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author | Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> | 2020-10-23 19:05:12 +0200 |
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committer | Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> | 2020-12-04 18:04:35 -0500 |
commit | 4da8f8c8a1e07ad18f057f4044ad96f4135dc877 (patch) | |
tree | 99247a48d846727f3288051098cf927be70f55a1 /drivers/md/Kconfig | |
parent | 985eabdcfe3aad1aea6fc195dafff503f303aa3a (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-4da8f8c8a1e07ad18f057f4044ad96f4135dc877.tar.gz linux-stable-4da8f8c8a1e07ad18f057f4044ad96f4135dc877.tar.bz2 linux-stable-4da8f8c8a1e07ad18f057f4044ad96f4135dc877.zip |
dm verity: Add support for signature verification with 2nd keyring
Add a new configuration DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING
to enable dm-verity signatures to be verified against the secondary
trusted keyring. Instead of relying on the builtin trusted keyring
(with hard-coded certificates), the second trusted keyring can include
certificate authorities from the builtin trusted keyring and child
certificates loaded at run time. Using the secondary trusted keyring
enables to use dm-verity disks (e.g. loop devices) signed by keys which
did not exist at kernel build time, leveraging the certificate chain of
trust model. In practice, this makes it possible to update certificates
without kernel update and reboot, aligning with module and kernel
(kexec) signature verification which already use the secondary trusted
keyring.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/md/Kconfig')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/md/Kconfig | 13 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/md/Kconfig b/drivers/md/Kconfig index 30ba3573626c..1d68935e45ef 100644 --- a/drivers/md/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/md/Kconfig @@ -530,11 +530,22 @@ config DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG bool "Verity data device root hash signature verification support" depends on DM_VERITY select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION - help + help Add ability for dm-verity device to be validated if the pre-generated tree of cryptographic checksums passed has a pkcs#7 signature file that can validate the roothash of the tree. + By default, rely on the builtin trusted keyring. + + If unsure, say N. + +config DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING + bool "Verity data device root hash signature verification with secondary keyring" + depends on DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG + depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + help + Rely on the secondary trusted keyring to verify dm-verity signatures. + If unsure, say N. config DM_VERITY_FEC |