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| author | Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> | 2022-08-02 15:47:02 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2022-08-11 13:06:47 +0200 |
| commit | 1bea03b44ea2267988cce064f5887b01d421b28c (patch) | |
| tree | cd26ea3bf9c6ecfa603d79b46b980f83d258b1cf /crypto/cast5_generic.c | |
| parent | 509c2c9fe75ea7493eebbb6bb2f711f37530ae19 (diff) | |
| download | linux-stable-1bea03b44ea2267988cce064f5887b01d421b28c.tar.gz linux-stable-1bea03b44ea2267988cce064f5887b01d421b28c.tar.bz2 linux-stable-1bea03b44ea2267988cce064f5887b01d421b28c.zip | |
x86/speculation: Add LFENCE to RSB fill sequence
commit ba6e31af2be96c4d0536f2152ed6f7b6c11bca47 upstream.
RSB fill sequence does not have any protection for miss-prediction of
conditional branch at the end of the sequence. CPU can speculatively
execute code immediately after the sequence, while RSB filling hasn't
completed yet.
#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \
mov $(nr/2), reg; \
771: \
ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL; \
call 772f; \
773: /* speculation trap */ \
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY; \
pause; \
lfence; \
jmp 773b; \
772: \
ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL; \
call 774f; \
775: /* speculation trap */ \
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY; \
pause; \
lfence; \
jmp 775b; \
774: \
add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp; \
dec reg; \
jnz 771b; <----- CPU can miss-predict here.
Before RSB is filled, RETs that come in program order after this macro
can be executed speculatively, making them vulnerable to RSB-based
attacks.
Mitigate it by adding an LFENCE after the conditional branch to prevent
speculation while RSB is being filled.
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/cast5_generic.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions