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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-08-15 21:16:02 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-08-15 21:16:02 -0700 |
commit | 99a2c789ddeb703cf7b0a3d889ab1a25cf4cbbaf (patch) | |
tree | 3a653ba4bfb2db0c8fc52fbb5a2f0dc2e817e513 /lib/vsprintf.c | |
parent | fa3b39cdafbfd5d9b1d064f5cf63cf0314f1d070 (diff) | |
parent | 9a47249d444d344051c7c0e909fad0e88515a5c2 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-99a2c789ddeb703cf7b0a3d889ab1a25cf4cbbaf.tar.gz linux-stable-99a2c789ddeb703cf7b0a3d889ab1a25cf4cbbaf.tar.bz2 linux-stable-99a2c789ddeb703cf7b0a3d889ab1a25cf4cbbaf.zip |
Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random
Pull random updates from Ted Ts'o:
"Some changes to trust cpu-based hwrng (such as RDRAND) for
initializing hashed pointers and (optionally, controlled by a config
option) to initialize the CRNG to avoid boot hangs"
* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
random: Make crng state queryable
random: remove preempt disabled region
random: add a config option to trust the CPU's hwrng
vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash
vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key
random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG
random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/vsprintf.c')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/vsprintf.c | 27 |
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c index cda186230287..d5b3a3f95c01 100644 --- a/lib/vsprintf.c +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c @@ -1651,6 +1651,17 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn, return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec); } +/* Make pointers available for printing early in the boot sequence. */ +static int debug_boot_weak_hash __ro_after_init; + +static int __init debug_boot_weak_hash_enable(char *str) +{ + debug_boot_weak_hash = 1; + pr_info("debug_boot_weak_hash enabled\n"); + return 0; +} +early_param("debug_boot_weak_hash", debug_boot_weak_hash_enable); + static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(not_filled_random_ptr_key); static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly; @@ -1675,8 +1686,16 @@ static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = { static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void) { - int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready); + int key_size = sizeof(ptr_key); + int ret; + /* Use hw RNG if available. */ + if (get_random_bytes_arch(&ptr_key, key_size) == key_size) { + static_branch_disable(¬_filled_random_ptr_key); + return 0; + } + + ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready); if (!ret) { return 0; } else if (ret == -EALREADY) { @@ -1695,6 +1714,12 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec) const char *str = sizeof(ptr) == 8 ? "(____ptrval____)" : "(ptrval)"; unsigned long hashval; + /* When debugging early boot use non-cryptographically secure hash. */ + if (unlikely(debug_boot_weak_hash)) { + hashval = hash_long((unsigned long)ptr, 32); + return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec); + } + if (static_branch_unlikely(¬_filled_random_ptr_key)) { spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr); /* string length must be less than default_width */ |