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authorAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>2018-01-30 03:37:41 +0100
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2018-02-03 17:04:24 +0100
commit28c486744e6de4d882a1d853aa63d99fcba4b7a6 (patch)
treeb4a82948e9da647092abc75c19ce0b73756fa07f /init
parent361fb0481247bea4da3eb122e685c8b72ef7c8a9 (diff)
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bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config
[ upstream commit 290af86629b25ffd1ed6232c4e9107da031705cb ] The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715. A quote from goolge project zero blog: "At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying. So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets." To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode. So far eBPF JIT is supported by: x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64 The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only. In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden v2->v3: - move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel) v1->v2: - fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback) - fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback) - add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog->bpf_func - retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk. It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next Considered doing: int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT; but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place and remove this jit_init() function. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'init')
-rw-r--r--init/Kconfig7
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 235c7a2c0d20..ef2f97dc6010 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1556,6 +1556,13 @@ config BPF_SYSCALL
Enable the bpf() system call that allows to manipulate eBPF
programs and maps via file descriptors.
+config BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
+ bool "Permanently enable BPF JIT and remove BPF interpreter"
+ depends on BPF_SYSCALL && HAVE_EBPF_JIT && BPF_JIT
+ help
+ Enables BPF JIT and removes BPF interpreter to avoid
+ speculative execution of BPF instructions by the interpreter
+
config SHMEM
bool "Use full shmem filesystem" if EXPERT
default y