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author | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2015-11-19 12:39:22 -0500 |
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committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2016-02-21 09:03:44 -0500 |
commit | e40ba6d56b41754b37b995dbc8035b2b3a6afd8a (patch) | |
tree | 0bbc573dde5374e434d6acd883b330f92645bfe2 /security/integrity | |
parent | 09596b94f7d28595602482e69ed954deab707437 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-e40ba6d56b41754b37b995dbc8035b2b3a6afd8a.tar.gz linux-stable-e40ba6d56b41754b37b995dbc8035b2b3a6afd8a.tar.bz2 linux-stable-e40ba6d56b41754b37b995dbc8035b2b3a6afd8a.zip |
firmware: replace call to fw_read_file_contents() with kernel version
Replace the fw_read_file_contents with kernel_file_read_from_path().
Although none of the upstreamed LSMs define a kernel_fw_from_file hook,
IMA is called by the security function to prevent unsigned firmware from
being loaded and to measure/appraise signed firmware, based on policy.
Instead of reading the firmware twice, once for measuring/appraising the
firmware and again for reading the firmware contents into memory, the
kernel_post_read_file() security hook calculates the file hash based on
the in memory file buffer. The firmware is read once.
This patch removes the LSM kernel_fw_from_file() hook and security call.
Changelog v4+:
- revert dropped buf->size assignment - reported by Sergey Senozhatsky
v3:
- remove kernel_fw_from_file hook
- use kernel_file_read_from_path() - requested by Luis
v2:
- reordered and squashed firmware patches
- fix MAX firmware size (Kees Cook)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 21 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 757765354158..e9651be17b72 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -337,17 +337,6 @@ int ima_module_check(struct file *file) return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK, 0); } -int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) -{ - if (!file) { - if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && - (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) - return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ - return 0; - } - return process_measurement(file, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, FIRMWARE_CHECK, 0); -} - /** * ima_post_read_file - in memory collect/appraise/audit measurement * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit @@ -366,12 +355,22 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, { enum ima_hooks func = FILE_CHECK; + if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) { + if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && + (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) + return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ + return 0; + } + if (!file || !buf || size == 0) { /* should never happen */ if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) return -EACCES; return 0; } + if (read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) + func = FIRMWARE_CHECK; + return process_measurement(file, buf, size, MAY_READ, func, 0); } |