summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/crypto
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorArd Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>2021-01-02 14:59:09 +0100
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2021-01-12 20:10:20 +0100
commit457b67797cba7bb20e7754b622b1246ad1d521fd (patch)
tree83ab03b6b9e7e5c8d34a876244dd6eab4eea0208 /crypto
parent9540ea23f62391050da23c2dd47e76bdfb5dcbd5 (diff)
downloadlinux-stable-457b67797cba7bb20e7754b622b1246ad1d521fd.tar.gz
linux-stable-457b67797cba7bb20e7754b622b1246ad1d521fd.tar.bz2
linux-stable-457b67797cba7bb20e7754b622b1246ad1d521fd.zip
crypto: ecdh - avoid buffer overflow in ecdh_set_secret()
commit 0aa171e9b267ce7c52d3a3df7bc9c1fc0203dec5 upstream. Pavel reports that commit 17858b140bf4 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()") fixes one problem but introduces another: the unconditional memcpy() introduced by that commit may overflow the target buffer if the source data is invalid, which could be the result of intentional tampering. So check params.key_size explicitly against the size of the target buffer before validating the key further. Fixes: 17858b140bf4 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()") Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r--crypto/ecdh.c3
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/ecdh.c b/crypto/ecdh.c
index a6e1a5d43fa7..34605509b41a 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdh.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdh.c
@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ static int ecdh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,
struct ecdh params;
unsigned int ndigits;
- if (crypto_ecdh_decode_key(buf, len, &params) < 0)
+ if (crypto_ecdh_decode_key(buf, len, &params) < 0 ||
+ params.key_size > sizeof(ctx->private_key))
return -EINVAL;
ndigits = ecdh_supported_curve(params.curve_id);