diff options
author | Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> | 2017-11-30 11:56:02 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2017-12-18 09:43:48 -0500 |
commit | 4e8581eefe720f8d990b892a8c9d298875e1a299 (patch) | |
tree | 3d2ebfa0c25038f526bda7c8757a9f54b823a52e /security/integrity | |
parent | 72bf83b0c978c495ce9f6bfeee1ccd34478b05e6 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-4e8581eefe720f8d990b892a8c9d298875e1a299.tar.gz linux-stable-4e8581eefe720f8d990b892a8c9d298875e1a299.tar.bz2 linux-stable-4e8581eefe720f8d990b892a8c9d298875e1a299.zip |
ima: pass filename to ima_rdwr_violation_check()
ima_rdwr_violation_check() retrieves the full path of a measured file by
calling ima_d_path(). If process_measurement() calls this function, it
reuses the pointer and passes it to the functions to measure/appraise/audit
an accessed file.
After commit bc15ed663e7e ("ima: fix ima_d_path() possible race with
rename"), ima_d_path() first tries to retrieve the full path by calling
d_absolute_path() and, if there is an error, copies the dentry name to the
buffer passed as argument.
However, ima_rdwr_violation_check() passes to ima_d_path() the pointer of a
local variable. process_measurement() might be reusing the pointer to an
area in the stack which may have been already overwritten after
ima_rdwr_violation_check() returned.
Correct this issue by passing to ima_rdwr_violation_check() the pointer of
a buffer declared in process_measurement().
Fixes: bc15ed663e7e ("ima: fix ima_d_path() possible race with rename")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index be1987e13c43..0abc7d0db90b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -84,10 +84,10 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int must_measure, char **pathbuf, - const char **pathname) + const char **pathname, + char *filename) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); - char filename[NAME_MAX]; fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false; @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, if (!rc && violation_check) ima_rdwr_violation_check(file, iint, action & IMA_MEASURE, - &pathbuf, &pathname); + &pathbuf, &pathname, filename); inode_unlock(inode); |