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author | James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> | 2005-05-01 08:58:40 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org> | 2005-05-01 08:58:40 -0700 |
commit | b207a290ea7dc83dba02e40b81cc8a29415a9c60 (patch) | |
tree | fe76d1c494977ba95ab576e9207dc13c4a66a04a /security/selinux/include | |
parent | 6af963f1d6789ef20abca5696cd52a758b396e52 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-b207a290ea7dc83dba02e40b81cc8a29415a9c60.tar.gz linux-stable-b207a290ea7dc83dba02e40b81cc8a29415a9c60.tar.bz2 linux-stable-b207a290ea7dc83dba02e40b81cc8a29415a9c60.zip |
[PATCH] SELinux: add finer grained permissions to Netlink audit processing
This patch provides finer grained permissions for the audit family of
Netlink sockets under SELinux.
1. We need a way to differentiate between privileged and unprivileged
reads of kernel data maintained by the audit subsystem. The AUDIT_GET
operation is unprivileged: it returns the current status of the audit
subsystem (e.g. whether it's enabled etc.). The AUDIT_LIST operation
however returns a list of the current audit ruleset, which is considered
privileged by the audit folk. To deal with this, a new SELinux
permission has been implemented and applied to the operation:
nlmsg_readpriv, which can be allocated to appropriately privileged
domains. Unprivileged domains would only be allocated nlmsg_read.
2. There is a requirement for certain domains to generate audit events
from userspace. These events need to be collected by the kernel,
collated and transmitted sequentially back to the audit daemon. An
example is user level login, an auditable event under CAPP, where
login-related domains generate AUDIT_USER messages via PAM which are
relayed back to auditd via the kernel. To prevent handing out
nlmsg_write permissions to such domains, a new permission has been
added, nlmsg_relay, which is intended for this type of purpose: data is
passed via the kernel back to userspace but no privileged information is
written to the kernel.
Also, AUDIT_LOGIN messages are now valid only for kernel->user messaging,
so this value has been removed from the SELinux nlmsgtab (which is only
used to check user->kernel messages).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/include')
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h | 2 |
2 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h index eb340b45bc6f..8928bb4d3c53 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h @@ -220,6 +220,8 @@ S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write") S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read") S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write") + S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY, "nlmsg_relay") + S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV, "nlmsg_readpriv") S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read") S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write") S_(SECCLASS_DBUS, DBUS__ACQUIRE_SVC, "acquire_svc") diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h index f9de0f966559..bdfce4ca8f8e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h @@ -840,6 +840,8 @@ #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ 0x00400000UL #define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE 0x00800000UL +#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY 0x01000000UL +#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV 0x02000000UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL |