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author | Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> | 2015-09-09 15:38:51 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2015-09-10 13:29:01 -0700 |
commit | a43cac0d9dc2073ff2245a171429ddbe1accece7 (patch) | |
tree | 2d4c4e98d70b12a451d5b790cc6a369c7eefe85b /kernel/kexec_file.c | |
parent | a202fbbf56e819de83876827c4bf5da2bfbac5ec (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-a43cac0d9dc2073ff2245a171429ddbe1accece7.tar.gz linux-stable-a43cac0d9dc2073ff2245a171429ddbe1accece7.tar.bz2 linux-stable-a43cac0d9dc2073ff2245a171429ddbe1accece7.zip |
kexec: split kexec_file syscall code to kexec_file.c
Split kexec_file syscall related code to another file kernel/kexec_file.c
so that the #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE in kexec.c can be dropped.
Sharing variables and functions are moved to kernel/kexec_internal.h per
suggestion from Vivek and Petr.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix bisectability]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare the various arch_kexec functions]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/kexec_file.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/kexec_file.c | 1045 |
1 files changed, 1045 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6a9a3f2a0e8e --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c @@ -0,0 +1,1045 @@ +/* + * kexec: kexec_file_load system call + * + * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat Inc. + * Authors: + * Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> + * + * This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public License, + * Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details. + */ + +#include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/file.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/kexec.h> +#include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <linux/list.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/sha.h> +#include <linux/syscalls.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include "kexec_internal.h" + +/* + * Declare these symbols weak so that if architecture provides a purgatory, + * these will be overridden. + */ +char __weak kexec_purgatory[0]; +size_t __weak kexec_purgatory_size = 0; + +static int kexec_calculate_store_digests(struct kimage *image); + +static int copy_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, unsigned long *buf_len) +{ + struct fd f = fdget(fd); + int ret; + struct kstat stat; + loff_t pos; + ssize_t bytes = 0; + + if (!f.file) + return -EBADF; + + ret = vfs_getattr(&f.file->f_path, &stat); + if (ret) + goto out; + + if (stat.size > INT_MAX) { + ret = -EFBIG; + goto out; + } + + /* Don't hand 0 to vmalloc, it whines. */ + if (stat.size == 0) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + *buf = vmalloc(stat.size); + if (!*buf) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + pos = 0; + while (pos < stat.size) { + bytes = kernel_read(f.file, pos, (char *)(*buf) + pos, + stat.size - pos); + if (bytes < 0) { + vfree(*buf); + ret = bytes; + goto out; + } + + if (bytes == 0) + break; + pos += bytes; + } + + if (pos != stat.size) { + ret = -EBADF; + vfree(*buf); + goto out; + } + + *buf_len = pos; +out: + fdput(f); + return ret; +} + +/* Architectures can provide this probe function */ +int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(struct kimage *image, void *buf, + unsigned long buf_len) +{ + return -ENOEXEC; +} + +void * __weak arch_kexec_kernel_image_load(struct kimage *image) +{ + return ERR_PTR(-ENOEXEC); +} + +int __weak arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + +int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf, + unsigned long buf_len) +{ + return -EKEYREJECTED; +} + +/* Apply relocations of type RELA */ +int __weak +arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(const Elf_Ehdr *ehdr, Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, + unsigned int relsec) +{ + pr_err("RELA relocation unsupported.\n"); + return -ENOEXEC; +} + +/* Apply relocations of type REL */ +int __weak +arch_kexec_apply_relocations(const Elf_Ehdr *ehdr, Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, + unsigned int relsec) +{ + pr_err("REL relocation unsupported.\n"); + return -ENOEXEC; +} + +/* + * Free up memory used by kernel, initrd, and command line. This is temporary + * memory allocation which is not needed any more after these buffers have + * been loaded into separate segments and have been copied elsewhere. + */ +void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image) +{ + struct purgatory_info *pi = &image->purgatory_info; + + vfree(image->kernel_buf); + image->kernel_buf = NULL; + + vfree(image->initrd_buf); + image->initrd_buf = NULL; + + kfree(image->cmdline_buf); + image->cmdline_buf = NULL; + + vfree(pi->purgatory_buf); + pi->purgatory_buf = NULL; + + vfree(pi->sechdrs); + pi->sechdrs = NULL; + + /* See if architecture has anything to cleanup post load */ + arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(image); + + /* + * Above call should have called into bootloader to free up + * any data stored in kimage->image_loader_data. It should + * be ok now to free it up. + */ + kfree(image->image_loader_data); + image->image_loader_data = NULL; +} + +/* + * In file mode list of segments is prepared by kernel. Copy relevant + * data from user space, do error checking, prepare segment list + */ +static int +kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, + const char __user *cmdline_ptr, + unsigned long cmdline_len, unsigned flags) +{ + int ret = 0; + void *ldata; + + ret = copy_file_from_fd(kernel_fd, &image->kernel_buf, + &image->kernel_buf_len); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* Call arch image probe handlers */ + ret = arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(image, image->kernel_buf, + image->kernel_buf_len); + + if (ret) + goto out; + +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG + ret = arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf, + image->kernel_buf_len); + if (ret) { + pr_debug("kernel signature verification failed.\n"); + goto out; + } + pr_debug("kernel signature verification successful.\n"); +#endif + /* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */ + if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) { + ret = copy_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf, + &image->initrd_buf_len); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + + if (cmdline_len) { + image->cmdline_buf = kzalloc(cmdline_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!image->cmdline_buf) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + ret = copy_from_user(image->cmdline_buf, cmdline_ptr, + cmdline_len); + if (ret) { + ret = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + + image->cmdline_buf_len = cmdline_len; + + /* command line should be a string with last byte null */ + if (image->cmdline_buf[cmdline_len - 1] != '\0') { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + } + + /* Call arch image load handlers */ + ldata = arch_kexec_kernel_image_load(image); + + if (IS_ERR(ldata)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(ldata); + goto out; + } + + image->image_loader_data = ldata; +out: + /* In case of error, free up all allocated memory in this function */ + if (ret) + kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(image); + return ret; +} + +static int +kimage_file_alloc_init(struct kimage **rimage, int kernel_fd, + int initrd_fd, const char __user *cmdline_ptr, + unsigned long cmdline_len, unsigned long flags) +{ + int ret; + struct kimage *image; + bool kexec_on_panic = flags & KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH; + + image = do_kimage_alloc_init(); + if (!image) + return -ENOMEM; + + image->file_mode = 1; + + if (kexec_on_panic) { + /* Enable special crash kernel control page alloc policy. */ + image->control_page = crashk_res.start; + image->type = KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH; + } + + ret = kimage_file_prepare_segments(image, kernel_fd, initrd_fd, + cmdline_ptr, cmdline_len, flags); + if (ret) + goto out_free_image; + + ret = sanity_check_segment_list(image); + if (ret) + goto out_free_post_load_bufs; + + ret = -ENOMEM; + image->control_code_page = kimage_alloc_control_pages(image, + get_order(KEXEC_CONTROL_PAGE_SIZE)); + if (!image->control_code_page) { + pr_err("Could not allocate control_code_buffer\n"); + goto out_free_post_load_bufs; + } + + if (!kexec_on_panic) { + image->swap_page = kimage_alloc_control_pages(image, 0); + if (!image->swap_page) { + pr_err("Could not allocate swap buffer\n"); + goto out_free_control_pages; + } + } + + *rimage = image; + return 0; +out_free_control_pages: + kimage_free_page_list(&image->control_pages); +out_free_post_load_bufs: + kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(image); +out_free_image: + kfree(image); + return ret; +} + +SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd, + unsigned long, cmdline_len, const char __user *, cmdline_ptr, + unsigned long, flags) +{ + int ret = 0, i; + struct kimage **dest_image, *image; + + /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) + return -EPERM; + + /* Make sure we have a legal set of flags */ + if (flags != (flags & KEXEC_FILE_FLAGS)) + return -EINVAL; + + image = NULL; + + if (!mutex_trylock(&kexec_mutex)) + return -EBUSY; + + dest_image = &kexec_image; + if (flags & KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH) + dest_image = &kexec_crash_image; + + if (flags & KEXEC_FILE_UNLOAD) + goto exchange; + + /* + * In case of crash, new kernel gets loaded in reserved region. It is + * same memory where old crash kernel might be loaded. Free any + * current crash dump kernel before we corrupt it. + */ + if (flags & KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH) + kimage_free(xchg(&kexec_crash_image, NULL)); + + ret = kimage_file_alloc_init(&image, kernel_fd, initrd_fd, cmdline_ptr, + cmdline_len, flags); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = machine_kexec_prepare(image); + if (ret) + goto out; + + ret = kexec_calculate_store_digests(image); + if (ret) + goto out; + + for (i = 0; i < image->nr_segments; i++) { + struct kexec_segment *ksegment; + + ksegment = &image->segment[i]; + pr_debug("Loading segment %d: buf=0x%p bufsz=0x%zx mem=0x%lx memsz=0x%zx\n", + i, ksegment->buf, ksegment->bufsz, ksegment->mem, + ksegment->memsz); + + ret = kimage_load_segment(image, &image->segment[i]); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + + kimage_terminate(image); + + /* + * Free up any temporary buffers allocated which are not needed + * after image has been loaded + */ + kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(image); +exchange: + image = xchg(dest_image, image); +out: + mutex_unlock(&kexec_mutex); + kimage_free(image); + return ret; +} + +static int locate_mem_hole_top_down(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, + struct kexec_buf *kbuf) +{ + struct kimage *image = kbuf->image; + unsigned long temp_start, temp_end; + + temp_end = min(end, kbuf->buf_max); + temp_start = temp_end - kbuf->memsz; + + do { + /* align down start */ + temp_start = temp_start & (~(kbuf->buf_align - 1)); + + if (temp_start < start || temp_start < kbuf->buf_min) + return 0; + + temp_end = temp_start + kbuf->memsz - 1; + + /* + * Make sure this does not conflict with any of existing + * segments + */ + if (kimage_is_destination_range(image, temp_start, temp_end)) { + temp_start = temp_start - PAGE_SIZE; + continue; + } + + /* We found a suitable memory range */ + break; + } while (1); + + /* If we are here, we found a suitable memory range */ + kbuf->mem = temp_start; + + /* Success, stop navigating through remaining System RAM ranges */ + return 1; +} + +static int locate_mem_hole_bottom_up(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, + struct kexec_buf *kbuf) +{ + struct kimage *image = kbuf->image; + unsigned long temp_start, temp_end; + + temp_start = max(start, kbuf->buf_min); + + do { + temp_start = ALIGN(temp_start, kbuf->buf_align); + temp_end = temp_start + kbuf->memsz - 1; + + if (temp_end > end || temp_end > kbuf->buf_max) + return 0; + /* + * Make sure this does not conflict with any of existing + * segments + */ + if (kimage_is_destination_range(image, temp_start, temp_end)) { + temp_start = temp_start + PAGE_SIZE; + continue; + } + + /* We found a suitable memory range */ + break; + } while (1); + + /* If we are here, we found a suitable memory range */ + kbuf->mem = temp_start; + + /* Success, stop navigating through remaining System RAM ranges */ + return 1; +} + +static int locate_mem_hole_callback(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg) +{ + struct kexec_buf *kbuf = (struct kexec_buf *)arg; + unsigned long sz = end - start + 1; + + /* Returning 0 will take to next memory range */ + if (sz < kbuf->memsz) + return 0; + + if (end < kbuf->buf_min || start > kbuf->buf_max) + return 0; + + /* + * Allocate memory top down with-in ram range. Otherwise bottom up + * allocation. + */ + if (kbuf->top_down) + return locate_mem_hole_top_down(start, end, kbuf); + return locate_mem_hole_bottom_up(start, end, kbuf); +} + +/* + * Helper function for placing a buffer in a kexec segment. This assumes + * that kexec_mutex is held. + */ +int kexec_add_buffer(struct kimage *image, char *buffer, unsigned long bufsz, + unsigned long memsz, unsigned long buf_align, + unsigned long buf_min, unsigned long buf_max, + bool top_down, unsigned long *load_addr) +{ + + struct kexec_segment *ksegment; + struct kexec_buf buf, *kbuf; + int ret; + + /* Currently adding segment this way is allowed only in file mode */ + if (!image->file_mode) + return -EINVAL; + + if (image->nr_segments >= KEXEC_SEGMENT_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * Make sure we are not trying to add buffer after allocating + * control pages. All segments need to be placed first before + * any control pages are allocated. As control page allocation + * logic goes through list of segments to make sure there are + * no destination overlaps. + */ + if (!list_empty(&image->control_pages)) { + WARN_ON(1); + return -EINVAL; + } + + memset(&buf, 0, sizeof(struct kexec_buf)); + kbuf = &buf; + kbuf->image = image; + kbuf->buffer = buffer; + kbuf->bufsz = bufsz; + + kbuf->memsz = ALIGN(memsz, PAGE_SIZE); + kbuf->buf_align = max(buf_align, PAGE_SIZE); + kbuf->buf_min = buf_min; + kbuf->buf_max = buf_max; + kbuf->top_down = top_down; + + /* Walk the RAM ranges and allocate a suitable range for the buffer */ + if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) + ret = walk_iomem_res("Crash kernel", + IORESOURCE_MEM | IORESOURCE_BUSY, + crashk_res.start, crashk_res.end, kbuf, + locate_mem_hole_callback); + else + ret = walk_system_ram_res(0, -1, kbuf, + locate_mem_hole_callback); + if (ret != 1) { + /* A suitable memory range could not be found for buffer */ + return -EADDRNOTAVAIL; + } + + /* Found a suitable memory range */ + ksegment = &image->segment[image->nr_segments]; + ksegment->kbuf = kbuf->buffer; + ksegment->bufsz = kbuf->bufsz; + ksegment->mem = kbuf->mem; + ksegment->memsz = kbuf->memsz; + image->nr_segments++; + *load_addr = ksegment->mem; + return 0; +} + +/* Calculate and store the digest of segments */ +static int kexec_calculate_store_digests(struct kimage *image) +{ + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + struct shash_desc *desc; + int ret = 0, i, j, zero_buf_sz, sha_region_sz; + size_t desc_size, nullsz; + char *digest; + void *zero_buf; + struct kexec_sha_region *sha_regions; + struct purgatory_info *pi = &image->purgatory_info; + + zero_buf = __va(page_to_pfn(ZERO_PAGE(0)) << PAGE_SHIFT); + zero_buf_sz = PAGE_SIZE; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(tfm); + goto out; + } + + desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); + desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!desc) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out_free_tfm; + } + + sha_region_sz = KEXEC_SEGMENT_MAX * sizeof(struct kexec_sha_region); + sha_regions = vzalloc(sha_region_sz); + if (!sha_regions) + goto out_free_desc; + + desc->tfm = tfm; + desc->flags = 0; + + ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); + if (ret < 0) + goto out_free_sha_regions; + + digest = kzalloc(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!digest) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out_free_sha_regions; + } + + for (j = i = 0; i < image->nr_segments; i++) { + struct kexec_segment *ksegment; + + ksegment = &image->segment[i]; + /* + * Skip purgatory as it will be modified once we put digest + * info in purgatory. + */ + if (ksegment->kbuf == pi->purgatory_buf) + continue; + + ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, ksegment->kbuf, + ksegment->bufsz); + if (ret) + break; + + /* + * Assume rest of the buffer is filled with zero and + * update digest accordingly. + */ + nullsz = ksegment->memsz - ksegment->bufsz; + while (nullsz) { + unsigned long bytes = nullsz; + + if (bytes > zero_buf_sz) + bytes = zero_buf_sz; + ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, zero_buf, bytes); + if (ret) + break; + nullsz -= bytes; + } + + if (ret) + break; + + sha_regions[j].start = ksegment->mem; + sha_regions[j].len = ksegment->memsz; + j++; + } + + if (!ret) { + ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); + if (ret) + goto out_free_digest; + ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image, "sha_regions", + sha_regions, sha_region_sz, 0); + if (ret) + goto out_free_digest; + + ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image, "sha256_digest", + digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); + if (ret) + goto out_free_digest; + } + +out_free_digest: + kfree(digest); +out_free_sha_regions: + vfree(sha_regions); +out_free_desc: + kfree(desc); +out_free_tfm: + kfree(tfm); +out: + return ret; +} + +/* Actually load purgatory. Lot of code taken from kexec-tools */ +static int __kexec_load_purgatory(struct kimage *image, unsigned long min, + unsigned long max, int top_down) +{ + struct purgatory_info *pi = &image->purgatory_info; + unsigned long align, buf_align, bss_align, buf_sz, bss_sz, bss_pad; + unsigned long memsz, entry, load_addr, curr_load_addr, bss_addr, offset; + unsigned char *buf_addr, *src; + int i, ret = 0, entry_sidx = -1; + const Elf_Shdr *sechdrs_c; + Elf_Shdr *sechdrs = NULL; + void *purgatory_buf = NULL; + + /* + * sechdrs_c points to section headers in purgatory and are read + * only. No modifications allowed. + */ + sechdrs_c = (void *)pi->ehdr + pi->ehdr->e_shoff; + + /* + * We can not modify sechdrs_c[] and its fields. It is read only. + * Copy it over to a local copy where one can store some temporary + * data and free it at the end. We need to modify ->sh_addr and + * ->sh_offset fields to keep track of permanent and temporary + * locations of sections. + */ + sechdrs = vzalloc(pi->ehdr->e_shnum * sizeof(Elf_Shdr)); + if (!sechdrs) + return -ENOMEM; + + memcpy(sechdrs, sechdrs_c, pi->ehdr->e_shnum * sizeof(Elf_Shdr)); + + /* + * We seem to have multiple copies of sections. First copy is which + * is embedded in kernel in read only section. Some of these sections + * will be copied to a temporary buffer and relocated. And these + * sections will finally be copied to their final destination at + * segment load time. + * + * Use ->sh_offset to reflect section address in memory. It will + * point to original read only copy if section is not allocatable. + * Otherwise it will point to temporary copy which will be relocated. + * + * Use ->sh_addr to contain final address of the section where it + * will go during execution time. + */ + for (i = 0; i < pi->ehdr->e_shnum; i++) { + if (sechdrs[i].sh_type == SHT_NOBITS) + continue; + + sechdrs[i].sh_offset = (unsigned long)pi->ehdr + + sechdrs[i].sh_offset; + } + + /* + * Identify entry point section and make entry relative to section + * start. + */ + entry = pi->ehdr->e_entry; + for (i = 0; i < pi->ehdr->e_shnum; i++) { + if (!(sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC)) + continue; + + if (!(sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_EXECINSTR)) + continue; + + /* Make entry section relative */ + if (sechdrs[i].sh_addr <= pi->ehdr->e_entry && + ((sechdrs[i].sh_addr + sechdrs[i].sh_size) > + pi->ehdr->e_entry)) { + entry_sidx = i; + entry -= sechdrs[i].sh_addr; + break; + } + } + + /* Determine how much memory is needed to load relocatable object. */ + buf_align = 1; + bss_align = 1; + buf_sz = 0; + bss_sz = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < pi->ehdr->e_shnum; i++) { + if (!(sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC)) + continue; + + align = sechdrs[i].sh_addralign; + if (sechdrs[i].sh_type != SHT_NOBITS) { + if (buf_align < align) + buf_align = align; + buf_sz = ALIGN(buf_sz, align); + buf_sz += sechdrs[i].sh_size; + } else { + /* bss section */ + if (bss_align < align) + bss_align = align; + bss_sz = ALIGN(bss_sz, align); + bss_sz += sechdrs[i].sh_size; + } + } + + /* Determine the bss padding required to align bss properly */ + bss_pad = 0; + if (buf_sz & (bss_align - 1)) + bss_pad = bss_align - (buf_sz & (bss_align - 1)); + + memsz = buf_sz + bss_pad + bss_sz; + + /* Allocate buffer for purgatory */ + purgatory_buf = vzalloc(buf_sz); + if (!purgatory_buf) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + if (buf_align < bss_align) + buf_align = bss_align; + + /* Add buffer to segment list */ + ret = kexec_add_buffer(image, purgatory_buf, buf_sz, memsz, + buf_align, min, max, top_down, + &pi->purgatory_load_addr); + if (ret) + goto out; + + /* Load SHF_ALLOC sections */ + buf_addr = purgatory_buf; + load_addr = curr_load_addr = pi->purgatory_load_addr; + bss_addr = load_addr + buf_sz + bss_pad; + + for (i = 0; i < pi->ehdr->e_shnum; i++) { + if (!(sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC)) + continue; + + align = sechdrs[i].sh_addralign; + if (sechdrs[i].sh_type != SHT_NOBITS) { + curr_load_addr = ALIGN(curr_load_addr, align); + offset = curr_load_addr - load_addr; + /* We already modifed ->sh_offset to keep src addr */ + src = (char *) sechdrs[i].sh_offset; + memcpy(buf_addr + offset, src, sechdrs[i].sh_size); + + /* Store load address and source address of section */ + sechdrs[i].sh_addr = curr_load_addr; + + /* + * This section got copied to temporary buffer. Update + * ->sh_offset accordingly. + */ + sechdrs[i].sh_offset = (unsigned long)(buf_addr + offset); + + /* Advance to the next address */ + curr_load_addr += sechdrs[i].sh_size; + } else { + bss_addr = ALIGN(bss_addr, align); + sechdrs[i].sh_addr = bss_addr; + bss_addr += sechdrs[i].sh_size; + } + } + + /* Update entry point based on load address of text section */ + if (entry_sidx >= 0) + entry += sechdrs[entry_sidx].sh_addr; + + /* Make kernel jump to purgatory after shutdown */ + image->start = entry; + + /* Used later to get/set symbol values */ + pi->sechdrs = sechdrs; + + /* + * Used later to identify which section is purgatory and skip it + * from checksumming. + */ + pi->purgatory_buf = purgatory_buf; + return ret; +out: + vfree(sechdrs); + vfree(purgatory_buf); + return ret; +} + +static int kexec_apply_relocations(struct kimage *image) +{ + int i, ret; + struct purgatory_info *pi = &image->purgatory_info; + Elf_Shdr *sechdrs = pi->sechdrs; + + /* Apply relocations */ + for (i = 0; i < pi->ehdr->e_shnum; i++) { + Elf_Shdr *section, *symtab; + + if (sechdrs[i].sh_type != SHT_RELA && + sechdrs[i].sh_type != SHT_REL) + continue; + + /* + * For section of type SHT_RELA/SHT_REL, + * ->sh_link contains section header index of associated + * symbol table. And ->sh_info contains section header + * index of section to which relocations apply. + */ + if (sechdrs[i].sh_info >= pi->ehdr->e_shnum || + sechdrs[i].sh_link >= pi->ehdr->e_shnum) + return -ENOEXEC; + + section = &sechdrs[sechdrs[i].sh_info]; + symtab = &sechdrs[sechdrs[i].sh_link]; + + if (!(section->sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC)) + continue; + + /* + * symtab->sh_link contain section header index of associated + * string table. + */ + if (symtab->sh_link >= pi->ehdr->e_shnum) + /* Invalid section number? */ + continue; + + /* + * Respective architecture needs to provide support for applying + * relocations of type SHT_RELA/SHT_REL. + */ + if (sechdrs[i].sh_type == SHT_RELA) + ret = arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(pi->ehdr, + sechdrs, i); + else if (sechdrs[i].sh_type == SHT_REL) + ret = arch_kexec_apply_relocations(pi->ehdr, + sechdrs, i); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Load relocatable purgatory object and relocate it appropriately */ +int kexec_load_purgatory(struct kimage *image, unsigned long min, + unsigned long max, int top_down, + unsigned long *load_addr) +{ + struct purgatory_info *pi = &image->purgatory_info; + int ret; + + if (kexec_purgatory_size <= 0) + return -EINVAL; + + if (kexec_purgatory_size < sizeof(Elf_Ehdr)) + return -ENOEXEC; + + pi->ehdr = (Elf_Ehdr *)kexec_purgatory; + + if (memcmp(pi->ehdr->e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) != 0 + || pi->ehdr->e_type != ET_REL + || !elf_check_arch(pi->ehdr) + || pi->ehdr->e_shentsize != sizeof(Elf_Shdr)) + return -ENOEXEC; + + if (pi->ehdr->e_shoff >= kexec_purgatory_size + || (pi->ehdr->e_shnum * sizeof(Elf_Shdr) > + kexec_purgatory_size - pi->ehdr->e_shoff)) + return -ENOEXEC; + + ret = __kexec_load_purgatory(image, min, max, top_down); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = kexec_apply_relocations(image); + if (ret) + goto out; + + *load_addr = pi->purgatory_load_addr; + return 0; +out: + vfree(pi->sechdrs); + vfree(pi->purgatory_buf); + return ret; +} + +static Elf_Sym *kexec_purgatory_find_symbol(struct purgatory_info *pi, + const char *name) +{ + Elf_Sym *syms; + Elf_Shdr *sechdrs; + Elf_Ehdr *ehdr; + int i, k; + const char *strtab; + + if (!pi->sechdrs || !pi->ehdr) + return NULL; + + sechdrs = pi->sechdrs; + ehdr = pi->ehdr; + + for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_shnum; i++) { + if (sechdrs[i].sh_type != SHT_SYMTAB) + continue; + + if (sechdrs[i].sh_link >= ehdr->e_shnum) + /* Invalid strtab section number */ + continue; + strtab = (char *)sechdrs[sechdrs[i].sh_link].sh_offset; + syms = (Elf_Sym *)sechdrs[i].sh_offset; + + /* Go through symbols for a match */ + for (k = 0; k < sechdrs[i].sh_size/sizeof(Elf_Sym); k++) { + if (ELF_ST_BIND(syms[k].st_info) != STB_GLOBAL) + continue; + + if (strcmp(strtab + syms[k].st_name, name) != 0) + continue; + + if (syms[k].st_shndx == SHN_UNDEF || + syms[k].st_shndx >= ehdr->e_shnum) { + pr_debug("Symbol: %s has bad section index %d.\n", + name, syms[k].st_shndx); + return NULL; + } + + /* Found the symbol we are looking for */ + return &syms[k]; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +void *kexec_purgatory_get_symbol_addr(struct kimage *image, const char *name) +{ + struct purgatory_info *pi = &image->purgatory_info; + Elf_Sym *sym; + Elf_Shdr *sechdr; + + sym = kexec_purgatory_find_symbol(pi, name); + if (!sym) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + sechdr = &pi->sechdrs[sym->st_shndx]; + + /* + * Returns the address where symbol will finally be loaded after + * kexec_load_segment() + */ + return (void *)(sechdr->sh_addr + sym->st_value); +} + +/* + * Get or set value of a symbol. If "get_value" is true, symbol value is + * returned in buf otherwise symbol value is set based on value in buf. + */ +int kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(struct kimage *image, const char *name, + void *buf, unsigned int size, bool get_value) +{ + Elf_Sym *sym; + Elf_Shdr *sechdrs; + struct purgatory_info *pi = &image->purgatory_info; + char *sym_buf; + + sym = kexec_purgatory_find_symbol(pi, name); + if (!sym) + return -EINVAL; + + if (sym->st_size != size) { + pr_err("symbol %s size mismatch: expected %lu actual %u\n", + name, (unsigned long)sym->st_size, size); + return -EINVAL; + } + + sechdrs = pi->sechdrs; + + if (sechdrs[sym->st_shndx].sh_type == SHT_NOBITS) { + pr_err("symbol %s is in a bss section. Cannot %s\n", name, + get_value ? "get" : "set"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + sym_buf = (unsigned char *)sechdrs[sym->st_shndx].sh_offset + + sym->st_value; + + if (get_value) + memcpy((void *)buf, sym_buf, size); + else + memcpy((void *)sym_buf, buf, size); + + return 0; +} |