Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux

Pull arm64 festive updates from Will Deacon:
 "In the end, we ended up with quite a lot more than I expected:

   - Support for ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication in userspace (CRIU and
     kernel-side support to come later)

   - Support for per-thread stack canaries, pending an update to GCC
     that is currently undergoing review

   - Support for kexec_file_load(), which permits secure boot of a kexec
     payload but also happens to improve the performance of kexec
     dramatically because we can avoid the sucky purgatory code from
     userspace. Kdump will come later (requires updates to libfdt).

   - Optimisation of our dynamic CPU feature framework, so that all
     detected features are enabled via a single stop_machine()
     invocation

   - KPTI whitelisting of Cortex-A CPUs unaffected by Meltdown, so that
     they can benefit from global TLB entries when KASLR is not in use

   - 52-bit virtual addressing for userspace (kernel remains 48-bit)

   - Patch in LSE atomics for per-cpu atomic operations

   - Custom preempt.h implementation to avoid unconditional calls to
     preempt_schedule() from preempt_enable()

   - Support for the new 'SB' Speculation Barrier instruction

   - Vectorised implementation of XOR checksumming and CRC32
     optimisations

   - Workaround for Cortex-A76 erratum #1165522

   - Improved compatibility with Clang/LLD

   - Support for TX2 system PMUS for profiling the L3 cache and DMC

   - Reflect read-only permissions in the linear map by default

   - Ensure MMIO reads are ordered with subsequent calls to Xdelay()

   - Initial support for memory hotplug

   - Tweak the threshold when we invalidate the TLB by-ASID, so that
     mremap() performance is improved for ranges spanning multiple PMDs.

   - Minor refactoring and cleanups"

* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (125 commits)
  arm64: kaslr: print PHYS_OFFSET in dump_kernel_offset()
  arm64: sysreg: Use _BITUL() when defining register bits
  arm64: cpufeature: Rework ptr auth hwcaps using multi_entry_cap_matches
  arm64: cpufeature: Reduce number of pointer auth CPU caps from 6 to 4
  arm64: docs: document pointer authentication
  arm64: ptr auth: Move per-thread keys from thread_info to thread_struct
  arm64: enable pointer authentication
  arm64: add prctl control for resetting ptrauth keys
  arm64: perf: strip PAC when unwinding userspace
  arm64: expose user PAC bit positions via ptrace
  arm64: add basic pointer authentication support
  arm64/cpufeature: detect pointer authentication
  arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2
  arm64/kvm: hide ptrauth from guests
  arm64/kvm: consistently handle host HCR_EL2 flags
  arm64: add pointer authentication register bits
  arm64: add comments about EC exception levels
  arm64: perf: Treat EXCLUDE_EL* bit definitions as unsigned
  arm64: kpti: Whitelist Cortex-A CPUs that don't implement the CSV3 field
  arm64: enable per-task stack canaries
  ...

1 files changed, 129 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index bcb6262044d8..6b7bf0fc190d 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -261,6 +261,9 @@ config ZONE_DMA32
 config HAVE_GENERIC_GUP
 	def_bool y
 
+config ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
+	def_bool y
+
 config SMP
 	def_bool y
 
@@ -274,7 +277,7 @@ config PGTABLE_LEVELS
 	int
 	default 2 if ARM64_16K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_36
 	default 2 if ARM64_64K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_42
-	default 3 if ARM64_64K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_48
+	default 3 if ARM64_64K_PAGES && (ARM64_VA_BITS_48 || ARM64_USER_VA_BITS_52)
 	default 3 if ARM64_4K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_39
 	default 3 if ARM64_16K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_47
 	default 4 if !ARM64_64K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_48
@@ -313,9 +316,13 @@ menu "Kernel Features"
 
 menu "ARM errata workarounds via the alternatives framework"
 
+config ARM64_WORKAROUND_CLEAN_CACHE
+	def_bool n
+
 config ARM64_ERRATUM_826319
 	bool "Cortex-A53: 826319: System might deadlock if a write cannot complete until read data is accepted"
 	default y
+	select ARM64_WORKAROUND_CLEAN_CACHE
 	help
 	  This option adds an alternative code sequence to work around ARM
 	  erratum 826319 on Cortex-A53 parts up to r0p2 with an AMBA 4 ACE or
@@ -337,6 +344,7 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_826319
 config ARM64_ERRATUM_827319
 	bool "Cortex-A53: 827319: Data cache clean instructions might cause overlapping transactions to the interconnect"
 	default y
+	select ARM64_WORKAROUND_CLEAN_CACHE
 	help
 	  This option adds an alternative code sequence to work around ARM
 	  erratum 827319 on Cortex-A53 parts up to r0p2 with an AMBA 5 CHI
@@ -358,6 +366,7 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_827319
 config ARM64_ERRATUM_824069
 	bool "Cortex-A53: 824069: Cache line might not be marked as clean after a CleanShared snoop"
 	default y
+	select ARM64_WORKAROUND_CLEAN_CACHE
 	help
 	  This option adds an alternative code sequence to work around ARM
 	  erratum 824069 on Cortex-A53 parts up to r0p2 when it is connected
@@ -380,6 +389,7 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_824069
 config ARM64_ERRATUM_819472
 	bool "Cortex-A53: 819472: Store exclusive instructions might cause data corruption"
 	default y
+	select ARM64_WORKAROUND_CLEAN_CACHE
 	help
 	  This option adds an alternative code sequence to work around ARM
 	  erratum 819472 on Cortex-A53 parts up to r0p1 with an L2 cache
@@ -497,6 +507,18 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873
 
 	  If unsure, say Y.
 
+config ARM64_ERRATUM_1165522
+	bool "Cortex-A76: Speculative AT instruction using out-of-context translation regime could cause subsequent request to generate an incorrect translation"
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option adds work arounds for ARM Cortex-A76 erratum 1165522
+
+	  Affected Cortex-A76 cores (r0p0, r1p0, r2p0) could end-up with
+	  corrupted TLBs by speculating an AT instruction during a guest
+	  context switch.
+
+	  If unsure, say Y.
+
 config ARM64_ERRATUM_1286807
 	bool "Cortex-A76: Modification of the translation table for a virtual address might lead to read-after-read ordering violation"
 	default y
@@ -700,15 +722,43 @@ config ARM64_VA_BITS_47
 config ARM64_VA_BITS_48
 	bool "48-bit"
 
+config ARM64_USER_VA_BITS_52
+	bool "52-bit (user)"
+	depends on ARM64_64K_PAGES && (ARM64_PAN || !ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN)
+	help
+	  Enable 52-bit virtual addressing for userspace when explicitly
+	  requested via a hint to mmap(). The kernel will continue to
+	  use 48-bit virtual addresses for its own mappings.
+
+	  NOTE: Enabling 52-bit virtual addressing in conjunction with
+	  ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication will result in the PAC being
+	  reduced from 7 bits to 3 bits, which may have a significant
+	  impact on its susceptibility to brute-force attacks.
+
+	  If unsure, select 48-bit virtual addressing instead.
+
 endchoice
 
+config ARM64_FORCE_52BIT
+	bool "Force 52-bit virtual addresses for userspace"
+	depends on ARM64_USER_VA_BITS_52 && EXPERT
+	help
+	  For systems with 52-bit userspace VAs enabled, the kernel will attempt
+	  to maintain compatibility with older software by providing 48-bit VAs
+	  unless a hint is supplied to mmap.
+
+	  This configuration option disables the 48-bit compatibility logic, and
+	  forces all userspace addresses to be 52-bit on HW that supports it. One
+	  should only enable this configuration option for stress testing userspace
+	  memory management code. If unsure say N here.
+
 config ARM64_VA_BITS
 	int
 	default 36 if ARM64_VA_BITS_36
 	default 39 if ARM64_VA_BITS_39
 	default 42 if ARM64_VA_BITS_42
 	default 47 if ARM64_VA_BITS_47
-	default 48 if ARM64_VA_BITS_48
+	default 48 if ARM64_VA_BITS_48 || ARM64_USER_VA_BITS_52
 
 choice
 	prompt "Physical address space size"
@@ -883,6 +933,39 @@ config KEXEC
 	  but it is independent of the system firmware.   And like a reboot
 	  you can start any kernel with it, not just Linux.
 
+config KEXEC_FILE
+	bool "kexec file based system call"
+	select KEXEC_CORE
+	help
+	  This is new version of kexec system call. This system call is
+	  file based and takes file descriptors as system call argument
+	  for kernel and initramfs as opposed to list of segments as
+	  accepted by previous system call.
+
+config KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
+	depends on KEXEC_FILE
+	help
+	  Select this option to verify a signature with loaded kernel
+	  image. If configured, any attempt of loading a image without
+	  valid signature will fail.
+
+	  In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
+	  verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
+	  loaded in order for this to work.
+
+config KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
+	bool "Enable Image signature verification support"
+	default y
+	depends on KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+	depends on EFI && SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
+	help
+	  Enable Image signature verification support.
+
+comment "Support for PE file signature verification disabled"
+	depends on KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+	depends on !EFI || !SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
+
 config CRASH_DUMP
 	bool "Build kdump crash kernel"
 	help
@@ -983,6 +1066,20 @@ config ARM64_SSBD
 
 	  If unsure, say Y.
 
+config RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED
+	bool "Apply r/o permissions of VM areas also to their linear aliases"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Apply read-only attributes of VM areas to the linear alias of
+	  the backing pages as well. This prevents code or read-only data
+	  from being modified (inadvertently or intentionally) via another
+	  mapping of the same memory page. This additional enhancement can
+	  be turned off at runtime by passing rodata=[off|on] (and turned on
+	  with rodata=full if this option is set to 'n')
+
+	  This requires the linear region to be mapped down to pages,
+	  which may adversely affect performance in some cases.
+
 menuconfig ARMV8_DEPRECATED
 	bool "Emulate deprecated/obsolete ARMv8 instructions"
 	depends on COMPAT
@@ -1188,6 +1285,29 @@ config ARM64_CNP
 
 endmenu
 
+menu "ARMv8.3 architectural features"
+
+config ARM64_PTR_AUTH
+	bool "Enable support for pointer authentication"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Pointer authentication (part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions) provides
+	  instructions for signing and authenticating pointers against secret
+	  keys, which can be used to mitigate Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
+	  and other attacks.
+
+	  This option enables these instructions at EL0 (i.e. for userspace).
+
+	  Choosing this option will cause the kernel to initialise secret keys
+	  for each process at exec() time, with these keys being
+	  context-switched along with the process.
+
+	  The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in
+	  hardware it will not be advertised to userspace nor will it be
+	  enabled.
+
+endmenu
+
 config ARM64_SVE
 	bool "ARM Scalable Vector Extension support"
 	default y
@@ -1272,6 +1392,13 @@ config RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL
 	  a limited range that contains the [_stext, _etext] interval of the
 	  core kernel, so branch relocations are always in range.
 
+config CC_HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR_SYSREG
+	def_bool $(cc-option,-mstack-protector-guard=sysreg -mstack-protector-guard-reg=sp_el0 -mstack-protector-guard-offset=0)
+
+config STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK
+	def_bool y
+	depends on STACKPROTECTOR && CC_HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR_SYSREG
+
 endmenu
 
 menu "Boot options"