diff options
author | Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> | 2020-07-09 01:19:03 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> | 2020-07-16 21:53:55 -0400 |
commit | 712183437ebebc89cd086ef96cf9a521fd97fd09 (patch) | |
tree | 889fa938707d5fc0487fe64c33ee0b2929300db0 | |
parent | 2bdd737c5687d6dec30e205953146ede8a87dbdd (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-712183437ebebc89cd086ef96cf9a521fd97fd09.tar.gz linux-stable-712183437ebebc89cd086ef96cf9a521fd97fd09.tar.bz2 linux-stable-712183437ebebc89cd086ef96cf9a521fd97fd09.zip |
ima: Fail rule parsing when buffer hook functions have an invalid action
Buffer based hook functions, such as KEXEC_CMDLINE and KEY_CHECK, can
only measure. The process_buffer_measurement() function quietly ignores
all actions except measure so make this behavior clear at the time of
policy load.
The parsing of the keyrings conditional had a check to ensure that it
was only specified with measure actions but the check should be on the
hook function and not the keyrings conditional since
"appraise func=KEY_CHECK" is not a valid rule.
Fixes: b0935123a183 ("IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments")
Fixes: 5808611cccb2 ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 40 |
1 files changed, 38 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index e458cd47c099..40c28f1a6a5a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -973,6 +973,43 @@ static void check_template_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *template) #undef MSG } +static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) +{ + /* Ensure that the action is set */ + if (entry->action == UNKNOWN) + return false; + + /* + * Ensure that the hook function is compatible with the other + * components of the rule + */ + switch (entry->func) { + case NONE: + case FILE_CHECK: + case MMAP_CHECK: + case BPRM_CHECK: + case CREDS_CHECK: + case POST_SETATTR: + case MODULE_CHECK: + case FIRMWARE_CHECK: + case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK: + case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK: + case POLICY_CHECK: + /* Validation of these hook functions is in ima_parse_rule() */ + break; + case KEXEC_CMDLINE: + case KEY_CHECK: + if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE)) + return false; + + break; + default: + return false; + } + + return true; +} + static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) { struct audit_buffer *ab; @@ -1150,7 +1187,6 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) keyrings_len = strlen(args[0].from) + 1; if ((entry->keyrings) || - (entry->action != MEASURE) || (entry->func != KEY_CHECK) || (keyrings_len < 2)) { result = -EINVAL; @@ -1356,7 +1392,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) break; } } - if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN)) + if (!result && !ima_validate_rule(entry)) result = -EINVAL; else if (entry->action == APPRAISE) temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entry->func); |