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| author | Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com> | 2020-04-14 09:35:15 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2020-04-23 10:30:15 +0200 |
| commit | ad8fb61c184fe0f8d1e0b5b954d010fb9f94a6ee (patch) | |
| tree | 81c44297a8c5eb48cca46e2c20c6e8e68df435d1 /net/xdp | |
| parent | 2b48629885b6f6a0f26bd51f9dbdca1a0bfa217a (diff) | |
| download | linux-stable-ad8fb61c184fe0f8d1e0b5b954d010fb9f94a6ee.tar.gz linux-stable-ad8fb61c184fe0f8d1e0b5b954d010fb9f94a6ee.tar.bz2 linux-stable-ad8fb61c184fe0f8d1e0b5b954d010fb9f94a6ee.zip | |
xsk: Add missing check on user supplied headroom size
[ Upstream commit 99e3a236dd43d06c65af0a2ef9cb44306aef6e02 ]
Add a check that the headroom cannot be larger than the available
space in the chunk. In the current code, a malicious user can set the
headroom to a value larger than the chunk size minus the fixed XDP
headroom. That way packets with a length larger than the supported
size in the umem could get accepted and result in an out-of-bounds
write.
Fixes: c0c77d8fb787 ("xsk: add user memory registration support sockopt")
Reported-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207225
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/1586849715-23490-1-git-send-email-magnus.karlsson@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/xdp')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/xdp/xdp_umem.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/net/xdp/xdp_umem.c b/net/xdp/xdp_umem.c index 556a649512b6..706fad12f22c 100644 --- a/net/xdp/xdp_umem.c +++ b/net/xdp/xdp_umem.c @@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umem *umem, struct xdp_umem_reg *mr) u32 chunk_size = mr->chunk_size, headroom = mr->headroom; unsigned int chunks, chunks_per_page; u64 addr = mr->addr, size = mr->len; - int size_chk, err, i; + int err, i; if (chunk_size < XDP_UMEM_MIN_CHUNK_SIZE || chunk_size > PAGE_SIZE) { /* Strictly speaking we could support this, if: @@ -295,8 +295,7 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umem *umem, struct xdp_umem_reg *mr) headroom = ALIGN(headroom, 64); - size_chk = chunk_size - headroom - XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM; - if (size_chk < 0) + if (headroom >= chunk_size - XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM) return -EINVAL; umem->address = (unsigned long)addr; |