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author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2019-04-19 23:27:05 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> | 2019-04-19 23:27:05 -0400 |
commit | d55535232c3dbde9a523a9d10d68670f5fe5dec3 (patch) | |
tree | 43265cdcfde71ed2fdbd562c17f034c28aab15bc /drivers/char/random.c | |
parent | eb9d1bf079bb438d1a066d72337092935fc770f6 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-d55535232c3dbde9a523a9d10d68670f5fe5dec3.tar.gz linux-stable-d55535232c3dbde9a523a9d10d68670f5fe5dec3.tar.bz2 linux-stable-d55535232c3dbde9a523a9d10d68670f5fe5dec3.zip |
random: move rand_initialize() earlier
Right now rand_initialize() is run as an early_initcall(), but it only
depends on timekeeping_init() (for mixing ktime_get_real() into the
pools). However, the call to boot_init_stack_canary() for stack canary
initialization runs earlier, which triggers a warning at boot:
random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x357/0x548 with crng_init=0
Instead, this moves rand_initialize() to after timekeeping_init(), and moves
canary initialization here as well.
Note that this warning may still remain for machines that do not have
UEFI RNG support (which initializes the RNG pools during setup_arch()),
or for x86 machines without RDRAND (or booting without "random.trust=on"
or CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char/random.c')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index e247c45b2772..8757ed493b11 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1783,7 +1783,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); * data into the pool to prepare it for use. The pool is not cleared * as that can only decrease the entropy in the pool. */ -static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) +static void __init init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) { int i; ktime_t now = ktime_get_real(); @@ -1810,7 +1810,7 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) * take care not to overwrite the precious per platform data * we were given. */ -static int rand_initialize(void) +int __init rand_initialize(void) { init_std_data(&input_pool); init_std_data(&blocking_pool); @@ -1822,7 +1822,6 @@ static int rand_initialize(void) } return 0; } -early_initcall(rand_initialize); #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) |