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author | Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> | 2008-08-14 22:15:52 +1000 |
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committer | Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 2008-08-29 15:50:04 +1000 |
commit | 17f0f4a47df9aea9ee26c939f8057c35e0be1847 (patch) | |
tree | d6c7ff6c93573227a49c9e8fe06c53d97950e4e6 /crypto/ansi_cprng.c | |
parent | ccb778e1841ce04b4c10b39f0dd2558ab2c6dcd4 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-17f0f4a47df9aea9ee26c939f8057c35e0be1847.tar.gz linux-stable-17f0f4a47df9aea9ee26c939f8057c35e0be1847.tar.bz2 linux-stable-17f0f4a47df9aea9ee26c939f8057c35e0be1847.zip |
crypto: rng - RNG interface and implementation
This patch adds a random number generator interface as well as a
cryptographic pseudo-random number generator based on AES. It is
meant to be used in cases where a deterministic CPRNG is required.
One of the first applications will be as an input in the IPsec IV
generation process.
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/ansi_cprng.c')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ansi_cprng.c | 417 |
1 files changed, 417 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/ansi_cprng.c b/crypto/ansi_cprng.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..72db0fd763cc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/ansi_cprng.c @@ -0,0 +1,417 @@ +/* + * PRNG: Pseudo Random Number Generator + * Based on NIST Recommended PRNG From ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 using + * AES 128 cipher + * + * (C) Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it + * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the + * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your + * any later version. + * + * + */ + +#include <crypto/internal/rng.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/moduleparam.h> +#include <linux/string.h> + +#include "internal.h" + +#define DEFAULT_PRNG_KEY "0123456789abcdef" +#define DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ 16 +#define DEFAULT_BLK_SZ 16 +#define DEFAULT_V_SEED "zaybxcwdveuftgsh" + +/* + * Flags for the prng_context flags field + */ + +#define PRNG_FIXED_SIZE 0x1 +#define PRNG_NEED_RESET 0x2 + +/* + * Note: DT is our counter value + * I is our intermediate value + * V is our seed vector + * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/rng/931rngext.pdf + * for implementation details + */ + + +struct prng_context { + spinlock_t prng_lock; + unsigned char rand_data[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ]; + unsigned char last_rand_data[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ]; + unsigned char DT[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ]; + unsigned char I[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ]; + unsigned char V[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ]; + u32 rand_data_valid; + struct crypto_cipher *tfm; + u32 flags; +}; + +static int dbg; + +static void hexdump(char *note, unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len) +{ + if (dbg) { + printk(KERN_CRIT "%s", note); + print_hex_dump(KERN_CONT, "", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, + 16, 1, + buf, len, false); + } +} + +#define dbgprint(format, args...) do {\ +if (dbg)\ + printk(format, ##args);\ +} while (0) + +static void xor_vectors(unsigned char *in1, unsigned char *in2, + unsigned char *out, unsigned int size) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < size; i++) + out[i] = in1[i] ^ in2[i]; + +} +/* + * Returns DEFAULT_BLK_SZ bytes of random data per call + * returns 0 if generation succeded, <0 if something went wrong + */ +static int _get_more_prng_bytes(struct prng_context *ctx) +{ + int i; + unsigned char tmp[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ]; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + + + dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "Calling _get_more_prng_bytes for context %p\n", + ctx); + + hexdump("Input DT: ", ctx->DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + hexdump("Input I: ", ctx->I, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + hexdump("Input V: ", ctx->V, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + + /* + * This algorithm is a 3 stage state machine + */ + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + + switch (i) { + case 0: + /* + * Start by encrypting the counter value + * This gives us an intermediate value I + */ + memcpy(tmp, ctx->DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + output = ctx->I; + hexdump("tmp stage 0: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + break; + case 1: + + /* + * Next xor I with our secret vector V + * encrypt that result to obtain our + * pseudo random data which we output + */ + xor_vectors(ctx->I, ctx->V, tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + hexdump("tmp stage 1: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + output = ctx->rand_data; + break; + case 2: + /* + * First check that we didn't produce the same + * random data that we did last time around through this + */ + if (!memcmp(ctx->rand_data, ctx->last_rand_data, + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ)) { + printk(KERN_ERR + "ctx %p Failed repetition check!\n", + ctx); + ctx->flags |= PRNG_NEED_RESET; + return -EINVAL; + } + memcpy(ctx->last_rand_data, ctx->rand_data, + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + + /* + * Lastly xor the random data with I + * and encrypt that to obtain a new secret vector V + */ + xor_vectors(ctx->rand_data, ctx->I, tmp, + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + output = ctx->V; + hexdump("tmp stage 2: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + break; + } + + + /* do the encryption */ + crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->tfm, output, tmp); + + } + + /* + * Now update our DT value + */ + for (i = 0; i < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; i++) { + ctx->DT[i] += 1; + if (ctx->DT[i] != 0) + break; + } + + dbgprint("Returning new block for context %p\n", ctx); + ctx->rand_data_valid = 0; + + hexdump("Output DT: ", ctx->DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + hexdump("Output I: ", ctx->I, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + hexdump("Output V: ", ctx->V, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + hexdump("New Random Data: ", ctx->rand_data, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + + return 0; +} + +/* Our exported functions */ +static int get_prng_bytes(char *buf, size_t nbytes, struct prng_context *ctx) +{ + unsigned long flags; + unsigned char *ptr = buf; + unsigned int byte_count = (unsigned int)nbytes; + int err; + + + if (nbytes < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->prng_lock, flags); + + err = -EINVAL; + if (ctx->flags & PRNG_NEED_RESET) + goto done; + + /* + * If the FIXED_SIZE flag is on, only return whole blocks of + * pseudo random data + */ + err = -EINVAL; + if (ctx->flags & PRNG_FIXED_SIZE) { + if (nbytes < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) + goto done; + byte_count = DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; + } + + err = byte_count; + + dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "getting %d random bytes for context %p\n", + byte_count, ctx); + + +remainder: + if (ctx->rand_data_valid == DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) { + if (_get_more_prng_bytes(ctx) < 0) { + memset(buf, 0, nbytes); + err = -EINVAL; + goto done; + } + } + + /* + * Copy up to the next whole block size + */ + if (byte_count < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) { + for (; ctx->rand_data_valid < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; + ctx->rand_data_valid++) { + *ptr = ctx->rand_data[ctx->rand_data_valid]; + ptr++; + byte_count--; + if (byte_count == 0) + goto done; + } + } + + /* + * Now copy whole blocks + */ + for (; byte_count >= DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; byte_count -= DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) { + if (_get_more_prng_bytes(ctx) < 0) { + memset(buf, 0, nbytes); + err = -EINVAL; + goto done; + } + memcpy(ptr, ctx->rand_data, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + ctx->rand_data_valid += DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; + ptr += DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; + } + + /* + * Now copy any extra partial data + */ + if (byte_count) + goto remainder; + +done: + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->prng_lock, flags); + dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "returning %d from get_prng_bytes in context %p\n", + err, ctx); + return err; +} + +static void free_prng_context(struct prng_context *ctx) +{ + crypto_free_cipher(ctx->tfm); +} + +static int reset_prng_context(struct prng_context *ctx, + unsigned char *key, size_t klen, + unsigned char *V, unsigned char *DT) +{ + int ret; + int rc = -EINVAL; + unsigned char *prng_key; + + spin_lock(&ctx->prng_lock); + ctx->flags |= PRNG_NEED_RESET; + + prng_key = (key != NULL) ? key : (unsigned char *)DEFAULT_PRNG_KEY; + + if (!key) + klen = DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ; + + if (V) + memcpy(ctx->V, V, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + else + memcpy(ctx->V, DEFAULT_V_SEED, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + + if (DT) + memcpy(ctx->DT, DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + else + memset(ctx->DT, 0, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + + memset(ctx->rand_data, 0, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + memset(ctx->last_rand_data, 0, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + + if (ctx->tfm) + crypto_free_cipher(ctx->tfm); + + ctx->tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(ctx->tfm)) { + dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "Failed to alloc tfm for context %p\n", + ctx); + ctx->tfm = NULL; + goto out; + } + + ctx->rand_data_valid = DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; + + ret = crypto_cipher_setkey(ctx->tfm, prng_key, klen); + if (ret) { + dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "PRNG: setkey() failed flags=%x\n", + crypto_cipher_get_flags(ctx->tfm)); + crypto_free_cipher(ctx->tfm); + goto out; + } + + rc = 0; + ctx->flags &= ~PRNG_NEED_RESET; +out: + spin_unlock(&ctx->prng_lock); + + return rc; + +} + +static int cprng_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) +{ + struct prng_context *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + spin_lock_init(&ctx->prng_lock); + + return reset_prng_context(ctx, NULL, DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ, NULL, NULL); +} + +static void cprng_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) +{ + free_prng_context(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm)); +} + +static int cprng_get_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *rdata, + unsigned int dlen) +{ + struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm); + + return get_prng_bytes(rdata, dlen, prng); +} + +static int cprng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *seed, unsigned int slen) +{ + struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm); + u8 *key = seed + DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ; + + if (slen < DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) + return -EINVAL; + + reset_prng_context(prng, key, DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ, seed, NULL); + + if (prng->flags & PRNG_NEED_RESET) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; +} + +static struct crypto_alg rng_alg = { + .cra_name = "stdrng", + .cra_driver_name = "ansi_cprng", + .cra_priority = 100, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_RNG, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct prng_context), + .cra_type = &crypto_rng_type, + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .cra_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(rng_alg.cra_list), + .cra_init = cprng_init, + .cra_exit = cprng_exit, + .cra_u = { + .rng = { + .rng_make_random = cprng_get_random, + .rng_reset = cprng_reset, + .seedsize = DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ, + } + } +}; + + +/* Module initalization */ +static int __init prng_mod_init(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if (fips_enabled) + rng_alg.cra_priority += 200; + + ret = crypto_register_alg(&rng_alg); + + if (ret) + goto out; +out: + return 0; +} + +static void __exit prng_mod_fini(void) +{ + crypto_unregister_alg(&rng_alg); + return; +} + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Software Pseudo Random Number Generator"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>"); +module_param(dbg, int, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(dbg, "Boolean to enable debugging (0/1 == off/on)"); +module_init(prng_mod_init); +module_exit(prng_mod_fini); +MODULE_ALIAS("stdrng"); |