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| author | Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com> | 2019-06-26 12:50:30 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2019-07-14 08:01:09 +0200 |
| commit | 2b73121a7fe86776ccd7ffdfd3675b8a2868f936 (patch) | |
| tree | 0b6a9f6633504a360c0b9f51ffb0736be4ed66f2 /Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst | |
| parent | d1ba61ae4be5e5a5727e303c827591517b6188bb (diff) | |
| download | linux-stable-2b73121a7fe86776ccd7ffdfd3675b8a2868f936.tar.gz linux-stable-2b73121a7fe86776ccd7ffdfd3675b8a2868f936.tar.bz2 linux-stable-2b73121a7fe86776ccd7ffdfd3675b8a2868f936.zip | |
x86/tls: Fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area()
commit 993773d11d45c90cb1c6481c2638c3d9f092ea5b upstream.
The index to access the threads tls array is controlled by userspace
via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation
of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
The index can be controlled from:
ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> do_get_thread_area.
Fix this by sanitizing the user supplied index before using it to access
the p->thread.tls_array.
Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561524630-3642-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions