diff options
author | Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> | 2018-09-25 14:38:18 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> | 2019-05-22 23:15:10 +0100 |
commit | b152cff30dca90e6c4149c84fdf1dec5ceb1018a (patch) | |
tree | 8fbfd47b0661d90bd3b1a86a8d4bbbcc13f06562 /arch/x86 | |
parent | e018272fa2db03097253c6933b246e68b42784b6 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-b152cff30dca90e6c4149c84fdf1dec5ceb1018a.tar.gz linux-stable-b152cff30dca90e6c4149c84fdf1dec5ceb1018a.tar.bz2 linux-stable-b152cff30dca90e6c4149c84fdf1dec5ceb1018a.zip |
x86/speculation: Apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak
commit dbfe2953f63c640463c630746cd5d9de8b2f63ae upstream.
Currently, IBPB is only issued in cases when switching into a non-dumpable
process, the rationale being to protect such 'important and security
sensitive' processess (such as GPG) from data leaking into a different
userspace process via spectre v2.
This is however completely insufficient to provide proper userspace-to-userpace
spectrev2 protection, as any process can poison branch buffers before being
scheduled out, and the newly scheduled process immediately becomes spectrev2
victim.
In order to minimize the performance impact (for usecases that do require
spectrev2 protection), issue the barrier only in cases when switching between
processess where the victim can't be ptraced by the potential attacker (as in
such cases, the attacker doesn't have to bother with branch buffers at all).
[ tglx: Split up PTRACE_MODE_NOACCESS_CHK into PTRACE_MODE_SCHED and
PTRACE_MODE_IBPB to be able to do ptrace() context tracking reasonably
fine-grained ]
Fixes: 18bf3c3ea8 ("x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch")
Originally-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251437340.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: we still can't use ctx_id to optimise the check]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 28 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c index 71b450232c7a..42bf70d1df69 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> #include <linux/debugfs.h> +#include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <asm/tlbflush.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h> @@ -95,6 +96,19 @@ void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, local_irq_restore(flags); } +static bool ibpb_needed(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + /* + * Check if the current (previous) task has access to the memory + * of the @tsk (next) task. If access is denied, make sure to + * issue a IBPB to stop user->user Spectre-v2 attacks. + * + * Note: __ptrace_may_access() returns 0 or -ERRNO. + */ + return (tsk && tsk->mm && + ptrace_may_access_sched(tsk, PTRACE_MODE_SPEC_IBPB)); +} + void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, struct task_struct *tsk) { @@ -107,16 +121,12 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, * one process from doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another. * * As an optimization, flush indirect branches only when - * switching into processes that disable dumping. This - * protects high value processes like gpg, without having - * too high performance overhead. IBPB is *expensive*! - * - * This will not flush branches when switching into kernel - * threads. It will flush if we switch to a different non- - * dumpable process. + * switching into a processes that can't be ptrace by the + * current one (as in such case, attacker has much more + * convenient way how to tamper with the next process than + * branch buffer poisoning). */ - if (tsk && tsk->mm && - get_dumpable(tsk->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) && ibpb_needed(tsk)) indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.state, TLBSTATE_OK); |