summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/mm/slub.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>2018-02-06 15:36:23 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-02-06 18:32:42 -0800
commit47adccce3e8a31d315f47183ab1185862b2fc5d4 (patch)
treeaaf982ef67484b702b42440b459cfd648e58dc4e /mm/slub.c
parentd321599cf6b861beefe92327476b617435c7fc4a (diff)
downloadlinux-stable-47adccce3e8a31d315f47183ab1185862b2fc5d4.tar.gz
linux-stable-47adccce3e8a31d315f47183ab1185862b2fc5d4.tar.bz2
linux-stable-47adccce3e8a31d315f47183ab1185862b2fc5d4.zip
kasan: detect invalid frees for large objects
Patch series "kasan: detect invalid frees". KASAN detects double-frees, but does not detect invalid-frees (when a pointer into a middle of heap object is passed to free). We recently had a very unpleasant case in crypto code which freed an inner object inside of a heap allocation. This left unnoticed during free, but totally corrupted heap and later lead to a bunch of random crashes all over kernel code. Detect invalid frees. This patch (of 5): Detect frees of pointers into middle of large heap objects. I dropped const from kasan_kfree_large() because it starts propagating through a bunch of functions in kasan_report.c, slab/slub nearest_obj(), all of their local variables, fixup_red_left(), etc. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1b45b4fe1d20fc0de1329aab674c1dd973fee723.1514378558.git.dvyukov@google.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>a Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/slub.c')
-rw-r--r--mm/slub.c4
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index cc71176c6eef..b54f8787c674 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -1356,7 +1356,7 @@ static inline void kmalloc_large_node_hook(void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
kasan_kmalloc_large(ptr, size, flags);
}
-static inline void kfree_hook(const void *x)
+static inline void kfree_hook(void *x)
{
kmemleak_free(x);
kasan_kfree_large(x);
@@ -3910,7 +3910,7 @@ void kfree(const void *x)
page = virt_to_head_page(x);
if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
BUG_ON(!PageCompound(page));
- kfree_hook(x);
+ kfree_hook(object);
__free_pages(page, compound_order(page));
return;
}