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| author | Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> | 2017-01-17 11:07:15 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2017-10-08 10:14:18 +0200 |
| commit | 093fe104c5bbd99b4934bd80216b6e6d7371c4fc (patch) | |
| tree | d8755608cfc7d0fe3881997742c3d5b7a21df722 /net | |
| parent | af3749456042cc38c80902e849421451b27215f6 (diff) | |
| download | linux-stable-093fe104c5bbd99b4934bd80216b6e6d7371c4fc.tar.gz linux-stable-093fe104c5bbd99b4934bd80216b6e6d7371c4fc.tar.bz2 linux-stable-093fe104c5bbd99b4934bd80216b6e6d7371c4fc.zip | |
audit: log 32-bit socketcalls
[ Upstream commit 62bc306e2083436675e33b5bdeb6a77907d35971 ]
32-bit socketcalls were not being logged by audit on x86_64 systems.
Log them. This is basically a duplicate of the call from
net/socket.c:sys_socketcall(), but it addresses the impedance mismatch
between 32-bit userspace process and 64-bit kernel audit.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/14
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/compat.c | 17 |
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/net/compat.c b/net/compat.c index 5cfd26a0006f..0ccf3ecf6bbb 100644 --- a/net/compat.c +++ b/net/compat.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include <linux/filter.h> #include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <net/scm.h> @@ -767,14 +768,24 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(recvmmsg, int, fd, struct compat_mmsghdr __user *, mmsg, COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(socketcall, int, call, u32 __user *, args) { - int ret; - u32 a[6]; + u32 a[AUDITSC_ARGS]; + unsigned int len; u32 a0, a1; + int ret; if (call < SYS_SOCKET || call > SYS_SENDMMSG) return -EINVAL; - if (copy_from_user(a, args, nas[call])) + len = nas[call]; + if (len > sizeof(a)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(a, args, len)) return -EFAULT; + + ret = audit_socketcall_compat(len / sizeof(a[0]), a); + if (ret) + return ret; + a0 = a[0]; a1 = a[1]; |