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author | Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> | 2008-02-05 12:13:24 +1100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@redback.melbourne.sgi.com> | 2008-02-07 18:22:38 +1100 |
commit | 4576758db5817a91b8974c696247d459dc653db2 (patch) | |
tree | 43b5b471510f0981ea2dc668ca7591a75831f111 /fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c | |
parent | f6aa7f2184330262e1cb5f7802536e5346bd46a3 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-4576758db5817a91b8974c696247d459dc653db2.tar.gz linux-stable-4576758db5817a91b8974c696247d459dc653db2.tar.bz2 linux-stable-4576758db5817a91b8974c696247d459dc653db2.zip |
[XFS] use generic_permission
Now that all direct caller of xfs_iaccess are gone we can kill xfs_iaccess
and xfs_access and just use generic_permission with a check_acl callback.
This is required for the per-mount read-only patchset in -mm to work
properly with XFS.
SGI-PV: 971186
SGI-Modid: xfs-linux-melb:xfs-kern:30370a
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@sgi.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c | 30 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c index 5bfb66f33caf..7272fe39a92d 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c @@ -392,32 +392,6 @@ xfs_acl_allow_set( } /* - * The access control process to determine the access permission: - * if uid == file owner id, use the file owner bits. - * if gid == file owner group id, use the file group bits. - * scan ACL for a matching user or group, and use matched entry - * permission. Use total permissions of all matching group entries, - * until all acl entries are exhausted. The final permission produced - * by matching acl entry or entries needs to be & with group permission. - * if not owner, owning group, or matching entry in ACL, use file - * other bits. - */ -STATIC int -xfs_acl_capability_check( - mode_t mode, - cred_t *cr) -{ - if ((mode & ACL_READ) && !capable_cred(cr, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)) - return EACCES; - if ((mode & ACL_WRITE) && !capable_cred(cr, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) - return EACCES; - if ((mode & ACL_EXECUTE) && !capable_cred(cr, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) - return EACCES; - - return 0; -} - -/* * Note: cr is only used here for the capability check if the ACL test fails. * It is not used to find out the credentials uid or groups etc, as was * done in IRIX. It is assumed that the uid and groups for the current @@ -438,7 +412,6 @@ xfs_acl_access( matched.ae_tag = 0; /* Invalid type */ matched.ae_perm = 0; - md >>= 6; /* Normalize the bits for comparison */ for (i = 0; i < fap->acl_cnt; i++) { /* @@ -520,7 +493,8 @@ xfs_acl_access( break; } - return xfs_acl_capability_check(md, cr); + /* EACCES tells generic_permission to check for capability overrides */ + return EACCES; } /* |