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author | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2017-09-23 10:16:53 -0700 |
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committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2017-09-23 10:16:53 -0700 |
commit | 1f8d31d189cc6ce1e4b972959fda41e790bb92b8 (patch) | |
tree | fd3cca12a29319f073773ac55f7d41cc58e2c73f /kernel | |
parent | 3fb5ec06578e4c85d3486b6a73cbeb07960a51ce (diff) | |
parent | cd4175b11685b11c40e31a03e05084cc212b0649 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-1f8d31d189cc6ce1e4b972959fda41e790bb92b8.tar.gz linux-stable-1f8d31d189cc6ce1e4b972959fda41e790bb92b8.tar.bz2 linux-stable-1f8d31d189cc6ce1e4b972959fda41e790bb92b8.zip |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/devmap.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/events/core.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/irq/chip.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/seccomp.c | 321 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/trace/trace.c | 19 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/trace/trace.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/trace/trace_mmiotrace.c | 1 |
9 files changed, 346 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c index 959c9a07f318..e093d9a2c4dd 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c @@ -75,8 +75,8 @@ static u64 dev_map_bitmap_size(const union bpf_attr *attr) static struct bpf_map *dev_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) { struct bpf_dtab *dtab; + int err = -EINVAL; u64 cost; - int err; /* check sanity of attributes */ if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 || @@ -108,6 +108,8 @@ static struct bpf_map *dev_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) if (err) goto free_dtab; + err = -ENOMEM; + /* A per cpu bitfield with a bit per possible net device */ dtab->flush_needed = __alloc_percpu(dev_map_bitmap_size(attr), __alignof__(unsigned long)); @@ -128,7 +130,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *dev_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) free_dtab: free_percpu(dtab->flush_needed); kfree(dtab); - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + return ERR_PTR(err); } static void dev_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index cb17e1cd1d43..25d074920a00 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -186,15 +186,17 @@ static int bpf_map_alloc_id(struct bpf_map *map) static void bpf_map_free_id(struct bpf_map *map, bool do_idr_lock) { + unsigned long flags; + if (do_idr_lock) - spin_lock_bh(&map_idr_lock); + spin_lock_irqsave(&map_idr_lock, flags); else __acquire(&map_idr_lock); idr_remove(&map_idr, map->id); if (do_idr_lock) - spin_unlock_bh(&map_idr_lock); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&map_idr_lock, flags); else __release(&map_idr_lock); } diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 799b2451ef2d..b914fbe1383e 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -4205,7 +4205,12 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) } if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) { - u64 addr = (unsigned long)prog; + /* Note, we cannot use prog directly as imm as subsequent + * rewrites would still change the prog pointer. The only + * stable address we can use is aux, which also works with + * prog clones during blinding. + */ + u64 addr = (unsigned long)prog->aux; struct bpf_insn r4_ld[] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_4, addr), *insn, diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 3e691b75b2db..6bc21e202ae4 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -8171,6 +8171,7 @@ static int perf_event_set_bpf_prog(struct perf_event *event, u32 prog_fd) } } event->tp_event->prog = prog; + event->tp_event->bpf_prog_owner = event; return 0; } @@ -8185,7 +8186,7 @@ static void perf_event_free_bpf_prog(struct perf_event *event) return; prog = event->tp_event->prog; - if (prog) { + if (prog && event->tp_event->bpf_prog_owner == event) { event->tp_event->prog = NULL; bpf_prog_put(prog); } diff --git a/kernel/irq/chip.c b/kernel/irq/chip.c index f51b7b6d2451..6fc89fd93824 100644 --- a/kernel/irq/chip.c +++ b/kernel/irq/chip.c @@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ __irq_startup_managed(struct irq_desc *desc, struct cpumask *aff, bool force) irqd_clr_managed_shutdown(d); - if (cpumask_any_and(aff, cpu_online_mask) > nr_cpu_ids) { + if (cpumask_any_and(aff, cpu_online_mask) >= nr_cpu_ids) { /* * Catch code which fiddles with enable_irq() on a managed * and potentially shutdown IRQ. Chained interrupt diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 98b59b5db90b..c24579dfa7a1 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -17,11 +17,13 @@ #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/coredump.h> +#include <linux/kmemleak.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h> #include <linux/seccomp.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> +#include <linux/sysctl.h> #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER #include <asm/syscall.h> @@ -42,6 +44,7 @@ * get/put helpers should be used when accessing an instance * outside of a lifetime-guarded section. In general, this * is only needed for handling filters shared across tasks. + * @log: true if all actions except for SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW should be logged * @prev: points to a previously installed, or inherited, filter * @prog: the BPF program to evaluate * @@ -57,6 +60,7 @@ */ struct seccomp_filter { refcount_t usage; + bool log; struct seccomp_filter *prev; struct bpf_prog *prog; }; @@ -171,10 +175,15 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen) /** * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @sd * @sd: optional seccomp data to be passed to filters + * @match: stores struct seccomp_filter that resulted in the return value, + * unless filter returned SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, in which case it will + * be unchanged. * * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes. */ -static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd) +#define ACTION_ONLY(ret) ((s32)((ret) & (SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL))) +static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd, + struct seccomp_filter **match) { struct seccomp_data sd_local; u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW; @@ -184,7 +193,7 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd) /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */ if (unlikely(WARN_ON(f == NULL))) - return SECCOMP_RET_KILL; + return SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS; if (!sd) { populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local); @@ -198,8 +207,10 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd) for (; f; f = f->prev) { u32 cur_ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(f->prog, sd); - if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION)) + if (ACTION_ONLY(cur_ret) < ACTION_ONLY(ret)) { ret = cur_ret; + *match = f; + } } return ret; } @@ -444,6 +455,10 @@ static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags, return ret; } + /* Set log flag, if present. */ + if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG) + filter->log = true; + /* * If there is an existing filter, make it the prev and don't drop its * task reference. @@ -514,6 +529,65 @@ static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall, int reason) } #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */ +/* For use with seccomp_actions_logged */ +#define SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS (1 << 0) +#define SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD (1 << 1) +#define SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP (1 << 2) +#define SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO (1 << 3) +#define SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE (1 << 4) +#define SECCOMP_LOG_LOG (1 << 5) +#define SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW (1 << 6) + +static u32 seccomp_actions_logged = SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS | + SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD | + SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP | + SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO | + SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE | + SECCOMP_LOG_LOG; + +static inline void seccomp_log(unsigned long syscall, long signr, u32 action, + bool requested) +{ + bool log = false; + + switch (action) { + case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW: + break; + case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP: + log = requested && seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP; + break; + case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO: + log = requested && seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO; + break; + case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE: + log = requested && seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE; + break; + case SECCOMP_RET_LOG: + log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_LOG; + break; + case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD: + log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD; + break; + case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS: + default: + log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS; + } + + /* + * Force an audit message to be emitted when the action is RET_KILL_*, + * RET_LOG, or the FILTER_FLAG_LOG bit was set and the action is + * allowed to be logged by the admin. + */ + if (log) + return __audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action); + + /* + * Let the audit subsystem decide if the action should be audited based + * on whether the current task itself is being audited. + */ + return audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action); +} + /* * Secure computing mode 1 allows only read/write/exit/sigreturn. * To be fully secure this must be combined with rlimit @@ -539,7 +613,7 @@ static void __secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) #ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG dump_stack(); #endif - audit_seccomp(this_syscall, SIGKILL, SECCOMP_RET_KILL); + seccomp_log(this_syscall, SIGKILL, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD, true); do_exit(SIGKILL); } @@ -566,6 +640,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd, const bool recheck_after_trace) { u32 filter_ret, action; + struct seccomp_filter *match = NULL; int data; /* @@ -574,9 +649,9 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd, */ rmb(); - filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd); + filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd, &match); data = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA; - action = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION; + action = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL; switch (action) { case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO: @@ -637,14 +712,25 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd, return 0; + case SECCOMP_RET_LOG: + seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action, true); + return 0; + case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW: + /* + * Note that the "match" filter will always be NULL for + * this action since SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW is the starting + * state in seccomp_run_filters(). + */ return 0; - case SECCOMP_RET_KILL: + case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD: + case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS: default: - audit_seccomp(this_syscall, SIGSYS, action); + seccomp_log(this_syscall, SIGSYS, action, true); /* Dump core only if this is the last remaining thread. */ - if (get_nr_threads(current) == 1) { + if (action == SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS || + get_nr_threads(current) == 1) { siginfo_t info; /* Show the original registers in the dump. */ @@ -653,13 +739,16 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd, seccomp_init_siginfo(&info, this_syscall, data); do_coredump(&info); } - do_exit(SIGSYS); + if (action == SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS) + do_group_exit(SIGSYS); + else + do_exit(SIGSYS); } unreachable(); skip: - audit_seccomp(this_syscall, 0, action); + seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action, match ? match->log : false); return -1; } #else @@ -794,6 +883,29 @@ static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags, } #endif +static long seccomp_get_action_avail(const char __user *uaction) +{ + u32 action; + + if (copy_from_user(&action, uaction, sizeof(action))) + return -EFAULT; + + switch (action) { + case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS: + case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD: + case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP: + case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO: + case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE: + case SECCOMP_RET_LOG: + case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW: + break; + default: + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } + + return 0; +} + /* Common entry point for both prctl and syscall. */ static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, const char __user *uargs) @@ -805,6 +917,11 @@ static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, return seccomp_set_mode_strict(); case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER: return seccomp_set_mode_filter(flags, uargs); + case SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL: + if (flags != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + return seccomp_get_action_avail(uargs); default: return -EINVAL; } @@ -922,3 +1039,185 @@ out: return ret; } #endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL + +/* Human readable action names for friendly sysctl interaction */ +#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS_NAME "kill_process" +#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME "kill_thread" +#define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME "trap" +#define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME "errno" +#define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME "trace" +#define SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME "log" +#define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME "allow" + +static const char seccomp_actions_avail[] = + SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS_NAME " " + SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME " " + SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME " " + SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME " " + SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME " " + SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME " " + SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME; + +struct seccomp_log_name { + u32 log; + const char *name; +}; + +static const struct seccomp_log_name seccomp_log_names[] = { + { SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS_NAME }, + { SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME }, + { SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME }, + { SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME }, + { SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME }, + { SECCOMP_LOG_LOG, SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME }, + { SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME }, + { } +}; + +static bool seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(char *names, size_t size, + u32 actions_logged) +{ + const struct seccomp_log_name *cur; + bool append_space = false; + + for (cur = seccomp_log_names; cur->name && size; cur++) { + ssize_t ret; + + if (!(actions_logged & cur->log)) + continue; + + if (append_space) { + ret = strscpy(names, " ", size); + if (ret < 0) + return false; + + names += ret; + size -= ret; + } else + append_space = true; + + ret = strscpy(names, cur->name, size); + if (ret < 0) + return false; + + names += ret; + size -= ret; + } + + return true; +} + +static bool seccomp_action_logged_from_name(u32 *action_logged, + const char *name) +{ + const struct seccomp_log_name *cur; + + for (cur = seccomp_log_names; cur->name; cur++) { + if (!strcmp(cur->name, name)) { + *action_logged = cur->log; + return true; + } + } + + return false; +} + +static bool seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(u32 *actions_logged, char *names) +{ + char *name; + + *actions_logged = 0; + while ((name = strsep(&names, " ")) && *name) { + u32 action_logged = 0; + + if (!seccomp_action_logged_from_name(&action_logged, name)) + return false; + + *actions_logged |= action_logged; + } + + return true; +} + +static int seccomp_actions_logged_handler(struct ctl_table *ro_table, int write, + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, + loff_t *ppos) +{ + char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)]; + struct ctl_table table; + int ret; + + if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + memset(names, 0, sizeof(names)); + + if (!write) { + if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(names, sizeof(names), + seccomp_actions_logged)) + return -EINVAL; + } + + table = *ro_table; + table.data = names; + table.maxlen = sizeof(names); + ret = proc_dostring(&table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (write) { + u32 actions_logged; + + if (!seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(&actions_logged, + table.data)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW) + return -EINVAL; + + seccomp_actions_logged = actions_logged; + } + + return 0; +} + +static struct ctl_path seccomp_sysctl_path[] = { + { .procname = "kernel", }, + { .procname = "seccomp", }, + { } +}; + +static struct ctl_table seccomp_sysctl_table[] = { + { + .procname = "actions_avail", + .data = (void *) &seccomp_actions_avail, + .maxlen = sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail), + .mode = 0444, + .proc_handler = proc_dostring, + }, + { + .procname = "actions_logged", + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = seccomp_actions_logged_handler, + }, + { } +}; + +static int __init seccomp_sysctl_init(void) +{ + struct ctl_table_header *hdr; + + hdr = register_sysctl_paths(seccomp_sysctl_path, seccomp_sysctl_table); + if (!hdr) + pr_warn("seccomp: sysctl registration failed\n"); + else + kmemleak_not_leak(hdr); + + return 0; +} + +device_initcall(seccomp_sysctl_init) + +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c index 5360b7aec57a..752e5daf0896 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c @@ -4020,11 +4020,17 @@ static int tracing_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) /* If this file was open for write, then erase contents */ if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC)) { int cpu = tracing_get_cpu(inode); + struct trace_buffer *trace_buf = &tr->trace_buffer; + +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE + if (tr->current_trace->print_max) + trace_buf = &tr->max_buffer; +#endif if (cpu == RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS) - tracing_reset_online_cpus(&tr->trace_buffer); + tracing_reset_online_cpus(trace_buf); else - tracing_reset(&tr->trace_buffer, cpu); + tracing_reset(trace_buf, cpu); } if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) { @@ -5358,6 +5364,13 @@ static int tracing_set_tracer(struct trace_array *tr, const char *buf) if (t == tr->current_trace) goto out; + /* Some tracers won't work on kernel command line */ + if (system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING && t->noboot) { + pr_warn("Tracer '%s' is not allowed on command line, ignored\n", + t->name); + goto out; + } + /* Some tracers are only allowed for the top level buffer */ if (!trace_ok_for_array(t, tr)) { ret = -EINVAL; @@ -5667,7 +5680,7 @@ static int tracing_wait_pipe(struct file *filp) * * iter->pos will be 0 if we haven't read anything. */ - if (!tracing_is_on() && iter->pos) + if (!tracer_tracing_is_on(iter->tr) && iter->pos) break; mutex_unlock(&iter->mutex); diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.h b/kernel/trace/trace.h index fb5d54d0d1b3..652c682707cd 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace.h +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.h @@ -444,6 +444,8 @@ struct tracer { #ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE bool use_max_tr; #endif + /* True if tracer cannot be enabled in kernel param */ + bool noboot; }; diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_mmiotrace.c b/kernel/trace/trace_mmiotrace.c index cd7480d0a201..dca78fc48439 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_mmiotrace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_mmiotrace.c @@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ static struct tracer mmio_tracer __read_mostly = .close = mmio_close, .read = mmio_read, .print_line = mmio_print_line, + .noboot = true, }; __init static int init_mmio_trace(void) |