_security,
-	.sem_associate = 		smack_sem_associate,
-	.sem_semctl = 			smack_sem_semctl,
-	.sem_semop = 			smack_sem_semop,
-
-	.d_instantiate = 		smack_d_instantiate,
-
-	.getprocattr = 			smack_getprocattr,
-	.setprocattr = 			smack_setprocattr,
-
-	.unix_stream_connect = 		smack_unix_stream_connect,
-	.unix_may_send = 		smack_unix_may_send,
-
-	.socket_post_create = 		smack_socket_post_create,
+struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, smack_sb_kern_mount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, smack_bprm_committing_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, smack_bprm_secureexec),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, smack_file_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, smack_file_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, smack_task_wait),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, smack_msg_msg_free_security),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_msg_queue_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, smack_msg_queue_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_shm_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, smack_shm_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_sem_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, smack_sem_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
 #ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
-	.socket_bind =			smack_socket_bind,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
-	.socket_connect =		smack_socket_connect,
-	.socket_sendmsg =		smack_socket_sendmsg,
-	.socket_sock_rcv_skb = 		smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
-	.socket_getpeersec_stream =	smack_socket_getpeersec_stream,
-	.socket_getpeersec_dgram =	smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
-	.sk_alloc_security = 		smack_sk_alloc_security,
-	.sk_free_security = 		smack_sk_free_security,
-	.sock_graft = 			smack_sock_graft,
-	.inet_conn_request = 		smack_inet_conn_request,
-	.inet_csk_clone =		smack_inet_csk_clone,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
 
  /* key management security hooks */
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-	.key_alloc = 			smack_key_alloc,
-	.key_free = 			smack_key_free,
-	.key_permission = 		smack_key_permission,
-	.key_getsecurity =		smack_key_getsecurity,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
  /* Audit hooks */
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
-	.audit_rule_init =		smack_audit_rule_init,
-	.audit_rule_known =		smack_audit_rule_known,
-	.audit_rule_match =		smack_audit_rule_match,
-	.audit_rule_free =		smack_audit_rule_free,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, smack_audit_rule_free),
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
-	.ismaclabel =			smack_ismaclabel,
-	.secid_to_secctx = 		smack_secid_to_secctx,
-	.secctx_to_secid = 		smack_secctx_to_secid,
-	.release_secctx = 		smack_release_secctx,
-	.inode_notifysecctx =		smack_inode_notifysecctx,
-	.inode_setsecctx =		smack_inode_setsecctx,
-	.inode_getsecctx =		smack_inode_getsecctx,
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, smack_release_secctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
 };
 
 
@@ -4451,7 +4437,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
 	struct cred *cred;
 	struct task_smack *tsp;
 
-	if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
+	if (!security_module_enable("smack"))
 		return 0;
 
 	smack_enabled = 1;
@@ -4481,8 +4467,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
 	/*
 	 * Register with LSM
 	 */
-	if (register_security(&smack_ops))
-		panic("smack: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
+	security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks));
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index d9682985349e..5e0a64ebdf23 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -87,16 +87,6 @@ int smack_cipso_direct = SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT;
  */
 int smack_cipso_mapped = SMACK_CIPSO_MAPPED_DEFAULT;
 
-/*
- * Unless a process is running with this label even
- * having CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE isn't enough to grant
- * privilege to violate MAC policy. If no label is
- * designated (the NULL case) capabilities apply to
- * everyone. It is expected that the hat (^) label
- * will be used if any label is used.
- */
-struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
 /*
  * Allow one label to be unconfined. This is for
@@ -338,8 +328,7 @@ static int smk_perm_from_str(const char *string)
  * @import: if non-zero, import labels
  * @len: label length limit
  *
- * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL on failure and -ENOENT when either subject
- * or object is missing.
+ * Returns 0 on success, appropriate error code on failure.
  */
 static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 				const char *access1, const char *access2,
@@ -351,16 +340,16 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 
 	if (import) {
 		rule->smk_subject = smk_import_entry(subject, len);
-		if (rule->smk_subject == NULL)
-			return -EINVAL;
+		if (IS_ERR(rule->smk_subject))
+			return PTR_ERR(rule->smk_subject);
 
 		rule->smk_object = smk_import_entry(object, len);
-		if (rule->smk_object == NULL)
-			return -EINVAL;
+		if (IS_ERR(rule->smk_object))
+			return PTR_ERR(rule->smk_object);
 	} else {
 		cp = smk_parse_smack(subject, len);
-		if (cp == NULL)
-			return -EINVAL;
+		if (IS_ERR(cp))
+			return PTR_ERR(cp);
 		skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
 		kfree(cp);
 		if (skp == NULL)
@@ -368,8 +357,8 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 		rule->smk_subject = skp;
 
 		cp = smk_parse_smack(object, len);
-		if (cp == NULL)
-			return -EINVAL;
+		if (IS_ERR(cp))
+			return PTR_ERR(cp);
 		skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
 		kfree(cp);
 		if (skp == NULL)
@@ -412,7 +401,7 @@ static int smk_parse_rule(const char *data, struct smack_parsed_rule *rule,
  * @import: if non-zero, import labels
  * @tokens: numer of substrings expected in data
  *
- * Returns number of processed bytes on success, -1 on failure.
+ * Returns number of processed bytes on success, -ERRNO on failure.
  */
 static ssize_t smk_parse_long_rule(char *data, struct smack_parsed_rule *rule,
 				int import, int tokens)
@@ -431,7 +420,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_parse_long_rule(char *data, struct smack_parsed_rule *rule,
 
 		if (data[cnt] == '\0')
 			/* Unexpected end of data */
-			return -1;
+			return -EINVAL;
 
 		tok[i] = data + cnt;
 
@@ -529,14 +518,14 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_rules_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	while (cnt < count) {
 		if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT) {
 			rc = smk_parse_rule(data, &rule, 1);
-			if (rc != 0) {
-				rc = -EINVAL;
+			if (rc < 0)
 				goto out;
-			}
 			cnt = count;
 		} else {
 			rc = smk_parse_long_rule(data + cnt, &rule, 1, tokens);
-			if (rc <= 0) {
+			if (rc < 0)
+				goto out;
+			if (rc == 0) {
 				rc = -EINVAL;
 				goto out;
 			}
@@ -567,23 +556,17 @@ static void *smk_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos,
 				struct list_head *head)
 {
 	struct list_head *list;
+	int i = *pos;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	for (list = rcu_dereference(list_next_rcu(head));
+		list != head;
+		list = rcu_dereference(list_next_rcu(list))) {
+		if (i-- == 0)
+			return list;
+	}
 
-	/*
-	 * This is 0 the first time through.
-	 */
-	if (s->index == 0)
-		s->private = head;
-
-	if (s->private == NULL)
-		return NULL;
-
-	list = s->private;
-	if (list_empty(list))
-		return NULL;
-
-	if (s->index == 0)
-		return list->next;
-	return list;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 static void *smk_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos,
@@ -591,17 +574,15 @@ static void *smk_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos,
 {
 	struct list_head *list = v;
 
-	if (list_is_last(list, head)) {
-		s->private = NULL;
-		return NULL;
-	}
-	s->private = list->next;
-	return list->next;
+	++*pos;
+	list = rcu_dereference(list_next_rcu(list));
+
+	return (list == head) ? NULL : list;
 }
 
 static void smk_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 {
-	/* No-op */
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 
 static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max)
@@ -661,7 +642,7 @@ static int load_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 {
 	struct list_head *list = v;
 	struct smack_master_list *smlp =
-		 list_entry(list, struct smack_master_list, list);
+		list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_master_list, list);
 
 	smk_rule_show(s, smlp->smk_rule, SMK_LABELLEN);
 
@@ -809,7 +790,7 @@ static int cipso_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 {
 	struct list_head  *list = v;
 	struct smack_known *skp =
-		 list_entry(list, struct smack_known, list);
+		list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_known, list);
 	struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cmp = skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat;
 	char sep = '/';
 	int i;
@@ -915,8 +896,10 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	mutex_lock(&smack_cipso_lock);
 
 	skp = smk_import_entry(rule, 0);
-	if (skp == NULL)
+	if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT)
 		rule += SMK_LABELLEN;
@@ -998,7 +981,7 @@ static int cipso2_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 {
 	struct list_head  *list = v;
 	struct smack_known *skp =
-		 list_entry(list, struct smack_known, list);
+		list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_known, list);
 	struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cmp = skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat;
 	char sep = '/';
 	int i;
@@ -1082,7 +1065,7 @@ static int netlbladdr_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 {
 	struct list_head *list = v;
 	struct smk_netlbladdr *skp =
-			 list_entry(list, struct smk_netlbladdr, list);
+			list_entry_rcu(list, struct smk_netlbladdr, list);
 	unsigned char *hp = (char *) &skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr;
 	int maskn;
 	u32 temp_mask = be32_to_cpu(skp->smk_mask.s_addr);
@@ -1237,8 +1220,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	 */
 	if (smack[0] != '-') {
 		skp = smk_import_entry(smack, 0);
-		if (skp == NULL) {
-			rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+			rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
 			goto free_out;
 		}
 	} else {
@@ -1619,8 +1602,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	}
 
 	skp = smk_import_entry(data, count);
-	if (skp == NULL) {
-		rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -1643,34 +1626,79 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_ambient_ops = {
 	.llseek		= default_llseek,
 };
 
-/**
- * smk_read_onlycap - read() for smackfs/onlycap
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
- * @buf: where to put the result
- * @cn: maximum to send along
- * @ppos: where to start
- *
- * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+/*
+ * Seq_file operations for /smack/onlycap
  */
-static ssize_t smk_read_onlycap(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
-				size_t cn, loff_t *ppos)
+static void *onlycap_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
 {
-	char *smack = "";
-	ssize_t rc = -EINVAL;
-	int asize;
+	return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smack_onlycap_list);
+}
 
-	if (*ppos != 0)
-		return 0;
+static void *onlycap_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smack_onlycap_list);
+}
 
-	if (smack_onlycap != NULL)
-		smack = smack_onlycap->smk_known;
+static int onlycap_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+	struct list_head *list = v;
+	struct smack_onlycap *sop =
+		list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_onlycap, list);
 
-	asize = strlen(smack) + 1;
+	seq_puts(s, sop->smk_label->smk_known);
+	seq_putc(s, ' ');
 
-	if (cn >= asize)
-		rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos, smack, asize);
+	return 0;
+}
 
-	return rc;
+static const struct seq_operations onlycap_seq_ops = {
+	.start = onlycap_seq_start,
+	.next  = onlycap_seq_next,
+	.show  = onlycap_seq_show,
+	.stop  = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+static int smk_open_onlycap(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &onlycap_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_list_swap_rcu - swap public list with a private one in RCU-safe way
+ * The caller must hold appropriate mutex to prevent concurrent modifications
+ * to the public list.
+ * Private list is assumed to be not accessible to other threads yet.
+ *
+ * @public: public list
+ * @private: private list
+ */
+static void smk_list_swap_rcu(struct list_head *public,
+			      struct list_head *private)
+{
+	struct list_head *first, *last;
+
+	if (list_empty(public)) {
+		list_splice_init_rcu(private, public, synchronize_rcu);
+	} else {
+		/* Remember public list before replacing it */
+		first = public->next;
+		last = public->prev;
+
+		/* Publish private list in place of public in RCU-safe way */
+		private->prev->next = public;
+		private->next->prev = public;
+		rcu_assign_pointer(public->next, private->next);
+		public->prev = private->prev;
+
+		synchronize_rcu();
+
+		/* When all readers are done with the old public list,
+		 * attach it in place of private */
+		private->next = first;
+		private->prev = last;
+		first->prev = private;
+		last->next = private;
+	}
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1686,47 +1714,79 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	char *data;
-	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
+	char *data_parse;
+	char *tok;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_onlycap *sop;
+	struct smack_onlycap *sop2;
+	LIST_HEAD(list_tmp);
 	int rc = count;
 
 	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	/*
-	 * This can be done using smk_access() but is done
-	 * explicitly for clarity. The smk_access() implementation
-	 * would use smk_access(smack_onlycap, MAY_WRITE)
-	 */
-	if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != skp)
-		return -EPERM;
-
 	data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (data == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+		kfree(data);
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	data_parse = data;
+	while ((tok = strsep(&data_parse, " ")) != NULL) {
+		if (!*tok)
+			continue;
+
+		skp = smk_import_entry(tok, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+			rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		sop = kzalloc(sizeof(*sop), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (sop == NULL) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		sop->smk_label = skp;
+		list_add_rcu(&sop->list, &list_tmp);
+	}
+	kfree(data);
+
 	/*
-	 * Should the null string be passed in unset the onlycap value.
-	 * This seems like something to be careful with as usually
-	 * smk_import only expects to return NULL for errors. It
-	 * is usually the case that a nullstring or "\n" would be
-	 * bad to pass to smk_import but in fact this is useful here.
+	 * Clear the smack_onlycap on invalid label errors. This means
+	 * that we can pass a null string to unset the onlycap value.
 	 *
-	 * smk_import will also reject a label beginning with '-',
+	 * Importing will also reject a label beginning with '-',
 	 * so "-usecapabilities" will also work.
+	 *
+	 * But do so only on invalid label, not on system errors.
+	 * The invalid label must be first to count as clearing attempt.
 	 */
-	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
-		rc = -EFAULT;
-	else
-		smack_onlycap = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+	if (rc == -EINVAL && list_empty(&list_tmp))
+		rc = count;
+
+	if (rc >= 0) {
+		mutex_lock(&smack_onlycap_lock);
+		smk_list_swap_rcu(&smack_onlycap_list, &list_tmp);
+		mutex_unlock(&smack_onlycap_lock);
+	}
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(sop, sop2, &list_tmp, list)
+		kfree(sop);
 
-	kfree(data);
 	return rc;
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations smk_onlycap_ops = {
-	.read		= smk_read_onlycap,
+	.open		= smk_open_onlycap,
+	.read		= seq_read,
 	.write		= smk_write_onlycap,
-	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+	.llseek		= seq_lseek,
+	.release	= seq_release,
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
@@ -1773,6 +1833,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_unconfined(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 					size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	char *data;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
 	int rc = count;
 
 	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
@@ -1782,21 +1843,31 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_unconfined(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (data == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+		goto freeout;
+	}
+
 	/*
-	 * Should the null string be passed in unset the unconfined value.
-	 * This seems like something to be careful with as usually
-	 * smk_import only expects to return NULL for errors. It
-	 * is usually the case that a nullstring or "\n" would be
-	 * bad to pass to smk_import but in fact this is useful here.
+	 * Clear the smack_unconfined on invalid label errors. This means
+	 * that we can pass a null string to unset the unconfined value.
 	 *
-	 * smk_import will also reject a label beginning with '-',
+	 * Importing will also reject a label beginning with '-',
 	 * so "-confine" will also work.
+	 *
+	 * But do so only on invalid label, not on system errors.
 	 */
-	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
-		rc = -EFAULT;
-	else
-		smack_unconfined = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+	skp = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+	if (PTR_ERR(skp) == -EINVAL)
+		skp = NULL;
+	else if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+		goto freeout;
+	}
 
+	smack_unconfined = skp;
+
+freeout:
 	kfree(data);
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -1895,7 +1966,7 @@ static int load_self_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 {
 	struct list_head *list = v;
 	struct smack_rule *srp =
-		 list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list);
+		list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_rule, list);
 
 	smk_rule_show(s, srp, SMK_LABELLEN);
 
@@ -1980,7 +2051,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_user_access(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object,
 				 rule.smk_access1, NULL);
 	else if (res != -ENOENT)
-		return -EINVAL;
+		return res;
 
 	/*
 	 * smk_access() can return a value > 0 in the "bringup" case.
@@ -2024,7 +2095,7 @@ static int load2_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 {
 	struct list_head *list = v;
 	struct smack_master_list *smlp =
-		 list_entry(list, struct smack_master_list, list);
+		list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_master_list, list);
 
 	smk_rule_show(s, smlp->smk_rule, SMK_LONGLABEL);
 
@@ -2101,7 +2172,7 @@ static int load_self2_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 {
 	struct list_head *list = v;
 	struct smack_rule *srp =
-		 list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list);
+		list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_rule, list);
 
 	smk_rule_show(s, srp, SMK_LONGLABEL);
 
@@ -2182,8 +2253,8 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_access2_ops = {
 static ssize_t smk_write_revoke_subj(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	char *data = NULL;
-	const char *cp = NULL;
+	char *data;
+	const char *cp;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	struct smack_rule *sp;
 	struct list_head *rule_list;
@@ -2205,18 +2276,18 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_revoke_subj(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
 		rc = -EFAULT;
-		goto free_out;
+		goto out_data;
 	}
 
 	cp = smk_parse_smack(data, count);
-	if (cp == NULL) {
-		rc = -EINVAL;
-		goto free_out;
+	if (IS_ERR(cp)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(cp);
+		goto out_data;
 	}
 
 	skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
 	if (skp == NULL)
-		goto free_out;
+		goto out_cp;
 
 	rule_list = &skp->smk_rules;
 	rule_lock = &skp->smk_rules_lock;
@@ -2228,9 +2299,11 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_revoke_subj(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 	mutex_unlock(rule_lock);
 
-free_out:
-	kfree(data);
+out_cp:
 	kfree(cp);
+out_data:
+	kfree(data);
+
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2341,10 +2414,10 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_syslog(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		rc = -EFAULT;
 	else {
 		skp = smk_import_entry(data, count);
-		if (skp == NULL)
-			rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (IS_ERR(skp))
+			rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
 		else
-			smack_syslog_label = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+			smack_syslog_label = skp;
 	}
 
 	kfree(data);
@@ -2547,7 +2620,7 @@ static int __init init_smk_fs(void)
 	int err;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
+	if (!security_module_enable("smack"))
 		return 0;
 
 	err = smk_init_sysfs();
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 57c88d52ffa5..cbf3df422c87 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * Copyright (C) 2005-2011  NTT DATA CORPORATION
  */
 
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include "common.h"
 
 /**
@@ -72,12 +72,6 @@ static void tomoyo_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
  */
 static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-
 	/*
 	 * Do only if this function is called for the first time of an execve
 	 * operation.
@@ -502,36 +496,35 @@ static int tomoyo_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
  * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
  * registering TOMOYO.
  */
-static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = {
-	.name                = "tomoyo",
-	.cred_alloc_blank    = tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank,
-	.cred_prepare        = tomoyo_cred_prepare,
-	.cred_transfer	     = tomoyo_cred_transfer,
-	.cred_free           = tomoyo_cred_free,
-	.bprm_set_creds      = tomoyo_bprm_set_creds,
-	.bprm_check_security = tomoyo_bprm_check_security,
-	.file_fcntl          = tomoyo_file_fcntl,
-	.file_open           = tomoyo_file_open,
-	.path_truncate       = tomoyo_path_truncate,
-	.path_unlink         = tomoyo_path_unlink,
-	.path_mkdir          = tomoyo_path_mkdir,
-	.path_rmdir          = tomoyo_path_rmdir,
-	.path_symlink        = tomoyo_path_symlink,
-	.path_mknod          = tomoyo_path_mknod,
-	.path_link           = tomoyo_path_link,
-	.path_rename         = tomoyo_path_rename,
-	.inode_getattr       = tomoyo_inode_getattr,
-	.file_ioctl          = tomoyo_file_ioctl,
-	.path_chmod          = tomoyo_path_chmod,
-	.path_chown          = tomoyo_path_chown,
-	.path_chroot         = tomoyo_path_chroot,
-	.sb_mount            = tomoyo_sb_mount,
-	.sb_umount           = tomoyo_sb_umount,
-	.sb_pivotroot        = tomoyo_sb_pivotroot,
-	.socket_bind         = tomoyo_socket_bind,
-	.socket_connect      = tomoyo_socket_connect,
-	.socket_listen       = tomoyo_socket_listen,
-	.socket_sendmsg      = tomoyo_socket_sendmsg,
+static struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, tomoyo_cred_prepare),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, tomoyo_cred_transfer),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, tomoyo_cred_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, tomoyo_bprm_set_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, tomoyo_bprm_check_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, tomoyo_file_fcntl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, tomoyo_file_open),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, tomoyo_path_truncate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, tomoyo_path_unlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, tomoyo_path_mkdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, tomoyo_path_rmdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, tomoyo_path_symlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, tomoyo_path_mknod),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, tomoyo_path_link),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, tomoyo_path_rename),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, tomoyo_inode_getattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, tomoyo_file_ioctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, tomoyo_path_chmod),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, tomoyo_path_chown),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chroot, tomoyo_path_chroot),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, tomoyo_sb_mount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, tomoyo_sb_umount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, tomoyo_sb_pivotroot),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, tomoyo_socket_bind),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, tomoyo_socket_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, tomoyo_socket_listen),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, tomoyo_socket_sendmsg),
 };
 
 /* Lock for GC. */
@@ -546,11 +539,10 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
 {
 	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current_cred();
 
-	if (!security_module_enable(&tomoyo_security_ops))
+	if (!security_module_enable("tomoyo"))
 		return 0;
 	/* register ourselves with the security framework */
-	if (register_security(&tomoyo_security_ops))
-		panic("Failure registering TOMOYO Linux");
+	security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks));
 	printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
 	cred->security = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
 	tomoyo_mm_init();
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 24aae2ae2b30..9ed32502470e 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  *
  */
 
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/prctl.h>
@@ -154,13 +154,9 @@ void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
 int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 			   unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
 {
-	int rc;
+	int rc = -ENOSYS;
 	struct task_struct *myself = current;
 
-	rc = cap_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
-	if (rc != -ENOSYS)
-		return rc;
-
 	switch (option) {
 	case PR_SET_PTRACER:
 		/* Since a thread can call prctl(), find the group leader
@@ -279,17 +275,10 @@ static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer,
  *
  * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error.
  */
-int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
+static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
 				    unsigned int mode)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	/* If standard caps disallows it, so does Yama.  We should
-	 * only tighten restrictions further.
-	 */
-	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
+	int rc = 0;
 
 	/* require ptrace target be a child of ptracer on attach */
 	if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) {
@@ -335,14 +324,7 @@ int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
  */
 int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	/* If standard caps disallows it, so does Yama.  We should
-	 * only tighten restrictions further.
-	 */
-	rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
+	int rc = 0;
 
 	/* Only disallow PTRACE_TRACEME on more aggressive settings. */
 	switch (ptrace_scope) {
@@ -364,16 +346,17 @@ int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 	return rc;
 }
 
-#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
-static struct security_operations yama_ops = {
-	.name =			"yama",
-
-	.ptrace_access_check =	yama_ptrace_access_check,
-	.ptrace_traceme =	yama_ptrace_traceme,
-	.task_prctl =		yama_task_prctl,
-	.task_free =		yama_task_free,
+static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, yama_task_prctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, yama_task_free),
 };
-#endif
+
+void __init yama_add_hooks(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks));
+}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
 static int yama_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
@@ -418,16 +401,13 @@ static struct ctl_table yama_sysctl_table[] = {
 static __init int yama_init(void)
 {
 #ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
-	if (!security_module_enable(&yama_ops))
+	/*
+	 * If yama is being stacked this is already taken care of.
+	 */
+	if (!security_module_enable("yama"))
 		return 0;
 #endif
-
-	printk(KERN_INFO "Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
-
-#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
-	if (register_security(&yama_ops))
-		panic("Yama: kernel registration failed.\n");
-#endif
+	pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
 	if (!register_sysctl_paths(yama_sysctl_path, yama_sysctl_table))