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| author | Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@gmail.com> | 2010-10-30 22:54:47 +0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> | 2010-11-05 14:42:27 -0200 |
| commit | 97e69aa62f8b5d338d6cff49be09e37cc1262838 (patch) | |
| tree | b16e0b5d64322f1e0d6ff6de7bbf11609fb09785 /arch/x86 | |
| parent | d8cdddcd645766cd4d80fa222226ae6ebfb706af (diff) | |
| download | linux-stable-97e69aa62f8b5d338d6cff49be09e37cc1262838.tar.gz linux-stable-97e69aa62f8b5d338d6cff49be09e37cc1262838.tar.bz2 linux-stable-97e69aa62f8b5d338d6cff49be09e37cc1262838.zip | |
KVM: x86: fix information leak to userland
Structures kvm_vcpu_events, kvm_debugregs, kvm_pit_state2 and
kvm_clock_data are copied to userland with some padding and reserved
fields unitialized. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack
memory. We have to initialize them to zero.
In patch v1 Jan Kiszka suggested to fill reserved fields with zeros
instead of memset'ting the whole struct. It makes sense as these
fields are explicitly marked as padding. No more fields need zeroing.
KVM-Stable-Tag.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index b0818f672064..463c65b8f93f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -2560,6 +2560,7 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, !kvm_exception_is_soft(vcpu->arch.exception.nr); events->exception.nr = vcpu->arch.exception.nr; events->exception.has_error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code; + events->exception.pad = 0; events->exception.error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.error_code; events->interrupt.injected = @@ -2573,12 +2574,14 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, events->nmi.injected = vcpu->arch.nmi_injected; events->nmi.pending = vcpu->arch.nmi_pending; events->nmi.masked = kvm_x86_ops->get_nmi_mask(vcpu); + events->nmi.pad = 0; events->sipi_vector = vcpu->arch.sipi_vector; events->flags = (KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_NMI_PENDING | KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SIPI_VECTOR | KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SHADOW); + memset(&events->reserved, 0, sizeof(events->reserved)); } static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, @@ -2623,6 +2626,7 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, dbgregs->dr6 = vcpu->arch.dr6; dbgregs->dr7 = vcpu->arch.dr7; dbgregs->flags = 0; + memset(&dbgregs->reserved, 0, sizeof(dbgregs->reserved)); } static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, @@ -3106,6 +3110,7 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state2 *ps) sizeof(ps->channels)); ps->flags = kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags; mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock); + memset(&ps->reserved, 0, sizeof(ps->reserved)); return r; } @@ -3486,6 +3491,7 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, user_ns.clock = kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset + now_ns; local_irq_enable(); user_ns.flags = 0; + memset(&user_ns.pad, 0, sizeof(user_ns.pad)); r = -EFAULT; if (copy_to_user(argp, &user_ns, sizeof(user_ns))) |