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| author | Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com> | 2019-06-25 23:30:17 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2019-07-14 08:01:09 +0200 |
| commit | d1ba61ae4be5e5a5727e303c827591517b6188bb (patch) | |
| tree | a3e27f2ade88c6c160edd53cd6783893a6b081e5 /Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst | |
| parent | 635d4fb7ea3a33b1e0cc1b8f0434dc343f7587bc (diff) | |
| download | linux-stable-d1ba61ae4be5e5a5727e303c827591517b6188bb.tar.gz linux-stable-d1ba61ae4be5e5a5727e303c827591517b6188bb.tar.bz2 linux-stable-d1ba61ae4be5e5a5727e303c827591517b6188bb.zip | |
x86/ptrace: Fix possible spectre-v1 in ptrace_get_debugreg()
commit 31a2fbb390fee4231281b939e1979e810f945415 upstream.
The index to access the threads ptrace_bps is controlled by userspace via
syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the
Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
The index can be controlled from:
ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> ptrace_get_debugreg.
Fix this by sanitizing the user supplied index before using it access
thread->ptrace_bps.
Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561476617-3759-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions