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author | Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | 2019-08-03 11:51:18 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> | 2019-09-11 12:45:49 +0200 |
commit | 351e5d869e5ac10cb40c78b5f2d7dfc816ad4587 (patch) | |
tree | bbff139362c2d49c1bfff6a843c7e32cfd32902b /fs/configfs | |
parent | f74c2bb98776e2de508f4d607cd519873065118e (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-351e5d869e5ac10cb40c78b5f2d7dfc816ad4587.tar.gz linux-stable-351e5d869e5ac10cb40c78b5f2d7dfc816ad4587.tar.bz2 linux-stable-351e5d869e5ac10cb40c78b5f2d7dfc816ad4587.zip |
configfs: fix a deadlock in configfs_symlink()
Configfs abuses symlink(2). Unlike the normal filesystems, it
wants the target resolved at symlink(2) time, like link(2) would've
done. The problem is that ->symlink() is called with the parent
directory locked exclusive, so resolving the target inside the
->symlink() is easily deadlocked.
Short of really ugly games in sys_symlink() itself, all we can
do is to unlock the parent before resolving the target and
relock it after. However, that invalidates the checks done
by the caller of ->symlink(), so we have to
* check that dentry is still where it used to be
(it couldn't have been moved, but it could've been unhashed)
* recheck that it's still negative (somebody else
might've successfully created a symlink with the same name
while we were looking the target up)
* recheck the permissions on the parent directory.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/configfs')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/configfs/symlink.c | 33 |
1 files changed, 32 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/configfs/symlink.c b/fs/configfs/symlink.c index 91eac6c55e07..f3881e4caedd 100644 --- a/fs/configfs/symlink.c +++ b/fs/configfs/symlink.c @@ -143,11 +143,42 @@ int configfs_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *symna !type->ct_item_ops->allow_link) goto out_put; + /* + * This is really sick. What they wanted was a hybrid of + * link(2) and symlink(2) - they wanted the target resolved + * at syscall time (as link(2) would've done), be a directory + * (which link(2) would've refused to do) *AND* be a deep + * fucking magic, making the target busy from rmdir POV. + * symlink(2) is nothing of that sort, and the locking it + * gets matches the normal symlink(2) semantics. Without + * attempts to resolve the target (which might very well + * not even exist yet) done prior to locking the parent + * directory. This perversion, OTOH, needs to resolve + * the target, which would lead to obvious deadlocks if + * attempted with any directories locked. + * + * Unfortunately, that garbage is userland ABI and we should've + * said "no" back in 2005. Too late now, so we get to + * play very ugly games with locking. + * + * Try *ANYTHING* of that sort in new code, and you will + * really regret it. Just ask yourself - what could a BOFH + * do to me and do I want to find it out first-hand? + * + * AV, a thoroughly annoyed bastard. + */ + inode_unlock(dir); ret = get_target(symname, &path, &target_item, dentry->d_sb); + inode_lock(dir); if (ret) goto out_put; - ret = type->ct_item_ops->allow_link(parent_item, target_item); + if (dentry->d_inode || d_unhashed(dentry)) + ret = -EEXIST; + else + ret = inode_permission(dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC); + if (!ret) + ret = type->ct_item_ops->allow_link(parent_item, target_item); if (!ret) { mutex_lock(&configfs_symlink_mutex); ret = create_link(parent_item, target_item, dentry); |