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author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 2019-10-24 14:54:36 -0700 |
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committer | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 2019-11-06 12:34:36 -0800 |
commit | b103fb7653fff09e7a6fb6ba9398a41584e7ae36 (patch) | |
tree | 76a36a85c9d27f1a8e58e6cbf751844958ab1867 /fs | |
parent | ff73c2c016f8569b728eb1e9ebfab383545e4d65 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-b103fb7653fff09e7a6fb6ba9398a41584e7ae36.tar.gz linux-stable-b103fb7653fff09e7a6fb6ba9398a41584e7ae36.tar.bz2 linux-stable-b103fb7653fff09e7a6fb6ba9398a41584e7ae36.zip |
fscrypt: add support for IV_INO_LBLK_64 policies
Inline encryption hardware compliant with the UFS v2.1 standard or with
the upcoming version of the eMMC standard has the following properties:
(1) Per I/O request, the encryption key is specified by a previously
loaded keyslot. There might be only a small number of keyslots.
(2) Per I/O request, the starting IV is specified by a 64-bit "data unit
number" (DUN). IV bits 64-127 are assumed to be 0. The hardware
automatically increments the DUN for each "data unit" of
configurable size in the request, e.g. for each filesystem block.
Property (1) makes it inefficient to use the traditional fscrypt
per-file keys. Property (2) precludes the use of the existing
DIRECT_KEY fscrypt policy flag, which needs at least 192 IV bits.
Therefore, add a new fscrypt policy flag IV_INO_LBLK_64 which causes the
encryption to modified as follows:
- The encryption keys are derived from the master key, encryption mode
number, and filesystem UUID.
- The IVs are chosen as (inode_number << 32) | file_logical_block_num.
For filenames encryption, file_logical_block_num is 0.
Since the file nonces aren't used in the key derivation, many files may
share the same encryption key. This is much more efficient on the
target hardware. Including the inode number in the IVs and mixing the
filesystem UUID into the keys ensures that data in different files is
nevertheless still encrypted differently.
Additionally, limiting the inode and block numbers to 32 bits and
placing the block number in the low bits maintains compatibility with
the 64-bit DUN convention (property (2) above).
Since this scheme assumes that inode numbers are stable (which may
preclude filesystem shrinking) and that inode and file logical block
numbers are at most 32-bit, IV_INO_LBLK_64 will only be allowed on
filesystems that meet these constraints. These are acceptable
limitations for the cases where this format would actually be used.
Note that IV_INO_LBLK_64 is an on-disk format, not an implementation.
This patch just adds support for it using the existing filesystem layer
encryption. A later patch will add support for inline encryption.
Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/crypto/crypto.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/crypto/keyring.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 45 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/crypto/policy.c | 41 |
5 files changed, 100 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/fs/crypto/crypto.c b/fs/crypto/crypto.c index ced8ad9f2d01..3719efa546c6 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/crypto.c +++ b/fs/crypto/crypto.c @@ -73,11 +73,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_free_bounce_page); void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num, const struct fscrypt_info *ci) { + u8 flags = fscrypt_policy_flags(&ci->ci_policy); + memset(iv, 0, ci->ci_mode->ivsize); - iv->lblk_num = cpu_to_le64(lblk_num); - if (fscrypt_is_direct_key_policy(&ci->ci_policy)) + if (flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64) { + WARN_ON_ONCE((u32)lblk_num != lblk_num); + lblk_num |= (u64)ci->ci_inode->i_ino << 32; + } else if (flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY) { memcpy(iv->nonce, ci->ci_nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE); + } + iv->lblk_num = cpu_to_le64(lblk_num); } /* Encrypt or decrypt a single filesystem block of file contents */ diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h index d9a3e8614049..130b50e5a011 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h @@ -163,6 +163,9 @@ struct fscrypt_info { /* The actual crypto transform used for encryption and decryption */ struct crypto_skcipher *ci_ctfm; + /* True if the key should be freed when this fscrypt_info is freed */ + bool ci_owns_key; + /* * Encryption mode used for this inode. It corresponds to either the * contents or filenames encryption mode, depending on the inode type. @@ -281,7 +284,8 @@ extern int fscrypt_init_hkdf(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, const u8 *master_key, */ #define HKDF_CONTEXT_KEY_IDENTIFIER 1 #define HKDF_CONTEXT_PER_FILE_KEY 2 -#define HKDF_CONTEXT_PER_MODE_KEY 3 +#define HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRECT_KEY 3 +#define HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_64_KEY 4 extern int fscrypt_hkdf_expand(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, u8 context, const u8 *info, unsigned int infolen, @@ -378,8 +382,14 @@ struct fscrypt_master_key { struct list_head mk_decrypted_inodes; spinlock_t mk_decrypted_inodes_lock; - /* Per-mode tfms for DIRECT_KEY policies, allocated on-demand */ - struct crypto_skcipher *mk_mode_keys[__FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1]; + /* Crypto API transforms for DIRECT_KEY policies, allocated on-demand */ + struct crypto_skcipher *mk_direct_tfms[__FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1]; + + /* + * Crypto API transforms for filesystem-layer implementation of + * IV_INO_LBLK_64 policies, allocated on-demand. + */ + struct crypto_skcipher *mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_tfms[__FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1]; } __randomize_layout; diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyring.c b/fs/crypto/keyring.c index c34fa7c61b43..040df1f5e1c8 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c @@ -43,8 +43,10 @@ static void free_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) wipe_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret); - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mk->mk_mode_keys); i++) - crypto_free_skcipher(mk->mk_mode_keys[i]); + for (i = 0; i <= __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX; i++) { + crypto_free_skcipher(mk->mk_direct_tfms[i]); + crypto_free_skcipher(mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_tfms[i]); + } key_put(mk->mk_users); kzfree(mk); diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c index 28bc2da9be3c..f577bb6613f9 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c @@ -114,40 +114,54 @@ int fscrypt_set_derived_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *derived_key) return PTR_ERR(tfm); ci->ci_ctfm = tfm; + ci->ci_owns_key = true; return 0; } static int setup_per_mode_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, - struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) + struct fscrypt_master_key *mk, + struct crypto_skcipher **tfms, + u8 hkdf_context, bool include_fs_uuid) { + const struct inode *inode = ci->ci_inode; + const struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb; struct fscrypt_mode *mode = ci->ci_mode; u8 mode_num = mode - available_modes; struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, *prev_tfm; u8 mode_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; + u8 hkdf_info[sizeof(mode_num) + sizeof(sb->s_uuid)]; + unsigned int hkdf_infolen = 0; int err; - if (WARN_ON(mode_num >= ARRAY_SIZE(mk->mk_mode_keys))) + if (WARN_ON(mode_num > __FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX)) return -EINVAL; /* pairs with cmpxchg() below */ - tfm = READ_ONCE(mk->mk_mode_keys[mode_num]); + tfm = READ_ONCE(tfms[mode_num]); if (likely(tfm != NULL)) goto done; BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(mode_num) != 1); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(sb->s_uuid) != 16); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(hkdf_info) != 17); + hkdf_info[hkdf_infolen++] = mode_num; + if (include_fs_uuid) { + memcpy(&hkdf_info[hkdf_infolen], &sb->s_uuid, + sizeof(sb->s_uuid)); + hkdf_infolen += sizeof(sb->s_uuid); + } err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, - HKDF_CONTEXT_PER_MODE_KEY, - &mode_num, sizeof(mode_num), + hkdf_context, hkdf_info, hkdf_infolen, mode_key, mode->keysize); if (err) return err; - tfm = fscrypt_allocate_skcipher(mode, mode_key, ci->ci_inode); + tfm = fscrypt_allocate_skcipher(mode, mode_key, inode); memzero_explicit(mode_key, mode->keysize); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) return PTR_ERR(tfm); /* pairs with READ_ONCE() above */ - prev_tfm = cmpxchg(&mk->mk_mode_keys[mode_num], NULL, tfm); + prev_tfm = cmpxchg(&tfms[mode_num], NULL, tfm); if (prev_tfm != NULL) { crypto_free_skcipher(tfm); tfm = prev_tfm; @@ -178,7 +192,19 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, ci->ci_mode->friendly_name); return -EINVAL; } - return setup_per_mode_key(ci, mk); + return setup_per_mode_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_direct_tfms, + HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRECT_KEY, false); + } else if (ci->ci_policy.v2.flags & + FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64) { + /* + * IV_INO_LBLK_64: encryption keys are derived from (master_key, + * mode_num, filesystem_uuid), and inode number is included in + * the IVs. This format is optimized for use with inline + * encryption hardware compliant with the UFS or eMMC standards. + */ + return setup_per_mode_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_tfms, + HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_64_KEY, + true); } err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, @@ -302,8 +328,7 @@ static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci) if (ci->ci_direct_key) fscrypt_put_direct_key(ci->ci_direct_key); - else if (ci->ci_ctfm != NULL && - !fscrypt_is_direct_key_policy(&ci->ci_policy)) + else if (ci->ci_owns_key) crypto_free_skcipher(ci->ci_ctfm); key = ci->ci_master_key; diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c index 4072ba644595..96f528071bed 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/policy.c +++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c @@ -29,6 +29,40 @@ bool fscrypt_policies_equal(const union fscrypt_policy *policy1, return !memcmp(policy1, policy2, fscrypt_policy_size(policy1)); } +static bool supported_iv_ino_lblk_64_policy( + const struct fscrypt_policy_v2 *policy, + const struct inode *inode) +{ + struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb; + int ino_bits = 64, lblk_bits = 64; + + if (policy->flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY) { + fscrypt_warn(inode, + "The DIRECT_KEY and IV_INO_LBLK_64 flags are mutually exclusive"); + return false; + } + /* + * It's unsafe to include inode numbers in the IVs if the filesystem can + * potentially renumber inodes, e.g. via filesystem shrinking. + */ + if (!sb->s_cop->has_stable_inodes || + !sb->s_cop->has_stable_inodes(sb)) { + fscrypt_warn(inode, + "Can't use IV_INO_LBLK_64 policy on filesystem '%s' because it doesn't have stable inode numbers", + sb->s_id); + return false; + } + if (sb->s_cop->get_ino_and_lblk_bits) + sb->s_cop->get_ino_and_lblk_bits(sb, &ino_bits, &lblk_bits); + if (ino_bits > 32 || lblk_bits > 32) { + fscrypt_warn(inode, + "Can't use IV_INO_LBLK_64 policy on filesystem '%s' because it doesn't use 32-bit inode and block numbers", + sb->s_id); + return false; + } + return true; +} + /** * fscrypt_supported_policy - check whether an encryption policy is supported * @@ -55,7 +89,8 @@ bool fscrypt_supported_policy(const union fscrypt_policy *policy_u, return false; } - if (policy->flags & ~FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID) { + if (policy->flags & ~(FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_MASK | + FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)) { fscrypt_warn(inode, "Unsupported encryption flags (0x%02x)", policy->flags); @@ -83,6 +118,10 @@ bool fscrypt_supported_policy(const union fscrypt_policy *policy_u, return false; } + if ((policy->flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64) && + !supported_iv_ino_lblk_64_policy(policy, inode)) + return false; + if (memchr_inv(policy->__reserved, 0, sizeof(policy->__reserved))) { fscrypt_warn(inode, |