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| author | Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com> | 2006-09-29 01:59:33 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@g5.osdl.org> | 2006-09-29 09:18:08 -0700 |
| commit | 8454aeef6fea944ced757ff8e761b59eb3ee960f (patch) | |
| tree | 235e366e3744cdf76381d9e8a709d7564dde94e0 /fs/binfmt_aout.c | |
| parent | 563d075702454f6fa745ff8b0db605c73478078e (diff) | |
| download | linux-stable-8454aeef6fea944ced757ff8e761b59eb3ee960f.tar.gz linux-stable-8454aeef6fea944ced757ff8e761b59eb3ee960f.tar.bz2 linux-stable-8454aeef6fea944ced757ff8e761b59eb3ee960f.zip | |
[PATCH] Require mmap handler for a.out executables
Files supported by fs/proc/base.c, i.e. /proc/<pid>/*, are not capable of
meeting the validity checks in ELF load_elf_*() handling because they have
no mmap handler which is required by ELF. In order to stop a.out
executables being used as part of an exploit attack against /proc-related
vulnerabilities, we make a.out executables depend on ->mmap() existing.
Signed-off-by: Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/binfmt_aout.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/binfmt_aout.c | 14 |
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_aout.c b/fs/binfmt_aout.c index f312103434d4..517e111bb7ef 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_aout.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_aout.c @@ -278,6 +278,13 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm, struct pt_regs * regs) return -ENOEXEC; } + /* + * Requires a mmap handler. This prevents people from using a.out + * as part of an exploit attack against /proc-related vulnerabilities. + */ + if (!bprm->file->f_op || !bprm->file->f_op->mmap) + return -ENOEXEC; + fd_offset = N_TXTOFF(ex); /* Check initial limits. This avoids letting people circumvent @@ -476,6 +483,13 @@ static int load_aout_library(struct file *file) goto out; } + /* + * Requires a mmap handler. This prevents people from using a.out + * as part of an exploit attack against /proc-related vulnerabilities. + */ + if (!file->f_op || !file->f_op->mmap) + goto out; + if (N_FLAGS(ex)) goto out; |