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authorHugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>2009-03-28 23:21:27 +0000
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2009-03-28 17:30:00 -0700
commit7c2c7d993044cddc5010f6f429b100c63bc7dffb (patch)
treeb92a6daf7c11f9a53de6fed07512fe02cd5b4a68 /fs
parente426b64c412aaa3e9eb3e4b261dc5be0d5a83e78 (diff)
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fix setuid sometimes wouldn't
check_unsafe_exec() also notes whether the fs_struct is being shared by more threads than will get killed by the exec, and if so sets LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE to make bprm_set_creds() careful about euid. But /proc/<pid>/cwd and /proc/<pid>/root lookups make transient use of get_fs_struct(), which also raises that sharing count. This might occasionally cause a setuid program not to change euid, in the same way as happened with files->count (check_unsafe_exec also looks at sighand->count, but /proc doesn't raise that one). We'd prefer exec not to unshare fs_struct: so fix this in procfs, replacing get_fs_struct() by get_fs_path(), which does path_get while still holding task_lock, instead of raising fs->count. Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org ___ fs/proc/base.c | 50 +++++++++++++++-------------------------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/base.c50
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index aef6d55b7de6..e0afd326b688 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -146,15 +146,22 @@ static unsigned int pid_entry_count_dirs(const struct pid_entry *entries,
return count;
}
-static struct fs_struct *get_fs_struct(struct task_struct *task)
+static int get_fs_path(struct task_struct *task, struct path *path, bool root)
{
struct fs_struct *fs;
+ int result = -ENOENT;
+
task_lock(task);
fs = task->fs;
- if(fs)
- atomic_inc(&fs->count);
+ if (fs) {
+ read_lock(&fs->lock);
+ *path = root ? fs->root : fs->pwd;
+ path_get(path);
+ read_unlock(&fs->lock);
+ result = 0;
+ }
task_unlock(task);
- return fs;
+ return result;
}
static int get_nr_threads(struct task_struct *tsk)
@@ -172,42 +179,24 @@ static int get_nr_threads(struct task_struct *tsk)
static int proc_cwd_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *path)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
- struct fs_struct *fs = NULL;
int result = -ENOENT;
if (task) {
- fs = get_fs_struct(task);
+ result = get_fs_path(task, path, 0);
put_task_struct(task);
}
- if (fs) {
- read_lock(&fs->lock);
- *path = fs->pwd;
- path_get(&fs->pwd);
- read_unlock(&fs->lock);
- result = 0;
- put_fs_struct(fs);
- }
return result;
}
static int proc_root_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *path)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
- struct fs_struct *fs = NULL;
int result = -ENOENT;
if (task) {
- fs = get_fs_struct(task);
+ result = get_fs_path(task, path, 1);
put_task_struct(task);
}
- if (fs) {
- read_lock(&fs->lock);
- *path = fs->root;
- path_get(&fs->root);
- read_unlock(&fs->lock);
- result = 0;
- put_fs_struct(fs);
- }
return result;
}
@@ -596,7 +585,6 @@ static int mounts_open_common(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
struct nsproxy *nsp;
struct mnt_namespace *ns = NULL;
- struct fs_struct *fs = NULL;
struct path root;
struct proc_mounts *p;
int ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -610,22 +598,16 @@ static int mounts_open_common(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
get_mnt_ns(ns);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
- if (ns)
- fs = get_fs_struct(task);
+ if (ns && get_fs_path(task, &root, 1) == 0)
+ ret = 0;
put_task_struct(task);
}
if (!ns)
goto err;
- if (!fs)
+ if (ret)
goto err_put_ns;
- read_lock(&fs->lock);
- root = fs->root;
- path_get(&root);
- read_unlock(&fs->lock);
- put_fs_struct(fs);
-
ret = -ENOMEM;
p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct proc_mounts), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)