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authorPeter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>2016-01-18 10:49:58 -0500
committerHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>2016-01-25 21:47:45 +0800
commit7ee7014d0eb6bcac679c0bd5fe9ce65bc4325648 (patch)
tree16147de802d890867c087a0e8ef968daf420526b /crypto
parente7a7104e432c0db8469ca3568daf4f1d1afe3e73 (diff)
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PKCS#7: Don't require SpcSpOpusInfo in Authenticode pkcs7 signatures
Dave Young reported: > Hi, > > I saw the warning "Missing required AuthAttr" when testing kexec, > known issue? Idea about how to fix it? > > The kernel is latest linus tree plus sevral patches from Toshi to > cleanup io resource structure. > > in function pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs(): > if (!test_bit(sinfo_has_content_type, &sinfo->aa_set) || > !test_bit(sinfo_has_message_digest, &sinfo->aa_set) || > (ctx->msg->data_type == OID_msIndirectData && > !test_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set))) { > pr_warn("Missing required AuthAttr\n"); > return -EBADMSG; > } > > The third condition below is true: > (ctx->msg->data_type == OID_msIndirectData && > !test_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set)) > > I signed the kernel with redhat test key like below: > pesign -c 'Red Hat Test Certificate' -i arch/x86/boot/bzImage -o /boot/vmlinuz-4.4.0-rc8+ -s --force And right he is! The Authenticode specification is a paragon amongst technical documents, and has this pearl of wisdom to offer: --------------------------------- Authenticode-Specific SignerInfo UnauthenticatedAttributes Structures The following Authenticode-specific data structures are present in SignerInfo authenticated attributes. SpcSpOpusInfo SpcSpOpusInfo is identified by SPC_SP_OPUS_INFO_OBJID (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.12) and is defined as follows: SpcSpOpusInfo ::= SEQUENCE { programName [0] EXPLICIT SpcString OPTIONAL, moreInfo [1] EXPLICIT SpcLink OPTIONAL, } --#public-- SpcSpOpusInfo has two fields: programName This field contains the program description: If publisher chooses not to specify a description, the SpcString structure contains a zero-length program name. If the publisher chooses to specify a description, the SpcString structure contains a Unicode string. moreInfo This field is set to an SPCLink structure that contains a URL for a Web site with more information about the signer. The URL is an ASCII string. --------------------------------- Which is to say that this is an optional *unauthenticated* field which may be present in the Authenticated Attribute list. This is not how pkcs7 is supposed to work, so when David implemented this, he didn't appreciate the subtlety the original spec author was working with, and missed the part of the sublime prose that says this Authenticated Attribute is an Unauthenticated Attribute. As a result, the code in question simply takes as given that the Authenticated Attributes should be authenticated. But this one should not, individually. Because it says it's not authenticated. It still has to hash right so the TBS digest is correct. So it is both authenticated and unauthenticated, all at once. Truly, a wonder of technical accomplishment. Additionally, pesign's implementation has always attempted to be compatible with the signatures emitted from contemporary versions of Microsoft's signtool.exe. During the initial implementation, Microsoft signatures always produced the same values for SpcSpOpusInfo - {U"Microsoft Windows", "http://www.microsoft.com"} - without regard to who the signer was. Sometime between Windows 8 and Windows 8.1 they stopped including the field in their signatures altogether, and as such pesign stopped producing them in commits c0c4da6 and d79cb0c, sometime around June of 2012. The theory here is that anything that breaks with pesign signatures would also be breaking with signtool.exe sigs as well, and that'll be a more noticed problem for firmwares parsing it, so it'll get fixed. The fact that we've done exactly this bug in Linux code is first class, grade A irony. So anyway, we should not be checking this field for presence or any particular value: if the field exists, it should be at the right place, but aside from that, as long as the hash matches the field is good. Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Tested-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c4
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
index 758acabf2d81..8f3056cd0399 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
@@ -547,9 +547,7 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
if (!test_bit(sinfo_has_content_type, &sinfo->aa_set) ||
- !test_bit(sinfo_has_message_digest, &sinfo->aa_set) ||
- (ctx->msg->data_type == OID_msIndirectData &&
- !test_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set))) {
+ !test_bit(sinfo_has_message_digest, &sinfo->aa_set)) {
pr_warn("Missing required AuthAttr\n");
return -EBADMSG;
}