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authorDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2018-03-31 23:33:04 -0400
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2018-03-31 23:33:04 -0400
commitd4069fe6fc91d496e4d1fe38b1a8b71aeb181c50 (patch)
tree2ca8148a4b4bc20965e98e03abd417c57bc0777e /net/ipv6
parent70ae7222c61d4f19c844c8fe75f053f8976b9552 (diff)
parent7828f20e3779e4e85e55371e0e43f5006a15fb41 (diff)
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Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Daniel Borkmann says: ==================== pull-request: bpf-next 2018-03-31 The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree. The main changes are: 1) Add raw BPF tracepoint API in order to have a BPF program type that can access kernel internal arguments of the tracepoints in their raw form similar to kprobes based BPF programs. This infrastructure also adds a new BPF_RAW_TRACEPOINT_OPEN command to BPF syscall which returns an anon-inode backed fd for the tracepoint object that allows for automatic detach of the BPF program resp. unregistering of the tracepoint probe on fd release, from Alexei. 2) Add new BPF cgroup hooks at bind() and connect() entry in order to allow BPF programs to reject, inspect or modify user space passed struct sockaddr, and as well a hook at post bind time once the port has been allocated. They are used in FB's container management engine for implementing policy, replacing fragile LD_PRELOAD wrapper intercepting bind() and connect() calls that only works in limited scenarios like glibc based apps but not for other runtimes in containerized applications, from Andrey. 3) BPF_F_INGRESS flag support has been added to sockmap programs for their redirect helper call bringing it in line with cls_bpf based programs. Support is added for both variants of sockmap programs, meaning for tx ULP hooks as well as recv skb hooks, from John. 4) Various improvements on BPF side for the nfp driver, besides others this work adds BPF map update and delete helper call support from the datapath, JITing of 32 and 64 bit XADD instructions as well as offload support of bpf_get_prandom_u32() call. Initial implementation of nfp packet cache has been tackled that optimizes memory access (see merge commit for further details), from Jakub and Jiong. 5) Removal of struct bpf_verifier_env argument from the print_bpf_insn() API has been done in order to prepare to use print_bpf_insn() soon out of perf tool directly. This makes the print_bpf_insn() API more generic and pushes the env into private data. bpftool is adjusted as well with the print_bpf_insn() argument removal, from Jiri. 6) Couple of cleanups and prep work for the upcoming BTF (BPF Type Format). The latter will reuse the current BPF verifier log as well, thus bpf_verifier_log() is further generalized, from Martin. 7) For bpf_getsockopt() and bpf_setsockopt() helpers, IPv4 IP_TOS read and write support has been added in similar fashion to existing IPv6 IPV6_TCLASS socket option we already have, from Nikita. 8) Fixes in recent sockmap scatterlist API usage, which did not use sg_init_table() for initialization thus triggering a BUG_ON() in scatterlist API when CONFIG_DEBUG_SG was enabled. This adds and uses a small helper sg_init_marker() to properly handle the affected cases, from Prashant. 9) Let the BPF core follow IDR code convention and therefore use the idr_preload() and idr_preload_end() helpers, which would also help idr_alloc_cyclic() under GFP_ATOMIC to better succeed under memory pressure, from Shaohua. 10) Last but not least, a spelling fix in an error message for the BPF cookie UID helper under BPF sample code, from Colin. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv6')
-rw-r--r--net/ipv6/af_inet6.c66
-rw-r--r--net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c16
-rw-r--r--net/ipv6/udp.c20
3 files changed, 84 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
index c1e292db04db..8da0b513f188 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
@@ -277,15 +277,7 @@ out_rcu_unlock:
/* bind for INET6 API */
int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
- struct sockaddr_in6 *addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)uaddr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
- struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
- struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
- __be32 v4addr = 0;
- unsigned short snum;
- bool saved_ipv6only;
- int addr_type = 0;
int err = 0;
/* If the socket has its own bind function then use it. */
@@ -295,11 +287,35 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* BPF prog is run before any checks are done so that if the prog
+ * changes context in a wrong way it will be caught.
+ */
+ err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_BIND(sk, uaddr);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return __inet6_bind(sk, uaddr, addr_len, false, true);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_bind);
+
+int __inet6_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len,
+ bool force_bind_address_no_port, bool with_lock)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)uaddr;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
+ struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
+ struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
+ __be32 v4addr = 0;
+ unsigned short snum;
+ bool saved_ipv6only;
+ int addr_type = 0;
+ int err = 0;
+
if (addr->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&addr->sin6_addr);
- if ((addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST) && sock->type == SOCK_STREAM)
+ if ((addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST) && sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
return -EINVAL;
snum = ntohs(addr->sin6_port);
@@ -307,7 +323,8 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
return -EACCES;
- lock_sock(sk);
+ if (with_lock)
+ lock_sock(sk);
/* Check these errors (active socket, double bind). */
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE || inet->inet_num) {
@@ -395,12 +412,20 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
sk->sk_ipv6only = 1;
/* Make sure we are allowed to bind here. */
- if ((snum || !inet->bind_address_no_port) &&
- sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, snum)) {
- sk->sk_ipv6only = saved_ipv6only;
- inet_reset_saddr(sk);
- err = -EADDRINUSE;
- goto out;
+ if (snum || !(inet->bind_address_no_port ||
+ force_bind_address_no_port)) {
+ if (sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, snum)) {
+ sk->sk_ipv6only = saved_ipv6only;
+ inet_reset_saddr(sk);
+ err = -EADDRINUSE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_POST_BIND(sk);
+ if (err) {
+ sk->sk_ipv6only = saved_ipv6only;
+ inet_reset_saddr(sk);
+ goto out;
+ }
}
if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY)
@@ -411,13 +436,13 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
inet->inet_dport = 0;
inet->inet_daddr = 0;
out:
- release_sock(sk);
+ if (with_lock)
+ release_sock(sk);
return err;
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_bind);
int inet6_release(struct socket *sock)
{
@@ -868,6 +893,10 @@ static const struct ipv6_stub ipv6_stub_impl = {
.nd_tbl = &nd_tbl,
};
+static const struct ipv6_bpf_stub ipv6_bpf_stub_impl = {
+ .inet6_bind = __inet6_bind,
+};
+
static int __init inet6_init(void)
{
struct list_head *r;
@@ -1024,6 +1053,7 @@ static int __init inet6_init(void)
/* ensure that ipv6 stubs are visible only after ipv6 is ready */
wmb();
ipv6_stub = &ipv6_stub_impl;
+ ipv6_bpf_stub = &ipv6_bpf_stub_impl;
out:
return err;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index 883df0ad5bfe..6d664d83cd16 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -117,6 +117,21 @@ static u32 tcp_v6_init_ts_off(const struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb)
ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32);
}
+static int tcp_v6_pre_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
+ int addr_len)
+{
+ /* This check is replicated from tcp_v6_connect() and intended to
+ * prevent BPF program called below from accessing bytes that are out
+ * of the bound specified by user in addr_len.
+ */
+ if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ sock_owned_by_me(sk);
+
+ return BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_CONNECT(sk, uaddr);
+}
+
static int tcp_v6_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int addr_len)
{
@@ -1925,6 +1940,7 @@ struct proto tcpv6_prot = {
.name = "TCPv6",
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.close = tcp_close,
+ .pre_connect = tcp_v6_pre_connect,
.connect = tcp_v6_connect,
.disconnect = tcp_disconnect,
.accept = inet_csk_accept,
diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c
index ad30f5e31969..6861ed479469 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c
@@ -957,6 +957,25 @@ static void udp_v6_flush_pending_frames(struct sock *sk)
}
}
+static int udpv6_pre_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
+ int addr_len)
+{
+ /* The following checks are replicated from __ip6_datagram_connect()
+ * and intended to prevent BPF program called below from accessing
+ * bytes that are out of the bound specified by user in addr_len.
+ */
+ if (uaddr->sa_family == AF_INET) {
+ if (__ipv6_only_sock(sk))
+ return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+ return udp_pre_connect(sk, uaddr, addr_len);
+ }
+
+ if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_CONNECT_LOCK(sk, uaddr);
+}
+
/**
* udp6_hwcsum_outgoing - handle outgoing HW checksumming
* @sk: socket we are sending on
@@ -1512,6 +1531,7 @@ struct proto udpv6_prot = {
.name = "UDPv6",
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.close = udp_lib_close,
+ .pre_connect = udpv6_pre_connect,
.connect = ip6_datagram_connect,
.disconnect = udp_disconnect,
.ioctl = udp_ioctl,