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| author | Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> | 2021-08-29 15:16:14 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2021-09-15 09:50:45 +0200 |
| commit | 8692f0bb29927d13a871b198adff1d336a8d2d00 (patch) | |
| tree | 01be5c3c03168d17c8feba5db7a6c408368b7e35 /net/ipv6 | |
| parent | 4663aaef24dffd004fa030b7434de7a7e9a34f26 (diff) | |
| download | linux-stable-8692f0bb29927d13a871b198adff1d336a8d2d00.tar.gz linux-stable-8692f0bb29927d13a871b198adff1d336a8d2d00.tar.bz2 linux-stable-8692f0bb29927d13a871b198adff1d336a8d2d00.zip | |
ipv6: make exception cache less predictible
[ Upstream commit a00df2caffed3883c341d5685f830434312e4a43 ]
Even after commit 4785305c05b2 ("ipv6: use siphash in rt6_exception_hash()"),
an attacker can still use brute force to learn some secrets from a victim
linux host.
One way to defeat these attacks is to make the max depth of the hash
table bucket a random value.
Before this patch, each bucket of the hash table used to store exceptions
could contain 6 items under attack.
After the patch, each bucket would contains a random number of items,
between 6 and 10. The attacker can no longer infer secrets.
This is slightly increasing memory size used by the hash table,
we do not expect this to be a problem.
Following patch is dealing with the same issue in IPv4.
Fixes: 35732d01fe31 ("ipv6: introduce a hash table to store dst cache")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Keyu Man <kman001@ucr.edu>
Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv6')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/route.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c index bcf4fae83a9b..168a7b4d957a 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -1655,6 +1655,7 @@ static int rt6_insert_exception(struct rt6_info *nrt, struct in6_addr *src_key = NULL; struct rt6_exception *rt6_ex; struct fib6_nh *nh = res->nh; + int max_depth; int err = 0; spin_lock_bh(&rt6_exception_lock); @@ -1709,7 +1710,9 @@ static int rt6_insert_exception(struct rt6_info *nrt, bucket->depth++; net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_rt_cache++; - if (bucket->depth > FIB6_MAX_DEPTH) + /* Randomize max depth to avoid some side channels attacks. */ + max_depth = FIB6_MAX_DEPTH + prandom_u32_max(FIB6_MAX_DEPTH); + while (bucket->depth > max_depth) rt6_exception_remove_oldest(bucket); out: |