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authorDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>2018-01-29 17:03:21 -0800
committerThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>2018-01-30 21:54:32 +0100
commitedfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360 (patch)
tree359a23abbd70ceb523c2c04bb45243ab84e876f6 /arch/x86
parent259d8c1e984318497c84eef547bbb6b1d9f4eb05 (diff)
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x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim mitigation for __user pointer de-references. Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 400c34ec9179..fdb6068a23b5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
- return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,