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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-03-07 11:44:01 -0800 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-03-07 11:44:01 -0800 |
commit | ae5906ceee038ea29ff5162d1bcd18fb50af8b94 (patch) | |
tree | 841a11c6d3c3afcf7e4d57be370ebcf57aab214a /security/apparmor | |
parent | 1fc1cd8399ab5541a488a7e47b2f21537dd76c2d (diff) | |
parent | 468e91cecb3218afd684b8c422490dfebe0691bb (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-ae5906ceee038ea29ff5162d1bcd18fb50af8b94.tar.gz linux-stable-ae5906ceee038ea29ff5162d1bcd18fb50af8b94.tar.bz2 linux-stable-ae5906ceee038ea29ff5162d1bcd18fb50af8b94.zip |
Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
- Extend LSM stacking to allow sharing of cred, file, ipc, inode, and
task blobs. This paves the way for more full-featured LSMs to be
merged, and is specifically aimed at LandLock and SARA LSMs. This
work is from Casey and Kees.
- There's a new LSM from Micah Morton: "SafeSetID gates the setid
family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID transitions from a given
UID/GID to only those approved by a system-wide whitelist." This
feature is currently shipping in ChromeOS.
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (62 commits)
keys: fix missing __user in KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY
LSM: Update list of SECURITYFS users in Kconfig
LSM: Ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is specified
LSM: Update function documentation for cap_capable
security: mark expected switch fall-throughs and add a missing break
tomoyo: Bump version.
LSM: fix return value check in safesetid_init_securityfs()
LSM: SafeSetID: add selftest
LSM: SafeSetID: remove unused include
LSM: SafeSetID: 'depend' on CONFIG_SECURITY
LSM: Add 'name' field for SafeSetID in DEFINE_LSM
LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
tomoyo: Allow multiple use_group lines.
tomoyo: Coding style fix.
tomoyo: Swicth from cred->security to task_struct->security.
security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs
security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs
security: keys: annotate implicit fall through
capabilities:: annotate implicit fall through
...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/apparmor')
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/Kconfig | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/capability.c | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/domain.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/include/capability.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/include/cred.h | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/include/file.h | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/include/lib.h | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/include/task.h | 18 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/ipc.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/lsm.c | 67 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/resource.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/task.c | 6 |
12 files changed, 74 insertions, 83 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig index b6b68a7750ce..3de21f46c82a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig +++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig @@ -14,22 +14,6 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. -config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE - int "AppArmor boot parameter default value" - depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR - range 0 1 - default 1 - help - This option sets the default value for the kernel parameter - 'apparmor', which allows AppArmor to be enabled or disabled - at boot. If this option is set to 0 (zero), the AppArmor - kernel parameter will default to 0, disabling AppArmor at - boot. If this option is set to 1 (one), the AppArmor - kernel parameter will default to 1, enabling AppArmor at - boot. - - If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1. - config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH bool "Enable introspection of sha1 hashes for loaded profiles" depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c index 253ef6e9d445..752f73980e30 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/capability.c +++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c @@ -110,13 +110,13 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile, * profile_capable - test if profile allows use of capability @cap * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL, NOT unconfined) * @cap: capability to test if allowed - * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated + * @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated * @sa: audit data (MAY BE NULL indicating no auditing) * * Returns: 0 if allowed else -EPERM */ -static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit, - struct common_audit_data *sa) +static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, + unsigned int opts, struct common_audit_data *sa) { int error; @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit, else error = -EPERM; - if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) { + if (opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) { if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) return error; /* audit the cap request in complain mode but note that it @@ -142,13 +142,13 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit, * aa_capable - test permission to use capability * @label: label being tested for capability (NOT NULL) * @cap: capability to be tested - * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated + * @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated * * Look up capability in profile capability set. * * Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code. */ -int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit) +int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts) { struct aa_profile *profile; int error = 0; @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit) sa.u.cap = cap; error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - profile_capable(profile, cap, audit, &sa)); + profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &sa)); return error; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index 11975ec8d566..ca2dccf5b445 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile, stack = NULL; break; } - /* fall through to X_NAME */ + /* fall through - to X_NAME */ case AA_X_NAME: if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) /* released by caller */ @@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } aa_put_label(cred_label(bprm->cred)); /* transfer reference, released when cred is freed */ - cred_label(bprm->cred) = new; + set_cred_label(bprm->cred, new); done: aa_put_label(label); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h index e0304e2aeb7f..1b3663b6ab12 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ struct aa_caps { extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[]; -int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit); +int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts); static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps) { diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h index 265ae6641a06..b9504a05fddc 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h @@ -23,8 +23,22 @@ #include "policy_ns.h" #include "task.h" -#define cred_label(X) ((X)->security) +static inline struct aa_label *cred_label(const struct cred *cred) +{ + struct aa_label **blob = cred->security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_cred; + + AA_BUG(!blob); + return *blob; +} +static inline void set_cred_label(const struct cred *cred, + struct aa_label *label) +{ + struct aa_label **blob = cred->security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_cred; + + AA_BUG(!blob); + *blob = label; +} /** * aa_cred_raw_label - obtain cred's label diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h index 4c2c8ac8842f..8be09208cf7c 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h @@ -32,7 +32,10 @@ struct path; AA_MAY_CHMOD | AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_LOCK | \ AA_EXEC_MMAP | AA_MAY_LINK) -#define file_ctx(X) ((struct aa_file_ctx *)(X)->f_security) +static inline struct aa_file_ctx *file_ctx(struct file *file) +{ + return file->f_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_file; +} /* struct aa_file_ctx - the AppArmor context the file was opened in * @lock: lock to update the ctx diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h index 6505e1ad9e23..bbe9b384d71d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include "match.h" @@ -55,6 +56,9 @@ const char *aa_splitn_fqname(const char *fqname, size_t n, const char **ns_name, size_t *ns_len); void aa_info_message(const char *str); +/* Security blob offsets */ +extern struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes; + /** * aa_strneq - compare null terminated @str to a non null terminated substring * @str: a null terminated string diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/task.h b/security/apparmor/include/task.h index 55edaa1d83f8..311e652324e3 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/task.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/task.h @@ -14,7 +14,10 @@ #ifndef __AA_TASK_H #define __AA_TASK_H -#define task_ctx(X) ((X)->security) +static inline struct aa_task_ctx *task_ctx(struct task_struct *task) +{ + return task->security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_task; +} /* * struct aa_task_ctx - information for current task label change @@ -37,17 +40,6 @@ int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 cookie); struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task); /** - * aa_alloc_task_ctx - allocate a new task_ctx - * @flags: gfp flags for allocation - * - * Returns: allocated buffer or NULL on failure - */ -static inline struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_ctx(gfp_t flags) -{ - return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), flags); -} - -/** * aa_free_task_ctx - free a task_ctx * @ctx: task_ctx to free (MAYBE NULL) */ @@ -57,8 +49,6 @@ static inline void aa_free_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx) aa_put_label(ctx->nnp); aa_put_label(ctx->previous); aa_put_label(ctx->onexec); - - kzfree(ctx); } } diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c index 527ea1557120..aacd1e95cb59 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer, aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label; aad(sa)->peer = tracee; aad(sa)->request = 0; - aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1); + aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, + CAP_OPT_NONE); return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 8db1731d046a..49d664ddff44 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers); static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred) { aa_put_label(cred_label(cred)); - cred_label(cred) = NULL; + set_cred_label(cred, NULL); } /* @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred) */ static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) { - cred_label(cred) = NULL; + set_cred_label(cred, NULL); return 0; } @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) { - cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)); + set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old))); return 0; } @@ -87,26 +87,21 @@ static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, */ static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { - cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)); + set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old))); } static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task) { aa_free_task_ctx(task_ctx(task)); - task_ctx(task) = NULL; } static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) { - struct aa_task_ctx *new = aa_alloc_task_ctx(GFP_KERNEL); - - if (!new) - return -ENOMEM; + struct aa_task_ctx *new = task_ctx(task); aa_dup_task_ctx(new, task_ctx(current)); - task_ctx(task) = new; return 0; } @@ -177,14 +172,14 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, } static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, - int cap, int audit) + int cap, unsigned int opts) { struct aa_label *label; int error = 0; label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); if (!unconfined(label)) - error = aa_capable(label, cap, audit); + error = aa_capable(label, cap, opts); aa_put_label(label); return error; @@ -434,21 +429,21 @@ static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file) static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) { - int error = 0; - - /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */ + struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file); struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_ctx(label, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!file_ctx(file)) - error = -ENOMEM; - end_current_label_crit_section(label); - return error; + spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock); + rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label)); + end_current_label_crit_section(label); + return 0; } static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file) { - aa_free_file_ctx(file_ctx(file)); + struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file); + + if (ctx) + aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label)); } static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask) @@ -1151,6 +1146,15 @@ static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, } #endif +/* + * The cred blob is a pointer to, not an instance of, an aa_task_ctx. + */ +struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *), + .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx), + .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), +}; + static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme), @@ -1333,8 +1337,8 @@ bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true; module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO); /* Boot time disable flag */ -static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; -module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO); +static int apparmor_enabled __lsm_ro_after_init = 1; +module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, int, 0444); static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) { @@ -1479,14 +1483,8 @@ static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) static int __init set_init_ctx(void) { struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred; - struct aa_task_ctx *ctx; - - ctx = aa_alloc_task_ctx(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ctx) - return -ENOMEM; - cred_label(cred) = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns)); - task_ctx(current) = ctx; + set_cred_label(cred, aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns))); return 0; } @@ -1665,12 +1663,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) { int error; - if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable("apparmor")) { - aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter"); - apparmor_enabled = false; - return 0; - } - aa_secids_init(); error = aa_setup_dfa_engine(); @@ -1731,5 +1723,8 @@ alloc_out: DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = { .name = "apparmor", + .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, + .enabled = &apparmor_enabled, + .blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes, .init = apparmor_init, }; diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c index 95fd26d09757..552ed09cb47e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/resource.c +++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_label *label, struct task_struct *task, */ if (label != peer && - aa_capable(label, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) != 0) + aa_capable(label, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0) error = fn_for_each(label, profile, audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, peer, diff --git a/security/apparmor/task.c b/security/apparmor/task.c index c6b78a14da91..4551110f0496 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/task.c +++ b/security/apparmor/task.c @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label) */ aa_get_label(label); aa_put_label(cred_label(new)); - cred_label(new) = label; + set_cred_label(new, label); commit_creds(new); return 0; @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token) return -EACCES; } - cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(label); + set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(label)); /* clear exec on switching context */ aa_put_label(ctx->onexec); ctx->onexec = NULL; @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token) return -ENOMEM; aa_put_label(cred_label(new)); - cred_label(new) = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous); + set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous)); AA_BUG(!cred_label(new)); /* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */ aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx); |